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Abstract 
The period of ‘people’s power’ in South Africa from 1985-7 represented for many 
participants a form of participatory, and often prefigurative, democracy. In the post-1994 
period South Africa’s ruling African National Congress (ANC) has committed to participatory 
democracy alongside representative democratic government. There has, however, been no 
clearly articulated theory of participatory democracy within the ANC. Through a 
combination of interviews and analysis of primary documents (including policy frameworks, 
legislation, discussion documents, guidance and other commentary), this thesis analyses the 
ANC’s understanding of participatory democracy as both a liberation movement in 
opposition and a government in power. While making a contribution to normative 
democratic debate, the thesis also challenges arguments which suggest that the democracy 
established in post-1994 South Africa is unrelated to people’s power or that people’s power 
in its entirety represented a superior form of democracy. Instead, it is argued that people’s 
power constituted a variety of overlapping themes and discourses. Elements were rooted in 
radical democratic theory, community activism, and ideas of popular empowerment. 
However it was also markedly influenced by Marxist-Leninist thought and a dominant notion 
of vanguardism. Overall, people’s power embraced a largely unitary form of democracy in 
which participation could only be exercised within the framework of the liberation 
movement. 
Into the democratic era, many of the ideas informing people’s power were woven into 
policy on participatory democracy. What also emerged, however, were new ideas and 
influences from development theory, governance discourse and international best practice. 
While these strands have themselves created conceptual tension - between the dual 
demands of performance and efficiency and citizen participation - public policy nonetheless 
provides politically pluralistic mechanisms for citizen influence. This thesis argues that 
alongside public policy discourse is a separate and distinct discourse of participation from 
the ANC as a movement. Here, vanguardism remains the dominant conceptual thread in 
which participation is seen as a means of fulfilling the NDR and extending ANC hegemony. 
As such, the teleological nature of participation as conceived by the ANC risks undermining 
the public policy objective of increasing citizen influence.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1. Aim 
This aim of this thesis is to reconstruct the African National Congress’ (ANC) theory of 
participatory democracy through an interrogation of its discourse and practice. The thesis 
covers an analysis of the ANC as a liberation movement in opposition (during the 1980s and 
early 1990s) to its role as a dominant party in power from 1994. Within each of these 
contexts, the ANC’s commentary on and practice of participatory democracy are examined 
in order to uncover the underlying ideas. In essence it traces the development of 
democratic thought in the ANC to reconstruct an understanding of its theory of 
participatory democracy.  
The focus of the research is the 1985-86 ‘people’s power’ movement and the formulation of 
post-1994 policy on participatory democracy. While there is no specific cut-off date for the 
period of analysis, the thesis is concerned with the period of policy formulation, from the 
constitutional discussions within the ANC from 1986 and commencement of local 
government negotiations in 1990 to the production of the most recent legislation and 
guidance on participatory democratic mechanisms in the early 2000s.  
The period of ‘people’s power’ during the 1980s involved the mobilisation and organisation 
of communities into locally constituted structures from the street level upwards. People’s 
power was understood by some ANC activists at the time as a form of direct or participatory 
democracy (Adler & Steinberg 2000). The thesis thus interrogates the conceptions of 
people’s power that existed amongst activists, participants and leadership in the ANC camp. 
The way in which both the role and future of people’s power was understood helps us to 
uncover the formation of ideas about the role of popular participation. 
The thesis then turns to the ideas that have informed post-1994 policy on participatory 
democracy. Through green and white paper processes, and finally in the passing and 
implementation of legislation, participatory democracy has been given form and content 
alongside a commitment to parliamentary, representative democracy. It has largely, though 
not exclusively, been given focus in the arena of local government. In the democratic era the 
ANC has linked the Freedom Charter’s principle that “the people shall govern” to the 
structures of local government (ANC 1995a) and, more recently, ward committees (ANC 
2000a). Analysis of the emergent ideas in this process thus enables an understanding of 
participatory democracy to be reconstructed.  
Discussion of the post-1994 period, however, also demands examination of the codification 
of the ANC’s ideas about popular participation, and about democracy more generally. The 
period following the height of the people’s power movement, in and around 1985-7, and 
preceding the 1994 formation of the Government of National Unity therefore forms part of 
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the analysis. It is argued that the second half of the 1980s up until 1994 constitutes a 
significant period in the development of ANC democratic thought.  
This thesis is primarily a study of ideas. It explores the way in which popular participation 
and the role for ‘the people’ has been understood by the ANC, first in the context of struggle 
and then in the context of democracy. In so doing, it assesses how the ANC understood the 
role and future of people’s power; examines its ideas about popular participation from the 
late 1980s through the transition period; and attempts to draw out the way in which various 
ideas and themes have been woven into policy.  
1.1.1. Context and Clarifications  
It is acknowledged that within the ANC there is no well-developed theory of participatory 
democracy, nor a singular identifiable understanding of this model. The absence of such 
clarity in a context of participatory democratic commitments makes this study all the more 
relevant. The banning of the ANC from 1960 and its primary focus on overthrowing 
apartheid precluded a detailed discussion about the form of a future democratic state. Any 
analysis that precedes the formation of a formal position on participatory democracy 
therefore takes place in somewhat of a vacuum. This thesis therefore considers both 
whether practices during the 1980s were in fact theoretically driven and whether a 
dominant theory of participatory democracy can be identified.  
The absence of a singular understanding of participatory democracy is also a reflection of 
the ideological breadth of the Congress movement. Its multiple, and often competing, 
political ideologies are reflected in the ambiguity of some of the ANC’s key documents. Any 
analysis of the ANC’s understanding of democracy necessitates familiarity with its 
ideological roots and traditions. The thesis therefore draws on this intellectual heritage to 
make possible the identification of continuities and discontinuities.  
Particularly relevant to the thesis are the overlapping identities, ideological roots and 
personnel within the congress camp including the South African Communist Party (SACP) 
from the 1950s, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) from 1985, and the 
United Democratic Front (UDF) from 1983 to 1991. While the focus of this work is 
specifically on the ANC, the thesis seeks to highlight the ways in which inter-organisational 
linkages and cross-cutting membership have shaped, promoted or constrained certain ideas. 
It also examines divergences in democratic thought within the ANC itself. 
A related issue here is how we define ‘the ANC’. This is particularly pertinent to its period of 
illegality and the concurrent existence of the aligned, but officially autonomous, United 
Democratic Front (UDF). While we can isolate the UDF as a legal ‘front’ organisation in the 
internal struggle, it was, by its own admission, operating in the absence of the banned ANC. 
Some members of its leadership were involved in ANC underground structures. For the 
purposes of this thesis the analysis of the 1980s looks at the ideas about popular 
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participation within both the exiled leadership of the ANC and amongst internal activists of 
the UDF and its affiliates. 
With regards to the post-1994 era, a useful set of literature is already available on the 
systemic and structural failures in local participatory governance (Buccus et al 2008; Benit-
Gbaffou 2008; Piper & Deacon 2009; Malabela & Ally 2011). These accounts are particularly 
valuable in their analysis of specific mechanisms and localities. This thesis, however, is 
concerned with exploration of the ideas informing such policy and does not seek to retrace 
existing terrain. Moreover, given the focus on policy, it does not purport to provide a study 
of non-institutional participatory spaces instigated by civil society groups themselves. A 
wealth of literature is already available on the rise of social movement and civil society 
activism and is thus not focused on here.1 What the thesis does do, however, is take note of 
the emergence of such ‘invented’ forms of participation2, considering the way in which they 
are understood by the ANC as a participatory democratic space. 
Finally, it should be noted that this analysis takes place in a context of formal commitment 
by the ANC to both representative and participatory democracy. The ANC itself continues to 
assert the complementary nature of these models. It has formally set out its adherence to 
principles of a liberal constitutionalism: the separation of powers, provision and protection 
of individual civil and political rights, political pluralism and open contestation. Therefore 
while this thesis is concerned with participatory democracy in particular, it also incorporates 
analysis of the ANC’s understanding of democracy generally.  
1.1.2. Background 
From the end of the 1970s, with the resurgence of internal struggle and advent of a broad 
civic movement largely aligned to the ANC, a language of mass participation and control 
became visible in its discourse. The period 1985-86 saw the emergence of township organs 
of ‘people’s power’ as well as a revival of the Freedom Charter’s demand for “democratic 
organs of self government”. The ANC’s earlier calls for ungovernability shifted toward a 
discourse of ‘people’s power’ in which the centre of control was transferred from Black 
Local Authorities (BLAs) to local popular organs informally structured outside of the state. 
While these structures were widely understood by ANC activists and cadres as contributing 
to one of the four ‘pillars’ of struggle, that of mass mobilisation, for some they were also 
understood in as pre-figuring a democracy of the future (Mzala 1986: 13). 
As the longevity of apartheid grew increasingly doubtful, the ANC began to state more 
clearly its vision of a post-apartheid state. The latter part of the 1980s and early 1990s thus 
begot more detailed discussion about its position on a democratic future and the values it 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Ballard et al (2006), Sinwell (2009), Dwyer (2004). 
2
 Institutional forms refer to formal, state-invited forums for citizen and community engagement with 
government (i.e. mechanisms for participatory governance). Non-institutional forms refer to the ‘bottom-up’ 
spaces for participation, created and instigated by civil society activists and organisations. 
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would endorse. The years from 1994 are a period of policy formulation and implementation. 
While it has taken time for the legislative meat to be put on the bones of policy frameworks, 
the ANC’s legislative commitment to public participation has consistently been linked to its 
democratic traditions and relationship with the people (Piper & Deacon 2009: 419). The 
reform of local government is the centrepiece of this commitment.  
On the surface, therefore, both political and legislative commitments are in place. Reports 
from political commentators, academics and participating communities themselves, 
however, suggest that these mechanisms are not substantively working. This thesis is 
therefore an attempt to unravel the theory and ideas within the ANC that underpin its policy 
commitments, partly in order to explore whether these might help to explain failures in 
practice. Not only do ideas play a critical role in influencing practice but examination of 
practice itself, in turn, reveals the ideas underpinning it.  
The thesis is also intended as a contribution to normative democratic debate in South Africa. 
It therefore also discusses participatory democracy by drawing on a range of normative 
democratic theory. It is the use of a normative framework that informs the questions asked 
of the ANC’s conception of participation. Importantly, it seeks to reveal how the normative 
understanding of participatory democracy maintained by the dominant political forces 
within the ANC influences the extent to which resulting practices can truly be considered 
‘democratic’. 
1.2. Rationale 
During both the transition to democracy and since 1994 the ANC has advocated a role for 
participatory democracy alongside South Africa’s representative institutions.3 The ideas that 
inform these commitments, however, are inadequately understood. Although the dominant 
currents of ANC ideology are found in African nationalism and Marxism-Leninism, our 
understanding of its discourse of participatory democracy remains limited. With regard to 
people’s power, a range of research has been produced on the 1980s experience of 
organisational and grassroots struggle, from providing a history of the UDF itself, to case-
study-based accounts of popular power in various localities. What is missing from existing 
accounts, however, is an analysis of the ideas about democracy that this movement 
implied, not only as isolated cases but as part of a broader trajectory of democratic 
thought.   
Since the passing of legislation providing for participatory democracy in local government, a 
range of research has been published detailing its functional and democratic weaknesses. 
Findings have highlighted issues such as deficits in representivity, the challenge of educating 
communities, weak accountability of participatory structures, and problems of party-
                                                          
3
 See, for example, the 1993 Alliance Discussion Document: ‘Strategic Objectives of the National Liberation 
Struggle’ (Alliance 1993: 6). 
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political loyalty. What is absent from the research to date is any attempt to connect this 
failure to the underlying theory. As a result, despite a discourse whose trajectory has made 
reference to popular involvement, we still don’t fully understand how the ANC conceives of 
‘participation’.  
The participatory democratic traditions for which the ANC has sought institutional form are 
linked by policy-makers to 1980s traditions of civic activism and community participation. 
Some parts of the ANC have gone so far as to refer to participatory governance structures as 
contemporary ‘organs of people’s power’. Since 1994, through a number of institutional and 
legislative commitments, the ANC has placed clear expectations upon local municipalities in 
respect of the engagement of communities in decision-making. As indicated above, 
however, reports from across the board indicate that these state-invited spaces have been 
of limited success in providing for participation, local control, accountability and feedback4.  
Existing findings thus call for a more thorough analysis of the theory behind legislation. It is 
suggested here that an interrogation of these ideas can help us better understand the 
limitations of existing practices in giving marginalised citizens a voice. The case study of 
‘people’s power’ and concurrent ideas within the ANC informing short-term objectives and 
longer term goals are significant in explaining the limitations and prospects for participatory 
democracy. 
Importantly, this thesis does not simply question the ANC’s commitments on the one hand 
and its failure in practice on the other. Rather, it seeks to understand the South African 
condition as one in which participatory democracy is not merely a rhetorical commitment 
but has in fact seen enactment in practice. The key is that the failure of participatory 
democracy to accomplish in reality the purpose set out for itself cannot be de-linked from 
the theory underpinning it. 
Although the period of analysis begins with the 1980s, the research question is framed by 
the historic development of democratic thought in the ANC. The Freedom Charter and the 
concept of National Democratic Revolution (NDR) are key frameworks. Alongside African 
nationalism, Soviet and Marxist-Leninist currents were influential within the ANC during its 
time in exile and, although members of the movement differed in the extent to which they 
engaged in theorisation about the state, the NDR appears to have been a guiding 
framework. The national democratic state would be neither capitalist nor socialist but 
would in some form pave the way for the latter. The Freedom Charter has proven a more 
ambiguous document for those seeking to better understand ANC democratic thought. On 
the one hand the demand that ‘The People Shall Govern’ refers to the right to universal 
                                                          
4
 Buccus et al (2008) and Benit-Gbaffou (2008) both provide enlightening accounts of the limitations of 
participatory governance at the local level. See also Friedman and McKaiser (2010) on the difficulties faced by 
community organisations formally engaging with government; and Piper and Deacon (2009) on problems 
befalling the ward committee system in Msunduzi municipality. 
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suffrage. However, it also demands the replacement of existing state institutions with 
“democratic organs of self-government” (1955). The distinction, or indeed overlap, between 
representative institutions and those of direct democracy is left unclear.  
During people’s power, this clause of the Freedom Charter was frequently invoked as a 
suggestion of direct democracy. For some in the UDF, the development of organs of 
people’s power was the enactment of this very clause (UDF, 1986a: 10). Organisational and 
communication difficulties triggered by the banning of the ANC saw the development of 
divergent strategies and tactics between the exiled movement, on the one hand, and 
internal activists on the other. Importantly, different ideas existed across the congress camp 
about the role and future of people’s power.  
Today, South Africa’s civic organisations have not come to play the influential role in 
community representation they had envisaged. Rather, the ANC has sought to co-opt civics 
within its broad project of national transformation;5 and has branded as ‘anti-
transformation’ those organisations embarking on protest against government delivery.6  
This thesis essentially challenges two prevalent views. Firstly, some voices on the Left in 
South Africa, such as Neocosmos (1998), Legassick (2007) and, to an extent, Sinwell (2011), 
view the current system of parliamentary, representative democracy as an inferior form of 
democracy to that prefigured by people’s power. From their perspective, people’s power 
constituted a deeper, more ‘real’ form of democracy. An interrogation of what precisely its 
proponents envisaged is therefore highly relevant.  
Secondly, it challenges the notion that the ANC has shifted from being a deeply democratic 
and popularly-driven movement to one displaying new authoritarian tendencies and 
practices. Instead, this thesis argues that top-down processes of development, centralised 
policy direction and an instrumental understanding of participation can be traced to the 
ANC’s ideological roots and traditions. Rather than constituting a post-1994 shift associated 
with the advent of liberal democracy, these traits were visible before the 1990s. The 
subsequent chapters examine this ideological lineage, showing that the failure and 
limitation of participatory democratic policy can be explained by the ideas underpinning it. 
1.3. Research Question 
How has the ANC understood and practiced participatory democracy since the 1980s? 
(With special reference to ‘people’s power’ and policy formulation) 
                                                          
5
 See, for example, the 1998 Alliance Summit Document Unity in Action, which questions the “strategic 
motivation” for the continued existence of SANCO branches in areas where an ANC branch is also present 
(Umrabulo 1999). 
6
 Some cases have seen the ANC use security forces and police to quell resistance, protest and unrest. See, for 
example, articles by Patel & Pithouse (2005) and the South Africa Independent Media Centre (2005). 
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1.3.1. Research sub-questions: 
 In what ways does the ANC’s intellectual heritage inform its understanding of popular 
participation? 
 What ideologies, models or bodies of theory influenced ‘people’s power’? 
 Did ‘people’s power’ embody a singular understanding of participation? 
 What understanding of democracy generally is implied in ANC discourse; and how has 
that impacted on its conception of popular participation?   
 In what ways did the experience and ideas of ‘people’s power’ influence the codification 
of the ANC’s ideas about participatory democracy? Which ideas have been lost, changed 
or survived? 
 What intellectual and theoretical influences fed into the development of post-1994 
policy on participatory democracy? 
 Is the ANC’s own discourse of participation (in its documents and commentary as a 
movement) influenced by the same ideas that have informed public policy? 
 What is the end result sought by the ANC in implementing participatory mechanisms?  
 Has a singular or dominant understanding of participation emerged within the ANC? 
1.4. Theoretical Framework: Situating the Research 
The theoretical framework of this research rests within democratic theory and debates 
concerning the value of participation as a supplement to representative institutions. It 
emphasises the need to acknowledge competing conceptions of ‘participation’ but also 
proceeds from a normative view of participatory democracy based on existing theoretical 
literature. This normative position informs the questions being asked, considering both the 
ideas underlying the role of participation in ANC discourse and the intellectual heritage of its 
model of participatory democracy. 
Interest in the construction of radical alternatives to ‘contemporary’ or ‘elitist’ theories of 
democracy7 emerged in the 1960s, leading to a wider trajectory of democratic debate about 
the value of citizen participation in political life. By the early 1980s, these ideas had formed 
part of a broader global discourse and practice on the New Left. This emanated from a 
revived interest in democratic alternatives to orthodox Marxism and a desire to address the 
limitations of classic liberalism in facilitating public participation. Various experiments in 
local participatory governance were undertaken, often interwoven with ideas of 
‘deliberative democracy’ as a new approach to participation.  
                                                          
7
 Pateman’s critique (1970) refers to the ‘contemporary’ theory of democracy. Walker’s critique (1966) of 
classic Schumpeterian ideas refers to the ‘elitist’ theory of democracy. 
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During the early 1990s, a not unrelated wave of thinking re-emerged amongst development 
specialists, whose ideas influenced international organisations, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and governments via a broader theory of ‘participatory development’. 
Debates on the role and impact of participation have come to incorporate a range of 
concerns, including its educative effect; the fallacy of political equality; goals of popular 
empowerment; the benefits of decentralised democracy; realisation of substantive as well 
as procedural democracy; and the protection of liberal rights and freedoms. 
Discussion of the intellectual lineage of participatory democracy generally begins with 
Rousseau. In The Social Contract (1762), Rousseau’s denunciation of representative 
democracy as a narrow and limiting form of popular control, restored the debate amongst 
subsequent theorists about the value of ‘classic’ (or participatory) democracy (Pateman 
1970; Barber 1984; Keane 1988; Walker 1966; Bobbio 1987, Dahl 1985). While Rousseau’s 
was a form of direct democracy that drew its inspiration from the city states of Ancient 
Greece, the ideas and values that he placed upon participation regarding its ‘educative’ and 
‘self-sustaining’ qualities (Pateman, 1970: 24-25) influenced radical democratic thought.  
Although the formation of the modern nation state rendered Rousseauian ideals of 
republican and direct democracy increasingly untenable, its ideas have caused modern 
democracy to undergo normative reconsideration.8 Drawing on the ideas of Pateman 
(1970), Barber (1984), Keane (1988), Beetham, (1993; 2005) and more recently Cornwall 
(2008), Hickey and Mohan (2004) and Theron and Ceasar (2008), participatory democracy 
has largely come to be understood as the participation of individual citizens in the decision-
making processes about issues that affect their lives. To use Beetham’s phraseology, if “the 
core meaning of democracy is the popular control of collective decision-making by equal 
citizens [then] the point of participation ... is to have some say in, and influence upon, 
collective decisions” (1993: 61).  
Situated within a context of normative democratic debate, any analysis must allow for 
competing ‘conceptions’ or ‘theories’ of participation. Reflecting on Beetham, participatory 
democracy’s success must be judged by the extent to which popular influence is realised. On 
this note, Sartori’s observation about the distinction between participation and mobilisation 
is pertinent. He argues that “Participation is self-motion and thus the exact reverse of being 
put into motion (by another will), i.e. the opposite of mobilisation” (1987: 113). There is 
thus an important distinction between bottom-up processes of participation and the 
mobilisation of popular groups from above.  
Although Beetham’s formulation can help us to reach a normative conception of 
participatory democracy – one which can be used as a benchmark to assess ANC theory and 
practice – space must also be made for the recognition of differing or competing versions. A 
                                                          
8
  Pateman (1970) and Wolfe (1985), for example, encourage the revisiting of works by Jean Jacques Rousseau, 
J.S. Mill and G.D.H. Cole. 
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key component of this thesis lies in identifying these multiple conceptions to ascertain the 
extent to which they can be considered ‘democratic’. 
1.4.1. Participatory versus Elitist Democracy  
To what, then, is participatory democracy an alternative? If participation is understood as 
the involvement of citizens in decision-making processes beyond those of electing 
representatives, its correct counterpart is the exclusion of citizens from this very activity. 
Here, participation is the preserve of professional, elected politicians or ‘elites’. Elitist 
democracy is linked to authors such as Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) and Joseph 
Schumpeter (1943). For these theorists, citizen participation involves merely “participation 
in the choice of decision makers” (Pateman 1970: 14).  
Elitist democracy is associated with the view that those interested in preserving the stability 
and efficiency of democracy should in fact fear popular participation. This presumption 
emanates from a belief in the autocratic and irresponsible tendencies of the average citizen 
(Pateman 1970; Walker 1966: 287, 289). From the view of proponents of participatory 
democracy, the elitist theory goes against the view of the popular mass as ‘citizens’ - as 
responsible and reasoned subjects with an interest in their own potentialities and in human 
progress more generally. It undermines the notion of citizens as “participants in public life” 
(Held 1993: 323,324).  
Bachrach and Botwinick therefore argue that “... the most disturbing counter-argument 
against the theory of participatory democracy is that mass political quiescence is essential to 
the stability and health of democracy” (1992: 32). A narrow conception of citizenship also 
restricts the circle of political activity considered legitimate in the eyes of power-holders. 
Walker highlights the tendency of elitist democrats to view social movements as playing an 
‘antagonistic’ role rather than viewing them as initiators of “reviews and innovations in 
policy” (1966: 294).9 Young also maintains that “civic organising that raises issues and 
promotes policy objectives in the public sphere is an important supplement to the electoral 
process” (2000: 177).  
1.4.2. Participatory and Representative Democracy 
If we accept the distinction between elite and participatory democracy, what of 
representation? A common tendency is to conflate participatory with direct democracy and 
to accordingly counterpoise participation and representation.10 This very confusion is a 
corollary to the not infrequent failure to identify participatory democracy’s rightful 
counterpart in elitist democracy. 
                                                          
9
 See also Young (2000: 46-51) and Cornwall (2008: 282) on dangers of viewing forms of ‘non-institutional’ 
participation as ‘disruptive’.  
10
 Thanks to Daryl Glaser for helpful discussion on these distinctions and contrasts. 
25 
 
Participatory democracy, in and of itself, is not direct. It does not necessarily imply the direct 
decision-making of citizens in political matters, and thereby the removal of all 
representatives in the execution of those decisions (although participatory democracy may 
involve both of those features, thus constituting a form of direct and participatory 
democracy). Rather, it is the participation of citizens in the decision-making process itself, 
whether or not this also involves representatives. Dahl, for example, advocates the 
extension of participatory democracy to the economic order through worker participation in 
decision-making which may involve the use of worker representatives (1985: 91). Most 
forms of participatory democracy involve some form of representation, either within 
participatory structures themselves or through the external complement of representative 
institutions (e.g. an elected council or national parliament). Simultaneously, representative 
systems themselves often involve features of participatory decision-making (e.g. 
neighbourhood forums or assemblies).  
Beetham’s definition suggests that participatory democracy involves citizens participating 
in decision-making processes, and that this takes place in such a way that their input 
influences the decisions reached (1993:61). Such participation may apply not only to the 
decision-making processes of individual citizens but to the internal structures of democratic 
movements and organisations. Either way, participation must involve some form of 
discussion and exchange of ideas, not merely the casting of a vote.  
Many advocates of participatory democracy, however, see the representative model as 
inadequate. For them, the very act of representation limits the extent to which it can be 
considered ‘democracy’. Participatory democrats have thus sometimes come under fire for 
devaluing some of the basic democratic principles, such as political pluralism and individual 
rights, which characterise representative democracy (Glaser 2007). Participatory democracy 
should also be subject to the uncertainty of outcome that we expect of democracy 
generally. Glaser argues that in some cases, participatory democracy has been used to mask 
decision-making taking place elsewhere (2007: 134), such as within the structures of the 
party, executive or in smaller caucuses. 
Other theorists taking up the mantle of participation did not seek the complete replacement 
of representative democratic institutions (Held 2006: 209; see also Sartori 1987: 112). This is 
partly guided by issues of scale and the sheer impracticality of direct democracy. However it 
has also placed value in representative democracy. Pateman and Barber, for example, argue 
not for the abolition of national representative institutions but for their increased 
democratisation through participation (Pateman 1970: 42, 105-106; Barber 1984: 264; 308). 
Pateman highlights that representative and participatory democracy can be mutually 
reinforcing (1970: 20; 109-110), contending that the presence of “competing leaders at 
national level” requires also the existence of a participatory society (1970: 42-43). In 
Barber’s case, he maintains the need to “reorient liberal democracy toward civic 
engagement and political community, not to raze it” (1984: 308). 
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However their work does not focus on the liberal democratic values as such, rather 
promoting the need for a deeper form of democracy through participation. Other views, 
however, have been influenced by an acceptance that liberal democracy, a feature of which 
is representation, also embodies certain values that underpin the very meaning of 
democracy itself. Debates about the pairing of radical democracy with some of the values of 
political liberalism are picked up again below. It is worth stating here, however, that this 
thesis proceeds from that basis that participatory democracy can and should supplement 
representative democracy as a way of increasing political equality, democratic control and 
accountability, and providing a much-needed voice in decision-making to more marginalized 
citizens. 
1.4.3. Marxism-Leninism and Mass Participation 
An early inspiration for ideas of popular participation in Marx’s writings was the 1871 Paris 
Commune. For Marx, the Commune was not necessarily a final outcome but rather a stage 
in a longer struggle (Levin 1989: 118; see also Lenin 1932: 32). Levin describes it as “an 
instrument of decentralised popular participatory expression” (Levin 1989: 117), 
characterised by elections (ibid: 122-123) and constituted largely of the middle class rather 
than workers (ibid: 115). The significance of the commune for Marx lay in its role as a 
vehicle toward a higher purpose. This was of course the Dictatorship of the Proletariat: “the 
state form which follows the proletarian revolution and precedes the final disappearance of 
all class distinctions” (Ibid: 12).11  
For Lenin, too, the Commune suggested potential for the popular seizure of state power and 
erection of a working body that combined both legislative and executive powers (1932: 40-
41). The focus of Lenin’s ideas about the masses, however, also related to the need for an 
organisation of revolutionaries in the form of the ‘vanguard party’. His key contributions to 
democratic thought included both the rejection of parliamentary institutions and the belief 
that class political consciousness needed to be brought to the workers from without 
(Liebman 1975: 30-31). Accordingly, the proletarian revolution implied both the seizure of 
state power and the primary role of the vanguard party. The ‘renegade’ Kautsky thus 
famously incurred Lenin’s criticism for his defence of institutions of liberal democracy and 
his insistence that socialism could be realised through parliamentary institutions (Pierson 
1986; Sirianni 1983: 85). 
Although this thesis defends the value of participatory democracy, it also remains vigilant to 
the use of popular participation for purposes other than increased popular control. A 
frequent criticism of those suspicious of participatory democracy is its tendency to provide a 
cover for authoritarian practice. The establishment of a variety of Party-connected mass 
organisations that characterised the experience of the Soviet Union and other Marxist-
                                                          
11
 See Levin (1989: 120-122) for a comprehensive analysis of the distinct features of the Paris Commune and 
the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. 
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Leninist and Marxist-inspired regimes, provides evidence of popular participation as a cloak 
for centralised control by the Party (Femia 1993: 75-78, 133; Glaser 2007).   
Although Lenin came to understand the Soviets (workers’ councils) as ‘embryos’ of a 
revolutionary government (Liebman 1975: 88-90), Schecter highlights that the Marxist 
notion of local, decentralised ‘communes’ or councils stood in tension with the 
simultaneous defence of a centrally planned economy (1994: 9-10). Under Lenin, this 
contradiction “was solved at the expense of the organs of grassroots democracy, or Soviets” 
as they were eventually shed of their autonomy and subsumed in the Communist Party 
(ibid.).  
The experience of state socialism has justifiably led participatory democracy’s critics to 
highlight its propensity to undermine both political pluralism and the protection of 
individual autonomy. In the African Marxist regimes of the mid-1970s,12 Glaser highlights 
how participatory organs were often established to make up for “the absence of 
representative-democratic institutions” (2007: 133). Participatory bodies were generally 
used for co-optation of civic groupings or to quell unwanted dissent. These regimes 
conceived of participation as the “mobilisation of the population to realise collective ends 
defined by the ruling party” (ibid.: 113-4). 
Although this brand of Marxist regime is distinct from the earlier generation of African 
socialism, found during the 1950s and 60s in Nyerere’s Tanzania, Senghor’s Senegal and 
Toure’s Guinea, these regimes too were averse to ‘bourgeois’ representative democracy. In 
creating their own forms of participatory or direct democracy, these states soon fitted 
Beetham’s portrayal of “individual rights attacked in the name of the popular will, collective 
good or a higher form of freedom” (1993: 57-58). 
Linked to the superficial or teleological application of citizen participation is what Femia 
refers to as Marxism-Leninism’s “schizophrenic attitude towards the popular will” (1993: 
93). On the one hand he notes that communist discourse emphasised popular power and 
control. Yet at the same time it implied “an agreed socialist culture to which the people 
needed to be enlightened” (ibid.). The Party either ‘interpreted’ the authentic popular will 
or acted as “an enlightened vanguard of the proletariat” (ibid.).  
Yet what appeared as an elaborate facade was, within communist ideology, merely an 
alternative conception of participation. The Vanguard Party’s historic role was to interpret 
the popular will; a will that was predestined, scientific and in the popular interest – whether 
or not the people themselves were yet conscious of it. The role for the masses is therefore 
critical for without them the vanguard cannot exist. As Femia argues, “The typical 
communist regime was not merely an authoritarian government, a small elite group ... 
Instead it was a dynamic totalitarian system, which set as its idea the active involvement of 
                                                          
12
 African Marxist regimes existed in post-independence Angola, Mozambique and in Ethiopia. 
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all citizens” (1993: 133). The ideas underpinning this conception of participation necessarily 
informed its practice.  
1.4.4. Alternative Socialist Projects and Experiments with Workplace Democracy  
Participatory democratic models which emerged as socialist alternatives to orthodox 
Marxism are of particular interest as experiments in popular control. The challenge that 
these models posed to Lenin’s focus on the state and Party highlight the divisions within 
Marxism itself. Despite Marxism’s very foundation in the struggle against working class 
oppression, Femia notes that Marx had actually said very little about the ‘mechanisms’ for 
worker participation and self-management (1993: 79). Through erection of community or 
workplace councils, the models of participation discussed here took up this very issue. 
Revolutionary- or anarcho-syndicalism, council communism and guild socialism came to 
represent Left experiments of alternatives to the centralized authoritarianism of state 
socialism and the elitist, centralised power structures of liberal democracy (Schecter 1994). 
These traditions all built forms of participatory workplace democracy, while the guild 
socialists sought to extend this beyond the industrial sphere. Both councils and workers 
guilds incorporated a belief that participation carried an educative function through 
‘learning’ self-government (see Schecter 1994: 75; and Pateman 1970: 38). The council 
communists held frequent informal elections and the ‘right to recall’ candidates, priding 
themselves on being rooted in ‘real’ or ‘functional’ communities as opposed to geographic 
ones (Glaser 1994: 146).  Anarcho or revolutionary syndicalism, for its part, took on a broad 
role in educational services, labour support and information dissemination to members. 
Given Lenin’s understanding of the (temporary) role of the state in securing the revolution, 
he was reproachful of syndicalists’ view of both the party and state as inadequate 
mechanisms for the attainment of workers’ power (Schecter 1994: 45).13  
In slight contrast, collective anarchism rejected state authority but was not based 
exclusively within the industrial sphere (Heywood 1992: 205). Given its rejection of 
permanent authority structures and unofficial nature of localised organisation, we could 
challenge collectivist anarchism’s definition as a form of democracy. Yet its import on direct 
and participatory democratic ideas lies in its belief in local, communal rule and what 
Heywood terms “the human capacity for social solidarity” (ibid). Collectivist anarchism 
entailed both a reliance on the ‘spontaneity’ of the masses and a rejection of the need to be 
“regulated or controlled by government” (ibid).  
Although the Soviets were undoubtedly victims on the altar of state socialism, council or 
soviet democracy as a model has been criticised for its democratic deficits. These include a 
                                                          
13
 Anarchism’s rejection of the state was also challenged by Marx and Engels who, although concurring with 
the “abolition of the state as an aim”, did maintain that temporary use should be made of it to secure the 
Dictatorship of the Proletariat (Lenin 1932: 52). 
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unitary class-reductionism and failure to allow for political pluralism (Glaser 1994). While 
creating their own internal representative structures, Schecter notes that both council 
communism and revolutionary syndicalism branded universal suffrage as beneficial only to 
the ruling elite bureaucracy (1994: 28). Sirianni’s analysis of the experience of ‘dual power’, 
where councils or committees existed in parallel to a national parliament, also notes the risk 
to democracy of the proliferation of council structures which lack institutional arrangements 
for mediation and democratic discussion (1983: 107). Given the comparisons drawn by the 
ANC between the concept of ‘dual power’ and the establishment of ‘people’s power’, then 
the council model is of some significance to the South African case.  
In light of the Leninist variant of Marxism within the ANC, and the SACP’s historic admiration 
for the model of the Soviet Union, it is not clear to what extent the ANC was influenced by 
the experiments that established themselves as alternatives to state socialism. In fact ideas 
associated with forms of ‘workerism’ and ‘ultra-leftism’ were shunned in favour of broader 
alliance politics. With the rise of South Africa’s independent trade union movement from 
the 1970s, however, some of the features and practices of these workplace experiments can 
be identified. Although often seen by workerists as part of an opposing tradition of 
‘populism’ or ‘Charterism’, the emergence of people’s power in the 1980s brought with it 
elements of community education, self-empowerment and service provision reflective of 
these workplace experiments. 
1.4.5. Themes in Normative Democratic Debate since the 1960s: liberalism, participation 
and consensus 
With the establishment of authoritarian communist regimes following the two world wars 
and the subsequent resurgence of liberal democratic doctrine, the late 1960s to 1990s 
brought about a revival of democratic debate on the issue of citizen participation. One of 
the earliest proponents of this movement was American academic, Arnold Kaufman (1968). 
His work in The Radical Liberal (1968) signified rising dissatisfaction on the democratic Left 
with the paradoxical rhetoric and reality of American democracy. Related ideas are also 
found in the ‘Port Huron Statement’ (1962) of America’s ‘Students for a Democratic Society’ 
(SDS), who sought “the establishment of a democracy of individual participation”.  
Kaufman’s fundamental argument is that the very need to “deepen and enrich the quality of 
the democratic process, to make it both more deliberative and more participatory, flows 
directly from the central doctrines of liberalism” (1968: 7). As such, by denying liberalism 
the possibility of cultivating human potential and thus producing good citizens, he argued 
that liberalism itself had become ‘self-defeating’ (ibid: 45). His solution to the ailments of 
American democracy was essentially the radicalisation of liberalism: “an attempt to build a 
society which is free because its citizens are thoughtful and informed” (Mattson 2000).  
Representative institutions and individual rights would remain the bedrock of Kaufman’s 
“reconstructed liberalism”. Participatory democracy, however, would be “a necessary 
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component” (ibid.). Kaufman is thus one of a number of radical democrats who have 
emphasised their desire to reinforce, not remove, the values underpinning liberal 
democracy. By his account, participation is not just a means for freely-associating individuals 
to influence policy decisions for collective benefit but also a self-fulfilling process in which 
participation produces better citizens. This case has also been convincingly argued by 
Pateman (1970) and Barber (1984).  
Through participation, it is therefore possible to rid democracy of the threat envisaged by 
elitist democrats of the ‘irresponsible demagogue’ or authoritarian mass (Walker 1966). At 
the same time it is possible to challenge ‘mass political quiescence’ (Bachrach & Botwinick 
1992: 32) and the disempowered ‘client’, whose citizenship in the ‘legal’ sense is not 
translated into agency, and whose voice is not heard through occasional contact via the 
ballot box. 
With the resurgence of this debate, several authors in the 1970s and 80s began to raise 
serious questions about the merits and possibilities of participatory democracy. According 
to Held, their project emanated from both ‘dissatisfaction’ with orthodox Marxism’s 
rejection of pluralism (1996: 264-5) and, like Kaufman, with the political inequality left 
unchallenged by liberalism (ibid.; See also Beetham 1993: 59-60). Many such authors have 
not sought to replace representative institutions entirely but have highlighted the absolute 
necessity to democracy of appropriate institutions which secure individual rights and enable 
popular choice (Beetham 1993; Beetham 2005; Cohen & Goulbourne 1991; Glaser 1991). 
Glaser underscores that “collective subjects are composed of freely associating individuals” 
(1991: 100) and so accordingly individual freedom is both “a premise and a goal of 
democratic collective action” (ibid).  
These debates link to the critique of Leninist strategy by Kautsky and later Poulantzas and 
Hodgson (Sirianni 1893: 85) that parliamentary institutions and universal suffrage should 
not be displaced but supplemented and ‘enriched’ by “grassroots democratic organisation” 
(Hodgson in Sirianni 1983: 85-86). Bobbio’s liberal socialist approach addresses both the 
need to extend principles of representative democratic control to other areas of society 
(1987: 54-55) and to not limit the content of political equality and participation to voting 
alone (1987: 56). He further pushes for the protection of pluralism (1987: 62) and the rights 
of citizens, both of which are guaranteed by liberalism (1987: 25-26).  
A particular author who seeks to reverse the problems of apathy and popular powerlessness 
induced by the citizens’ distance from decision-making is Benjamen Barber. Elucidating the 
need for something between liberal and unitary democracy, he refers to ‘strong democracy’ 
which focuses on civic engagement and deliberation but aspires to “a form of community 
that is not collectivist” (1984: 150-151). Barber sees the need for institutional reforms that 
combine liberal democratic institutions with local participation, proposing participatory 
spaces such as “neighbourhood assemblies” to create the “conditions” for participation and 
the capacity and “civil competence” for the local exercise of power (1984: 268-9).  
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Jane Mansbridge (1983), however, raises concerns about the democratic limitations of 
participation in a context where consensus amongst participants is not guaranteed. 
Assessing forms of participation that sprung up in 1960s America she argues that what many 
participatory democrats sought was not “equality or liberty” but rather “solidarity” and 
“community” (1983: viii). Hers is not an elitist democrat’s account, nor a defence of 
participatory democracy (1983: xi) but rather a word of warning that what participatory 
democrats seek in some cases is an essentially ‘unitary’ form of democracy.  
What Mansbridge seeks to convey is that unitary democracy may be appropriate and 
beneficial in cases where there is common agreement amongst participants. But in contexts 
in which this is not the case, unitary democracy may fail to recognise diverse interests, 
serving only to hide or suppress differences between groups in the name of a false unity 
(1983: 4, 34-45). However, what she refers to as ‘adversary’ democracy, a mechanism that 
assumes conflict between individuals, also runs the risk of failing to build social unity or 
citizen solidarity (1983: 4). Not only can such a sense of community help to foster the 
‘participatory society’ and the informed, publicly minded ‘good citizen’, it is also, as 
Mansbridge argues, a human need (1983: 4). The main thrust of her argument is that both 
forms of democracy are necessary: we need “a single institutional network that can allow us 
both to advance our common interests and to resolve our conflicting ones” (1983: 7) 
In a move to specify a method or process for more democratic decision-making, some have 
advocated ‘deliberative democracy’. While not synonymous with participatory democracy, 
deliberation is a method by which participation could be practiced. Gutmann and Thompson 
describe deliberative democracy as: 
“a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their 
representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one 
another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, 
with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all 
citizens but open to challenge in the future” (2004: 7) 
In contrast to aggregative democracy (in which decisions are reached by a purely numerical 
aggregation of votes), deliberation involves a process of discussion, argument and exchange 
of views. As such, there is an emphasis on accountability and the need to justify decisions 
taken. Young therefore argues that “through dialogue, proposals and arguments are tested 
and challenged ... participants arrive at a decision not by determining what preferences 
have greatest numerical support but by determining which proposals the collective agrees 
are supported by the best reasons” (2000: 22-23).  
Not unlike participatory democracy, deliberative democracy’s critics have equated its 
emphasis on consensus with attempts to eradicate pluralism and the conflict inherent to 
democracy (Mouffe 2000). In Mouffe’s concept of ‘agonistic democracy’, through which she 
critiques both Rawls and Habermas, the pursuit of consensus is neither possible nor 
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desirable (ibid.). Others argue, however, that deliberative democracy need not necessarily 
seek to erase difference. In what Gutmann and Thompson refer to as ‘deliberative 
pluralism’, value is placed on achieving “as much agreement as possible” but also seeking 
“ways of living well with those disagreements that cannot or should not be eliminated” 
(2004: 28). While deliberation may still be undertaken by representatives, its democratic 
value is broadened and deepened through “an expansive definition of who is included in the 
process of deliberation” (ibid.: 9). 
1.4.6. Participation and Municipal Governance  
Crucially, participation has not been the preserve of theorists alone. Stoker points toward an 
international shift in thinking about local government. States have come to extend their 
focus beyond local government’s role as a service-provider towards its concern with 
“community leadership” and local democratic input that goes beyond electoral and 
representative democracy (2002: 31). In the 1960s and 1970s various attempts at practising 
participation in local government took place in Britain and America, and were picked up 
again the 1980s and 1990s as part of a broader governance agenda to increase citizen 
participation. This latter period has also seen a number of participatory governance 
initiatives in municipalities of lower and middle income countries such as Brazil, South Africa 
and India.  
In Britain, Burns (et al) highlight the experience in 1986 of introducing neighbourhood 
committees in the London Borough of Islington. Although this successfully widened public 
involvement in local government decision-making (Burns et al 1994: 200-1), they argue that 
on the whole it failed to challenge existing power relations and the imposition of structures, 
processes and expertise (ibid. 269). In the USA, mechanisms for participatory governance 
were implemented in the 1960s around projects for urban renewal and housing, especially 
amongst low-income groups. However, Arnstein (1969) argues that the creation of 
structures such as neighbourhood ‘councils’, ‘advisory groups’ and other citizen forums 
tended to be characterised by a ‘one-way flow of information’ in which citizens were on the 
receiving end.  
More recent experiments, however, hold greater promise. The post-1997 Labour 
Government in Britain set out a vision for local government that focused on the idea of 
harnessing community contributions as a way of improving leadership and strengthening 
local democratic politics (Stoker 2002: 36). Wainwright (2003) covers efforts among local 
communities in northern England and Los Angeles to engage and challenge local 
government and improve standards of living. She contends that the potential for new forms 
and possibilities of participatory democracy are being generated at a local level (ibid.).  
In analysing experiments in participatory governance, some authors have drawn on ideas of 
deliberative democracy (Abers 1998; Baiocchi 2003; Fung and Wright 2001). Examining the 
experience of introducing ‘participatory governance’ in Porto Alegre in Brazil and Kerala in 
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India, Fung and Wright refer to the strategy of ‘empowered deliberative democracy’ which 
aspires to “deepen the ways in which ordinary people can effectively participate in and 
influence policies that directly affect their lives” (2001: 7).  
In Porto Alegre, local government reforms sought a “general restructuring of democratic 
decision-making” by introducing a participatory budgeting system involving local residents 
and associations (2001: 7-8). Local neighbourhood assemblies take place on a city-wide 
basis and every citizen has the right to elect a representative to their assembly (Wainwright 
2003) - a system not dissimilar to the ‘Panchayats’ or self-governing assemblies in Kerala. 
Moreover, the Porto Alegre municipality itself has invested in the up-skilling of citizens to be 
involved in such processes (Abers, 1998; Wainwright 2003). Both examples appear to have 
enhanced citizen incentive to engage in issues of local government (Heller, 2001; Abers 
1998; Fung and Wright 2001). Heller’s account of Kerala, for example, suggests a 
‘downward’ shift in the ‘locus’ of decision-making and an increase in the range of grassroots 
groups participating in policy formulation (2001: 142). 
Experiments in participatory governance, however, have also been subject to criticism. 
Although community participation in decision-making processes should facilitate both the 
empowerment of participants and greater project efficiency (Cleaver 2001: 37), it is argued 
that the concept in itself does not address issues of unequal power relations and social 
inequalities, nor does it account for local political contexts (Baiocchi 2003; Cornwall 2008; 
see also Theron & Ceasar 2008). Much can rest on the strength of local democratic political 
institutions, for example. Where such institutions are weak, “it is possible for 
decentralisation to result in decentralized authoritarianism or elite control” (Beard et al 
2008: 6), warranting the caution that decentralisation does not necessarily produce more 
democracy (ibid.).14 
A useful analytical tool in this respect is Arnstein’s ‘ladder of participation’ (1969), which 
alerts us to the existence of different degrees (or conceptions) of participation. Her 
categorisations, illustrated through empirical cases, range on a spectrum from 
‘manipulation’ to ‘citizen control’. This shows the ways in which ‘consultation’, ‘informing’ 
and ‘placation’ can be construed as forms of participation yet differ significantly in their 
empowering potential to methods such as ‘partnership’, ‘delegated power’ and ‘citizen 
control’ (ibid.). Not dissimilarly, the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) 
has produced a Spectrum of Public Participation. This depicts an increasing scale of public 
impact, including: inform, consult, involve, collaborate, and empower (IAP2, 2007a). The 
public participation strategies used by the South African government in the application of 
local government Integrated Development Planning (IDP) have been based on IAP2’s ‘core 
values’ (Theron & Ceasar 2008: 112-113). 
                                                          
14
 See also Miraftab (2008) in the same book who argues that strong central and regional governments are also 
necessary for local authorities to enable “inclusive development”.  
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1.4.7. Participatory Development Discourse 
Not dissimilarly to attempts at participatory governance, development theorists have also 
sought to pursue and evaluate a number of experiments in participatory development, 
community participation and participatory planning. Further to the failed development 
experiments in participation during the 1960s, ideas about the positive potential of 
‘participation’ were renewed in the 1980s-90s amongst development organisations, NGOs, 
international organisations and major donors. The World Bank has defined participation as 
“the process through which stakeholders influence and share control over priority setting, 
policy-making, resource allocations and access to public goods and services” (World Bank, 
undated). Many such projects have focussed on rural development through techniques such 
as participatory rural appraisal (PRA). 
While participatory development is premised upon the need to empower participants, as 
well as achieve sustainable and effective outcomes, Cooke and Kothari have critiqued its 
failure to fundamentally challenge deeper issues of power and power relations (2001: 6, 14). 
Others have highlighted how the notion of ‘participation’, which has been co-opted by 
mainstream international development organisations, has become a new ‘buzzword’ in 
development, thus losing its “radical transformative edge” (Cleaver 2001: 37). As such, it has 
become more concerned with efficiency (ibid; Mosse 2001: 17) and meeting donor 
requirements (Bond and Hulme in Harley 2001: 98-99; Mosse 2001: 25). 
These concerns warrant a range of questions regarding whose voice is heard in deliberative 
processes: for example, is participation dominated by those who are more educated, more 
confident, or whose work and family circumstances give them greater flexibility to attend 
participatory meetings?15 “Who is excluded and who excludes themselves?” (Cornwall 2008: 
275). Are those who act as ‘community representatives’ indeed representative of those they 
claim to speak for? Do participants shape the agenda, as “social actors” and not “passive 
subjects” (Theron & Ceaser 2008: 105)? And have priorities already been agreed by local 
leaders, external experts or government officials?16 These concerns have accordingly led to 
warnings of the “tyranny of participation” (Cooke & Kothari 2001). Linking these thoughts to 
Mansbridge’s thesis (1983), we should also ask whether participatory forums leave room for 
adversary (not just unitary) mechanisms to recognise when participants cannot be 
characterised by a collective social interest.  
Although here I have separated out experiments in participatory governance from those of 
participatory development, many of the lessons and concepts are cross-cutting. Arnstein’s 
formulation (1969) applies to politicians, bureaucrats, project leaders and managers. 
Similarly the IAP2 spectrum of participation is produced for use by governments and other 
                                                          
15
 Disparities in participation are reported by Mansbridge (1983) in her observations and interviews with 
participants of the Selby Town Meeting. 
16
 See, for example, comments by Botes and van Rensburg on “the paternalistic role of development experts” 
and the “inhibiting and prescriptive role of the state” (2000: 42-43). 
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organisations. They define ‘public participation’ as “any process that involves the public in 
problem-solving or decision-making and that uses public input to make better decisions” 
(IAP2 Code of Ethics). 
Using this broad theoretical landscape of democratic theory, participatory development, 
participatory planning and municipal governance, an understanding of the influences of 
these concepts in the South African context becomes possible. 
1.5. Literature Review 
A range of existing literature captures the active role of civil society in the struggle against 
apartheid, most notably the organisation of township civic associations and the 
independent labour movement. Thorough accounts of the UDF and township struggles of 
the 1980s have been produced by Seekings (2000a), Van Kessel (2000), Mufson (1990) and 
Adler and Steinberg (2000). Equally, some of the most well-known case study analyses of 
popular and civic organisation in the mid-1980s covers townships in the Pretoria-
Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) region (Seekings 1988, 1992; Marks 2001), and more 
specifically the West Rand (Seekings 1992a; van Kessel 2000); Alexandra (Bozzolli 2004, 
Mayekiso 1991, Carter 1991), Atteridgeville/Sausville (Steinberg 2000); Diepkloof (Marks 
2001); and Mamelodi (Boraine 1987). Research has also covered areas including 
Sekhukhneland (van Kessel 2000), Port Elizabeth (Cherry 2000a & 2000b) and, to a much 
lesser extent, Cape Town (van Kessel 2000; Scharf and Ngcokoto 1990).  
This existing literature shows the ways in which largely ANC-aligned activists and 
organisations began working in communities during the early 1980s, seeking to mobilise 
people around local grievances that were eventually linked to broader issues of national 
political oppression (Seekings 1992b; Sisulu 1986: 101-102; van Kessel 2000: 28). Research 
has also analysed the spontaneous mass uprisings and revolts that were a feature from 
1984, with a view to understanding the way in which they linked to more organised forms of 
struggle. As a result, the material that we are able to draw upon today is extensive. 
In addition to literature on internal activism, accounts of the ANC’s period in exile also 
provide important insight, particularly the development of thinking around the armed and 
political struggles (Ellis & Sechaba 1992; Ellis 2012; Barrell 1992 and 1993; Shubin 1999). 
Interestingly, Barrell (1992) addresses the concurrent relevance of the ANC’s ‘strategic 
review’ of revolutionary strategy in 1978-79 to the direction that the internal liberation 
struggle took from 1980 onwards. This acknowledged the severe limitations of the ‘militarist 
vanguardism’ pursued by the movement thus far (Barrell 1992: 85) and instead “identified a 
political base as a prerequisite for a decisive and forcible ANC contention for state power” 
(ibid.: 64). Grassroots political organisation in South Africa consequently came to take on 
increasing importance in ANC revolutionary strategy.  
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However, although supporting people’s power through the call to “make South Africa 
ungovernable”,17 the ANC’s strategic and ideological vision remained that, under its own 
leadership, these forces would culminate in popular armed insurrection (Barrell 1992: 65). 
What emerged in South Africa’s townships, however, was a groundswell of locally-driven 
popular power, albeit aligned to the liberation movement. Seekings therefore observes that, 
by mid-1985, “township struggles were the key element in internal opposition politics” 
(1992: 20).  
Some explorations of the historic role of the civics have drawn on the extent to which they 
viewed themselves as embryonic forms of a future democracy (Seekings 2000a; Cherry 
2000a; Glaser 1991: 110). Adler and Steinberg, for example, draw upon the “quasi-
governmental institutions” founded by the civics, who often viewed themselves as “the sole 
and legitimate representative of the people” (2000: 6-7). Civics established street and area 
committees where township affairs and issues would be discussed by residents, and 
extended their role to cover functions such as education, justice and policing in the place of 
the BLAs. 
These models of people’s power, for some activists, were understood as a form of direct of 
participatory democracy that extended beyond the restricted democracy represented by 
the ballot box (Adler & Steinberg 2000: 8). As Adler and Steinberg explain, “In this 
participatory vision, the gap between governors and governed would be closed by virtue of 
a political form that inducts everybody into the realms of political and administrative 
decision-making” (ibid.). Interestingly, Mufson likens people’s power to the Paris Commune 
or the soviets of pre-Bolshevik Russia in their replication of “the enthusiasm of ordinary 
citizens for a parallel government under their control” (1990: 105). There was certainly a 
clear influence of socialist and Marxist thought amongst the UDF and its affiliates, with the 
phrase ‘dual power’ itself being borrowed from Lenin (Mufson 1990: 132). However 
theorisation was also partly the preserve of particular intellectuals. The extent to which its 
ideological lineage and ideas guided the thinking of local activists is picked up in Chapter 
Three. 
In some cases, organs of popular power were compared to the shop floor structures of the 
trade unions in terms of social solidarity, self-organisation and service provision but also in 
their democratic ideals. Certainly by the mid-1980s both the civics and independent trade 
unions were linking local issues to the broader nationalist struggle. Glaser argues that the 
overlapping ideological persuasions and personnel in ANC camp were sowing seeds of direct 
and participatory democracy not only amongst the labour movement but in the ‘populist’ 
politics of the UDF and civics (1991: 109-110). He therefore suggests that the “intellectual 
lineages” of the independent trade unions, in particular those of syndicalism and council 
communism (Glaser 1991: 109) began to penetrate township struggles.  
                                                          
17
 See, for example, the ANC article in Mayibuye (1984): “Let us make our county ungovernable”. 
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It is also important to note, however, that the civics were not necessarily uniformly oriented 
toward revolution. Many civics and related programmes sought rather to provide services 
which gave communities some respite against the daily grind of apartheid life. Civic 
associations largely dealt with bread and butter issues, and in some cases sought not to 
challenge local authority structures but to gain concessions for residents (van Kessel 2000: 
29; 150). Others, Mufson describes as more moderate or ‘conservative’, seeing themselves 
as re-imposing ‘law and order’ and reigning in militant youth (1990: 126-7; see also Bozzoli 
2004). According to Seekings, even the infamous ‘people’s courts’ sometimes started out 
life as ‘advice offices’ (1990: 125).   
An important debate for this research is thus the extent to which civics had a revolutionary 
or ideological vision versus a (relatively) short-term, reformative agenda. It’s interesting that 
where negotiations between civics and local authorities did take place, it was not always 
warmly received by the ANC (ibid; Lodge 1990: 52). The ultimate ends sought by civics thus 
had bearing on the methods used to get there. 
Organs of people’s power have also generated critique of their democratic credentials. On 
the one hand they emerged in the context of a lack of alternatives: of an illegitimate, 
oppressive state and the declining provision of services. They were nonetheless often 
underpinned by a rejection of political pluralism. In eradicating ‘the gap’ between governors 
and governed there emerged not only an absence of mechanisms to ensure accountability 
but also a participatory vision that removed the need for debate or deliberation. In the case 
of localised justice through ‘people’s courts’, punishment could be arbitrary and their 
function and remit not the result of consultation or democratic agreement (see Bozzoli 
2004: 141, 149-156). Steinberg highlights that these popular organs also assumed the logic 
of “a single political voice” (2000: 185). The direct control of many civic organisations was 
consequently wielded only by those aligned with the majority view.18 
Van Kessel argues that, by 1986, the UDF was displaying increasing intolerance and labelling 
alternative groups as enemy forces (2000: 38). Additionally, despite the Front’s official 
stance against violence, the leadership’s sometimes insufficient condemnation of violence 
against perceived opponents did not go un-noticed (Jeffery 2000), nor did it prevent 
individuals from sanctioning particular incidents or encouraging retaliation (Mufson 1990: 
97). 
This said, it is largely accepted that the UDF lost a lot of control over popular protest 
(Mufson 1990: 97) and over the actions of individuals who saw themselves as members of 
the ANC or UDF but did not officially belong to any organisation (Seekings 2000a: 315). 
Through its calls to action, the ANC itself was also somewhat responsible for the violence 
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 Cherry, for example, draws upon the majority decision-making and “territorial hegemony” built by the civics, 
positioning against one another those who were aligned and non-aligned with the congress movement (2000a: 
107). 
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that accompanied protest, even though, as Mufson highlights, it continued to maintain a 
policy of ‘controlled violence’ (1990: 100).  
How different then was the understanding of people’s power amongst civic activists to that 
of the ANC in exile? This question is not easily answered. Familiar to both ‘inzile’ and ‘exile’ 
discourses was the debate of ‘dual power’ and ‘liberated zones’: the extent to which 
popular organisations in South Africa were establishing truly alternative structures in areas 
where the state had lost almost complete control. The assumption of Charterist hegemony 
and a unified popular will were also not peculiar to the civics. The 1980s discourse of the 
ANC echoed these same ideas but did so in a context of exile that called not only for popular 
unity but clandestinity and tight central control. 
What is of significance for this research is the surfacing within the broad ANC camp of 
multiple understandings of the role and future of people’s power. Steinberg (2000) argues 
that there were three ways in which people’s power was conceived by the civics. Firstly he 
highlights the “political instrumental conception” which viewed township organs as “a 
vehicle by which local apartheid structures are to be destroyed”. In this understanding, the 
existence of people’s power is entirely dependent “on the continued existence of the 
apartheid regime”. Secondly, is a conception of temporary power - i.e. organs of township 
resistance “doubling up as organs of government” but only while apartheid continues to 
exist and in the absence of democracy. Thirdly is a conception of people’s power as 
developing organs of a future democracy - built to destroy apartheid structures but also to 
“outlive and replace” them (Steinberg 2000: 186-187).  
To this we could add a fourth conception: that the organs of resistance would outlive 
apartheid as institutions of local democracy but would remain a civil realm (Daryl Glaser, 
personal communication). Civics would retain their earned right to represent their 
communities but in combination with the formal democratic government. Debates taking 
place within the civic movement by 1990 also show that the possibilities of either the ANC 
taking over civic work, or of civics, themselves, becoming formations of that ANC were also 
being considered (UDF National Civics Office 1990). 
In Steinberg’s study of the Atteridgeville/Saulsville Resident's Association (ASRO), he finds 
the third conception - of people’s power as a form of future democracy - to be absent 
amongst the civic leadership (2000: 190). He argues, however, that this does not mean civics 
conceived of their role as merely a “tactical initiative” but rather as a process of residents’ 
empowerment, of encouraging participation and broadening people’s understanding of 
what democracy could mean (ibid). In essence, it created the “rudimentary principles” of 
the future and, importantly, “a deepening of the political”: “the notion that an array of 
social relations previously designated to lie either in the incontestable sphere of unilateral 
administrative action, were to be redefined and reshaped by the demand for participation” 
(ibid). 
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Janet Cherry’s research in the townships of Port Elizabeth is also useful. She argues that the 
“strategic intentions” of activists involved in establishing organs of people’s power can be 
divided into three views (2000a: 88). Firstly she sets out an “organic” or “spontaneous” 
perspective in which people’s power was understood as an “expression … by ordinary 
people trying to take control of their own lives (ibid.). This view was held by many who saw 
it as a bottom-up process, rather than one directed or controlled by the ANC. Cherry cites 
Mark Swilling and Jeremy Seekings as being among those who held this view (ibid.: 88-9).  
The second view that Cherry sets out is “the ‘classic revolutionary’ perspective” which she 
describes as being held by “the exiled liberation movements, the South African Communist 
Party (SACP), the ‘old guard’ of activists from the 1950s and 1960s, and many of the younger 
generation of activists loyal to the ANC” (ibid.: 89). In this version the street and area 
committees were primarily organs of struggle in a “protracted people’s war” (ibid.: 89-90). It 
assumed a strong connection between the exiled and internal mass movements, primarily 
via the work of underground cells, and focussed on people’s power’s utility and 
insurrectionary potential as an “an offensive” against the state (ANC 1986a). 
The third view identified by Cherry is “the ‘hegemonic revolutionary’ perspective” (ibid.: 91). 
This is in some ways a combination of the preceding two perspectives: it was neither an 
entirely local initiative, nor one controlled from without. Rather, “the building of democratic 
organisation and the mobilisation against the state were not seen as contradictory, since 
the capturing of state power was the common objective of both projects” (ibid.: 92). Van 
Kessel also suggests that the UDF’s conception of democracy as “both a means and an end” 
contrasted with that implied in ANC and SACP publications in which people’s power was 
instead “a means to an end” (2000: 70). By the time of the ANC’s unbanning in 1990, this 
friction would resurface as one of “Charterist hegemony versus autonomous civil society” 
(van Kessel 2000: 46). 
It could be reasoned that the political intolerance and pluralistic deficit in the 1980s form of 
popular participation did not fully materialise until the struggle had been won. Yet, the 
existence of factions within townships in the 1980s was not uncommon, neither were 
reports of the use of coercion by comrades to deal with non-compliance (Mufson 1990: 119; 
Bozzoli 2004: 134-135; van Kessel 2000: 188-191). In Alexandra, Bozzoli speaks of an 
overarching generational divide in which the millenarian view of the struggle held by 
‘utopian’ youth clashed with more adult-based residents and leaders seeking to create a 
local ‘popular democracy’ (2004: 125).19 The heterogeneity and disagreement within the 
internal movement itself must therefore not be underestimated.  
That being said, whatever their view of the future of people’s power, its practice instilled in 
many people the idea of participatory and mass driven democracy as the only ‘natural 
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 In some cases, structures of popular power were set up as a direct counter to local uncontrolled youth 
(Bozzoli 2004). 
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development’ from their active role in the mass politics of the struggle (Cronin 2005). The 
ANC’s formal shift toward liberal democracy from 1990 (albeit supplemented by principles 
of popular empowerment and participation) may well have conflicted with expectations on 
the ground. Nonetheless, after 1990 the ANC continued to indicate aspirations toward 
popular participation. In the context of a globally discredited socialist movement, the ANC’s 
alliance partners in the SACP were also searching for ways to translate citizen participation 
into the realisation of socialist democracy.  
In spite of this focus on participation, a concurrent post-1994 ANC discourse has also been 
present which is not only critical of political opposition but of voices within civil society who 
have utilised participatory spaces to challenge government policy. Egan and Wafer suggest 
that many within the ANC see civic-based organisations who dispute party policies as 
“challengers to the ANC Alliance’s ‘historic right’ to represent the masses, particularly the 
working class” (2006: 55). To what extent, then, have ANC conceptions of participatory 
democracy been shaped by a vision of itself as representing the masses? Does its character 
as a ‘broad mass movement’ preclude the need for independent input from citizens and 
their civil representatives? 
Some of the debates about a future democracy that took place within the ANC during the 
late 1980s-early 1990s are still not entirely understood. It is the codification and 
consolidation of its ideas during this period that the thesis hopes to uncover. What is clear is 
that by 1987 the ANC had stated its willingness to enter into negotiations (Lodge 1990: 48) 
and began to draw up certain principles or guidelines for a constitutional future. Included in 
this process was not only a “growing perception” that the transition to socialism would be 
“a gradual one” (Lodge 1990:50) but also a commitment to multi-party democracy and a bill 
of rights.20  
Moreover, while the ANC might not wish to label itself as such, its language from the late 
1980s was increasingly flavoured with ideas of ‘liberal’ or ‘constitutional’ democracy, albeit 
with an important emphasis on socio-economic rights. Lodge therefore described the 1988 
constitutional guidelines - a product of this very process of internal discussion - as “a 
balance between the ANC’s conservative and radical traditions” (1990: 53). On the issue of 
participation, while the specific form of 1980s people’s power may not have survived the 
transition to democracy, the ANC continued to infer the need to ‘concretise’ Charterist 
principles in the post-1990 era (Alliance 1993: 8). Williams also makes the case that the 
SACP shifted toward a more people-led (as opposed to state-led) conception of democracy 
from the early-mid 1990s (2008: 26-27).  
The local government legislation in the form of the Municipal Structures Act 1998 and 
Municipal Systems Act 2000 allowed for the formation of institutional structures for public 
participation to facilitate the involvement of communities in local government matters. 
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 See the ANC’s 1988 Draft Constitutional Guidelines. 
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Friedman & McKaiser therefore quite rightly assert that “the plethora of formal mechanisms 
which enable citizens to participate in government should make South Africa a model of 
participatory governance” (2010: 3). Despite the presence of legislative provision, however, 
it is argued that “on the whole... public participation is limited to forms of consultation, 
usually around needs, rather than any real empowerment in political decision-making or 
implementation” (Hemson 2007 cited in Buccus et al 2008: 299).  
A number of authors have undertaken valuable analyses of the pitfalls of this present 
system. Benit-Gbaffou (2008; 2007), Buccus et al (2008), Piper and Deacon (2009) and 
Malabela and Ally (2011) each provide accounts of problems that have dogged local 
government ward committees, including issues of dependency, accountability, community 
education and party political loyalty. Benit-Gbaffou contends that Ward Councillors lack 
sufficient power within council structures to ensure residents’ views are taken on board 
(2008: 11-16). Concurrently, there is a lack of accountability to their constituents – a feature 
impacted by the ‘party driven’ selection of ward councillors, where party loyalty tends to 
take precedence over “the candidates’ local credentials” (ibid.: 2008: 16-17). This would 
certainly explain the restricted mandate of ward committees and lack of any “real power” 
delegated to the local level (Benit-Gbaffou, 2007: 31). 
Within the framework of NDR and the historic role of the movement, there is perhaps a 
subtext to ANC discourse which suggests a reluctance to listen to views that do not endorse 
ANC policy. Some ANC commentary very closely links the ‘strengthening’ of participatory 
democracy with the ‘mobilisation’ of the masses (ANC, 2000b: para 2.2) and, as Pretorius 
argues, accordingly links ‘mobilisation’ with ‘hegemony’ (2006: 755). Ironically, however, the 
practice of mobilisation is essentially an elite-driven initiative rather than one that is driven 
or ‘activated’ from below (Pretorius 2006: 754; Sartori 1987: 113).  
Similarly, while Pretorius argues that the ANC does not see the people as homogenous but 
rather “refers quite clearly to different categories of people” (2006: 762), he also suggest 
that: 
“ - this recognition does not amount to recognition of such divisions as a 
condition to which the party and the state should adapt, or that should, at 
the very least, be accommodated. Instead the ANC arrogates for itself the 
task of defining the people’s interests and of leading those who profess 
‘narrow interests’ to the proper understanding of the ‘interests of all the 
people’” (2006: 762). 
In his argument, although the ANC acknowledges differentiation within the people and even 
in some instances expressly sets out the needs of particular groups, such as women or 
workers, their interests are defined unitarily by the party. Those who challenge the interests 
as allocated to them are portrayed as anti-transformation. If citizen participation is confused 
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with citizen mobilisation, it risks undermining the values on which participatory structures 
have been founded. 
Another relevant issue concerns what the ANC’s response to non-institutional, locally-
instigated forms of participation can tell us about its theory of participatory democracy. 
While some analysts continue to lament the weakness of civil society in South Africa, it has 
also been emphasised that non-institutional or informal channels for challenging 
government have increasingly drawn public attention to issues which might otherwise 
remain unaddressed.21. In Johannesburg, Benit-Gbaffou asserts that “the ward system, for 
instance, has proved inefficient, compared to marches, riots and lawsuits, for residents to 
have their voice heard by the Johannesburg Council” (2007: 27). 
It is not within the scope of this research to assess the democratic credentials of civic-based 
organisations or new social movements save to say that it would be entirely wrong to 
portray a polarised view of undemocratic institutional mechanisms versus democratic non-
institutional mechanisms. On the contrary, civics themselves have been criticised during the 
1990s and beyond for their assumption of an earned right to represent communities 
(Steinberg 2000: 194). What is of interest, however, is how the ANC understands the role of 
civics and that of civil society more broadly. Zuern highlights somewhat mixed messages 
from the ANC during the early 1990s - on the one hand promoting the protection of civics’ 
independence, and on the other promoting a “community of interests” in which civics must 
join hands with the ANC and pursue the same goals (2001: 16). 
With the formation of the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) in 1992, this 
conundrum has had consequences. The loss of many civic leaders to ANC government posts 
from 1994 has impacted SANCO and other established civic organisations significantly. 
Simultaneously, observers have cited the limitations of SANCO as an effective civic 
representative given its ties to the ANC (Seekings 1998; Zuern 2006; Heller 2003; Piper 
unpublished). In the local government arena Zuern provides a fairly recent account of the 
challenges involved in holding SANCO representatives to account in communities where the 
local SANCO representative is also an ANC ward councillor or holds a position in local 
government (2006: 182-183).  
Incorporation of civic leadership into ANC party structures after 1990 extended ANC 
hegemony but also enabled the utilisation of grassroots links for consolidating party 
support. Zuern in fact contends that “the ANC, realizing that its own local structures were 
weak, sought to maintain its linkages to the grass roots through popular associations” (2002: 
84). Since the birth of SANCO, there has been greater consolidation of the ANC’s own 
branch structures. Interestingly, Benif-Gbaffou suggests that where “local government 
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 See for example Patel and Pithouse (2005) on informal settlement protests in Kennedy Road, Durban; and 
Friedman & Mottiar’s research (2006) on the Treatment Action Campaign’s use of both institutional and non–
institutional means for engaging government. 
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participatory structures do not fulfil their promises”, then party structures become “more 
prominent as means for the poor to access the state” (2011: 462; 2012). With the process of 
decentralisation, the political party is then likely to become increasingly important in civil 
society (Benit-Gbaffou 2011: 462). 
Greenstein links participation more directly to state power: 
“Popular participation is always seen ...as a way of bolstering the role of 
the state under ANC leadership ... From this perspective, the focus on 
participation does not reflect recognition that civil society forces may play 
a role independently of, let alone in opposition to, the ruling party” (2003 
cited in Ballard 2008: 182). 
If this is indeed the case - that the ANC’s practice of popular participation is underpinned by 
a teleological or self-sustaining understanding of its purpose - then this defies the normative 
role of participatory democracy as a sharing of power between citizens and state. It is here 
that the discord in South Africa’s participatory democracy lies. The normative aims of 
popular participation in decision-making are not only limited but potentially stifled by a 
teleological understanding of participatory democracy. The repercussions for its full 
realisation alongside institutions of representative democracy must be explored, taking into 
account both ANC party dominance and the prevalence of a restricted conception of the 
role for civil society. 
1.6. Methodology  
The methodological approach to this thesis lies in the role of ideas in formulating policies 
and programmes. The ANC has always asserted the prominence of ‘the battle of ideas’ in 
influencing its own direction: the role of revolutionary theory, broader ideology and 
theories of the South African condition. Yet the ANC is also not ideologically homogenous, 
nor has it always drawn from the same tradition historically. It is therefore more 
appropriate to talk about ‘theory’ and ‘ideas’ as opposed to ‘ideology’ per se. Its ideas have 
certainly been influenced by ideological traditions but not exclusively so. Practices have also 
been influenced by other organisations, writers and intellectuals, revolutionary experiences 
and bodies of theory that are not reflective of one particular worldview. The notion of 
‘ideas’ therefore allows for the influence of theories, doctrine, ideologies and world views.  
Given the fragmented nature of the evidence about the ANC’s understanding of democracy, 
the methodology used is that of a reconstruction exercise, and key to this approach is 
analysis of the movement’s discourse during particular periods. The methodology engages 
an element of ‘decoding’ historic writings and interrogating the layers of meaning and ideas 
implied in texts. In a sense, it applies a form of thematic or content analysis by examining 
the ideas, meanings and inspirations contained in documents and commentary. 
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A blend of chronological examination and thematic analysis enables the identification of 
conceptual continuities, shifts and distinctions, without reproducing a simple policy history. 
The analysis of ‘people’s power’ forms a pre-1994 study of the ANC as an ‘opposition 
movement’. Although ‘people’s power’ took place inside South Africa, the thesis 
interrogates how it was conceptualised by the internal and external movement. 
Examination incorporates not only the ‘people’s power’ discourse itself but also the debates 
taking place amongst the leadership of the ANC about the desired form of a future state. A 
focal point here is the constitutional discussions and publications of the ANC from the late 
1980s.  
The transitional period from 1990 to 1994 is examined as a period in which a clearer 
articulation of the future democracy took shape. In terms of methodology and sources, 
attention is given to transitional discussion and policy documents and the ANC’s articulation 
of its policy direction between 1990 and 1994. Through an assessment of discourse during 
this period, the relative influence of different intellectual traditions can be better 
understood.  
The post-1994 section of the thesis, covering the ANC in government, separates out the 
ideas informing public policy, on the one hand, and those informing the ANC’s own 
‘movement’ discourse of participation on the other. It thematically analyses discussion and 
policy documents, legislation, speeches and other publications. It identifies whether the 
democratic and ideological traditions of the 1980s have influenced post-1994 policy, as well 
as the extent to which new ideas have emerged. 
1.6.1. Document Analysis 
The thesis draws on both secondary literature (existing theoretical and empirical analysis) 
and primary source documents of the ANC, SACP, UDF and civic movement. Examination of 
primary documents and the ideas implied in commentary and practice are a leading 
component of the methodology. Documents available online via digital collections, as well 
as those published on the ANC website, have been invaluable in compiling this research. 
Considerable use has been made of archival sources from the Liberation Archives at the 
University of Fort Hare (NAHECS), the Mayibuye Centre at the University of the Western 
Cape, the University of the Witwatersrand’s Historical Papers, and the UDF Collection at the 
South African History Archives in Johannesburg. This material was especially useful in 
reconstructing ideas during the 1980s and early 1990s, both inside and outside South Africa. 
Key sources include guiding programmatic documents such as the Freedom Charter; 
discussions and publications of the ANC and UDF; ANC Strategy and Tactics; ANC and 
Alliance Discussion Documents; and articles drawn from ANC publications. 
Of the post-1994 period, the research draws on the ANC’s own policy and discussion 
documents, commentary, speeches and government legislation. The most fundamental 
sources are legislative and policy documents providing for a combination of representative 
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and participatory democracy at local government level. This includes the 1994 
Reconstruction and Development Plan, the 1998 White Paper on Local Government; the 
Municipal Structures Act (1998) and Municipal Systems Act (2000); as well as guidance 
documents and handbooks produced by the Department for Provincial and Local 
Government (DPLG) and the South African Local Government Association (SALGA). 
1.6.2. Interviews 
Although the thesis draws principally on primary documentation, considerable use is also 
made of interviews with former activists, policy makers, ANC members and leadership. One 
of the challenges of historical study is that the passing of time can colour interviewees’ 
responses, and so accounts are likely to be influenced by the benefit of hindsight. For this 
reason, interviews have been used to supplement the main focus of the research 
methodology which interrogates primary documentation. That being said, the interviews 
have provided rich source material through personal recollections and experiences not 
captured in historic texts.  
Interviews undertaken focused on two areas of enquiry. The first of these was analysis of 
ideas amongst members of the ANC-aligned camp during the 1980s about the role and 
future of ‘people’s power’. Although research has previously been undertaken with activists 
in certain townships as a way of constructing a picture of the dynamics in those localities,22 
the interviews undertaken as part of this research asked a more focused set of questions 
about the role and future of people’s power and the development of democratic thought.  
The second batch of interviews sought to understand how democratic thought developed 
within the ANC from the late 1980s into the post-1994 era. Interviews were therefore 
undertaken with individuals and ANC members involved in codifying the ANC’s ideas around 
this, and in developing the policy on participatory democracy since 1994. The intention of 
these interviews was to understand the ideas informing legislative commitments and 
resulting practice. 
1.7. The ANC’s Theory of Participatory Democracy: Tracing a History of Ideas 
The framing theoretical principle of this research is that the power of ideas lies in their 
capacity to affect practice. As such, in order for us to understand the ANC’s actions, we must 
interrogate the theories that drive them. The ANC’s commitment to participatory 
democracy is not merely rhetorical. Contrary to Zuern’s contention, that the ANC 
government is “following a liberal model of elite Schumpeterian democracy” (2002: 80), it 
has in fact enacted legislation to bring the ideas of participatory governance to fruition.  
What appears to be missing from Zuern’s assessment is an interrogation as to why the step 
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beyond rhetoric – i.e. the establishment of institutional vehicles for participation – is not 
substantively working.  
It is the premise of this research that deficiencies in the substantive realisation of 
participatory democracy lie not in a lack of translation from paper into practice but in the 
way the ANC understands participatory democracy.23 Part of the process of unravelling this 
relationship involves the question of means and ends: what is the end result sought by the 
ANC in implementing mechanisms for popular participation?  
In seeking to understand the ANC’s conception of participatory democracy, it is necessary to 
trace its ideological. This entails alertness to the multitude of influences on ANC cadres, not 
least in terms of the range of ideological currents penetrating the movement over time. 
Thus, while this thesis interrogates a particular form of democracy, it is also history of ideas. 
Its structure is therefore a reflection of the ANC as a movement in transition, from the 
status of illegal opposition to a ruling party in government. A reconstruction of its theory of 
participatory democracy requires analysis of past and present discourse. Moreover, an 
understanding of the broader theoretical literature and debates about participation are 
essential in situating and critiquing ANC democratic thought.  
1.7.1. Outline of Argument 
This thesis argues that the understanding of participatory democracy in the ANC has been 
influenced by a multitude of intellectual and theoretical traditions. As such, it is not possible 
to identify a singular ‘conception’ or ‘theory’. What has emerged instead is a tension in 
participatory democratic discourse between that contained in public policy and that 
espoused by the ANC as a movement. While policy on participatory democracy draws on 
ideas about citizen influence and empowerment, there is a risk that this is undermined by a 
parallel discourse of the ANC as a movement in which popular participation is teleological.  
The presence of this tension can be traced to the ideological and intellectual influences on 
the ANC’s democratic thought. While a number of ideological traditions have influenced the 
movement historically, a few are particularly prominent: liberalism, African nationalism, 
Marxism-Leninism, the socialist democratic Left, trade unionism and, since the 1990s, global 
development discourse and governance. During the ANC’s earliest decades up to the 1930s 
it was influenced predominantly by a liberal conservatism which conceived of 
representation in terms of trusteeship. As African nationalist and Marxist Leninist traditions 
grew in influence from the mid-1940s, this top-down leadership style manifested itself in 
vanguardism - a concept which I argue has continued to influence the ANC’s democratic 
theory and practice into the present day. During the 1980s this vanguardist thread was 
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the democratic deficits of councillist democracy (Glaser 1994) and of democratic discourse on the South 
African Left historically (Glaser 1991).  
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particularly visible but also formed one of a number of conceptual currents shaping people’s 
power. Alongside vanguardism a variety of other themes can be traced, centred on ideas 
about community activism, grassroots governance, alternative currents of Marxism and 
radical democratic thought.  
The notion of vanguardism adopted in the ANC, however, was not without internal tension. 
Although both the exiled movement and ANC-aligned activists at home identified the ANC 
as a ‘vanguard’, for the latter contingent this did not preclude the simultaneous existence of 
local popular power in which democratic control rested with communities themselves. Such 
decentralised popular power, influenced by community activism and the participatory 
experiences of the labour movement, stood in tension with a more Leninist-inspired notion 
of vanguard leadership entailing political control from above. 
What can also be argued, however, is that the notion of participation espoused by both UDF 
and ANC was largely teleological and embraced a form of democracy bounded by allegiance 
to the movement. Even those traditions placing value on local democratic process shunned 
political pluralism and sought ultimately to establish a democracy under the leadership of 
the ANC.   
With the transition to democracy from 1990 new influences came to shape ideas about 
popular participation. The formulation of local government policy drew on ideas from 
democratic and development theory, progressive planning and international best practice. 
However it also drew on historic traditions in the ANC camp of popular organisation and 
grassroots control. The ANC’s radical democratic discourse remained but was considerably 
moderated - a repercussion of constitutional and human rights influences, as well as the 
global ascendency of liberal democracy and discrediting of socialism internationally.  
Importantly, however, formal acceptance by the ANC of a liberal democratic framework 
introduced principles of political pluralism and individual rights formerly absent in its 
participatory discourse.  
The post-1994 policy discourse on participatory democracy thus draws on an amalgamation 
of intellectual traditions which seek to empower citizens to participate in decision-making 
and draw on its educative and developmental benefits. The realisation of this objective, 
however, is constrained by a parallel policy trend focusing on the creation of a more 
efficient state. Here, a focus on technocracy, performance and centralised direction limits 
the extent to which citizens at the local level can influence the policy agenda. 
Nonetheless, the content of public policy is consistent with ideas in democratic theory about 
enabling popular influence over the decisions that affect people’s lives. Parallel to this, 
however, is a discourse of the ANC as a ‘movement’. In the latter, vanguardism remains a 
dominant theme in the conception of popular participation. Despite formal commitments to 
a system of participatory governance, in its own commentary and publications the ANC 
continues to link participatory structures to the realisation of the NDR. This discourse 
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retains imprints of the ANC’s Marxist-Leninist heritage in which the objective of 
participatory democracy is not increased citizen influencebut the strengthening of vanguard 
leadership and the extension of movement hegemony.  
1.8. Chapter Outline 
Chapter Two begins by providing an overview of the ANC’s ideological lineage prior to 1980, 
focusing on the origins of its ideas about popular participation. It examines, in particular, the 
historic influences of liberalism, trusteeship, African Nationalism and Marxism-Leninism on 
ideas about mass participation. It also introduces the notion of ‘vanguardism’ as a concept 
which came to characterise ANC political culture from the 1960s onwards. 
Chapter Three provides extensive analyses of the conceptual influences on people’s power, 
tracing the themes and discourses within the ANC camp about both its role and future. This 
constitutes a critical chapter in the broader thesis. It identifies the intellectual currents that 
shaped notions of participation in the 1980s and examines the normative ideas this 
generated about the form of a future democracy. In doing so, the chapter draws out not 
only conceptual influences but also tensions and parallels. 
Chapter Four looks at the codification of the ANC’s ideas about democracy. It covers the 
period from the 1980s to the early 1990s during which the movement began to set out 
more formally what it envisaged in a democratic state. It pays particular attention to the 
ANC’s appointment of a Constitution Committee in Lusaka in 1986 which set the direction 
for policy discussions that would continue within the ANC. It examines the ideas about 
citizen participation that emerged during this process including the linking of participatory 
democracy to the local government sphere specifically.  
Chapter Five then examines the development of public policy on participatory democracy 
since 1994. It looks at the ideas that have informed the notion of participation as it appears 
in policy and legislation, and shows how certain historic traditions have been carried 
forward, while new influences have also emerged. The coexistence of these multiple 
traditions and influential schools of thought make for some well-developed legislation and 
guidance. However they have also generated competing policy imperatives of public sector 
efficiency and citizen empowerment.   
Chapter Six looks at the discourse of participatory democracy in the ANC’s own documents 
and commentary. This is essentially an examination of its ideas as a ‘movement’. It traces 
the parallels and differences between participatory democracy, as advanced by ANC, and 
that contained in public policy. The chapter shows that, despite some conceptual overlap, 
the influences behind the ANC’s discourse of participation remain quite distinct from those 
informing the objectives of official legislation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Participation in the History of ANC Democratic Thought 
Any examination of the ideas and influences that have shaped ANC policy must incorporate 
a reflection on organisation’s intellectual and ideological lineage. The years from 1940, in 
particular, were formative in the development of its ideological framework, a key shift being 
the ANC’s decision to transform itself into a mass organisation. From the mid-1940s, the 
ANC moved away from its previous approach of seeking concessions via constitutional 
means toward the use of mass participation through passive resistance.  
Woven into this organisational shift was a self-perception of the ANC as having built the 
credentials and experience to occupy the position of the people’s representative. The ANC’s 
account of the bulk of its history is thus characterised by the direct involvement of the 
oppressed in their own liberation. This narrative remains an influential one in the ANC 
today. The struggle-era maxim, ‘the people are their own liberators’, continues to be 
reiterated in its post-1994 discourse, while the 1955 Freedom Charter is consistently 
invoked as the cornerstone of the ANC’s programme.  
This chapter therefore provides a ‘prelude’ to those that follow, tracing the existence of 
popular participation as a feature of ANC discourse prior to 1980. Cognisant of the power of 
ideas in shaping practice, it examines the ANC’s intellectual and ideological roots as a basis 
for understanding the development of its democratic thought. The chapter is divided 
thematically into conceptual stages in the movement’s history. It argues that up until 1960 
the ANC retained an understanding of democracy as primarily representative in character, 
while ideas of popular participation emerged with its transition to mass movement politics 
after 1949. The participation envisaged during this period is largely characterised by 
mobilisation. 
It is also identified that the conception of democracy historically held by the ANC, most 
notably in its early decades, was defined largely by the principle of ‘trusteeship’. In the years 
from 1950, currents of radical African nationalism and Marxism-Leninism emerged as 
dominant, with the latter becoming most influential during the movement’s years in exile. 
Nationalist discourse sustained the notion of representation as trusteeship and the 
movement continued to view itself as the sole trustee of African interests. It is also argued, 
however, that the framework of African nationalism provided a vehicle for trusteeship to 
break loose from its democratic bounds. With the co-existence of a Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine after 1960, trusteeship became more clearly visible as vanguardism. 
Reference to participatory democracy in ANC lexicon only appeared from around 1986 
onwards. Among civic and labour organisations at home, however, participatory democratic 
traditions can be identified from the 1970s in the organisational practices of the 
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independent trade unions and, from 1985, in the theory and practice of people’s power. 
Traditions and practices of democratic thought during the 1980s must be thus understood in 
the context of the intellectual and ideological heritage of the broader liberation movement. 
2.1. From Conservative Liberalism to African Nationalism 
Prior to the formation of the Congress Youth League in 1944, the dominant understanding 
of democracy in what was then the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) - 
changing its name to the African National Congress (ANC) only in 1925 - was characterised 
by an essentially reformist conservatism regarding political change. The plans to form 
Congress in 1912 were addressed to “Chiefs of royal blood and gentlemen of our races” 
(Seme cited in ANC 1953). Aspirations were toward the ideal of a non-racial but qualified 
Cape franchise rather than the unrestricted extension of democratic rights;24 and appeals to 
the government took the form of deputations and delegations of educated, middle class 
men appealing to the goodwill and Christian morals of public opinion, government and 
Crown (Walshe 1987: 3-4, 24; Jordan & Radebe 2010: 47-48; McKinley 1997: 6-8; see also 
Gerhart 1978: 77).25 Congress’ early ideological heritage was thus influenced by Christian 
liberalism, parliamentary liberalism, paternalism and trusteeship, which drew on dominant 
European views of the time. 
These ideas remained visible in the movement’s programmes of the 1940s and 50s and 
were perhaps most visibly embodied in the leadership of Dr A.B. Xuma and, later, Chief 
Albert Luthuli. Throughout his life, Nelson Mandela would also continue to hold in high 
regard the institutions of western democracy and representative government.26 By the mid-
1930s, however, growing African disillusionment with persistent government repression and 
the removal of Cape Africans from the common voters roll (Gerhart 1978: 34) surfaced 
debates within Congress over the value of challenging state authority via extra-
constitutional means versus continuing participation in the existing constitutional 
framework (Walshe 1987).  
Influences of competing global discourses also took root within Congress at this time, 
including the racial independence and assertion of American Garveyism (Walshe 1987: 158; 
165), which played some role in shaping the emergence of Africanist and nationalist 
                                                          
24
 The Cape qualified franchise was based on the Liberal Party’s slogan “equal rights for all civilised men” 
(Gerhart 1978: 7). The definition of ‘civilised men’ originated from the Cape Colony’s Constitution of 1853: 
“people who owned property, who earned an income of a certain value, who had a certain level of education” 
(Jordan & Radebe 2010: 41).   
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 For an account of the early leaders’ deputations and appeals to England, see for, example, ANC (1918) and 
Makgatho (1919).  
26
 See, for example, the excerpt from Mandela’s Courtroom Statement, ‘I am Prepared to Die’, at the Rivonia 
Trial in April 1964. 
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discourses, and the working class solidarity of international communism (ibid.: 170-171, 
176). After 1944, these conflicting strands would eventually find voice in the radicals of the 
Congress Youth League. During the 1930s, the (then) Communist Party of South Africa 
(CPSA) played a fairly marginal role as an organisation in African circles. Nonetheless, 
individuals within Congress came to be influenced by Marxist thought as a result of contact 
with a small number of white radicals (Gerhart 1978: 9). By the 1940s both the new blood 
infusing Congress and the growing disillusionment with gradual reformism culminated in the 
birth of a new radicalism. The Youth Leaguers essentially ‘redefined’ the ANC as an African 
nationalist movement (O’Malley 2008: 62), marking a step away from the ‘qualified’ 
franchise (Walshe 1987: 266) and a recognition of the need to create a mass membership 
(ibid: 264).  
At this stage, however, the ANC’s democratic ideals did not substantially change from its 
previous vision of representative institutions for Africans. The ANC’s view of itself as a mass 
movement also continued to reflect its self-identification as trustee of the people. The 
cultivation of a mass membership would serve to consolidate and validate its position as 
spokesperson. What became increasingly contested, however, were the “means of 
confronting the white power structure” (Walshe 1987: 278). Both of these debates were 
rooted simultaneously in the development of African nationalism and emergence of Marxist 
currents.  
2.1.1. Representation as Trusteeship: its significance for Participatory Democracy  
The idea of trusteeship in the ANC emerged from the mission-educated, middle class African 
leadership of the 1910s and 1920s. Trusteeship, in the South African context, originated 
from the early Cape Liberal provision of the franchise to educated and propertied Africans, 
resting on the ideal of assimilation and the purportedly temporary system of European 
guardianship. Basing their own political view on this paternalistic ideal, the early Congress 
leaders aspired to the role of direct representative or ‘trustee’ of African interests.27 
Speaking of the African elite, Gerhart has argued that “a belief in the superiority of 
European culture was basic to its world view, and its goals were unabashedly 
assimilationist” (1978: 34). As such, this stratum viewed itself as able to represent and 
articulate the interests of Africans who lacked both the education and political 
consciousness to challenge the system themselves. 
The Constitution of the SANNC in 1919 set out among its objectives, “to be the medium of 
expression of representative opinion” and “to educate bantu people on their rights, duties 
and obligations to the state and to themselves collectively” (SANNC 1919). This small African 
middle class, a number of whom constituted the early Congress leadership, were free of 
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 From 1910 until 1936, trusteeship was exercised by the Union administration in which the white state 
governed the affairs of Africans to the exclusion of ‘native’ representative opinion. 
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some of the challenges and educational disadvantage that faced the mass of their urban 
black compatriots (Gerhart 1978: 33-34). As such, they were “a natural leading sector in 
African society” (ibid: 34). 
While this conception of democracy could be read as rooted in an elitist tradition, appeals to 
the public, government, and white liberal opposition were not seen as the preserve the 
educated alone. Rather, they required articulation by an organised body of trustees able to 
challenge white preconceptions where their fellow countrymen lacked capacity to do so. 
Cape liberalism and the qualified franchise were in line with this perspective (van den 
Berghe cited in Gerhart 1978: 8). The notion of trusteeship embraced by Congress, in fact 
largely correlates with that originally theorised by Edmund Burke, whereby “trustees … use 
their best judgment on behalf of those they represent” (Castiglione & Warren 2006: 8).  
Those who advance a notion of representatives as ‘delegates’ who “simply mirror their 
constituents’ preferences” (ibid.), may be wary of the limited agency that trusteeship 
accords to those who are represented. Burkean trusteeship nonetheless remains within the 
bounds of a democratic system. Using the theoretical framework of representation 
presented by Weale (2007), the Cape liberal model and that advanced by Congress 
embodied a notion of representative as trustee, not delegate. In other words, the 
representative judges and acts upon what he considers best for his constituents.  
Applying Hannah Pitkin’s classification of the different ‘senses’ of representation (1967), the 
Congress leadership sought to bring to the Cape liberal model both descriptive 
representation on the basis of race and symbolic representation through the SANNC itself. 
In Pitkin’s formulation, descriptive representation is “to be like those for whom you are 
standing”, while symbolic representation is “to instantiate some property that enables you 
to symbolize a group, a nation or a set of ideals” (Weale 2007: 133). More recent ideas of 
“assumed representation” (Houtzager & Lavalle) could also be applied here - in which 
“constituencies do not authorize their claim to representation nor ensure accountability 
through any accepted institutional mechanism” (2010: 3).  
The emulation of a form of trusteeship is not to say that Congress did not aim to increase 
the status of those it spoke for. ANC President, Dr A.B. Xuma, emphasised in 1941 that “All 
its efforts are and must be concentrated upon raising the status of the African people from 
their semi-serfdom to citizenship” (Xuma 1941). It was Congress, however, that would 
appropriate and remain the ‘voice of’ these citizens. Xuma thus claimed in the same 
document that “the [ANC] is the mouthpiece of the African people of South Africa” (ANC 
1941). 
Although after 1940 trusteeship no longer constituted a dominant intellectual strand in the 
ANC, it nevertheless remained visible in Congress discourse. Its significance lies in the 
manner in which new ideological doctrines that infiltrated Congress after 1940 in fact 
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served to buttress the premise of trusteeship. The ANC’s perception of itself as a 
spokesperson and embodiment of the people can be traced to these theoretical 
foundations, forming the basis on which the ANC’s early ideas of representative democracy 
lay.  
Several points are worth noting about the way in which the ANC-as-trustee was reinforced 
after 1940. Firstly, despite Xuma’s pronouncements that a future democracy could not 
merely be government by proclamation but must be accompanied by the participation of 
Africans (ANC 1941), there is nothing to suggest that this was understood as anything other 
than democratic decision-making by elected (African) representatives. The documents of 
the time generally suggest adherence to a liberal and representative form of democracy: 
there is no evidence that participatory features were also envisaged.  
The 1943 ‘Africans’ Claims in South Africa’ is indicative of this tradition and reflects 
Congress’ earlier commitment to constitutionalism and human rights. Drawn up in response 
to the Atlantic Charter, ‘Africans’ Claims’ included a ‘Bill of Rights’ which signalled not only 
adherence to representative democracy but to a culture of rights that demanded “the 
extension to all adults, regardless of race, of the right to vote and be elected to parliament, 
provincial councils and other representative institutions” (ANC 1943). Although this demand 
retained the basis of a separate voters roll and the racial allocation of seats (Leatt et al 1986: 
93), Dubow has noted that this thinking was part of an emerging global discourse on 
“democratic rights and freedoms” and “a developing anti-colonial sentiment” (2012: 16). 
Gerhart thus refers to the ANC’s position at this stage as one of ‘liberal’ or ‘non-racial’ 
nationalism (1978: 13). 
Even amongst the ANC’s more radical elements, there is no suggestion that democracy was 
understood as anything beyond representative in form. The 1948 Basic Policy of the 
Congress Youth League reiterated the goal of political action as the achievement of “a true 
democracy” in which “all nationalities and minorities would have their fundamental human 
rights guaranteed in a democratic Constitution, encompassing direct representation in 
parliament on a democratic basis” (ANCYL 1948). The democracy envisaged was, arguably, 
utilitarian in nature, with participation taking the form of voting as James Mill intended. 
Representative government remained the lynchpin of Congress’ democratic demands with 
no evidence, at this stage, that it would involve ‘participatory’ elements.  
Although, by 1949, the election of a number of youth leaguers to the ANC’s National 
Executive Council (NEC) symbolised the rise of a new leadership generation, their radicalism 
was not so much a replacement of paternalist liberal values as it was a challenge to the 
methods by which its objectives would be achieved (see Gerhart 1978: 93-94). Gerhart 
notes a significant shift away from the earlier “realist tradition” of attainment of freedom 
via constitutional means, toward a focus on mass organisation and membership (ibid).  
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Secondly, although ‘Africans’ Claims’ contained rights to freedom of assembly and of the 
press (ANC 1943), a corresponding demand for multi-party competition is absent. The lack 
of any assurance of a role for a plurality of representative vehicles served to reinforce the 
ANC’s self-proclaimed role as trustee, albeit in a broader framework of representative 
democracy. Indeed, Dubow (2012) highlights that, after the 1940s, there is a significant gap 
in the ANC’s rights discourse, despite its claims to the contrary. The ANC’s formal 
commitment to rights only emerged again in 1988 with the publication of its ‘Draft 
Constitutional Guidelines’ (Brooks 2006). The significance of its absence in the interim four 
decades is traced in the forthcoming chapters.  
While the ANC’s paternalism may have remained, its liberal democratic rights discourse 
(reflected in ‘Africans Claims’) was being challenged by both Africanist and Communist 
strands (Dubow 2012: 20). Dubow argues that radical Africanists within the Youth League 
‘rejected’ non-racialism, while communists were ‘disdainful’ of the ‘bourgeois’ character of 
human rights that “neglected the primacy of class-based oppression” (ibid.). I would also 
contend, however, that African nationalism itself posed a challenge to political pluralism. In 
1948 the Youth League described its understanding of African nationalism as follows: 
“The historic task of African Nationalism ... is the building of a self-
confident and strong African Nation in South Africa. Therefore African 
Nationalism transcends the narrow limits imposed by any particular 
sectional organisation ... The germ of its growth was first sown within the 
bosom of the African National Congress, and it found its clear 
crystallisation in the Congress Youth League. It should now find concrete 
expression in the creation of a single national front”. (ANCYL 1948) 
The ‘self-confidence’ referred to here, reflects the Youth League’s push for increased mass 
action in challenging the state. Its notion of African nationalism as ‘crystallising’ in the Youth 
League and requiring the creation of a ‘single national front’ also reinforced a view of the 
ANC as the leading vehicle in that process. Congress’ concern after 1940 to root itself 
amongst a mass following, served the purpose of consolidating its position as the African 
opposition to government. The ANC’s earlier claim to be “the mouthpiece of the African 
people” (1941) was borne out in the Youth League’s manifesto:  
“... the League will be a coordinating agency for all youthful forces employed in 
rousing popular political consciousness and fighting oppression and reaction. It 
will educate the people politically by concentrating its energies on the African 
homefront to make all sections of our people Congress-minded and nation-
conscious”. (ANCYL 1944) 
Notably this shift in the ANC’s approach toward becoming a ‘mass movement’ did not beget 
a concurrent shift toward consultation with its new mass base, either on the form that mass 
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structures might take or the content and aims of the struggle. Critics of Burkean trusteeship 
argue that where representatives are “pure trustees, no democratic element remains, and 
… [they] are little more than paternalistic aristocrats” (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 8). If 
we apply theoretical frameworks, such as Arnstein’s ladder (1967) or IAP2’s spectrum 
(2000), then the form of representation that the League espoused does not yet correspond 
with any degree of ‘participation’ per se.  Political influence was to be achieved not by 
introducing participatory or consultative structures but by “rousing popular consciousness” 
and by making all people “Congress-minded” (ANCYL 1944).  
The idea of trusteeship was reinforced by emerging conceptions of the popular will as being 
not only collectivebut easily discernible by the trustee. This bolstered the portrayal of ‘true’ 
African nationals as being collectively in agreement. At the meeting of the committee to 
produce Africans’ Claims in 1943, Xuma, despite his predominantly Christian liberal outlook, 
affirmed the importance of unity and the smoothing over of differences: “In a mass 
liberation movement there is no room for divisions or for personal ambitions. The goal is 
one, namely, freedom for all. It should be the central and only aim for [sic] objective of all 
true African nationals” (ANC 1943). 
The advent of the Youth League did not, however, augur any greater ideological clarity. 
There remained a diversity of viewpoints within the movement, something that Gerhart 
argues contributed to the ambiguity of many of its policies (1978: 71). By the close of the 
Second World War, the ANC housed a variety of influences: Christianity, liberalism, African 
nationalism and Marxism. The spread of Marxist ideas, underpinned by a belief in the 
inevitability of socialism and homogeneity of the working class, were penetrating some 
members of Congress. Gerhart in fact argues that “Christian morality” was the ideological 
assumption that remained “most firmly rooted” and uncontested within Congress (1978: 
99).  
I would add, however, that the idea that continued to underpin ANC democratic theory and 
practice was trusteeship. Indirectly, both the traditions of African Nationalism and Marxism 
– which grew in influence as the 1940s progressed – in fact sustained its values and ideas. 
Moreover, it is possible to see that the form of trusteeship embraced by the ANC during its 
earlier years began gradually to break loose from the framework of a democratic system, 
merging instead into a notion of trusteeship that located the ANC ‘above politics’. 
Emerging discourses of African nationalism and, more gradually, Marxism-Leninism 
facilitated this shift, such that the ANC’s self-identification became that of a trustee whose 
role and legitimacy transcended democratic contestation. Over the coming years these 
intellectual influences shifted the principle of trusteeship from a form of representative 
(albeit thin) democracy to the fulfilment of an historic role. With the movement’s transition 
to exile after 1960, trusteeship would more visibly take the form of vanguardism. 
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2.1.2. Origins of ‘Participation’ 
The emergence of nationalist thinking not only existed alongside liberalism and Marxism but 
overlapped with them as well. A confusing amalgam of ideas emerged amongst the Youth 
Leaguers. Jordan Ngubane (who would later become a member of the Liberal Party) 
represented, according to Walshe, a more liberal element, wary of “state domination” and 
retaining concern for the protection of individual rights (1987: 354). Anton Lembede and 
A.P. Mda, however, clung to earlier iterations of liberal thought while combining it with 
revolutionary socialist language and asserting the need for African strength as an 
autonomous force for self-determination (Lembede 1946; Mda 1948).  
It was from Lembede, as the Youth League’s first President in 1944, that a brand of 
nationalism emerged which would influence the next generation of leaders (Gerhart 1978: 
78). Lembede’s ideas built on Africanist traditions rooted in the independence and unity of 
the African nation and the assertion of African identity and self-confidence (ibid.: 54-64).  
The theoretical understanding of mass organisation encompassed in African nationalism 
invoked mass support as the bedrock of Congress organisation. This involved an 
acknowledgement that, as trustee of the African majority, Congress needed to be rooted in 
their numerical strength.  
Karis and Carter argue that the relationship between African nationalists and others on the 
Left were often “extraordinarily complex” (1973: 107). In the 1946 ‘Policy of the Congress 
Youth League’, Lembede, for example, referred specifically to “African socialism” emerging 
after national freedom (Lembede 1946). The line between Marxist and nationalist influences 
thus became somewhat blurred, and while the ‘foreign’ imposition of a class analysis was 
rejected, the specific content of ‘African socialism’ was left undefined in Youth League 
discourse (ANCYL 1948). Although Lembede was clear that the “immediate task” was 
national liberation (1946), looking at the features of Africanism as an ideological framework 
Leatt (et al) argue that its “economic basis” was socialism (1986: 94).  
During the late 1940s, Marxist thought began to have a more discernible impact in ANC 
circles, and from 1948 the policy of apartheid and state repression of anti-government 
forces increasingly united many nationalists and Communists (Walshe 1987: 358-9). Marxist 
influence was by no means uncontested during this period: division over Marxism by 1959 
would in fact result in the breakaway of the ANC’s Africanist faction and formation of the 
Pan-African Congress (PAC). What can be claimed, however, is that by 1949 conservative 
‘realism’ in the ANC was being replaced by a more militant radicalism. 
The Youth League’s 1949 Programme of Action called for passive resistance via boycotts, 
strikes, civil disobedience and other forms of non-cooperation (ANCYL 1949). However, as 
Gerhart argues, it also re-stated the aims of the ANC without clarifying the detail or content 
of goals such as ‘national freedom’, ‘political independence’ and ‘self-determination’ (1978: 
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82). The significance of the ‘Programme of Action’ for emergent ideas about democracy is 
its implied characterization of ‘participation’ as ‘mobilisation’, and the supposition that 
“mass protest, boycotts and passive resistance would in fact create the basis of mass 
support” [emphasis added] (Walshe 1987: 351).  
Underpinning Congress’ aspirations to create a mass membership was the instilling of 
popular political consciousness - a characteristic that fits with the suggestion that nationalist 
ideologies are themselves conscientising in aspiration (Leatt et al 1986: 153). However the 
strategic shift within the ANC toward of a view of mass mobilisation as instrumental in 
achieving liberation was a product of both an African nationalist framework and currents of 
Marxism-Leninism. Increased focus in the ANC on the role of mobilisation coincided with the 
softening of anti-communist sentiment (Walshe 1987: 358-9) and an emerging overlap in 
thought and personnel between the movement and the (then) CPSA.  
Both ideologies found affinity in conscientisation and collectivity: African nationalism 
espoused a self-confident but collective understanding of the African people, underpinned 
by a belief in a united will – albeit one that needing rousing by movement. Marxism-
Leninism, not dissimilarly, was underpinned by socialism’s historic inevitability and the role 
of a political vanguard in leading the working class to these ends. Just as Marxist-Leninists 
believed that the masses would come to see the desirability of socialism, so, too, did 
Lembede’s African nationalism assume a “natural” striving amongst the masses toward 
“unity and national self-assertion” (Gerhart 1978: 78-9). For Lembede, whose ideas inspired 
the Youth Leaguers that followed, it was the “true instincts” of the people toward 
nationalism that “would be the binding force linking leaders in an invincible alliance with the 
masses” (ibid.: 79). Both traditions contributed to an emerging conception of democracy, 
based on an ‘idea’ of popular involvement, neither of which was fundamentally democratic.   
The ANC’s founding notions of trusteeship during the earlier decades did not peter out with 
the rise of new ideologies. Rather, trusteeship came to form the foundation on which its 
ideas of representative democracy lay. Indirectly, African nationalism and Marxism 
sustained its values. As the ANC adapted to exile - aligning itself increasingly with the SACP - 
the notion of trusteeship became more clearly visible as vanguardism. What was challenged 
by the Youth Leaguers, however, was the notion that trusteeship be accompanied by mass 
passivity. With the mobilisation and moulding of a “Congress-minded” following (ANCYL 
1944), they rather envisaged that the masses be engaged as active participants.  
2.2. Participation through Mass Movement Politics 
By the 1950s the ANC had emerged as “the major extra-parliamentary organisation in the 
struggle against apartheid” (Everatt 2009: 72), and with the banning of the CPSA in 1950, 
many more radical Africans found a home in the ANC (Gerhart 1978: 87; Karis & Carter, 
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1973: 407). Although a variety of intellectual influences were gaining ground in the 
movement, there was, as yet, no indication of a clearly articulated democratic discourse.  
The ANC’s articulation of a general principle of ‘direct representation’ does not appear to 
have referred to anything more radical than democracy in a representative, parliamentary 
form. However, in the absence of a corresponding commitment to political pluralism and 
individual rights, neither did this imply representative democracy in a liberal democratic 
sense. A medley of ideologies thus continued to characterise the ANC throughout the 1950s, 
with radical African nationalism and Marxism-Leninism emerging as dominant. 
2.2.1. New Theoretical Influences: Colonialism of a Special Type  
The reconstitution of the CPSA as the SACP in 195328 was surrounded by debate amongst 
leading Party theorists over the extent to which the class basis of communist ideology could 
be reconciled with the growth of both African nationalism and the ANC’s populartity. The 
solution was found in the theory of ‘Colonialism of a Special Type (CST). The starting point of 
the CST thesis was the unique conditions of South Africa: “the characteristics of both an 
imperialist state and colony within a single, indivisible, geographical, political and economic 
entity ...” (SACP 1950 cited in Everatt 2009: 90). As such, the SACP argued, non-white South 
Africa was a colony of white South Africa (SACP 1962).  
The CST thesis adapted Marxist theory to South African conditions, arguing that the 
deliberate suppression of the growth of an African bourgeoisie had resulted in relatively 
little class differentiation within the African population itself. Correspondingly, the 
emergence of a united working class of both blacks and whites was stunted by apartheid’s 
labour legislation. Consequently, the struggle against oppression in South Africa had a 
naturally national as opposed to class character. The concept of CST was first developed by 
the Comintern in the 1920s, encompassing an early articulation of the two-stage theory of 
revolution. Despite the national liberation movements’ often ‘bourgeois’ leadership, it was 
through this theory that Moscow foresaw a role for them in the struggle for socialism. The 
‘special type’ of colonialism that existed in South Africa, it was argued, “called for an 
independent native South African republic as a stage towards a workers’ and peasants’ 
republic with full, equal rights for all races” (Executive Committee of the Communist 
International 1928).29  
Although it was not until 1962 that the SACP endorsed CST formally, during the 1950s some 
leading SACP theorists were arguing that there was a role for the small African bourgeoisie 
                                                          
28
 Although the SACP formed in the early 1950s, its existence was not made public until 1960 (Bernstein 1999: 
134) 
29
 For an account of the theoretical influence of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and origins of the 
emergence of the concept of internal colonialism (or ‘the native republic thesis’), see Drew (2000). 
59 
 
(SACP 1962; Drew 1997: 25-26; Everatt 2009: 93; Lazerson 1994: 126-129). They came to 
view the ANC as a movement essentially in a ‘transitional’ phase, in which the influence of 
the working class was becoming increasingly visible (Everatt 2009: 93-94).30 Through the 
SACP’s two-stage theory, national liberation would form a first and necessary stage in the 
transition to socialism. Only under the conditions of what was referred to as ‘national 
democracy’ – a stage that is both ‘non-capitalist’ and ‘socialist-oriented’ (Hudson 1987: 54) 
– could the way be paved for a socialist future and an eventual state of communism.  
The ANC therefore saw itself as engaged in a ‘National Democratic Revolution’ (NDR) for 
political freedom. Within the movement, there remained some division over the two stage 
theory, between those who foresaw national democracy as an end point in itself  or as part 
of an advancing process in the broader socialist struggle (Sithole & Ndlovu 2004: 193). What 
concerns us here is the extent to which adherence to NDR and the two-stage theory had an 
influence on its understanding of democracy.   
The subsequent chapters include analysis of the democratic implications of the NDR. It is 
worth stating here, however, that the concepts of a two-stage theory and national 
democracy are underpinned by a theory of historical direction. While there is nothing 
inherently undemocratic in this, under conditions of democracy - for which the ANC was 
fighting - such a programme must be subject to popular contestation. Should a ‘correct’ or 
pre-ordained path be assumed, then claims to the exercise of a democratic will - whether 
representative or participatory - are undermined by the presence of a ‘truth’ (See Hudson 
1986). Here, the danger posed is that discussion and the involvement of citizens in decision-
making about the future become surplus to requirements.  
Either way, the 1950s represented an emergence of Marxist thinking in the ANC that 
became more prominent after 1960. Even the liberal-inclined ANC President, Chief Albert 
Luthuli, in 1953, claimed that the ANC “can well regard itself as being the vanguard of the 
movement in the Union” [emphasis added] (1953). It was in this context of dual ideology 
that the inter-organisational alliance of ANC and SACP grew. In addition to this relationship, 
however, the various mass actions that took place during the 1950s also provide some 
indication of how democratic thought was evolving in practice.  
2.2.2. Participation qua Mobilisation 
Designed as a programme of resistance against apartheid laws and institutions, culminating 
in mass action, the Defiance Campaign invoked the extra-legal tactics and mass action 
proposed in the Youth League’s ‘Programme of Action’. It drew on the numerical strength of 
the African majority as a method of wearing down the state (Gerhart 1978: 89), as well as 
                                                          
30
 Interestingly, ANC MP, Ben Turok, wrote in 2010 that “Historically there has been little friction between the 
Marxist conception of the ANC as an alliance of a variety of class forces and the movement’s self-perception as 
the principal vehicle of national liberation” (2010: 10).  
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on Gandhi’s principles of non-violent passive resistance through mass protest (O’Malley 
2008: 61-62). On the one hand, the Defiance Campaign was successful in a number of ways, 
increasing ANC membership from just 7 000 to over 100 000 (Kathrada 2004: 107), and not 
only “[politicising] thousands of Africans” but instilling in them a “self-confidence and 
discipline” (Karis and Carter 1973: 403) that underpinned the nationalist discourse of self-
reliance.  
What the Defiance Campaign is able to tell us about democratic thought, specifically, 
however, suggests two things. Firstly, people were not mobilised around a coherent 
ideology. Rather, this remained vague amongst the senior Congress leadership (Gerhart 
1978: 91, 93) and reflected the ANC’s concern to mobilise a wide range of interests. 
Secondly, the issues on which the campaign was based were not derived from an 
understanding of the practical issues affecting the targeted communities. Gerhart notes that 
“action had to be centred around issues capable of inspiring mass enthusiasm” yet “the 
choice of such issues ... lay predominantly with the African leadership, not with the masses 
themselves” (1978: 90).  
The assumption that Africans would naturally come to recognise the need for the ANC’s 
leadership, is reflected in the Joint Planning Council’s programme for the Defiance 
Campaign (ANC 1951). This document, which notably already carries suggestions of 
vanguardism, remarked that ‘mass action’ would “gradually embrace larger groups of 
people, permeate both the rural and urban areas and make possible for us to organise, 
discipline and lead the people in a planned manner” (ibid.). The ANC’s positioning of itself 
during this period led Lodge to argue that the movement viewed the struggles of the 1950s 
as “a manifestation of the general will” (1983: 92).  
In a fascinating study of localised struggles in the early 1950s, Lodge observed that during 
resistance against the Sophiatown force removals, the ANC’s organised resistance against 
the removals lacked communication between organisers and residents, and assumed a level 
of unanimity amongst local residents (1983: 107-8). A similar failure to account for local 
heterogeneity and stratification is evidenced in the 1957 Alexandra bus boycott, where 
there were divisions in the Alexandra People’s Transport Committee between the ANC’s 
liberal and more militant Africanist strands (Lodge 1983: 160). Lodge also notes that the 
movement did not place any apparent value on “the process of popular decision-making” 
which he argues had come to play an important part in the boycott (1983: 171). He suggests 
that the ANC leaders “did not attempt in any real sense to ‘institutionalise’ the popular 
power, the popular political participation, that had developed out of the boycott” (1983: 
171). These Transvaal struggles suggest a practice within the ANC of mobilising around 
particular issues without establishing longer-term democratic structures to outlast the 
campaigns themselves. 
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Two points are worth making as regards the roots and impact of localised resistance. Firstly, 
although the Youth Leaguers were indeed pushing new ideas about mass action and 
mobilisation, the forerunner to this was undertaken independently of the ANC by black 
labour, who organised around a new form of resistance politics not previously seen in the 
strategy of the liberation movement. The 1946 mineworkers’ strike, for example, showed 
the power of militant strike action over the minimum wage and working conditions, pushing 
the ANC to assert that the masses were ready for such action.  
In 1948, violence was used by a local community in rural Ciskei against headmen, local 
Chiefs and government officials over terms of land ownership (NEUM 1951 cited in Matoti 
and Ntsebeza 2004: 177). The affected community formed “Location Committees ... in order 
to assert their right to decide how they should own their land” (ibid.). Not dissimilarly, 
during the rural revolts in Mpondoland in 1960, people took action into their own hands by 
forming Committees and Sub-Committees in antithesis to the state’s tribal authorities as a 
result of the lack of popular consultation (Matoti and Ntsebeza 2004: 185; Meli 1988: 136). 
While the procedures and practices which would make this activity ‘democratic’ are not 
detailed, it nonetheless reflected locally-driven organisation in which people were asserting 
their right to participate in the decisions that affect their lives.  
The second point to note is that the democratic dividend that could be derived from the 
process of mass action does not yet appear to have been recognised by the ANC. In an 
extract from his Presidential address to the Transvaal ANC in 1953, Mandela stated that “the 
general political level of the people has been considerably raised ... [and] ... The ties 
between the working people and the Congress have been greatly strengthened” (1953). 
However these ties were a short-term result of mobilisation rather than sustained 
participation. Natal Indian Congress (NIC) President, Monty Naicker, later commented that, 
although “during the previous chapters in our struggle we were able to rouse people by 
mass propaganda … [A]t the cessation of our activities we lost support and general interest 
in the struggle waned” (1985 cited in Everatt 2009: 173). 
It was this disconnect from the people, and the movement’s confessed lack of direction 
(Luthuli 1953 cited in Everatt 2009:173), that led to proposals by Congress leadership for the 
development of a ‘people’s charter’ and a plan to co-ordinate and organise the ANC into a 
stronger, more tightly structured organisation. 
2.3. Participation and the Freedom Charter 
This time we would not be campaigning for our own ready-made programme but 
searching for a national consensus. In today’s jargon, we would be setting out to 
‘empower people’. (Lionel ‘Rusty’ Bernstein 1999: 149). 
The aftermath of the Defiance Campaign saw the formal establishment in 1953 of the 
Congress Alliance – a multi-racial grouping under the leadership of the ANC of the South 
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African Indian Congress (SAIC), South Africa Coloured People’s Organisation (SACPO), the 
South Africa Congress of Democrats (SACOD)31 and South African Congress of Trade Unions 
(SACTU). The content of a people’s charter was to be formulated through a Congress of the 
People (COP). The COP campaign was hailed by many leading ANC figures as marking a 
change or ‘shift’ in Congress thought and practice toward a new era of mass participation. 
Rusty Bernstein, a member of SACOD and a figure heavily involved in drawing up the 
Charter, hailed it as a significant moment for the ANC and Congress Alliance in changing its 
view of democratic practice: “It meant campaigning in a radically new way - no longer telling 
people: ‘This is what we stand for! Support us!’ But instead asking them: ‘What do you 
want? What should we be fighting for?’ It required that they listen to and learn from the 
people rather than exhort or instruct them”. (1999: 148) 
Similarly, Alfred Nzo asserted that “ ... the Congress of the People came as the culmination 
of the most widespread and thorough canvassing of opinion, of the most truly democratic 
process South Africa had ever witnessed” (Nzo 1980). Did the COP represent a change in 
ANC democratic thought: a shift toward a participatory form of democracy that set out to 
‘empower’ people? And can the Freedom Charter tell us anything about the ANC’s vision of 
a future democratic state? The section that follows considers these questions by looking at 
both the process of the COP campaign and the content of the Freedom Charter. 
2.3.1. The Campaign: Consultation as Mobilisation 
In order to regenerate popular mobilisation following the Defiance campaign, then Cape 
ANC President, ZK Matthews proposed the idea of “a National Convention, a CONGRESS OF 
THE PEOPLE, representing all the people of this country irrespective of race or colour to 
draw up a FREEDOM CHARTER for the DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA OF THE FUTURE” 
[capitals in original] (Matthews 1953). The campaign was intended to gather ideas as part of 
a consultative process. Popular demands were collected by teams of organisers from across 
the Congress Alliance and collated by a committee headed by Rusty Bernstein (Everatt 2009: 
189).  
Accounts of the demands collated reflect the ordinary realities of those consulted, 
addressing issues such as “homes, jobs, living standards, civil liberties” (Bernstein 1999: 
150). Only a few, according to Bernstein, were “carefully formulated opinions about such 
general issues as the economy, civil rights, democracy and racism” (ibid.). The diversity of 
attendees at the COP (Karis & Carter 1977: 61) suggests that attendance was more broadly 
representative of South African society than any preceding event. There are suggestions, 
                                                          
31
 SACOD was a white organisation on the democratic left formed in 1953 to provide a vehicle for whites to 
support the liberation struggle. As many members of the banned CPSA joined SACOD, it was often accused by 
liberals and Africanists of being dominated and controlled by communists.  For an account that challenges this 
perception, see Everatt (2009: 98-122). 
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however, that its content took second place to the popular mood and mobilisation which 
the broader campaign sought to ignite. Z.K. Matthews himself described the underlying aim 
of the COP as “the instilling of political consciousness into the people and the encouraging 
of political activity” (undated, Karis & Carter 1977: 57).32 In his autobiography, Rusty 
Bernstein took this further and spoke of the demands collated during the campaign as 
follows:  
“We stuffed them away in an old cabin trunk, just as we received them, to 
be pondered over later – not for lack of seriousness but because at that 
stage, the Charter seemed far off. We were concentrating on the COP itself 
... the Charter seemed to be the incidental spin-off from the new political 
culture of listening to and learning from the people. Tacitly we deferred 
collating the demands into a draft Charter in order to focus on what 
seemed like the core issue”. (1999: 150)  
Yet if the Charter itself was to reflect the will and input of all South Africans, marking a new 
culture of ‘listening to’ and ‘learning from’ people, then its content would surely be the 
focus. It would not be merely a ‘spin off’, as Bernstein states elsewhere (1988 in Everatt 
2009: 175). Yet the central aim of the campaign appears, rather, to have been mobilisation 
coined as ‘consultation’. A quote from Joe Slovo at a meeting of the COP National Action 
Committee (NAC) in 1954, refers to the campaign’s “main aims as being mobilisation, 
organisation and instilling in the people a ‘Freedom Consciousness’” (Everatt 2009: 170). 
While we might liken the approach to ‘informing’ or ‘consulting’ citizens - helping them to 
understand problems and inviting their opinions (Arnstein 1969) - its objectives were 
mobilisation and conscientisation. A 1954 report of the ANC NEC which hailed the most 
powerful ‘form’ of struggle as that of “the power and will of the people” (ANC NEC 1954), 
also suggested that ‘the people’s will’ be ascertained via mobilisation: “We must ... organise 
the people properly, politicise and activise them and lead them against the forces of fascism 
and reaction” (ibid.). Everatt’s conclusion thus seems particularly apt: that “the COP 
campaign was the culmination of a particular strategy ... [of] ... using popular participation 
in the production of documented statements of principle as tools of mobilisation and 
organisation. (2009: 170).  
This is by no means to overlook the broader political context in which the ANC operated: 
popular movement was restricted and activists faced banning orders and threats of arrest 
for public participation. In such a context, the Congresses could do little other than mobilise 
around popular concerns. The use of the ‘public meeting’ is reflective of intentions to 
‘consult’ (IAP2 2000). The COP also sought to ignite awareness amongst a population lacking 
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 Although this extract is undated, it is taken from a memorandum by Z.K. Matthews prepared for the defense 
in the Treason Trial. We can thus surmise that it was written circa 1956/7. 
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in capacity to organise through linking the daily symptoms of inequality to their roots in the 
broader political system. As such, it could also be compared to participation as ‘informing’ 
through helping people to understand problems and possible solutions (Arnstein 1969; IAP2 
2000).  The claim that the movement realised a shift in its democratic thought at that stage, 
however, does seems rather spurious. 
2.3.2. The Charter: Mobilising and Unifying 
“...the clarity and correctness of the ideas of the Freedom Charter testify to 
the revolutionary maturity of those responsible for drawing up the Charter 
– the people of South Africa”. (Alfred Nzo 1980) 
What, then, of the content of the Charter? Can the demands collated tell us anything about 
the ANC’s ideas for a future democratic state? Since its launch in 1955, the Freedom Charter 
has instigated debate about the detail behind its demands. The clause demanding ‘The 
People Shall Govern’ is of the most immediate relevance here. Sketching an ambiguous 
picture of democratic institutions, the Charter asserts that “All bodies of minority rule, 
advisory boards, councils and authorities shall be replaced by democratic organs of self-
government” (1955). Do these organs then refer to institutions of direct democracy? Could 
they be likened to the ‘soviets’ (workers’ councils), admired by the SACP? Or do we place 
too much emphasis on the content of the Charter to explain ANC democratic thought? 
Karis and Carter have argued that the Charter was merely a restatement of Congress’ 
previous aims (1977: 63) - remaining largely liberal in content and continuing to emphasise 
freedom within the realm of representative institutions. The demand that “Every man and 
woman shall have the right to vote for and stand as a candidate for all bodies which make 
laws” (1955) suggests features of representative democracy. Yet there is no qualification 
that this is representative in a liberal democratic sense. It is even less clear whether the 
model implied in ‘democratic organs of self-government’ is that of representative or direct 
democracy.  
One of the most detailed re-collections of the drafting of the Charter belongs to Rusty 
Bernstein. As the day of the COP neared, Bernstein gave the following account: “It was 
urgent that we turn our thousands of bits of paper into a draft freedom charter. We had 
delayed to the last moment largely because no one had any idea about how it was to be 
done. We had neither precedent nor plan. The Working Committee decided it was ‘just a 
writing job’ and handed it to me” (1999: 153). 
His account of compiling the Charter alone is at odds with his earlier accounts: in an 
interview in 1987, Bernstein claimed that “the content of the Charter was a matter of 
concern to the leadership of the national liberation movement as a whole, and that it was 
pondered over for some time” (Vadi 1995: 151). Vadi also refers to the statement of an 
anonymous activist that: “There was substantial collective input by the leadership from all 
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organisations … a great deal of discussion had taken place beforehand” (cited in Vadi 1995: 
151). In his autobiography, however, Bernstein asserts that he just got “a general flavour” of 
the demands and then stuffed them back into the box (1999: 154), “using those demands 
which seemed to fit, and discarding those which did not” (Ibid.)  
The demands also seemed to carry unequal weight. Bernstein himself commented: “This 
was not a straw poll where every demand counted equally with every other” (ibid.). He also 
confessed that “the most difficult part of the exercise was to keep ... [his] ... own opinions 
from determining the final draft” (1999: 154). A member of the underground SACP, 
Bernstein expressed his bias towards a socialist economy. But he mentions nothing of his 
views of democratic structures other than to say that “On many of the topics covered by the 
‘demands’ I had strong views of my own” (ibid: 154-155). He did admit, however, that the 
writing of the charter “required that a compromise or a consensus be read from – or read 
into – what was on the paper” (ibid: 155). 
At the COP itself, a discussion of the meaning of ‘democratic organs of self-government’ 
does not seem to have taken place. Speakers referred to participation in parliament (COP 
1955) but provided no other description of the envisioned ‘forms’ that self-government 
might take. There was certainly no reference to direct democratic institutions. However, in a 
fascinating discussion by Lazerson about the role of the white Congress of Democrats (COD), 
he refers to a series of lectures and discussion notes produced by the COD in the run-up to 
the COP campaign. One of these dealt directly with the institution of Parliament as an 
instrument of the ruling class (Lazerson 1994: 122). In its place the lecture advocated the 
construction of “a People’s Democracy” (ibid). Saul Dubow highlights the theoretical 
significance of this rejection of parliamentary institutions given the prominent role played 
by Bernstein, a COD member, in drafting the Freedom Charter (2012: 21, 46). 
Perhaps even more intriguing is evidence presented by Lazerson (2004: 176-77) of an 
undated ‘preliminary draft Charter’ that contains a more detailed statement of the clause, 
‘The People Shall Govern’, than that which appeared in the final version. Although Lazerson 
claims that “nothing was done to alter the meaning or intent of the original” (2004: 177) the 
reference to ‘parliament’ appears to have been removed (undated, cited in Lazerson 2004: 
176-77). With regards to a participatory form of democracy, the preliminary draft did not 
refer to “democratic organs of self-government” as the final version would but instead 
asserted that “the bonds between the people, the organs of public opinion and their elected 
representatives should be close, and consultation between the people and their 
representatives should prevail at all levels and at all times” (ibid). It is not clear which actors 
made the amendments to this draft, or when precisely this took place. However it appears 
that the earlier inclusions of popular consultation, and of a form of participatory as well as 
representative democracy, were toned down and replaced with a more ambiguous 
description of future institutions. 
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Given Bernstein’s description of the writing process, it seems unlikely that the Charter was 
an accurate amalgamation of the demands received. His account suggests that it was 
written by him, not by ‘the people’ or even by a body of the ANC: “it was – temporarily – a 
creature of the Working Committee and no one else” (1999: 156). It is also probable that 
Bernstein’s own views crept into the formulation of the demands but doubtful that the 
intended meaning of the clauses were interpreted uniformly across the ANC. Mandela, for 
example, seems to have envisaged democracy in a representative sense. In an article in 
1959, he reiterated his definition of democracy as representative: “The organs of 
government must be representative; that is to say, they must be freely chosen leaders and 
representatives of the people, whose mandate must be renewed at periodic democratic 
elections” (1959).  
In his court statement during the treason trial in 1962, Mandela referred to the democratic 
form of the traditional African ‘imbizo’, ‘pitso’ or ‘kgotla’, about which he claimed “the 
council was so completely democratic that all members of the tribe could participate in its 
deliberations” (1962). Yet there are no other statements expanding on the features of such 
a participatory model, nor its desirable application in the contemporary context. Rather, in 
the very same statement, Mandela confirmed that “it certainly could never measure up to 
the demands of the present epoch” (ibid.). Elsewhere he affirmed his own admiration for 
representative self-government (1959; 1964). 
The Charter is, by no means, however, a transparent resemblance of aspirations for a liberal 
democratic future. Although there was nothing by 1955 to suggest that the ANC had 
jettisoned a commitment to representative institutions, the Charter makes no mention of 
mechanisms to cater for political competition and alternatives, nor is it explicit about the 
place of individual rights beyond those of groups or races. Dubow rather argues that the 
rights espoused in the Freedom Charter are ‘substantive’ rather than ‘procedural’ (2012: 
22).  
Given the debate and division over the Charter’s layers of meaning, it is perhaps safer to 
assume that it has continued to mean whatever individuals choose it to. The contention that 
its ambiguity can be explained by one of its main objectives – to unite the disparate strands 
of the movement through a “unifying ideological statement” (Everatt 2009: 175) – carries 
considerable weight. The lack of indication of the ANC’s vision for a future state reflects 
both the underdevelopment of its democratic thought at that stage, and a deliberate 
strategy to broaden the alliance of forces under its hegemony. The ANC of the mid-1950s 
could thus be described as a hybrid of multiple political persuasions. The endorsement of 
the Freedom Charter was an attempt to contain differences in the interest of unity while 
mobilising and politicising the African population. 
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2.4. Revolutionary Theory and the Popular Role 
“The people have to be drawn into the manifold tasks of the revolution. Our 
theory of revolution must become the possession of all our people”. (Joe 
Matthews 1969) 
The period following the banning of the ANC in 1960 was characterised by a number of 
shifts. Perhaps most visible was the effective formalisation of its alliance with the SACP, 
consolidated in 1961 through the founding of the armed unit, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and 
the decision to embark on armed struggle. Closely linked to this was the re-birth of the ANC 
as a revolutionary movement. The ANC’s dominance within the Congress Alliance 
accompanied its move into exile. With the decision that the exiled structures of the ANC 
would act as the “sole spokespeople” of the liberation movement, Ndebele and 
Nieftagodien suggest that the alliance became virtually defunct as a consultative body 
(2004: 578). The ANC’s assertion by 1963 that it remained “the one and only vanguard of 
the oppressed people in this county” (ANC NEC 1963) also led to a decline in internal 
democracy - a culture that was buttressed by the requirements of secrecy and discipline. 
The establishment of the ANC-in-exile as the ANC ‘proper’ also produced growing distance 
between the leadership and its support base at home. 
From the outset, the formation of an armed organisation was located in the context of 
broader political struggle and the announcement of MK’s formation situated it firmly “under 
the overall political guidance” of the national liberation movement (ANC 1961). The 
formation of an armed unit had its roots in both the anti-colonial revolutionary experience 
of Africa at the time and in Marxist revolutionary thought (Barrell 1993). The Leninist variant 
of Marxism, prominent in the SACP, often embraced violent methods as a means to seize 
power. With the commitment to armed struggle, a theoretical leadership position for the 
SACP thus undoubtedly emerged. The closeness of its alliance with the ANC is reflected in 
the militarisation of the latter’s language and the increasing visibility of Marxist theory. By 
1960, with the exception of Oliver Tambo, all of the ANC’s top leadership in exile were 
members of the SACP.33  
Despite the ANC’s pronouncements to the contrary, Barrell suggests that in reality the 
movement side-lined political organisation in favour of military struggle (1993). He 
attributes the ANC’s eventual military failure, in part, to the “overestimation of what armed 
activity was capable of achieving” but also to the ANC’s ‘appropriation’ of a “Marxist-
Leninist strategic discourse” which ‘devalued’ political activity (ibid). Operation Mayibuye 
(ANC 1963), which set out a strategy and plan for armed activity, placed little value on mass 
political participation. Overall, the ANC’s revolutionary approach reflected Marxism’s 
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 Alfred Nzo (ANC Secretary General), JB Marks (Chairman of the ANC National Executive), and Moses Kotane 
(ANC Treasurer General) were all members of the SACP. 
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simultaneous desire to ensure top-down control while cultivating bottom-up initiative 
(Femia 1993: 136). This contradiction found resonance in existing nationalist currents in 
which political participation was itself devalued to the role of mobiliser.  
2.4.1. From Trusteeship to Vanguardism 
“The people ... are led by the most trusted and tried organisation, the ANC. It 
remains the one and only vanguard of the oppressed people in this country ... 
Our primary objective is the conquest of political power, in doing so African unity 
is indispensable”. (ANC NEC 1963) 
Conditions in which the struggle took place shaped and in many ways constrained the 
development of democratic ways of organising. The embrace of revolutionary theory itself, 
however, also had implications for popular democratic involvement. As the ANC’s 
dominance with the Alliance was established, forms of political organisation became subject 
to military imperatives. Lodge’s claim that by 1961 many members of the South African 
Congress of Trade Unions (Sactu) were drawn into MK activity (1983: 197), points not only 
to the ANC’s military focus but to its disregard for the local participatory organising taking 
place within black labour. Jeremy Cronin asserts that “the ANC-SACP treated the trade union 
movement as a simple adjunct to the political struggle in the early 1960s and, when the 
arms [sic] struggle was launched, the trade union movement was seen simply as a 
recruitment terrain for guerrillas” (Interview with Helena Sheehan: 17 April 2001).  
The transfer of revolutionary authority to the ANC in exile erased any remaining semblance 
of participation by the wider Congresses, whose members were often co-opted into ANC 
structures abroad. Perhaps most tellingly, a report on ‘Problems in the Congress 
Movement’, produced by a 1966 Subcommittee formed at the behest of the ANC 
leadership, contended that “many problems could be easily resolved if the leadership of the 
ANC was fully accepted by members of the alliance” (cited in Ndebele & Nieftagodien 2004: 
583). As reflected in the quote at the opening of this section, the ANC’s conception of its 
vanguard role was also strongly asserted.  
The ANC’s theoretical position on the role of armed activity, in particular, is revealing of the 
centrality of revolutionary theory. The announcement of MK’s formation emphasised the 
ANC’s longstanding policy of non-violence but remarked “we are striking out along a new 
road ... the choice is not ours; it has been made by the Nationalist government which has 
rejected every peaceable demand by the people for rights and freedom (ANC 1961). The 
sentiment that the ANC had been left with no choice was asserted by Mandela in his 
courtroom statement during the Rivonia Trial (1964) and is verified elsewhere (Turok 2003: 
137; Slovo 1995: 152). Operation Mayibuye also referred to the white state as offering the 
people “only one choice” (ANC 1963).  
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In contrast, the position taken by the ANC in its 1969 Strategy and Tactics portrays the 
decision as a response to the requirements of revolutionary theory. The movement denies 
that it was only in 1961 that armed struggle became an alternative, instead espousing a 
Marxist-Leninist inspired understanding of a pre-destined path to victory via revolutionary 
violence. What it terms as the “so-called reformist” activities of the ANC’s earlier years are 
presented as necessary for “advancement into the new phase” of armed struggle (ANC 
1969). In Strategy and Tactics it seems to be envisaged that “the moulding of mass political 
consciousness” would lead naturally to popular recognition of both the need for armed 
action and the necessity of a leading vanguard.  
The ANC’s adoption of a revolutionary discourse also induced shifts in the conception of its 
relationship with the masses. It was during the movement’s period in exile that the earlier 
exercise of trusteeship began to manifest as vanguardism. The idea of a political ‘vanguard’ 
originates with Marxist-Leninist theory, and is particularly characteristic of revolutionary 
(often Marxist-Leninist) parties. The ANC’s conceptual shift of the mid-1940s (in which the 
notion of trusteeship-as-representative democracy merged into an understanding of 
trusteeship as external to democratic politics) laid the conceptual foundations for its further 
transition into vanguardism.  
Concurrent with the ANC’s vanguard discourse was not a jettisoning of democracy as 
representation but the advancement of a form of representation in which the 
‘representative’ was understood as not only indisputable but also chosen by history. This 
engendered not only a conception of democracy as pre-determined but of popular 
participation as requiring the vanguard’s direction. The ‘correctness’ of the ANC’s ideas – 
claimed first of the Freedom Charter (Nzo 1980) and then of its revolutionary theory (ANC 
1969) - required the mobilisation of the masses behind it.  
The following chapters of this thesis trace the significance and implications of vanguardism 
for the ANC’s understanding of participatory democracy. Chapter Three, in particular, 
explores vanguardism in detail as a dominant conceptual thread in the idea of ‘people’s 
power’, while Chapter Six discusses the survival of this discourse after 1994. It is the 1960s, 
however, to which we can trace its emergence in ANC discourse. It is worth setting out here 
the programmatic framework in which vanguardism emerged. 
2.4.2. Meshing Ideological Traditions: Marxism-Leninism and African Nationalism 
From 1969 the ANC’s revolutionary theory was situated in a dominant framework of 
Marxism-Leninism with the retention of African nationalist elements. The ANC’s 1969 
Strategy and Tactics document situated the South African struggle “within an international 
context of transition to the socialist system” while making clear that “national liberation is 
the chief content of the struggle” (ANC 1969). The document also set out the ANC’s 
adherence to the basic tenets of CST and the two-stage theory of revolution. However the 
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struggle was simultaneously contextualised within a framework of African nationalism, the 
achievement of independence in some parts of the African continent and the continuing 
struggle against colonialism and racism in others. 
While I argue that these dual nationalist and communist discourses in many respects 
reinforced one another, there was also some degree of tension. There is evidence that an 
earlier draft of Strategy and Tactics, produced by Joe Slovo (1969),34 was “corrected” by 
fellow party members Joe Matthews and Duma Nokwe prior to its adoption at Morogoro 
(Matthews 2008: 30). This is perhaps a reflection of the differences of opinion within the 
Party itself, possibly between African and non-African members. The contextualising of the 
South African struggle amongst broader African struggles for independence is left out of 
Slovo’s draft. In contrast, the final report placed significance not only on the alliance with 
the SACP but with the Zimbabwean African People’s Union (ZAPU) and the strategic role of 
pan-African unity amongst the region’s national liberation movements (ANC 1969). It also 
omitted the danger, inferred in Slovo’s version, that South Africa might follow the fate of 
other independent African states where little had been done to advance their societies 
toward socialism (Slovo, 1969: 22). Slovo had alluded to the risk of the white bourgeoisie 
being merely replaced by a black bourgeoisie should revolution not proceed through both 
‘stages’. The final document, however, reiterated the ANC’s observance of both Marxist-
Leninist and African nationalist thought. 
Despite these nuances, Strategy and Tactics made clear a number of points about the 
synergy of military and political activity; the importance of revolutionary theory in guiding 
strategy; and the conquest of power as the end goal of struggle. Within this framework, two 
themes emerged: the need to ‘mould’ political consciousness to the necessity and 
correctness of armed struggle; and a conception of the popular role as being an enabler for 
the seizure of power. The ANC was guided not merely by pragmatic considerations in the 
face of state repression but by theoretical considerations as to the best framework for the 
conquest of power.  
However, despite the need to retain contact with home, the ANC’s conception of mass 
activity still did not draw on local experiences, views or conditions. Instead, organisational 
practice implied a top-down transmission of ideas from vanguard to people, requiring 
communication of the Morogoro conference’s “perspectives and decisions” in order to 
mobilise the masses (Matthews 1969: 5). It also, to a degree, foreclosed democratic space, 
making reference to the falling by the wayside of those leaders not willing to move with the 
hidden powers of history - those who the ANC refers to as “unable to adjust to the new 
revolutionary mood” (ANC 1969). As such, the movement claimed, “a departure in this 
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 The document is an annotated copy by Joe Slovo written in March 1969 before the ANC’s First Consultative 
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direction [of armed struggle] is correct, necessary and, in the true sense, revolutionary” 
(ibid). By 1970 the influence of Marxism-Leninism was unmistakable.  
It is worth adding, however, that the ANC was aware of differences of opinion within its own 
ranks. It sought to contain this, however, through the construction of an ‘authoritative 
organ’ to prosecute the revolution under ANC leadership (Matthews 1969). Such a structure 
seems to have been envisaged as directing mass action and opinion toward that which was 
theoretically correct. The extent to which the ANC’s external mission became dominated or 
controlled by the SACP or individual communists is not a debate for which there is space 
here. Views about the nature of this relationship can be found elsewhere.35 Several points 
are worth making, however, about the extent to which Marxism-Leninism was internalised 
by the ANC and thus influenced its theory and practice.  
Analysis of the ANC’s language at this time certainly suggests a growing influence of these 
ideas. The movement’s hierarchical and centralising tendencies, which became most 
apparent in exile, can be attributed, in part, to the closeness of its working relationship with 
the SACP and the latter’s own modus operandi. This was reinforced by the cross-fertilisation 
of personnel between the two organisations. Their lineage can also, however, be traced to 
the ANC’s roots in African nationalism. The nationalist tradition itself promoted a 
conception of participation as mobilisation. It also continued to employ longstanding ideas 
of trusteeship in which the ANC represents people and nation.  
Broader pan-African influences, which drew on anti-colonial sentiment and the ideology of 
African socialism were also gaining ground in other parts of the continent. It is not clear 
from the ANC’s commentary to what extent African Socialism in Tanzania, for example – 
where the ANC based itself from 1963 – left imprints on its ideology. It was, however, a 
primarily nationalist ideology which claimed to correspond to the traditions and roots of 
African society (Leatt et al 1986: 153). Leatt (et al) argue that it is an ideology of 
“conscientisation” - “a socialism planned by an elite for the people”, in which Parliamentary 
democracy is generally seen as unable to provide sufficient leadership (ibid). Once the ANC 
was in exile, these formative ideas, of the people as a cohesive whole whose natural 
instincts would lead them to nationalism, were combined with the SACP’s ideas of 
‘democratic centralism’ and the necessity of a leading vanguard. With the growing influence 
of Leninist thought, therefore, trusteeship eventually emerged as vanguardism. 
It is undoubtable that the Party’s access to military resources bolstered its influence in 
formulating strategy. The reports and resolutions of the Morogoro Conference themselves 
testify to that. However, notions of an SACP take-over seem somewhat simplistic. Such 
control implies an act of imposition and a movement vulnerable to domination. I would 
argue that the formulation of ideas and their translation into practice required something 
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more than this: it required that the ANC adopt many of the tendencies of Marxist-Leninist 
thought in its own right. 
Reflecting on the more recent past, the SACP’s marginalisation after 1990 can be seen as 
not only a result of global ideological shifts and the discrediting of the former Soviet bloc 
but also of the ANC’s transposition of itself (and not the Party) as the political ‘vanguard’ of 
the people. Fundamentally, this entailed the ANC’s own adoption of the Marxist-Leninist 
view, which complemented existing nationalist ideas, that the people’s role can only be 
realised through the leadership of a vanguard movement.  
This is of course not to say that the SACP leadership did not seek to win-over non-Party 
comrades or increase its own influence. The SACP’s emphasis, however, on the leading role 
of the working class in the struggle for socialism (SACP 1962) must be understood within the 
framework of its two-stage theory. An internal memo of the SACP Central Committee in 
1967 stated: “the task of building such a society cannot even begin until the people are free 
from national oppression ... the paramount duty of the South African Communist Party 
today is to participate in and support the struggle for freedom in our country whose main 
content is freedom of the African people (SACP CC 1967) 
There were also conflicting allegiances of dual ANC-SACP membership. Barrell points to Joe 
Slovo and Yusuf Dadoo’s concern “to counter a tendency which they had detected among 
Africa-based SACP cadres to submerge the party almost totally within the ANC” (1993). The 
result of the dual loyalties of many SACP members was that democratic centralism in the 
vanguard Party competed with the requirements of loyalty to the vanguard ANC. Shubin 
argues that Tambo, who by 1965 was acting president, saw no need for the creation in exile 
of organised Party units. Rather, his view was that attempts to return to South Africa should 
be undertaken “as the ANC” (1999: 113-114).  
The conceptual framework of National Democratic Revolution (NDR), in which the focus of 
the struggle remained on the first stage, allowed the development and later retention of the 
ANC’s vanguard position. The Party was effectively dependent on the ANC for the realisation 
of a ‘second stage’. OR Tambo’s suggestion in a discussion between a delegation of the 
Party’s CC and the ANC NEC,36 summarised by Ndlovu, that the “sensible move for the SACP, 
as an ally, [would be] to accept the ANC’s vanguard role”, on the grounds that the African 
masses were “not yet mobilised into a socialist way of thinking” (Ndlovu, 2004: 453) reflects 
a view of the ANC, and not the Party, as vanguard.  
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2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has identified several key points that provide context and conceptual framing 
for analysis of the subsequent decades. By the 1970s, the process of mass struggle (both 
political and military) was viewed by the movement as instrumental to achieving liberation. 
The ANC’s shift toward mobilisation and mass movement politics in the 1950s was thus 
consolidated over subsequent decades through the development of a revolutionary theory 
focused on the conquest of state power. While this theorisation was characterised by the 
growing influence of Marxism-Leninism, it was also supported by the ANC’s nationalist 
heritage which itself contained characteristics of a top-down theory of organisation. 
Although African nationalism elevated a role for the masses, this was viewed as needing to 
take place through a process of conscientisation which could only be brought to the people 
from without by a dedicated leadership.  
Exile conditions of course imposed on the ANC a modus operandi which severely limited its 
contact with home. Under these circumstances, factors beyond the ANC’s control imposed 
constraints on its relationship with the people. However, irrespective of such conditions, the 
correctness of the revolutionary theory adopted by the ANC appears to have been seen as 
irrefutable. Although the movement’s liberal origins were barely visible by the time it re-
grouped in exile, we are able to see how early ideas of trusteeship and paternalism provided 
favourable conditions for the subsequent emergence of a new view of leadership in the 
form of revolutionary vanguardism. The subsequent chapters take up this theme further 
displaying how vanguardism has proven to be powerful in shaping ANC democratic thought. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Participation and ‘People’s Power’ 
3.1. Introduction 
The conceptual complexity of ‘people’s power’ is generally overlooked in what is perceived 
to be either a spontaneous uprising from below or an ANC-orchestrated phenomenon. 
Closer analysis of its theory and practice, however, reflects a series of interlinking 
conceptions of the role of popular participation. More often than not, these ideas 
overlapped, drawing upon one another’s sources of inspiration or displaying a similar 
ideological lineage. Particular actors and strands of the movement also had bearing on the 
shape of the democratic project. Given their integrated nature, it is erroneous to separate 
the various conceptions into mutually exclusive categories. They certainly weren’t 
experienced as such at the time. What is attempted here is instead the identification of 
‘themes’ or ‘discourses’ in the theory and practice of people’s power. 
The geographical division and ideological disparity of the movement with which people’s 
power was associated renders its analysis especially complex. In some instances the chapter 
refers to the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) - a term which refers to the broad group 
of civil society forces aligned with the ANC, including the UDF, civics, sectoral organisations 
and trade unions. In many cases activists and participants belonged to more than one of 
these groupings and so considerable cross-pollination of ideas took place. Consequently, 
there is often a lack of linearity in the sequencing of both events and political thought. 
Although this thesis deals with the subject of participatory democracy, I refer throughout 
the chapter to ‘participation’ or ‘popular participation’, each used interchangeably. Having 
said this, I also take note of the fact that the term ‘participatory democracy’ was not 
generally used by participants in struggle at the time. The introduction of this term into ANC 
lexicon from the late 1980s is, in itself, significant and is dealt with in Chapter Four.  
It is also worth stating that the purpose of the chapter is not to highlight democratic deficits 
in popular power, or to suggest that any one conception was superior. The liberation 
struggle was conducted under conditions of illegality, severe state repression, and an 
absence of the civil and political freedoms that enable organisations under ‘normal’ 
circumstances to operate openly. What we demand and expect of popular structures should 
therefore be mindful of this context. This does not, however, preclude a critique of such 
forms of organisation and this is in part what this analysis seeks to do.  
Importantly, it takes a different view to some existing approaches which view the 
democracy established after 1994 as somewhat inferior or unrelated to that pre-figured by 
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people’s power (c.f. Neocosmos 1998; Legassick 2007; Sinwell 2011).37 Instead, I argue that 
the discourse and practice of popular power during times of struggle can tell us something 
about the ideas and objectives of popular power that later take shape under democracy. 
Subsequent chapters trace the trajectory of these ideas after 1990, showing that while new 
influences emerged existing ones also remained.  
It also diverges from more recent research by Sinwell (2011) who suggests that people’s 
power held, in its entirety, the promise of a transformative and democratic form of popular 
participation - a politics of participation which, he argues, has been lost since 1994. His 
analysis, I suggest, ignores the presence of other important influences and traditions that 
also constituted people’s power, some of which continue to inform the theory and practice 
of participatory democracy today. 
The chapter opens by providing a short overview of the emergence of people’s power and 
goes on to explore the themes discernible in it. Each of these can be identified, albeit to 
varying degrees, in the range of conceptions and experiments in popular participation. 
Section 3.3 then discusses the ideologues and influences that shaped these discourses and 
endeavours to link them to an intellectual or ideological heritage. Section 3.4 then 
constitutes a reflective analysis, providing an assessment of the conceptions and key 
conclusions we can draw about the way people’s power was understood. 
3.1.1. ‘People’s Power’: the Emergence of a Movement 
The period of popular unrest in South Africa during the 1980s was presaged by a number of 
domestic and international pressures. The state’s economic crises in 1983-4 marked the 
onset of a period in which “resistance took hold nationally” (Marks 2001: 40). Deepening 
recession, rising labour militancy and mounting state debt led to measures that 
incorporated both repression and reform. The Black Local Authorities Act of 1982 and the 
proposals for a Tricameral Parliament in 1983 to house Whites, Indians and Coloureds only, 
also triggered a new set of challenges. Resistance to these structures generated popular, 
largely urban, protest leading to the breakdown of relations between communities and local 
government.  
The ANC itself by this stage had successfully re-grouped in exile and consolidated some of its 
senior leadership on Robben Island. The Soweto uprising in 1976 led to an exodus of young 
black South Africans joining the movement abroad, while many people formerly in the Black 
Consciousness Movement gravitated to the Congress camp. Reviewing its own strategy in 
light of these shifts, the ANC reoriented its vision toward a strategy of a ‘people’s war’ in 
which popular organisation at home would provide the basis for military challenge to the 
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state. ‘People’s power’ as a concept and practice emerged against the backdrop of these 
shifts. While it may not be strictly a product of them, the way in which it evolved can be 
explained by both changing domestic socio-economic conditions and the context of a 
broadening ANC hegemony.  
Amidst growing politicisation and the daily grind of life under apartheid a number of civic, 
community and issue-based organisations were formed. The United Democratic Front 
(UDF), originally established to protest the elections for the tricameral parliament, had by 
the end of 1984 turned its attention to broader political organisation. As a ‘Front’, 
comprised of a multitude of sectoral and civic affiliates, the UDF saw its role as linking ‘local 
struggles’ to ‘national interests’ (UDF c.1987) and became largely associated with the ANC. 
It was from emergent local organisation around bread and butter concerns that ‘organs of 
people’s power’ transpired.  
In its more general sense, ‘people’s power’ as a phenomenon referred to the general era 
between 1985 and 1987 of popular organisation and challenge to state authority. In its 
more specific sense, it referred to structures and organisational activity instigated within 
communities to exert a measure of popular control. Largely established by activists and civic 
organisers, ‘organs of people’s power’ took the form of structures such as People’s 
Committees (yard committees, block committees, street committees and area committees) 
and forums for popular justice (often referred to as People’s Courts). The purpose of these 
structures ranged from providing advice and services to local residents, to challenging the 
very legitimacy of the local state and acting as de facto organs of self-governance. 
3.2. Themes and Discourses in the Conception of ‘People’s Power’. 
3.2.1. The ‘People’ and the Transfer of Power 
A popularly used idiom during the 1980s was the usage of ‘people’ as a prefix and descriptor 
for liberation activity, institutions, programmes and goals. The ANC, UDF and civic 
organisations referred in varying degrees to people’s power, people’s war, the people’s 
army, people’s courts, people’s education, people’s sanctions, people’s democracy and a 
people’s parliament. Influences on its usage appear to have been two-way: both the ANC 
and UDF popularised the term in their own literature, while more localised references to 
things such as ‘people’s parks’38 are likely to have been coined on the ground. 
Reference to ‘the people’ in Congress discourse reflects its longstanding preoccupation with 
unity and equality. It also, however, implied ownership. Attachment of the term to 
institutions and actions became particularly prevalent from the late 1970s. On the one 
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hand, ‘the people’ referred generally to the oppressed non-White population. As the 
programme of the liberation movement extended, however, ‘the people’ became 
increasingly associated with all those who opposed apartheid: the progressive forces as 
opposed to the reactionary, and those who disassociated with the state and enemy (i.e. ‘the 
other’). In a sense, ‘the people’s camp’ was only relevant as a result of the presence of this 
‘other’. Thus while the definition of ‘the people’ was not always articulated, by implication it 
embodied both all that was being rejected and all that was being fought for. 
The composition of the ‘people’ also relates to issues of racial versus class identity - a 
debate resolved by the ANC through its adoption of the NDR framework, which maintained 
that while there was a leading role of the working class, the most oppressed group 
remained the African population more broadly. In this sense, the ‘people’s’ identity 
incorporated this conceptual approach. Through developing a concept of the people, 
defined by the existence of an enemy versus an identifiable oppressed majority, the ANC 
adopted an understanding of ‘the people’ as largely homogeneous. The waging of a struggle 
that was national in character was, understandably, premised upon what people had in 
common. It also tended, however, to paper over differences amongst ‘the people’ - of class, 
generation, culture, religion and gender. The structures and practices which emerged took 
little account of contrary views. Feminist scholars, for example, have highlighted struggles of 
women in the ANC whose concern to increase organisational attention toward issues of 
women’s emancipation was often overlooked in the interests of broader national liberation 
(Hassim 2004).   
The application of the term ‘the people’ also warrants clarification about the role of national 
democracy itself. Although a ‘people’s democracy’ could refer simply in its popular usage to 
an inclusive democratic state, for some in the ANC it referred to the models of socialist 
transition in Eastern Europe, excluding the Soviet Union (Netshitenzhe Interview: 14 May 
2013). Here, ‘people’s democracy’ took the form of a multi-class front of forces, led by a 
Communist Party, as a stage in the construction of communism (ibid.; see also Femia 1981: 
59). In line with the SACP’s 1984 constitution, Party leader Joe Slovo emphasised 
‘democracy’ and 'People's Power' as “an essential prerequisite for the longer-term advance 
towards a socialist transformation” (1988b).  
Recognising that the character of the national liberation struggles in the ‘third world’ 
differed somewhat to their European counterparts, the term ‘national democracy’ was 
applied. Led by a liberation movement, the struggle was for national liberation and 
independence but it would lay the basis for a socialist transition.39 The interchangeability of 
the terms ‘national democracy’, ‘people’s democracy’ and ‘people’s state’ in ANC and UDF 
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 See Golan (1987: 600-601) on debates taking place about vanguard parties and the prospect of a ‘people’s 
democracy’ in third world contexts  
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literature reflect their similarity and the broad influence of the Communist movement 
internationally.40  
The application of revolutionary terminology also denotes the idea of a transfer of power. A 
common thread in the discourse of people’s power is the general belief that the activity 
being carried out was part of a broader commitment to non-racial democracy. In some cases 
participants saw themselves as working towards that very objective: people’s power was 
understood as both a rejection of the state’s legitimacy and an embodiment of a democratic 
alternative (Skweyiya 1991: 130). Some popular actions thus challenged the legitimacy of 
the state from the outset. Those whose focus was more on reducing the burden of daily life 
than on broader political questions were still, if unintentionally, bringing into question the 
very nature and basis of the state. 
The ANC as an organisation made a much more direct link between people’s power and the 
attainment of democracy. This discourse implied that ‘People’s Power’ was precisely what 
was being fought for, and referred to a future dispensation that could only be reached 
under the ANC’s leadership (ANC NEC 1985b). It thus claimed in 1985 that “the people … are 
openly demonstrating over and over again that the ANC is their legitimate and overall leader 
on the road to people’s power” (ibid.). Beyond vague references to direct representation, 
self-government and majority rule, however, it does not appear that the ANC, at this stage, 
had a clear idea of what ‘people’s power’ in practice would entail. 
3.2.2. Active Participation and the Inadequacy of Representative Democracy 
Underpinning people’s power was a belief in the inadequacy of representative democracy. 
This was by no means a wholesale rejection of representation. Both the civic and UDF as 
well as organs of people’s power themselves involved elections and tiers of representatives. 
Representative democracy alone, however, was seen as insufficient (Morobe 1987; Boraine 
1987; Seedat Interview: 13 May 2013). In setting out its own view of democracy in a speech 
by Murphy Morobe (notably titled Towards a People’s Democracy), the UDF asserted “not 
only are we opposed to the present parliament because we are excluded, but because 
parliamentary-type representation in itself represents a very limited and narrow idea of 
democracy” (1987: 82).  
The statement did not reject the value of the right to vote but portrayed ‘real’ democracy as 
something richer and more meaningful than voting in elections. It would involve not only 
                                                          
40
 While the ANC has maintained its commitment to NDR, its 1985 Strategy and Tactics Document - ‘Broad 
Guidelines for Discussion’ - refers to “the creation of a people’s democracy based on the ideals embodied in 
the Freedom Charter” (ANC 1985a). Murphy Morobe’s speech to IDASA in 1987 refers to both engagement in 
the ‘national democratic struggle’ and a movement toward a ‘people’s democracy’ (Morobe 1987). A Transvaal 
UDF lecture series in 1986, referring to the national democratic revolution in Nicaragua and Mozambique, also 
conflates the state of national democracy with a ‘people’s state’ (UDF 1986c). 
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indirect democracy but a deeper form of control by ordinary people: “When we say that the 
people shall govern, we mean at all levels and in all spheres, and we demand that there be 
real, effective control on a daily basis” (ibid.).  
Member of the UDF National and Western Cape Executive, Andrew Boraine’s critique in 
1987 of the insufficiency of “constitutions, voting procedures and competing political 
parties”, which referred also to broader social, economic and cultural power relations that 
impact on the potential for a democratic future (1987: 11), highlighted the ANC’s and UDF’s 
concerns with issues beyond procedural democratic rights and political pluralism. Neil 
Coleman, an MDM activist and editor of the UDF journal, Phambile commented: “it was 
inconceivable to us at the time that you would have a narrow form of formal, parliamentary 
democracy in which all those forms of democratic popular participation would simply 
disappear.” (Interview: 20 February 2013). 
The UDF’s stance was juxtaposed to those liberal or bourgeois versions of democracy which 
advocated political pluralism: “- liberal approaches look at abstract models, and, in 
particular, they lay great stress on multi-party systems as opposed to supposedly 
'undemocratic' one-party states. A future, liberated SA may have a one-party or a multi-
party system. That, for us, is not at all the most important question” (UDF 1987a: 21). The 
nub of the UDF position was that the essence of their version of democracy lay not in 
pluralism or contestation but in mass organisation (Ibid.: 22).  
While Morobe’s speech defended the principle of differences of opinion within a context of 
organisational unity (1987: 85), it also maintained that this was not the essence of 
democracy (ibid.: 83). What the UDF discourse appeared to advocate was a form of 
participatory democracy also concerned with democratic economic control, particularly by 
the working class: “Democracy means, in the first instance, the ability of the broad working 
classes to participate in and to control all dimensions of their lives. This, for us, is the 
essence of democracy, not some liberal, pluralistic debating society notion of a ‘thousand 
schools contending’” (New Era 1986 cited in Lodge 1991:131). 
This emphasis on mass participation as a condition for ‘real’ democracy to flourish 
represented a rejection of more elitist forms, while in a Rousseauian sense representative 
structures were understood as needing to be supplemented by direct and participatory 
mechanisms. Several interviewees involved in the UDF or civic organisation during the 1980s 
expressed that, in the future they envisaged some measure of popular democratic control 
would be exercised at a local or grassroots level (Mufamadi Interview: 26 November 2012; 
Masondo Interview: 13 March 2013; Mayekiso Interview: 8 April 2013; Cronin Interview: 27 
November 2012; Tsenoli Interview: 11 March 2013).  
Amos Masondo, an activist in the Soweto Civic Association, explained: 
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“The understanding really was that we were not struggling just to have 
people in parliament or in the legislatures. Ours was not a mere 
representative democracy but a democracy that, yes you would have to 
have elected people but an element of that would be [a] participatory kind 
of democracy. We would encourage, in between the various elections, 
deep participatory processes that will ensure that, apart from the elected 
public representatives, people at a local level would still be engaged in 
activities. They won’t put everything aside and just wait for an election 
every five years but people would be involved at a local level to change 
their own lives”. (Interview: 13 March 2013). 
Andrew Boraine, drawing on both Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Norberto Bobbio on the 
limitations of the vote, similarly referred to ‘a people’s democracy’ as one that "broadens 
the concept of democracy beyond that of representation to include notions of direct and 
participatory democracy" (1987: 8).  
Beyond references to something greater and more participatory than representative 
democracy, however, it was not always clear on a practical level what precisely this would 
be replaced with. For many activists, the 1980s was a period of war and struggle in which 
the priority was not theorisation as to what would replace the current state but rather 
making the existing system unworkable (Coovadia Interview: 28 May 2013). A leader of the 
Atteridgeville-Sausville Residents Organisation observed that “What the community would 
look like after democracy was an academic question. The situation did not allow us to 
address it” (cited in Steinberg: 2000: 187). Nonetheless, while concerns may have centred 
on the immediate struggle, organisational practice came to bear the marks of normative 
conceptual influence. What were often produced were ‘rudimentary principles’ of popular 
power, if not clear institutional forms (Steinberg 2000: 190). 
3.2.3. Discipline and Hegemonic Unity41 
An important feature of people’s power was that it was predominantly Charterist in 
character. The ANC by the 1980s referred to itself as “a genuine people’s organisation” and 
“the genuine representative of all the people” (ANC 1985b). Despite weaknesses in its 
contact with popular struggles, the movement nonetheless remained sure of its domestic 
support base (ANC NPC 1985: 4-5; see also ANC 1985c: 1). The breadth and consolidation of 
ANC hegemony during the 1980s supports Suttner’s concept of a ‘hegemonic unity’ which 
he defines as seeking “overall leadership and representation of all forces in all sectors 
struggling for liberation under specific banners” (2011: 15). The ANC’s consultative 
conference in 1985 affirmed: 
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 The term ‘hegemonic unity’ is used by Suttner (2011) to characterise the unity of the liberation movement. 
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“Without the ANC, in contact with and as part of the masses of the people, 
enjoying their support and confidence and leading them into many-sided 
action, our victory is impossible. The ANC is a genuine people’s 
organisation as the product of their sacrifices, the inheritor and the 
continuation of the revolutionary experience of the oppressed people as a 
whole, their organiser and leader” (ANC 1985b). 
The hegemonic position of the ANC was reinforced by the UDF who affirmed its view of the 
movement as the vanguard of the struggle (MDM c.1988; UDF 1990a; Molefe 1990b). 
Considering itself “under ANC discipline and carrying out its strategies”, Suttner has argued 
that the UDF carried a “B Team mentality”; its self-conception being that of “a ‘curtain 
raiser’ before the main team arrived on the field” (2004: 699). Several others also indicated 
that there was a deference to the ANC (Seedat Interview: 13 May 2013; Mayekiso Interview: 
8 April 2013; Ramaphosa in Butler 2008: 227). The unity that Suttner describes was thus not 
only aspired to but realised. The nature of being a hegemonic movement implies that the 
leadership position sought is accepted by those who are led.  
The establishment of a hegemonic unity was also underpinned by a sense of discipline and 
revolutionary principle. ‘Discipline’, or ‘revolutionary discipline’, was a means of maintaining 
unity and preventing factionalism. For the structure of the UDF as a ‘front’ this was 
particularly important (UDF 1985a: 25-26). Interestingly, personal indiscipline and lack of 
revolutionary maturity were sometimes used to explain or excuse instances of violence and 
coercion. Unity in action and thought were crucial for a umbrella body like the UDF whose 
affiliates were comprised of a range of local organisations. A 1985 article in the UDF’s 
theoretical journal, Isizwe was devoted to the very issue: “Unless indiscipline is eliminated, 
our organisations are threatened with disunity, division and suspicion. All forms of 
factionalism, regionalism, individualism and cliquism must be stopped. We are working not 
in our individual capacities but as activists of a people’s front” (ibid.: 24).  
In this sense, the maintenance of hegemonic unity required not only personal but political 
discipline as well as the acceptance of and commitment to a collective identity and 
undertaking. The same Isizwe article emphasised: “Our concept of discipline arises from a 
political understanding … The discipline we speak of is a discipline that involves the 
conscious and willing decision to subordinate one’s own will and immediate personal 
inclinations to that of the collective, or more precisely to the organisation to which one is 
responsible” (UDF 1985a: 23). The notion of securing this political discipline corresponded 
with the UDF’s democratic discourse: just as it rejected a liberal understanding of 
democracy as adversarial and pluralistic, it’s concept of organisational discipline 
necessitated unity and popular control exercised as a collective. 
Despite this discourse of hegemony, the full extent of ANC influence was in some respects 
disguised by the secrecy of affiliation. The structures of people’s power are claimed to have 
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been open to people of all political affiliations. In reality, however, Charterist influence 
predominated. Referring to structures such as the street and area committees, Neil 
Coleman explained that “the understanding at the time in the movement was that we’ve 
got to make these organisations as non-sectarian as possible while at the same time being 
vehicles of the mainstream movement which was the Congress movement” (Interview: 20 
February 2013). Cas Coovadia, an activist in the Civic Association of Johannesburg (CAJ), 
noted that while tensions existed with other political tendencies, they were still recognised 
as part of the broader ‘progressive’ movement (Interview: 28 May 2013). However 
alternative affiliations also appear to have been tolerated by virtue of them presenting little 
threat to Charterist dominance:  
“We interacted with comrades in other political tendencies … we clashed 
philosophically, we clashed intellectually … [but] … it wasn’t the sort of 
friction that said we now need to totally delegitimise this tendency or 
delegitimise these people … But, to be quite honest, compared to the 
organising ability of those informed by the Charter and the Charterist 
movement, I think their ability to organise and their structures were pretty 
weak … If I have to be really crass about it, we tolerated those tendencies 
and carried on doing our work” (Ibid.). 
 
UDF-ANC suspicion and intolerance of alternative organisations have been noted by several 
authors (Marks 2001: 109; Jeffery 2009; Seekings 2000: 146-53) and in some instances 
resulted in intimidation and violence (Jeffery 2009; Carter 1991a). Neil Coleman noted the 
prevalence of a view that saw organisations such as the Azanian People’s Organisation 
(Azapo) “as the aggressors, as people who couldn’t tolerate the emergence of this very 
powerful movement” (Interview: 20 February 2013). In Mamelodi, there is evidence that 
Azapo was compared to a vigilante grouping and “not given chance to operate as an 
organisation” (ANC London Collection, undated f: 2). Recognition of the ANC’s extended 
influence reinforced its homogeneous conception of ‘the people’. Both the ANC and UDF 
were somewhat guilty of assuming that the masses fell under the movement’s rubric. Its 
belief after 1991 that the ANC and its structures could fulfil the role formerly played by the 
UDF became an indication of this assumption. 
3.2.4. Participation as a Means: Struggle and Insurrection 
“The importance of mass mobilisation for the seizure of power … the one 
who wins the masses wins the war.” (ANC 1985h: 1) 
A key influence shaping the discourse of people’s power concerned the extent to which it 
was understood as a means or an end of struggle: a method of challenging the state or an 
end goal in itself. For some, people’s power prefigured the very state being fought for. For 
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others it represented primarily a method of struggle - an effective mass weapon to both 
dislodge the regime and further revolutionary goals. 
What is clear from the ANC’s discourse is that mass participation in the revolution was 
fundamental for its success. The strategy of ‘people’s war’, adopted by the ANC in 1979, 
continued to give emphasis to this principle, affirming that “It remains one of the 
fundamental truths of our struggle that victory cannot be won without the active and 
conscious participation of the masses of the oppressed people themselves” (ANC 1979). 
Informed by the revolutionary experience in Vietnam, the ANC undertook a strategic review 
in 1978-9 which marked a shift in thinking toward an appreciation of, not only the military 
but the political aspects of struggle.  
People’s war was defined as: “a war in which a liberation army becomes rooted amongst the 
people who progressively participate actively in the armed struggle both political and 
militarily (sic) with the final aim of seizing power” (ANC 1985f: 1). It thus placed increased 
priority on domestic political organisation with a view to drawing the masses into a people’s 
army of which MK itself would be just a nucleus (Kasrils 1988). Pallo Jordan - then a member 
of the ANC’s Department of Information and Publicity and the Head of Radio Freedom - 
attributed to the review a clearer perspective for the ANC “that you can only conduct and 
talk about people's war in the context of a politically highly motivated and active, mobilised 
community” (Interview with Howard Barrell: 1989). As a result the ANC’s underground 
began consciously “to participate and encourage” the creation and revival of popular 
structures (ibid.). 
Seekings suggests, however, that it was only in 1985 with the onset of the state of 
emergency that people’s power was given its insurrectionary ‘thrust’ (2000a: 71, 173). While 
people’s war encompassed both military and political activity, for the ANC it was the 
insurrectionary role of popular structures that seems to have been foremost. Contained 
within the papers of the ANC’s Zambia mission is an interesting discussion paper on 
‘Ungovernability and People’s Power’. Here, organs of people’s power, specifically, are 
understood as essentially “organs of insurrection”: 
“- organs of popular power emerge and thrive in a situation of revolt, as a 
manifestation of the emergence and maturing of a revolutionary situations 
[sic], as part of the overall process towards armed insurrection. The tasks 
of these organs have come to concur with this strategic perspective. They 
are essentially organs of insurrection, or - in the period of the build-up - 
organs of people’s war” [emphasis added] (ANC, Undated a: 4) 
Available ANC archival documentation on people’s war draws largely on the struggle in 
Vietnam. South Africa was in some ways comparable with Vietnam, understood also as 
needing to go through a stage of a ‘national people’s democratic revolution’ in order to 
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reach socialism (ANC London Collection, undated a). In Vietnam, ‘liberated zones’ were 
established which, in addition to representing guerrilla bases, seemed to carry a pre-
figurative element as “models of a new life of a new regime” (ibid.).  
Several UDF activists referred to the influence of the Vietnamese revolution and its 
establishment of liberated zones (Tsenoli, Inteview: 11 March 2013; Coleman Interview: 20 
February 2013; Cronin Interview: 27 November 2012). Some referred to South Africa’s 
structures of people’s power being compared to elements of liberated zones (Moosa 
Interview: 30 April 2013; Coleman Interview: 20 February 2013), although not everyone 
agreed they could be strictly classified as such (Seedat Interview: 13 May 2013). 
The experiences and models of Marxist-inspired struggle in locations such as Vietnam, Cuba, 
Cape Verde, Mozambique, Angola and Algeria were widespread amongst activists, their 
influence cutting across both the ANC and SACP. It is therefore interesting that Ben Turok, a 
member of the SACP stationed in London,42 dismissed the notion that organs of people’s 
power were understood as structures of democracy - a view perhaps reflective of those 
within the Party, and maybe the ANC, for whom the aim of the struggle was not liberated 
zones but taking state power. Turok argued that a concept of people’s power as self-
government - relevant to struggles such as Vietnam, China or Guinea Bissau where liberated 
zones were established - did not enter into the discussion in South Africa: “In South Africa 
there was no prospect of liberated zones. So … the issues of empowerment or participation 
didn’t arise. Our conception was we would take over Pretoria” (Interview: 19 February 
2013). 
In contrast, Neil Coleman, a member of the Transvaal UDF who helped to produce UDF 
propaganda in the second half of the 1980s, portrayed the inspiration for people’s power as 
standing in direct contrast to the authoritarianism of a more Stalinist approach: “actually 
the inspiration is the opposite. It’s about people’s movements that have really been rooted 
in popular struggles in a very deep way so it was your Vietnams and those types of 
movements, guerrilla movements and some of the African experiences, your Mozambiques, 
etc, you know; it wasn’t your classic sort of insurrectionary, militaristic type of ideology” 
(Interview: 20 February 2013). 
It is not clear how widespread the more instrumental and militarised view of popular power 
was, although the SACP’s veneration of Lenin’s insurrectionary path to power would 
certainly indicate its presence. What can be argued is that the discourse of popular 
participation in relation to people’s war - a discourse belonging to the ANC external mission 
predominantly - was not one in which a language of democracy featured. Organs of people’s 
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 Turok was later expelled from the SACP in 1976 during a period of disagreement over whether the Party’s 
London contingent should focus solely on propaganda and solidarity (as it had been) or begin interactions with 
underground networks in South Africa (SAHO, www.sahistory.org.za).   
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power were conceived as primarily organs of struggle. Janet Cherry, a member of the ANC 
underground from 1982, noted that ANC strategy at the time was very much a Leninist one 
which drew heavily on the Soviet model (Interview: 3 October 2012). People’s participation 
was linked to the goal of armed struggle; and armed struggle itself was understood to be a 
fundamentally political undertaking. Underlying this discourse is therefore a sense of the 
strategic utility of participation. The ANC’s notes on the Vietnamese experience draw on 
how recruitment into armed units relied on the masses to provide an “inexhaustible source 
of supply” (ANC London Collection, undated c).  
The conception of participation as a means of struggle was not exclusive to the armed pillar. 
As a legal organisation, the UDF could not align itself with the armed struggle even if it 
wished to do so, and so its lack of involvement in armed activity naturally led it toward 
advocating a more political role for mass activity. Nonetheless, although popular 
organisation was emphasised in its own right - and not merely (or not primarily) as a conduit 
of a people’s war - it was still understood as part of a broader project for a liberation. 
Several interviewees involved in the UDF and its affiliates referred to organs of people’s 
power as being structures intended to mobilise and build capacity to fight the regime 
(Mashatile Interview: 21 February 2013; Coovadia Interview: 28 May 2013; Boraine 
Interview: 21 May 2013), or, as Moosa described, as “features of a low-level insurrection” 
(Interview: 30 April 2013). 
  
It was also the case that, for some activists, the future form that people’s power would take 
had not been consciously thought through. Former UDF General Secretary, Paul Mashatile, 
while conceding that influences from that period can indeed be seen in present-day 
structures, commented: “I think in the main at the time it was more the capacity we needed 
to mobilise to fight against unjust laws, the apartheid regime, as opposed to building models 
for the future … I think we didn’t build consciously a lot of those structures as models” 
(Interview: 21 February 2013). Andrew Boraine similarly said of people’s power: 
It was definitely part of the struggle … [T]he new state seemed to be 
twenty years off! You know the fact is that it was around the corner, you 
know, ten years later, but we didn’t know that ... So organs of people’s 
power were definitely part of making the system unworkable and 
ungovernable, sort of trying to carve out space in which one can operate ... 
I would say they were expressions of popular opinion but they were not 
necessarily consciously being designed as organs of democracy for the 
future state. (Interview: 21 May 2013). 
Cas Coovadia, a civic leader involved in establishing street and flat committees in inner-city 
Johannesburg, emphasised that “the organising was always to overthrow this government” 
(Interview: 28 May 2013). Although he also stated that the aim was “to replace it with a 
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democratic non-racial government under the leadership of the ANC”, he did not indicate 
that the committees themselves were organs of democracy (ibid.). Janet Cherry, also, did 
not recall much discussion about “the nature of democracy”, noting that the idea of organs 
of people’s power was linked to a “revolutionary and insurrectionary objective” (Interview: 
3 October 2012). Therefore despite the existence of a UDF discourse on building a 
democratic alternative, a 1986 Isizwe article on ‘Building People’s Power’ emphasised that 
every issue must be approached “from a political standpoint. We must always ask what 
possibilities it has for advancing the struggle” (1986a: 13).  
Given that the role apportioned to people’s power appears to be that of struggle, it is 
significant that a discourse can also be identified which understood people’s power as an 
end goal. Quite critically, for some in the movement, the view of popular structures as 
fulfilling a function of struggle did not preclude the simultaneous belief that they were also 
organs of democracy.  
3.2.5. Participation as an End: Prefiguring a Future State 
In this case, people’s power was not only a means of struggle but a prototype of what was 
being fought for and either prompted or deepened a process of normative theorising about 
democracy. In a reflection on the year of 1985, the UDF asserted: “it is possible to build 
mass bases, democratic organisation, which in the course of confronting and challenging the 
existing state, begin also to lay the seeds of a future society" (UDF 1985-6: 2; see also ANC 
London Collection, undated e). Some of the UDF’s ideas about the form of democracy it 
envisaged have been discussed already: its discourse drew on the inadequacy of 
representative democracy in which it foresaw a democratic future informed by ideals of 
direct democracy, popular control and active citizen participation. The UDF and its affiliates 
concentrated on the ‘democratic’ in the NDR, unveiling a two-fold conception of democracy 
as both the aim and the means of struggle (Morobe 1987: 82). The UDF’s theoretical journal, 
Isizwe, in March 1986 introduced the notion of pre-figurative democracy:  
- the building of people’s power is something that is already beginning to 
happen in the course of our struggle. It is not for us to sit back and merely 
dream of the day that the people shall govern. It is our task to start to 
realise that goal now. We must start the process of liberating South Africa. 
We must begin to place power in the hands of the people, in all spheres … 
Even in the present we must start to build the beginnings of our future 
society … Building people’s power is a training ground, a school for the 
future. [Underlining in original] (UDF 1986a: 2-3). 
The linking of popular structures and localised struggles to ideas about democracy appears 
to have taken place within the ANC from about 1986, although organs such as street and 
area committees began to form much earlier. Mufson suggests that it was in 1983 in the 
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Eastern Cape township of Lingelihle, near Cradock, that street committees were first formed 
(1990: 110; see also Seekings 2000b: 73).43 Following Cradock and Port Alfred, the Transvaal 
townships of Mamelodi and Alexandra were among the first to establish such structures 
(See ANC, undated a: 9-10; see also ANC London Collection 1986: 9).44 
Although the theorisation of people’s power can be traced to around 1986, it is interesting 
that ANC reference to it is first made in its January 8 Statement of 1981 which commented 
on Angola’s “involvement in the battle for the total liberation of Africa and in the struggle 
for the consolidation of people`s power” (ANC NEC 1981). It is not until its statement of 
1986, however, that the ANC began to develop what it means by “people’s power”. This 
timing aligns with its emergence in the lexicon of the UDF, whose first publication on 
people’s power appeared in its theoretical journal Isizwe in March of that year. 
In January 1984 the ANC made a direct connection between the slogan “power to the 
people” and the acquisition of state power (ANC NEC 1984). The form of state envisaged, 
was given little more detail than in the Freedom Charter, although it did allude to the 
potential for going beyond challenging state legitimacy to establishing an alternative power. 
Beyond historic references to the 1960 rural uprisings in Pondoland and the 1976 collapse of 
Urban Bantu Councils (ibid.), however, the idea is not developed further. It is also not clear 
that people’s power was at that stage understood in terms of democracy. The idea that it 
symbolized the replacement of existing structures is introduced but it is not yet linked to 
normative democratic ideas. Again, in its statement of 8th January 1985, the ANC’s focus is 
on forging the conditions for the establishment of “mass revolutionary bases” (ANC NEC 
1985a). 
The ANC’s ‘Call to the Nation’ in April of 1985, however, is more specific. Here is called for 
the replacement of “collapsing government stooge councils with people’s committees in 
every block which could become the embryos of people’s power” (ANC NEC 1985b). It also 
depicts people’s power as a dispensation to which people could only be led by the ANC 
(ibid.). The movement’s subsequent statement on 8th January 1986 took this further by 
linking people’s power conceptually to the power of the ANC (ANC NEC 1986). It is only in its 
‘Call to the People’ in May of 1986, however, that the ANC makes reference to specific 
structures of people’s power as a replacement of existing state administration (ANC 1986a). 
The document refers to the popular establishment of “people`s committees”, “street 
committees”, “comrades` committees”, “people`s courts”, “people`s defence militia” and 
other “popular organs of justice” (ANC 1986a). 
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 Seekings suggests that “street committees existed in Cradock from early 1985, if not earlier” (2000b: 73). 
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 Moses Mayekiso, leader of the Alexandra Civic Organisation, commented that it was Queenstown in the 
Eastern Cape from which they in Alex had got the idea of forming street committees (1988: 2895-6). 
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Whether a response to ANC policy or to grassroots needs, the establishment of people’s 
power said something about the society envisaged - both during the phase of struggle and 
into the future. The UDF made quite clear that the radical democracy it envisaged was 
emulated in the organs of people’s power: “The rudimentary organs of people’s power that 
have begun to emerge in South Africa (street committees, defence committees, shop-
steward structures, student representative councils, parent/ teacher /student associations) 
represent in many ways the beginnings of the kind of democracy we are striving for” 
(Morobe 1987: 83). What can be identified is a common ANC discourse that ‘people’s 
power’ was being fought for. What was not consistently clear is what this people’s power 
would look like. 
3.2.6. Alternative Order and Local Self-Governance 
Alongside national-level discourses a series of more localised meanings were imparted to 
popular organisation. In some senses these narratives are distinct to those outlined already 
in that they can be attributed to more localised experiences of UDF affiliates. Suttner argues 
that the activities of grassroots affiliates did not always ‘fit’ with dominant theoretical 
formulations (2004: 692). As a result, more localised discourses are often less identifiable in 
the ‘official’ literature of the ANC and UDF.  
That being said, the meanings given to popular participation at a more local level were not 
impervious to the liberation context. Activists and participants absorbed the ANC’s narrative 
in their conceptual and strategic approach, and the language and imagery of liberation 
permeated the structures that emerged. Engagement in local struggle was the civics’ 
primary weapon against the state and many activists made clear that what they sought was 
the replacement of current institutions with non-racial, democratic ones (see Mayeksio 
1988: 3062 and Mdakane 1988: 2315). However by focusing merely on the national political 
role of popular activity, we risk overlooking the specific meanings that participants imparted 
to these activities.  
There are, of course, limitations to the analysis here. The scope of the research question 
does not allow for analysis of particular localities or for examination of understandings 
amongst ordinary community members. Nonetheless, existing case studies, archival 
documentation and interviews with local activists, point to the existence of other 
interpretations, not necessarily visible in the discourse of the ANC.  
3.2.6.1. Grassroots Governance: Education and Empowerment 
[P]eople’s power referred to the actions taken by ordinary people, in and 
through democratically controlled structures, to exert control over their 
lives either by taking direct action to change conditions or by influencing 
others to do so. The element of accountability to the community and of 
changing the balance of forces in favour of the people by concrete 
intervention are key elements in the concept. (UDF c.1987: 8). 
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For some activists and participants, the formation of organs of people’s power was related 
to the establishment of grassroots democracy and in some cases, though not always explicit, 
this was also a pre-figurative exercise. While there is evidence that this was often part of the 
broader Charterist hegemony, a discourse is discernible which is unconnected to the 
national democratic project. As such, the ideological and strategic direction of popular 
structures was not always their most important feature. 
Lechesa Tsenoli, an activist in Durban during the 1980s, described the building of people’s 
power as something pre-figurative but also drew on notions of democracy that involved a 
change in power relations and a greater role for ordinary people in decision-making:  
“We were working to alter the power relations in the manner in which, for 
example, decisions were made, in that if those relations were not altered 
then and in the future what you'd have would be representatives and, 
officials taking decisions on behalf of people. We conceived of a future 
South Africa as informed by the Freedom Charter that ‘the people shall 
govern’” (Tsenoli Interview: 11 March 2013). 
Tsenoli’s reference to the Freedom Charter reflects a direct and participatory democratic 
interpretation of “the people shall govern”. It also highlights conceptual differences within 
the ANC itself. Tsenoli, who worked in youth and civic activism as well as being part of the 
ANC’s underground, held a view of the future that involved changing power relations, not 
merely taking power. His reference also of course demonstrates the connection made by 
many activists between the attainment of democracy and a Charterist future. However, 
even notions of people’s power tied to an ANC-led future often a carried with them an 
additional conceptual dimension. Here, participatory democracy - if only at the most local 
level - was valuable in its own right.  
A key element of this concept was the building of accountable and empowered structures, 
and pride was taken in the adherence to democratic practices and procedures. Cas Coovadia 
of the CAJ remarked:  
“we were absolutely clear ... that these were democratically elected 
structures that formed the bedrock of the strategic direction given to the 
organisations that represented them and I think under very difficult 
conditions we worked very hard to maintain their democratic content and 
to ensure that they were reported to, they informed, and they did 
participate in a very real way in developing strategy for the work we 
needed to do” (Interview: 28 May 2013). 
Similarly, in a guest column in the Sowetan in August of 1986, Murphy Morobe explained 
the value of self-governance not just theoretically but at a very practical level: "In setting up 
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street committees and democratic village councils, we are beginning to understand 
practically the meaning of people’s power. Our people are effectively showing through such 
committees their supressed desire to govern their own lives" (Morobe 1986). Uitenhage 
Civic leader, Weza Made also emphasised how people were both learning democracy and 
making decisions about their lives:  
"They must learn to participate over their problems. And the struggle and 
the way to govern and street committees is where all the people are 
participating. It's where they are producing the people's power. It is where 
they will learn to govern themselves and making decisions about what 
they need or what they desire for the future of this country. So they will 
learn in the local level, we hope that this will spread to other townships on 
other parts of the country. What we aim is to improve the government 
from the local level" (Interview: undated).  
In this sense the educative characteristics of people’s power were important. In a similar 
vein to the ideas proposed by G.D.H. Cole and J.S. Mill, it was at the local level (or, for Cole, 
in the workplace) that individuals could most effectively ‘learn democracy’. Through 
participation in those issues most directly affecting their everyday lives, real education could 
occur (Pateman 1970: 30-31; 37-38). 
Although it is not clear to what extent people’s committees influenced overall strategic 
direction, they do seem to have instilled in people a greater sense of self-confidence and 
empowerment. There was a feeling that people’s power provided for open discussion and a 
free expression of views (UDF 1876c). Weza Made, in particular, commented on the value of 
the street committee in enabling people who were not confident to “express their ideas” at 
a mass meeting; to feel comfortable doing so (Interview: undated).  
This strand of people’s power thus exhibited a degree of agency, empowerment and 
education, not present in the narrative from Lusaka. There was a sense that people were 
not being merely mobilised behind change but were also a part of shaping it.45 This was very 
much linked to a process of conscientisation. What it sought to produce was not just ‘active’ 
and ‘mobilised’ masses but educated and empowered ones. Cas Coovadia remarked on the 
culture of self-help it engendered; of enabling people to both identify problems and come 
up with solutions: “I swear I can’t remember a single flat committee or street committee 
where someone stood up and said, ‘Comrade Cas, what are you going to do for us?’ It was 
always ‘We have identified the problem here. How are you going to work with us to actually 
deal with this problem?’” (Interview: 28 May 2013).  
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The theory and practice of bringing decision-making closer to the people engendered a 
sense of real ‘self-governance’. The beneficial impact of this was not only understood in 
relation to revolution - which in the discourse of the ANC was the objective at all times - but 
in terms of more direct benefits of social order, cohesion and upliftment. Janet Cherry, who 
was working on an adult education project during 1985-6, did not recall people saying that 
the formation of street and area committees was going to be about democracy, per se. 
However she did note that those structures were used to facilitate education: “to empower 
people further through offering them literacy skills, numeracy, life skills, political education, 
access to information, and so on” (Interview: 3 October 2012).  
The Alexandra Action Committee’s (AAC) establishment of popular structures was not only 
part of the national liberation struggle; its stated aims also included elimination of illiteracy, 
adult education, assisting the unemployed to earn money, after-school care and family 
housing (Mayekiso 1988).46 In Alex it was also noted that the formation of yard committees 
was welcomed as a way to bring people together ,to reduce community and ethnic conflict 
(Tshabalala 1988: 3730-1) and resolve differences as well as find solutions to shared 
problems (see Bozzoli 2004: 194-5). The AAC’s Moses Mayekiso described his wife’s 
response to the construction of street committees in Queenstown:  
“- there is no longer fighting of the people, there is no longer killing of the 
people, as she knew Queenstown before. There was now harmony in that 
area. She was putting it that there were street committees and they were 
building up a civic in Queenstown. She also explained that they were 
working democratically and people were discussing and representing their 
problems …” (1988: 2896). 
As noted earlier, part of the conscientisation process was making people aware that 
organisation and democratic practice could themselves ameliorate shared problems. 
Richard Mdakane, one of the accused in the state trial against Moses Mayekiso, described 
Mayekiso’s speech at a meeting in Alexandra to encourage the formation of yard, block and 
street committees: “The yard committees would help the Alexandra community in order to 
improve their stay in the yard, in order to help one another as a community, as a community 
that was struggling. There was also a lot of crime, but if the people meet in the yards, they 
would be able to solve some of these problems …” (1988: 2093-4).  
It is not clear to what extent problems and their possible solutions were talked through and 
debated by residents before agreement was reached. However, the very idea that 
organisation and conscientisation involved a process of increasing ‘collective’ capacity to 
identify solutions to common problems (Cohen & Sabel 1997 in Stoker 2002: 32-3), speaks 
to the concept of a deliberative process. While this may not explicitly relate to a process of 
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‘reasoning’, as Gutmann and Thompson describe (2004: 7), the inclusive nature of 
discussions and the finding of accepted solutions is suggestive of a consensus-based if not a 
pluralistic, deliberative democracy.47  
Some actions were thus not always, or not primarily, about revolutionary activity or 
alternative governing structures but about enabling people to address local needs 
themselves. Suttner commented that in Port Alfred people kicked out the local authority 
and established a crèche in the Bantu Administration Department (Interview: 25 October 
2012). Their actions were not actions of the UDF, nor were they necessarily reflective of a 
national democratic agenda but simply targeted basic community needs such as cleanliness, 
services and crime. Making small gains, whether through taking joint responsibility for 
shared problems or organising to make demands of the local authorities, gave people a 
sense of empowerment and control over local concerns. There is of course little doubt that, 
in turn, the establishment and flourishing of people’s power structures also made many 
participants more optimistic about the prospects of national liberation (see Morobe 1986).  
3.2.6.2. Self-Service Provision and Negotiating Concessions   
Another theme in the local discourse of people’s power concerned service provision and 
self-help. Although related to the discourse of grassroots governance, its inspiration 
stemmed not so much from normative democratic thought as from the need to address the 
neglect of the state and find local solutions to local problems. The activities of civics and 
other structures were thus often oriented toward social welfare. Swilling argues however, 
that in the discourse of the liberation struggle, issues of urban citizenship - around which 
civic struggles were centred - became, effectively, the “poor cousin” of political citizenship 
(Interview: February 2013). Consequently, concerns about urban space and services were 
obscured by the national liberation agenda. 
The discourse of service provision manifested in two strands: the one was a culture of self-
help or ‘doing things for oneself’; and the other involved using popular structures to 
negotiate with local authorities to improve the provision of state services. The first of these 
reflected a culture of initiative and organisation in which communities filled the gap left by 
the state. Even the people’s courts who took a function of alternative justice, dealt with a 
range of community-based disputes, sometimes addressing social problems originating with 
the political struggle itself.48 There is a long history of informal local courts or street 
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 Gutmann and Thompson explain that “Although pluralists agree that deliberation should strive to justify as 
much agreement as possible , they also seek ways of living well with those disagreements that cannot or 
should not be eliminated at any given time …. “(2004: 28). 
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 Seekings, for example, refers to courts being established to address the disorder brought about by the 
political situation and also as a response to growing indiscipline with civics themselves (Seekings 1990: 124). In 
many cases the climate of unrest added to or exacerbated social problems, generational division and people’s 
experience of crime. See also Bozzoli (2004).  
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committees which preceded the 1980s, often established by more senior and respected 
residents to deal with local problems (Seekings 1990: 131-2; Scharf and Ngcokoto 1990: 
344). These courts, born of community initiatives, were formed to deal with crime and other 
disputes, and were not yet pre-figurative of a post-apartheid order (Scharf and Ngcokoto 
1990: 345).49 
Despite the self-conferred jurisdiction of the people’s courts of the 1980s, they were often 
popularly supported. Accounts of residents suggest that the courts helped to restore moral 
as well as legal order.50 There is also an important distinction between those courts in which 
the conflict resolution was linked to building an alternative state; and those whose purpose 
was to deal practically and effectively with social disputes where the state would not. 
Raymond Suttner commented on the “various levels of theoretical sophistication” regarding 
the role of people’s power, observing that “people who participated in some of these things 
would just think the police are not going to solve problems for us. The comrades are more 
likely to and so it would be just a practical thing: … I want safety” (Interview: 25 October 
2012). 
The second of these facets - securing concessions from the local state - relates directly to 
the first. Swilling asserts that once the civics had won mass support they needed to sustain 
that support by showing that people’s efforts could reap benefits (1989 cited in Botha 1992: 
65). Thus while the slogan ‘forward to people’s power’ was connected conceptually to 
wresting control from the state (Morobe 1987: 84), the objective of some civic initiatives 
was to force the state to do its job. 
The tradition of negotiating concessions preceded the UDF discourse of pre-figurative 
democracy. Thozamile Botha of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO) noted 
that “[a]s far back as 1979 PEBCO sent a number of delegations to meet with the East Cape 
Administration Board” (1992: 69). In Alexandra, the AAC set itself up as a democratic 
organisation that wanted recognition from local state administrators (Mayekiso 1988: 3017-
8) and to represent the community and their problems to the authorities (Bapela 1988: 
3966; Mdakane 1988: 2135). What the civics refused, was to recognise the authority of the 
BLAs or to work within them (Bapela 1988: 2972-3). Negotiating with local authorities was 
still seen as a form of democracy: communities themselves were involved in decision-
making about how to approach the state and sent delegates to meet the authorities and 
negotiate on their behalf. In this sense, the civics saw themselves as structures of civil 
society whose role was not only to represent communities but to hold government to 
account.  
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 Scharf and Ncgokoto (1990: 344) suggest that people’s court in Gugulethu, Cape Town, came into existence 
as early as the mid-1950s.  
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 See Seekings (1990: 127-8) on the types of cases and disputes taken by local residents to people’s courts in 
Kagiso, Munsieville, Orlando East, Atteridgeville and Alexandra.  
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This perception of the role of popular structures was not without internal debate: tensions 
existed over the extent to which civics should engage in service provision and/or negotiate 
with local authorities. The NWC of the UDF itself raised the question “‘when is people’s 
power reformist’? (UDF NWC 1986), perhaps reflecting unease at the risk of either civic co-
option or of dual power becoming a permanent affair in place of the seizure of power. The 
line emerging from Lusaka discouraged civics more firmly from acting as service providers. 
This was partly on the basis of their lack of capacity to fulfil municipal government functions 
(ANC 1985j: 12). However there is also a suggestion that the civic strategy of negotiating 
with local authorities was viewed by Lusaka as reformist. The ANC’s January 8 Statement of 
1986 affirmed: “We are not fighting and are not dying in order to have a better system of 
waste disposal. We are engaged in struggle for the inalienable right to govern our country in 
all its parts” (ANC NEC 1986).  
Civics, however, did not see their actions as at odds with the policy of Lusaka but as carrying 
out its programme. Mark Swilling provided a curious example of local leaders in Port 
Elizabeth interpreting the commencement of talks in exile between Thabo Mbeki and white 
leaders as an indication that they should also begin negotiations with local authorities 
(Interview: 20 February 2013).  
3.2.6.3. Collective Social Order: The Overthrow of Authority and Popular Democracy51 
In some cases people’s power was a response to the unrest itself. Many structures were 
formed to deal with crime, while some were more specifically about addressing social 
disorder and seeking to establish, in the case of Alexandra, what Bozzoli refers to as a 
“collective moral and social order” (2004). In her analysis of collective action and social 
movements in Alex, Bozzoli draws on two broad motivations for the establishment of 
people’s power: the erection of a popular democracy and the overthrow of existing 
authority (2004: 92). That youth came to play a prominent role in people’s courts in Alex is, 
according to Seekings, somewhat a-typical (1990: 133) - although Scharf and Ncgokoto’s 
account of the courts in Gugulethu, Cape Town, where unaffiliated youth were central 
actors in policing and adjudication, is also not dissimilar (1990: 346-7). Either way, Bozzoli’s 
research is useful for understanding the motivations of participants and how they related to 
ANC discourse. 
Bozzoli highlights a particular facet of people’s power in which the community was divided 
along generational lines, between a militant youth on the one hand, and more moderate 
adults on the other (2004: 80-81, 92). In both cases, protagonists saw themselves as 
establishing social control for the benefit of the wider community or, as Carter describes, as 
“constructing an “alternative hegemony” (1991b: 141). However, although both strands 
invoked a discourse of national liberation, their interpretation of the themes of struggle 
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varied. One of the most interesting aspects for our purposes is the challenge that the Alex 
experience poses to the notion of a homogeneous ‘people’. The exercise of people’s power 
in Alex reflects the way in which the phenomenon was differentially interpreted by the local 
community. Particularly significant is the way that these strands drew their strength but 
were also quite distinct from the dominant discourse of the ANC.  
As reflected in some of Moses Mayekiso’s statements, popular structures in Alex were 
erected not so much as part of a national agenda but as a response to local conditions. 
Amidst the social unrest and lawlessness which followed the 1986 revolt in Alex, Bozzoli 
describes how mobs of youth began to take hold of the township - both challenging the 
authority of the police while trying to direct and mobilise the community. That the youth 
became a breeding ground for militant, sometimes fundamentalist, activity was linked to 
the instability of life in the township, especially for young men (Bozzoli 2004: 96). Their 
project was guided by the ANC’s calls for ungovernability, while also invoking practices of 
coercion and violence. Reports from Alex reflect how, in some cases, the ‘comrades’ 
inflicted a reign of terror in which ordinary, and often older, members of the community 
became fearful of the actions of the youth.52 Bozzoli describes this younger generation as 
seeing themselves as the new “arbiters of justice” (2004: 84) whose view of the future was a 
characterised by a “millenarian utopianism” (ibid.: 92, 125).  
Theirs was a project which sought the overturning of all authority - both of the state and 
existing traditional hierarchies, combining what Bozzoli describes as an “explosive mix of 
local politics and exile power” (ibid.: 91).53 While enacted under the banner of the liberation 
movement, the youth’s was a different script in which the young ‘comrades’ themselves 
were the vanguards of change. This emergence of a rebellious and politicised “grassroots 
youth” (ibid.: 109) brought with it a decline in respect for seniority and traditional 
hierarchies of authority. Older members of the community referred to the revolution being 
waged by children and youth (ibid.: 94-5); people became intimidated and disillusioned by 
youth behaviour (ibid.: 134); and a strain was placed on communities where, in people’s 
courts, youth were seen to be adjudicating cases involving their seniors (Seekings 1990: 129-
130; see also Scharf and Ngcokoto: 1990).  
The ‘grassroots’ comrades generally fell outside of formal organisational control (Seekings 
1993 cited in Bozzoli 2004: 109), and in some cases abuses were committed by wayward 
“new recruits” later punished for their actions (Scharf and Ncgokoto 1990: 356-7). Yet these 
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 See also Cherry (2000b: 99) on the actions of the amabutho who sought to destroy existing authorities and 
set up alternative ones.  
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individuals often understood their actions as part of the ANC-led struggle. The UDF, rather 
than accept some responsibility for occurrences of intimidation and violence, was often 
concerned to emphasise the role of ‘agent provocateurs’. Authors such as Wentzel (1995) 
and more recently Jeffery (2009) have been heavily critical of the UDF and ANC for not 
sufficiently addressing or intervening in instances of local violence. Their accounts, however, 
are unfortunately state-sympathetic. 
That being said, the ANC and UDF were not without fault. Marginalised youth in Alex saw 
themselves as vanguards of the revolution - pursuing a cause and a new order of which the 
older generation had little understanding. The emotive language used in ANC statements 
appealed to the sense of grievance and injustice amongst this group, as well as to a mood of 
rebellion.54 A document on armed struggle from the ANC’s 1985 Kabwe Conference not only 
insinuated that some targets were legitimate but recommended that the “hated puppets, 
police”, when captured by guerrillas, should be dealt with “publicly”’ as part of the process 
of “political mobilisation” (ANC 1985f: 4).  
Although the notion of a new moral and collective order is not evident in the discourse of 
the ANC or UDF, it is possible to see how young people drew strength from the ANC’s calls 
for insurrection. As ANC hegemony strengthened, so did the young comrades’ confidence in 
establishing a new authority. While theirs may have been an unsanctioned utopia, it was 
also a pre-figurative one. The atmosphere of rebellion, spurred on by the discourse of 
struggle, reinforced the arbitrary nature of informal authority and the legitimation of 
unaccountable popular justice. Scharf and Ngcokoto’s account (1990) of people’s courts in 
Gugulethu is similar, while accounts from Alexandra suggest that some people were content 
with the more punitive courts (Tshabalala 1988: 3767). Paul Tshabalala referred to some 
individuals being of the view that if they approached the people’s court their complaint 
would be addressed immediately by punitive measures (such as lashing of the accused) 
(ibid.: 3759).  
In contrast to the ‘utopia’ of this youth generation an older generation of township 
residents, often more moderate in their outlook, sought to establish democratic structures 
to bring order to the township (Bozzoli 2004: 92, 114-123). In some cases they were set up 
to counter the lawlessness and indiscipline brought about by younger comrades. The adult 
generation sought to create something more formalised, orderly and, ultimately, 
harmonious than the youth. The control of organs of people’s power by respected and 
sometimes older residents and civic leaders seems to have been the norm in other regions 
of South Africa. In contrast to Alexandra, Seekings asserts that in most townships in the 
PWV region, control over people’s courts was established by older residents who had more 
concern for their popular support and legitimacy (1990: 133). Neil Coleman also emphasised 
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that “it was only through the development of these structures that they were able to stop 
the youth, in particular, from taking the law into their own hands” (Interview: 20 February 
2013). 
This alternative assertion of social order was done through formal structures and 
organisational discipline. In Alex, the notion that popular justice was the preserve of 
spontaneity and rebellion was challenged by more organised youth structures such as the 
Alexandra Youth Congress (AYCO) (Bozzoli 2004: 155; 113, 129-130). Marks provides a 
similar account of action by youth activists in Diepkloof (2001: 107-9). The adult generation 
in Alex also provided a counter to spontaneous activity. Bozzoli describes how this 
contingent had memories of the older generation of ANC leaders, were more influenced by 
intellectual thought and the participatory democracy of the trade union movement, and 
used popular organisational practices of the time such as the mass meeting and mobilising 
committees (2004: 122; see also 141). The ‘popular democracy’ that this generation 
advocated comprised some of the strands discussed already: active participation, social 
cohesion, service provision, empowerment, and the establishment of a pre-figurative but 
grassroots democracy.  
3.3. Ideologues and Influences  
It is possible to link some of the themes outlined above to particular ideological or 
theoretical roots. This section therefore draws out the main influences on the discourses of 
people power as well as identifying, where possible, the strands of the movement with 
which they were associated. 
3.3.1. The Role of Intellectuals 
An important influence on the theorisation of people’s power was the role of leading 
intellectuals and ideologues. Within the UDF, in particular, such individuals were especially 
influential in developing ideas about democracy. Often, however, they held multiple 
memberships and allegiances and so it is not possible to link ideas to individuals in an 
isolated manner. Nonetheless, there is value in identifying personal and intellectual 
influences to trace the emergence and spread of ideas. 
As noted in the preceding section, the structures that came to be known as ‘organs of 
people’s power’ were not initially imbibed with a prefigurative democratic content. Prior to 
1985, the UDF had been largely disconnected from local material struggles - focusing 
instead on the campaign against the tricameral elections. Indeed, Seekings has argued that 
the township revolt in September 1984 took the UDF somewhat by surprise (Interview: 19 
February 2013) and that the structures which had emerged by 1985 were not yet linked to 
the national liberation agenda (1991).  
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That being said, although according to Janet Cherry, the UDF had no “grand plan” of where 
it was going, its leadership did have “lots of ideas about democracy” (Interview: 3 October 
2012). Mark Swilling, at the time a leading member of the NGO, Planact, which supported 
civic organisations in urban consumption struggles, contends that the prefigurative 
discourse of people’s power was developed by people within the UDF who “now had to 
develop a theory for all of this in terms of national liberation” (Interview: 20 February 2013):  
“So they brought in a discourse of prefigurative people’s power in order to 
create a political language that they laid over these local struggles. And 
some of the local leaders who were connected into those networks would 
absorb that language to just legitimize what they were doing. But most of 
them, it was just a struggle for, against eviction, for land, consumer 
boycotts, boycott services, etc.” (ibid.). 
Not everybody therefore took a theoretical approach, or at least not initially, to what 
became known as ‘people’s power’. For many participants, local revolt was about material 
struggle. Cherry, who herself undertook research in Kwazakele near Port Elizabeth, suggests 
that activities were really being driven at the local level. While the UDF’s theorists were 
writing about people’s power and what it meant, she commented: “[p]eople here weren’t 
reading that stuff; they were just doing it. They were saying we are making the township 
ungovernable, we are taking control, putting into place our own structures, and so on” 
(Interview: 3 October 2012). Seekings also suggests that ‘people’s power’ became a good 
way for the UDF to ‘package’ what was taking place (19 February 2013). 
From the archives of the UDF and ANC it is very difficult to ascertain the extent to which 
local affiliates and participants were reading theoretical texts or were influenced by similar 
ideas to the Front’s intellectual activists. Raymond Suttner, who wrote for Isizwe and 
contributed to the theorisation of people’s power, conceded that “I’m an intellectual and I 
make a lot of it. But for a lot of people … it’s just a very practical thing” (Interview: 25 
October 2012). The shortage of documented records on more localised activity is perhaps 
one explanation for the primary focus of existing accounts on regional- and national-level 
discourse. Nonetheless, the ideas which surfaced through ideologues such as Raymond 
Suttner and Jeremy Cronin, Mark Swilling argues, “became the official ideology of the UDF” 
(Interview: 20 February 2013).  
Suttner, along with Cronin, spearheaded an influential campaign in 1986 to popularise the 
Freedom Charter through the celebration of its thirty year anniversary. Although the UDF 
did not officially adopt the Charter until 1987, the anniversary was used to develop a 
theoretical connection between mass activity and the Charter’s democratic demands. 
Cronin noted that it “was also an attempt to go back to those roots – the last period of 
sustained popular mobilisation … the Congress of the People, the collection of demands and 
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so forth, were all attempts to stir up an alternative form of democracy and participation by 
people to talk about their, you know, what they wanted” (Interview: 27 November 2012). 
Of significance is that the clause of the Charter which referred to replacing structures of 
minority rule with “democratic organs of self-government” was resurrected in the 1987 
campaign as a representation of precisely what was taking place via the formation of organs 
of people’s power: "The Charter says that all bodies of minority rule shall be scrapped and 
replaced by democratic organs of people's power. The democratic organs being built today 
by our people in the towns, villages and factories will lay the basis for the government of the 
people" (UDF 1987b). What Cronin and Suttner sought to achieve was a correlation in 
theory and practice between people’s power, on the one hand, and the Freedom Charter’s 
vision of democracy, on the other. Suttner made the following comment about the way in 
which this connection was made:  
“At the objective level what it meant for me as an intellectual was for the 
first time I was seeing the ‘popular’ in the masses, in creativity; and the 
way they conducted themselves led me to think that the meaning of the 
Freedom Charter was being re-read … [T]he emphasis had been on the 
vote. Now the activities were not emphasising the national parliament … 
and what I interpreted it to mean, and what some of them – they didn’t 
have the same theoretical interest as I had – but what some people said, 
as I say, what we are doing in Uitenhage in street committees is 
implementing the first clause of the Freedom Charter”. (Interview: 25 
October 2012).55 
As a theorist and intellectual, Suttner’s interpretation was that the Charter needed to be re-
read and reinterpreted in light of new events. Sydney Mufamadi - a civic and trade union 
activist as well as a member of the ANC’s underground structures - made a similar 
observation that many of the ideas set out in 1955 would come to make sense over time, 
with greater significance being added to them as people continued to experience the brunt 
of apartheid (Interview: 26 November 2012). Although it was not at all clear that the 
drafters of the Charter had envisaged ‘democratic organs of self-government’ as 
participatory democratic institutions, some of the movement’s theorists sought to attach a 
new but organic meaning to the term.  
Although the pre-figurative notion of people’s power was inspired by popular grassroots 
activity, the concept itself seems to have originated with the movement’s intellectuals. 
Seekings referred to the frequent quotation of the speech by the UDF’s acting publicity 
secretary, Murphy Morobe in 1987 which referred to people’s power as prefigurative. 
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 Civic leader, Weza Made in Uitenhange in the Eastern Cape indeed referred to implementing the first clause 
of the Charter through the establishment of street committees (Isizwe 1986b). 
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However he interestingly doubted very much that it was written by Morobe himself, instead 
citing someone such as Andrew Boraine as a possible author (Seekings Interview: 19 
February). Similarly, the oft-cited speech by Zwelakhe Sisulu on ‘People’s Education for 
People’s Power’ (1987) seems to have been mostly written, according to Suttner, by Neil 
Coleman who he described as “a very important invisible theorist” (Interview: 25 October 
2012). Sydney Mufamadi was another important theorist, although he didn’t write on 
popular power (ibid.), and the article on ‘discipline’ in Isizwe, although anonymous, was 
written by Suttner himself (ibid.).  
It is thus not evident whether the theorising that activists undertook during the 1980s is an 
accurate reflection of what most people envisaged. It is possible that some in the Front 
were merely keen to highlight the bogus nature of the ‘democracy’ proffered by the state as 
opposed to offering a pre-figurative vision of their own. Andrew Boraine conceded that he 
didn’t know how widespread the debates about a prefigurative democracy were, or how 
many people were reading what was published about it (Interview: 21 May 2013). It is 
intriguing that Boraine, who elsewhere in a 1987 study of Mamelodi township had 
presented people’s power quite unambiguously as prefigurative participatory democracy, 
was cautious with hindsight about overstating the connection between the future 
dispensation and the struggles of the 1980s: 
You know we may theorise about them and, you know you can build 
people’s parks and - a lot of it is just symbolic ... it’s saying to the apartheid 
regime: ‘stuff you, we’re going to do what we want to do’, you know. And 
it was sometimes deliberately provocative to show that. And most of the 
time I would say they were strategies for mobilising participation in the 
struggle, which in itself is educating about democracy, but it wasn’t 
necessarily consciously about building the new society. I would be hesitant 
to kind of go that far. (Ibid.). 
Seekings’ inclination is that “for a lot of activists … representative institutional models were 
so discredited that, anything else would seem better. And that the only thing that people 
had experience of … was these residence associations, civic organisations, etc.” (Interview: 
19 February 2013). He is therefore doubtful that during the late 1980s and early 1990s many 
activists “had a strong sense of participatory or direct democracy as an alternative to real 
liberal democratic forms of representative democracy” (ibid.).  
Moreover, many of the activists involved in the street and area committees were not the 
same people as the UDF’s patrons or its national and provincial leadership. Even at the most 
local level, distinctions existed between the strata of activists/organisers and the individuals 
in communities who carried out popular directives. A case in point is popular justice which, 
for many of its advocates, embodied notions of social cohesion, accountability and 
rehabilitation. Yet in practice the courts sometimes resorted to violence, terror and the 
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arbitrary issuing of punishments. Bozzoli’s account of Alex reflected how the liberation 
narrative of the ANC could be re-interpreted quite differently by the township’s youth. 
Moreover, she observed intellectual and ideological differences between the ‘grassroots 
youth’ and the formal youth leadership of organisations such as AYCO. The latter, she notes, 
had a greater focus on discipline and organisation as opposed to violence and spontaneity 
(2004: 113). 
While the prefigurative discourse became the dominant one in the UDF, it was not 
uniformly adopted across the ANC camp. Janet Cherry did not recall participants themselves 
making the connection with the Freedom Charter, for example. But she also noted that the 
ANC itself “was saying nothing about democratic structures” (Interview: 3 October 2012). Its 
focus was on revolutionary objectives as opposed to democracy. Suttner, who saw a need to 
“re-think the meanings of the Freedom Charter”, in light of popular activity, remarked: 
“I don’t know whether people in Lusaka did that because sometimes the 
ANC statements would say what we are going to do is we are going to 
establish a state of people’s power. Now, when they talked about that 
they were really talking about smashing the apartheid state and having 
some sort of ANC-led government … [W]hat that meant for the direct, 
local, I don’t think they had thought out that.” (Interview: 25 October 
2012). 
Ben Turok also suggested that forward thinking about democracy was not prominent within 
the ANC at that time. In relation to the means-versus-ends debate, he insisted that mass 
organisation was understood as a mechanism of struggle, not in terms of democracy 
(Interview: 19 February 2013).  
On the one hand the ANC’s cadres at home and abroad saw themselves as part of the same 
movement and the dual role of many individuals - between the ANC, SACP, UDF, and the 
civic and labour movements - led to conceptual cross-pollination. The Front’s leading 
ideologues, however, were not the same as those of the ANC itself. In exile the ANC had its 
own intellectuals, such as Pallo Jordan (Head of the ANC’s Research Department), Joel 
Netshitenzhe (the editor of Mayibuye) and the SACP intellectual and senior leader, Joe 
Slovo. The tone of the publications emerging from exile did not always have the same focus 
as those of the UDF. Thus, although we are able to identify many common threads, the 
movement’s cadres were also influenced by slight variations in ideological thought. This, 
alongside people’s own lived experiences, produced nuances in both the interpretation of 
people’s power and the movement’s view of the normative alternative to liberal democracy. 
3.3.2. Marxism-Leninism 
“A revolutionary democracy is a popular act and the popular writ forms its 
foundation, a foundation which ensures that the overwhelming majority - 
102 
 
the working people - are in firm control of state power. In brief, a NDR is a 
popular act based on popular experience”. (ANC, undated a: 3). 
Marxist influence in the ANC comprised not only a variety of currents but was found across 
all strands of the movement. The way in which Marxism and its derivative ideas manifested 
in the ANC is partly apparent from the themes above. Notions of people’s democracy, 
revolution, hegemony, and active participation derive from the Marxist tradition. 
Importantly, the specific interpretation of these themes, as well as the strands of Marxism 
from which they derive, have bearing on the means of achieving liberation and on the end-
state envisaged. Although we must be cautious in attributing particular characteristics to 
those ‘in exile’, the influence of Marxism-Leninism was indeed more visible and influential in 
the external movement than it was within the UDF. 
Overall, the ANC’s adherence to revolutionary theory had considerable bearing on its 
democratic vision. Although people’s power was shaped partly by local experiences, 
theoretical formulations and experiences of revolution internationally also provided a 
framework for interpreting popular struggle. The ANC both at home and abroad was 
strongly influenced by other liberation struggles and revolutions, including those in Cuba, 
Nicaragua and Vietnam, as well as in African states such as Algeria, Cape Verde and Guinea, 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola. The external mission, in particular, drew inspiration 
from Vietnam and its strategy of ‘people’s war’.  
A document from the ANC’s archival collection, entitled ‘Reading List for Study Groups on 
Guerrilla Warfare-Tactics and Strategy’, with ‘T.Mbeki’ noted in handwriting at the top, is 
informative in the texts it recommends.56 These include Lenin, Marx and Gramsci, as well as 
Basil Davidson on African revolution, Amilcar Cabral’s writings on Cape Verde and Guinea 
Bissau, the Mozambican academic and FRELIMO leader Eduardo Mondlane, Cuban 
revolutionary Che Guevara, Vietnam’s General Giap on people’s war, Mao Tse Tung on 
China and guerrilla warfare, and Regis Debray on Latin American revolution. The list also 
includes South African writings from Joe Slovo, Govan Mbeki, Harold Wolpe, and Jack and 
Rae Simons, as well as a list of articles from Sechaba and the African Communist (ANC 
London Collection, undated b). 
Lusaka’s theorisation of people’s power, as it relates to democracy specifically, seems to 
have been undertaken by the ANC’s Political Commission. The establishment of this body in 
1985 as a sub-structure of the Politico-Military Council (PMC) denoted renewed emphasis in 
ANC strategy on political as well as armed activity (Maharaj in O’Malley 2007: 234-5). In 
1986 the Political Commission or Committee (sometimes also referred to as ‘Political HQ’) 
produced two discussion papers: ‘Overview of the Internal Situation under the State of 
Emergency’ and ‘Ungovernability and People’s Power’. The latter of these is particularly 
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 This document is filed under ‘armed struggle’, 1970s-80s. 
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interesting and, although marked with no author or date, is referred to in the former 
document as a ‘Political Commission Discussion Document’ (ANC PC 1986a: 6).  
The ‘Ungovernability and People’s Power’ document states its aim as being to “establish 
broad guidelines” for the further advancement of people’s power and is described as “a 
response to the request of activists on the ground” (ANC, undated a). As well as drawing on 
reports and experiences of specific locations inside the country, the document is described 
as potentially serving as a guide for further activity (ibid.). It depicts people’s power as a 
replacement democratic authority for the structures of the old order: “Our central demand 
is that the people must govern … The collapse of the regime’s authority is to go hand in 
hand with the emergence of an authority of a new type - popular democratic authority 
morally, politically and structurally” (ibid: 1).   
What is initially unclear is the precise form this alternative authority is expected to take. 
Here a closer reading of the text is required. A notable conceptual influence is Lenin’s notion 
of ‘dual power’, originating with the events of the 1917 Russian revolution and drawing 
heavily on the model of the 1871 Paris Commune. The idea of ‘dual power’ and the extent 
to which a counter-authority to the South African state was actually established during the 
1980s was debated amongst ANC activists. Hassen Ebrahim who was based with the ANC in 
Botswana emphasised that popular control of territories was important not just as a method 
of resistance but in “shaping and developing our own ideas with regard to power and what 
type of power should replace the current power” (Interview by O’Malley: 4 December 
1999). 
The document also draws on the emergence of organs of people’s power in other 
revolutionary contexts (citing examples such as Vietnam, Cuba and anti-fascist revolutions in 
Europe). However it also emphasises that the conditions and path of each revolution can 
vary, making clear that no direct parallel can be drawn between South African conditions 
and those of struggles in which the organs established are “real prototypes of the new state 
to emerge” (ANC, undated a: 2). What is does do is to characterise the “rudimentary organs 
of people’s power”, as found in South Africa, as emerging “at the point when the masses 
start to address the question of the seizure of power” (ibid.). It then goes on to state that 
“What we have achieved are the beginnings of dual power” (ibid: 13).  
The seizure of power by the people is of course linked with the process of NDR, and here it 
is worth quoting the document at length. The ANC’s description of the power envisaged in 
NDR bears a strong resemblance to Lenin’s conception, set out subsequently, of the 
alternative power established by the Paris Communards and later the Russian Soviets: 
“The National Democratic Revolution entails the seizure of power by the 
revolutionary forces … this implies, from the very start, an emphasis during 
the struggle and after - different from that of bourgeois revolutions. 
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Particularly, a revolutionary democracy encourages popular initiative and 
mass creativity as opposed to actions solely from above. A revolutionary 
democracy is a popular act and the popular writ forms its foundation, a 
foundation which ensures that the overwhelming majority - the working 
people - are in firm control of state power. In brief, a NDR is a popular act 
based on popular experience” [emphasis added] (ANC, undated a: 3). 
The following extract is taken from Lenin’s writings on ‘The Dual Power’ (1917): 
 “It is a revolutionary dictatorship, i.e., a power directly based on 
revolutionary seizure, on the direct initiative of the people from below, and 
not on a law enacted by a centralised state power. It is an entirely different 
kind of power from the one that generally exists in the parliamentary 
bourgeois-democratic republics of the usual type still prevailing in the 
advanced countries of Europe and America. This circumstance often over 
looked, often not given enough thought, yet it is the crux of the matter. 
This power is of the same type as the Paris Commune of 1871” [emphasis 
added] (Lenin, 1917). 
The dual power to which Lenin refers, and which captures “the essence” of the Paris 
Commune, are the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. Like South Africa’s organs of 
people’s power, the source of the alternative power described by Lenin is “the direct 
initiative of the people from below, in their local areas”. It entails “the replacement of the 
police and the army” such that “order in the state under such a power is maintained … by 
the armed people themselves”; and “officialdom, the bureaucracy, are either similarly 
replaced by the direct rule of the people themselves or at least placed under special 
control” (Lenin 1917). Interestingly, the ANC Political Commission encouraged a structure 
not dissimilar to that of the Soviets in which “the Street and Area Committees should link up 
in a pyramid fashion and form a central people’s organ” (ANC PC 1986a). As these 
committees were formed in South Africa, this is precisely how they were structured, with a 
large number of yard, block or section committees at the base of the pyramid, moving 
upwards to a decreasing number of street committees, and an area committee or council. 
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Fig 1.0. Structure of organs of people’s power in Alexandra (Action Council and Street, Block and Yard 
Committees). Source: Wits Historical Papers, Mayekiso Trial AK2130: File 9 Court Records, B. Exhibits. 
 
Although the ANC referred to the examples of the Paris Commune and the Soviets, it was 
also careful to distinguish the national democratic, as opposed to socialist, nature of the 
South African revolution and the specificity of South African conditions:  
“We use the examples of the ‘Commune’ and the ‘Soviets’ not to imply 
that people’s committees are such organs. The nomenclature arises out of 
concrete situations. Above all, people’s committees are not at this stage 
addressing the issue of a socialist revolution, let alone a communist 
society. From their content and concrete tasks we can only say they are 
revolutionary; they are democratic … What we should study is their 
content, ensuring all the time that they carry out the revolutionary task 
that is expected of them” (ANC undated a: 19). 
While the two-stage nature of the South African revolution may have been emphasised, so, 
too, was the instrumental role of people’s power. The structures were only democratic in so 
far as they incorporated everyone, elected their representatives, and involved active 
participation. They were not multi-interest forums or pluralist structures but were imbued 
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with a revolutionary task. Of particular note, is that the very same document also states: 
“the vanguard movement should be so firmly in control that political distinction between 
the ANC and the popular organs becomes non-existent” (ibid: 18). As the soviets themselves 
were eventually subjected to the central control of the Bolshevik Party, one wonders 
whether such centralised control was also envisaged by the ANC.  
Those who were members of the SACP were more direct in comparing people’s power to 
Lenin’s ‘democracy from below’.57 Such theorisation could be found in the pages of the 
African Communist. The writings of Sisa Majola (also known as ‘Mzala’),58 for example, 
certainly draw more directly on Lenin’s understanding of popular structures as an 
alternative power, and it is possible to see how these ideas were replicated through 
people’s power. Mzala likened South Africa’s people’s committees to the Paris Commune 
(Mzala 1986: 8): as “embryos of the future state” (ibid.: 13). These structures, as he 
understood them, were aimed “at seizing control of every facet of life in their districts” 
(Majola 1986: 61), with the “final intention ... to form a people’s government in the whole 
country” (ibid.: 62). He also places a much stronger emphasis than do the writings of the 
ANC on the need for the movement to theorise about the state and revolution.  
Inside the country, there were some similar inspirations. Activists were influenced by 
ideologies relating to state power and revolutionary change, in particular the works of Marx 
(Seedat Interview: 13 May 2013; Mashatile Interview: 21 February 2013; Carrim Interview: 
16 January 2013; Steinberg 2000: 187-8). In Alexandra, Mzwanele Mayekiso, brother of 
Moses Mayekiso, compared the AAC to the Paris Commune (1996: 83). Rashid Seedat, who 
was involved in youth organisation in the Indian community, indicated the strong influence 
of the Soviet model amongst people in the ANC and UDF (Interview: 13 May 2013). In 
particular, he referred to the models of the Paris Commune and the Russian Soviets as 
informing the theorisation of people’s power (ibid.):   
“- you know when Lenin called ‘all power to the soviets’? Now it was the 
same kind of thing. And the soviets were worker councils in Russia, and 
saying that in a socialist democracy the workers exercise power via their 
workers’ councils. So [it’s] a similar kind of notion of saying power should 
be exercised by the people in their own local organs. That was very much 
the kind of thinking …” (ibid.). 
That these theoretical linkages were not drawn on more publicly by the UDF is 
understandable. The opportunities available as a result of its legal status were not 
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  The new power in which the people themselves directly participate was referred to by Lenin as ‘democracy 
from below’ (Majola 1986: 58). 
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 Sisa Majola was a pen name sometimes used by SACP intellectual Jabulani Nxumalo, most frequently known 
as Comrade Mzala. 
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something the Front wished to jeopardise. As Seedat explained, the UDF would need to 
‘temper’ what it said (Ibid.). Moreover there was a lack of uniformity in revolutionary 
inspiration. Some activists were influenced by the Soviet Union and East Germany, as well as 
by African states such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola (Mashatile Interview: 21 
February 2013). For others, the revolutions in Latin America made more of an impression 
(Boraine Interview: 21 May 2013). Either way, much of the Soviet influence is likely to have 
come from the overlapping membership between the ANC and SACP. Like many liberation 
movements of the time, the ANC was “very much influenced by socialist theory as 
articulated in the Soviet Union” (Mabandla Interview: 28 June 2013).  
From analysis of archival documents, there is no strong suggestion that the ANC or UDF 
themselves drew on the Soviet Union as a model for a future state. Nonetheless, the Front’s 
rejection of liberal, parliamentary-style democracy was fairly unambiguous. Valli Moosa’s 
claim, that the UDF had always envisaged features such as political pluralism, freedom of 
speech and a bill of fundamental rights (ibid.), seems somewhat implausible. Neither UDF 
nor ANC discourses resembled the parliamentary and gradualist ideas of Marxists like 
Kautsky or Bernstein and instead reflected the influences (albeit themselves divided) of 
Lenin and Left-wing Marxism. In terms of the latter, there is little evidence of the 
commitment to civil liberties within socialism as defended by Rosa Luxemburg.59 Cas 
Coovadia observed that, although the UDF was very insistent on organising democratically - 
on democratic practice and accountability - in “the throes of struggle”, discussion about a 
multi-party future or bill of rights did not take place (Interview: 28 May 2013).    
What is possible to identify, however, is that different strands of Marxism carried more 
weight in some parts of the movement than in others. This factor itself emphasises the 
value of examining ideas and theories as opposed to ‘ideology’ more strictly. The SACP in 
exile, for example, had very close ties with and was heavily influenced by the Soviet Union 
and a Leninist interpretation of Marx. The discourse emerging from the ANC in Lusaka (and 
official publications of the movement) drew more heavily on ideology and derivative 
theories of the South African condition. Examination of the syllabus and lectures of the 
ANC’s Department of Political Education (DPE), for example, indicates its focus on 
revolutionary and socialist content, including the example of the Soviet Union (ANC DPE 
1986-88). It also dealt with nationalist ideology - a reflection of the ANC’s intellectual 
heritage - and referred specifically to “the cross-pollination of ideas between communism 
and nationalism” (ANC DPE 1989).  
Some individuals in the UDF were also members of the SACP, and so the influence of 
Marxism-Leninism undoubtedly seeped into the internal movement through underground 
structures and academia. Yet, according to Ben Turok, while the Party was very influential in 
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exile, it was not so within the UDF (Interview: 19 February 2013). The influence of Marxism 
amongst domestic activists incorporated a greater variety of currents. Within the movement 
at home, alternatives to orthodox Marxism-Leninism were also taking root.  
3.3.3. Alternative Currents of Marxism 
One of the most significant of these alternatives was the work of Italian Marxist, Antonio 
Gramsci, whose ideas were influential on many UDF activists (Carrim Interview: 16 January 
2013; Cherry Interview: 3 October 2012; Tsenoli Interview: 11 March 2013; Moosa 
Interview: 30 April 2013). For some people, Gramsci was influential in shaping perceptions 
of people’s power as prefigurative - a current which is dealt with in the subsequent section. 
Primarily, however, Gramsci seems to have been influential in revolutionary theory and the 
practice of struggle (Moosa Interview: 30 April 2013; Cherry Interview: 3 October 2013).  
UDF strategy, according to Houston (1999), reflected Gramsci’s ‘war of position’ - a concept 
based on waging a battle for hegemony through persuasion rather than force. Gramsci’s 
ideas of hegemony involved the building of ideological consensus, requiring both moral and 
intellectual leadership and the forging of a popular and collective will (1971). For the UDF, 
ideological hegemony would be constructed through a process of struggle (Moosa 
Interview: 30 April 2013) and by working as a cross-class alliance of forces (Cherry Interview: 
3 October 2013).  
Related to the concept of hegemony is ‘civil society’, which Gramsci identified as a terrain of 
“consent, hegemony, direction, in conceptual opposition to the state (political society) 
which is a site of coercion, dictatorship, domination” (Gramsci 2000: 224). For a movement 
such as the UDF, operating on a legal terrain but in opposition to the state, the idea of the 
existence of a civil society was important: organised movements could build an alternative 
ideological hegemony to challenge that of the dominant class.  
Although Gramsci himself did not tie his concept of hegemony to normative democratic 
discussion, his ideas came to inspire Left alternatives to Bolshevism such as that of Euro-
communism (Killingsworth 2012: 14). His work is thus often viewed as a forerunner to 
democratic Marxism. Both Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and Brown (1990), for example, draw 
on Gramsci in order to distinguish between ‘democratic’ and ‘authoritarian’ hegemony. The 
former, according to Brown, rejects class reductionism: “’[it] is not a process of molding 
diverse groups' interests and tasks into conformity with what have been imputed to be 
those of the working class” (1990: 44). Instead, he argues that there is “no essential unity 
among diverse social groups beyond what can be created through articulation and 
democratic practice” (ibid.: 45).  
Laclau and Mouffe thus distinguish democratic practice (which recognises democratic choice 
as a critical part of the creation of a socialist hegemony) from authoritarian practice (in 
which mass identity is ‘predetermined’ by “a necessary law of history”) (1985: 58-59). 
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Contrasting this to Lenin and Bolshevism, they highlight how, in an authoritarian form of 
hegemony, representivity is presupposed through the “interweaving of science and 
politics”: “there is no longer any problem in considering the party as representative of the 
class". Authoritarianism is needed when the working class does not identify with its 
‘historical interests’ (ibid.).  
Although Gramsci has been read as proposing a more democratic notion of hegemony, it is 
not clear that this was the influence that filtered through the broader movement. 
Moreover, authors such as Keane have critiqued Gramsci’s veneration of the proletariat’s 
role, arguing that what he seeks is still the abolition of civil society (1988). Some individuals 
in the MDM made a connection between Gramscian thought and a democratic hegemony - 
emphasising, for example, the importance of combining the socialist project with 
democratic practice in forging a popular will (Bloch 1983).60 Yet it is not clear that this 
sentiment was broadly representative.  
Overall, the drawing of a correlation between hegemonic struggle and democratic 
contestation is not prevalent in UDF discourse. Janet Cherry noted that the Gramscian 
approach was discussed in terms of its strategic utility, not its democratic credentials 
(Interview: 3 October 2013). In fact Gramsci’s associated notion of civil society, which 
inspired many in the UDF, Friedman argues led not to a view of civil society in which 
hegemony was won through “pluralist political activity” but through the ‘colonisation’ of 
civil society institutions by ideologists of the liberation movement (1992: 86). Moreover, the 
neo-Gramscian acceptance, advocated earlier by Marxists such as Kautsky, of a democratic 
(parliamentary) path to power does not fit with the UDF’s statements on the inadequacy of 
parliamentary democracy or with the acceptance by many activists of a Leninist-inspired 
insurrection. 
The drawing of an inzile-exile distinction in democratic thought must therefore be made 
cautiously. Conceptual influence cut across the movement and the presence of the 
underground linked those abroad and at home. Nonetheless, it is possible to argue that the 
Gramscian influence on activists at home was not identifiable in exile discourse. Here, the 
absence of Gramsci’s ideas is likely a result of the stronger influence of Moscow and 
Gramsci’s location outside of orthodox Leninism. Amongst the external mission, a focus on 
central state power and attainment of hegemony through force shaped revolutionary 
strategy and the ANC itself exhibited a clear admiration for the Soviet Union. Gevisser, for 
example, refers to Thabo Mbeki’s admiration for the Soviet crushing of the Prague Spring in 
1968 (2007 cited in Glaser 2010: 14). Similarly, a 1969 report of the ANC NEC which noted 
the solidarity and friendship of the Soviet Union expressed the movement’s “great anxiety 
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 Graeme Bloch, a UDF and student organiser, produced a paper in 1983 which drew on Gramsci’s notions of 
hegemony and ideology, emphasising that socialism could not be guaranteed without struggle and democratic 
ideals (1983). 
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at the developments in Czechoslovakia” (presumably a reference to the Prague Spring) and 
stated its hope that “the situation there will soon return to normal” (1969: 28). 
The SACP in particular exhibited little awareness of Western Marxist ideas and regarded as 
suspicious and ‘heterodox’ the socialist alternatives to Marxism-Leninism. In 1985 the ANC 
highlighted its own unease that the working class was “bedevilled with various ideological 
tendencies which are harmful to the development of the national liberation struggle” (ANC 
1985g: 3; see also ANC 1985c). It also expressed similar concern at the lack of a “clear 
political perspective” amongst the expanding civic and community organisations (ANC 
1985c).  
The influence within the ANC camp of varying strands of Marxism is reflected in a comment 
by Yunus Carrim, who described differences in the understanding of ‘people’s democracy’ as 
follows:  
“Theirs [in exile] was more of a neo-Stalinist approach ... You know, at that 
time, many, many of the key UDF leaders were in some form or another 
influenced either overtly or even subtly by Marxist approaches ... [A]nd the 
strong current of Marxism that was there was influenced by Gramsci, the 
Italian Marxist, and it was quite open and, although … there were many 
sides to our movement that were quite authoritarian and coercive in 
securing mass support and directing mass struggles in particular ways, … 
overall, there was also a significant open, inclusive, democratic tradition 
and to the extent that the people who were of a Marxist disposition were 
influential, it was less, I think, Stalinist and the traditional approaches of 
the Communist Parties of most countries, and more to do with a 
Gramscian approach” (Interview: 16 January 2013). 
This position seems to be supported by Ben Turok, a member of the SACP’s senior 
leadership in exile between 1960 and the early 1970s, who commented: “we were not 
Gramsci-ists … we were Stalinists. Central power was what mattered; take over” (Interview: 
19 February 2013). Turok also suggested that the differences between the approach of the 
UDF and SACP resulted in the UDF being seen as a threat by some in the Party leadership: 
“Slovo argued consistently, and even in the Morogoro document, that the 
transition from a democratic revolution to a socialist revolution would not 
be a long one ... And he gave reasons for that and the sort of view was that 
because we have a strong proletariat and a weak bourgeoisie, a national 
bourgeoisie, therefore the transition would be fairly easy ... So if there 
were other forces like UDF which were not of the same mind, then this 
could be seen as a threat and a diversion. So it wasn’t so much about the 
question of the forms of democracy and power it was about who would 
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win and the nature of the transition … [The UDF was] … loose, amorphous, 
not Marxist … It was an alternative … On the one hand it was very 
welcome because it was this, the Arab spring. On the other hand, where 
was it going?” (ibid.). 
The Front’s cross-class nature and approach to revolutionary struggle that went against the 
grain of Leninist theory seems to have engendered some discomfort. Turok suggests that it 
was this perception of the UDF which ultimately led to it being ‘closed down’ (ibid.). Jeremy 
Cronin, who was active in the UDF as well as later reintegrating into the underground SACP, 
commented on the presence of a “school of thought” within the ANC that saw popular 
power as “a potential threat to the ANC and return of its hegemony” (Interview: 27 
November 2012).  
The presence of concerns about the ‘direction’ of the UDF was quite possibly linked to the 
split between Marxism-Leninism and alternative Left currents, which incorporated Lenin’s 
dispute with his detractors, Luxemburg and Trotsky. Their concern that the revolution may 
be frustrated rather than advanced by the presence of a ‘vanguard of professionals’ (Geras 
1972) underpinned debates about the role of vanguard leadership. It is thus also likely that 
it spoke to the contestation between Leninism and the ‘workerist’ positions of syndicalism 
and councillism. The trade unions in the case of syndicalists and workers councils in the case 
of councillists were viewed as the primary vehicles for revolutionary change. Both of these 
strands gained ground in the South African labour and civic movements - in the latter 
instance manifesting in the neighbourhood self-government of the street and area 
committees. Indeed, Gramsci, while defending the need for a Socialist Party, supported the 
model of a council movement, which had a greater emphasis on organisation from below, 
than on the leading role of the Party (Forgacs 1999: 78; Schecter 1994: 88-9). The ANC-SACP 
belief in the need for a vanguard movement and concurrent concern at the UDF’s lack of 
ideological clarity thus mirrored divisions within Marxist theory.  
Although the division between ‘workerists’ and ‘populists’ was resolved officially with the 
formation of COSATU in 1985,61 it did not erase these alternative currents. There thus 
emerged some tension between workers’ power (built from the shop floor upwards, 
through the trade unions) and people’s power (established under the auspices of the 
vanguard movement). Jeremy Cronin referred to the growing influence on South African 
labour of the Polish union federation, Solidarnosc (Solidarity) and, later, the Brazilian 
Workers’ Movement (Interview by Sheehan: 17 April 2001). Each of these organisations had 
sought to advance workers’ rights through prioritising workplace issues and safeguarding 
their autonomy from the Communist Party. Solidarity, in particular, was scorned by the 
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SACP. The Leninist view was that the narrowly economic struggles of the trade unions 
“could divert the working class from revolutionary activity” (Houston 1999: 16). The need 
for a revolutionary vanguard party (or movement) to guide mass struggle was a view held by 
Lusaka, which at times displayed a tendency to disregard the opinion of the movement at 
home. Thus although terms such as ‘syndicalism’, ‘workerism’ and ‘ultra-leftism’ were 
abhorred in the ANC’s official discourse, some strands of the MDM retained roots in these 
traditions.  
Tensions consequently emerged when these practices were transferred to the civic arena 
through individuals involved in both civic and union organisation. One example of such a 
person is Moses Mayekiso, who was both a leader of the Alexandra Civic Organisation and 
the National Union of Metal Workers (NUMSA). Visible in the organisation of civics and 
organs of people’s power was the councillist tradition of a pyramid structure of people’s 
councils or committees (Glaser 1998: 35 and 1991: 113-114). Like the Soviets, councillists 
were inspired by the model of the Paris Commune but deviated from the Bolshevik model 
by rooting power in the councils rather than the party (Schecter 1994: 92-5). Mayekiso 
notably referred to the presence of some individuals returning from imprisonment or exile 
being uncomfortable with the bottom-up structures of the civics and feeling that there was 
“too much power” from below (Interview: 8 April 2013). 
3.3.4. Prefigurative Radical Democracy 
As discussed in section 3.2, a prominent theme of people’s power was pre-figuring a future 
state. In terms of its ideological and theoretical underpinnings, the pre-figurative discourse 
was rooted in a Marxist heritage. Some activists linked pre-figuration of the future to the 
Gramscian concept of an ‘interregnum’: between the death of the old society and birth of 
the new (Coleman Interview: 20 February 2013; Boraine 1987: 3). Neil Coleman noted that 
“people’s power was very much seen in that sort of way” (Coleman Interview: 20 February 
2013). Raymond Suttner also referred to ‘pre-figurative democracy’ as a Gramscian term 
(Interview: 25 October 2012). Gramsci’s notion that “the old is dying and the new cannot 
yet be born” was drawn on as a formulation to understand how the ‘goal’ or ‘end result’ 
could be connected to the means of getting there (Boraine 1987: 3). It was in this sense that 
the present, or ‘interregnum’, offered “glimpses of the new” (ibid). The UDF’s Andrew 
Boraine thus argued that “What we have with us now determines to a large extent what is 
possible in the future” (ibid.). 
For others in the ANC, the pre-figurative notion was associated with the model of Marxist-
inspired revolutions elsewhere. Here, the strategy of ‘people’s war’ seems to have been 
important: popular structures established during the course of struggle were seen as 
embryos of a future people’s government. The idea of establishing people’s committees also 
bore resemblance to the model of the Paris Commune: a people’s revolutionary committee 
that signified the overthrow of the old society and its replacement with a government of the 
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people that would undertake both legislative and executive functions. In line with Marx’s 
idea of the withering away of the state, presumably such popular structures would be 
transitional, being replaced eventually with a dictatorship of the people. 
In terms of the form of the state being pre-figured, influences were rooted in both 
ideological tradition and the practical experience of exclusion. In terms of the former, 
radical democratic and revolutionary theory informed the principle of active participation 
and inadequacy of representative democracy. A particular influence in this regard was the 
Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua. Murphy Morobe’s 1987 speech for the UDF drew on the 
Nicaraguan revolutionaries’ proposal for a “permanent dynamic of people’s participation” 
as an inspiration for South African ideas about democracy (1987: 83). The ‘democratic’ in 
‘national democratic revolution’ was also highlighted as representing a superior form of 
democracy: "- it involves the taking control by all the people of all aspects of their lives [sic]. 
True democracy means that people participate fully in shaping their own future. This means 
that political power must be in the hands of the people" (UDF 1986c: 740). 
What was envisaged was that the state would not only be democratic but also participatory. 
In a document on the role of extra-parliamentary opposition, the UDF explained that the 
rise of popular localised struggles around daily living conditions and economic deprivation 
had led to an appreciation of the importance of seeing the national democratic state as “a 
function of mass organisation” (UDF, c.1987: 7). The UDF’s ideologues made a distinction 
between ‘real’ and ‘representative’ democracy. The former constituted popular control, not 
via elites or professional politicians but by affected people themselves. It also extended the 
democratic principle to all areas of life: “A real democracy is one that allows individuals real 
control over all aspects of their daily lives and not just those areas that are defined as 
'political'" (Boraine 1987: 8).  
Although the term ‘participatory democracy’ itself was not always used to describe what 
was happening, some activists such as Jeremy Cronin were clear that people’s power was 
understood as just that (Interview: 27 November 2012). Andrew Boraine also referred to 
people’s power as going beyond representative to include “direct and participatory 
democracy” (1987: 8). A document written in approximately 1986 on building and 
consolidating organs of peoples power in Mamelodi referred to these structures as ensuring 
“participatory democracy in the whole township” (ANC London Collection, undated f: 5). 
In terms of people’s lived experience of exclusion, the prevalence of a desire to merely 
create something that represented the very antithesis of the existing system was arguably 
more widespread amongst grassroots participants than political or democratic theory. 
Lechesa Tsenoli, for example, commented that: “we were seeing our experiences of the 
apartheid state then, in the way it fragmented communities and it actually disempowered 
people by denying them of opportunities to participate in decision making, as something 
that we should not only remedy but we should ensure also that what comes into replacing it 
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makes that as part of its modus operandi” (Interview: 11 March 2013). Deprivation not only 
of political rights but control over all aspects of people’s lives - from home life to education 
and the workplace - engendered a sense that democracy would entail popular control over 
all of those things. A 1988 discussion paper of the MDM thus stated that "true democracy is 
when all the people have a say over their daily lives and are able to determine it in their 
interests” (Mamdoo 1988). The formation of democratic mass organisation was a way of 
beginning to ‘realise’ this principle (ibid.).  
A significant issue in the debate concerned whether or not emerging structures were 
understood as embryonic of a future local government. The literature review in Chapter One 
of this thesis drew on the various positions of the civics on this issue, noting Steinberg’s 
reference to the existence of three views of people’s power: as a vehicle of struggle by 
which the local state is to be destroyed; as a temporary power to be replaced by a 
democratic state; and as organs of a future democracy which would destroy apartheid 
structures but also ‘replace’ them (2000: 186-7). Overall, of those who viewed people’s 
power as something pre-figurative, very few appear to have believed that these structures 
would themselves become a future local government. The majority seem to have 
understood their role to be primarily one of struggle but also of imbibing general principles 
of democracy, including an ethos that would allow for the participation of everyone. In this 
sense the structures pre-figured not so much the state as a future society in general (albeit 
an influential one in shaping what the future state would look like) (Coovadia Interview: 28 
May 2013; Mayekiso Interview: 8 April 2013; Tsenoli Interview: 11 March 2013).  
In terms of the participatory nature of the envisaged state, the practices and experience of 
the trade unions also served to shape the democracy being pre-figured. Much more so than 
the civics, the independent trade unions were consciously building democratic structures 
(Cherry, Interview: 3 October 2012; see also Glaser 1991: 109). The cross-pollination of 
ideas between union and civic organisation took place as a result of people such as Moses 
Mayekiso, as well as COSATU’s Chris Dlamini on the East Rand (Coleman Interview: 20 
February 2013; Tsenoli Interview: 11 March 2013) and Sam Ntuli of the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) in Thokoza (Coleman Interview: 20 February 2013) Mayekiso 
transferred his experience of building structures such as union shop steward committees 
and councils to civic work in Alexandra where he felt similar structures could work in the 
community context (Interview: 8 April 2013).62 
It is possible also to locate the extension of ideas about worker control and citizen 
participation to the post-1960 emergence of the New Left and resurrection of participatory 
democratic discourse amongst socialist movements, intellectuals and students. One of the 
most famous of these was the USA’s Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Janet Cherry 
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 See also Bozzoli (2004: 112) on the influence of Mayekiso and the union’s participatory democratic tradition.  
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referred to an emerging ‘democratic socialist’ tradition amongst young intellectuals at home 
which was seen as a counter to the Marxist-Leninist and Stalinist influences emerging from 
the Soviet bloc (Interview: 3 October 2012). According to her, people within this group were 
reading “Gramsci, Laclau, Poulantzas, and European Marxists and debating hegemony and 
participation” (ibid.).  
Cherry also commented that Rick Turner’s The Eye of the Needle (1972), which advanced 
ideas about worker control and participatory democracy, was very influential on that 
generation of student activists (Interview: 3 October 2012). Turner’s ideas about South 
Africa also sparked interest in particular models of worker control internationally, including 
Poland’s Solidarity (Ibid.; Cronin Interview: 27 November 2012). Through these lines of 
influence, civic and shop-floor struggles became dynamically linked, while normative 
democratic thought about a participatory society and government filtered in through 
unionists, students and intellectuals.  These ideas are notably absent in the discourse from 
Lusaka.  
The combination of trade union experience and intellectual debate about the labour 
movement transpired not only in theoretical debate but in the replication of organisational 
practice. Moses Mayekiso’s interpretation of the role of the civic, for example, was akin to 
that of a trade union: as a popular structure with layers of elected leadership in which the 
civic was given a mandate for action by communities (in this case to get rid of apartheid) 
(Interview: 8 April 2013). Much like a trade union, the civic in Alex was understood as an 
elected structure designed to negotiate with the authorities and improve living conditions 
(Mdakane 1988: 2313).  
Influences of the workerist models of democracy can be seen in some of the UDF language 
as well. A document presented by Valli Moosa at the UDF national workshop in 1990 
emphasised the importance of internal democracy and drew on union-style democratic 
practices such as elected leadership, seeking mandates from members, regular report-backs 
and ability to recall leaders (Moosa 1990: 11). These methods of organising in the civic 
context, however, did not always stem from ideological belief so much as being an effective 
way of addressing issues on the ground. 
Notably, publications and documents from the ANC’s exile collection do not show traits of 
union-style of organising, nor a desire to replicate workplace methods of representation. A 
1985 ANC discussion paper acknowledging its own “weakness in the trade union field” made 
reference to deficiencies in SACTU (the ANC-affiliated trade union congress) and noted the 
need for the ANC to review the way it related to the trade unions (1985c). The observation 
that practices of ‘participatory democracy’ were being developed by the unions which the 
ANC could learn from (ibid.), implies that it had not done so already. The ANC’s attempts to 
improve relations with labour in the mid-1980s were likely linked to concurrent efforts by 
the Party to revitalize its relevance to debates taking place at home. 
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Overall, it would be incorrect to exaggerate the extent to which discussion about democracy 
amongst internal activists took place independently of those in exile. Yet it would also be 
mistaken to argue that such theorisation was of equal concern across the movement. In 
general, the external mission does not appear to have grappled to the same degree with the 
form of a future democracy, nor do they make the link visible in UDF discourse between 
mass organisations and democracy. Thus, while the ANC’s January 8 Statements made 
regular reference to ‘people’s power’, it did not develop it further as a pre-figurative 
democratic idea. In addition to normative democratic debate within the domestic 
movement, other intellectual influences are identifiable that were perhaps even less visible 
in the movement in exile. Amongst internal cadres, people’s power was also shaped by an 
‘activist’ language rooted in ideas about community organising, the ‘experience’ of 
grassroots activism and activist movements internationally. 
3.3.5. Activist Discourses and Community Organising: Democracy as Transformative 
A prominent influence in this regard was the role of the applied theory of community 
organising. Overall, this aspect of people’s power is not visible in official ANC publications or 
in those statements of the UDF focused on national-level political change. Rather, discussion 
about the model and application of community organising took place at a more local level. 
In the first place, the organisation of communities and their conscientisation entailed a 
process of confronting the challenges that impact people’s daily lives. Through so doing, 
organisers were raising popular awareness of the reasons behind people’s circumstances 
(Moosa Interview: 30 April 2013; Coovadia Interview: 28 May 2013; see also Seekings 
2000b: 54 and Mufson 1990: 109). Paul Mashatile, then a member of the Alexandra Youth 
Congress (AYCO), referred to the importance of mobilising people around the issues that 
affected them, rather than drawing on abstract theories: “I think we learned then sooner 
that if you mobilise people for the revolution, for them it’s not an ideological thing and a 
concept, they want something that touches them. If you want to say to them the revolution 
is about a better life, you better show that you are dealing with what is bad at the time” 
(Interview: 21 February 2013). 
In tackling basic socio-economic demands, Valli Moosa who worked as a political activist in 
Lenasia described how links were then drawn between bread and butter issues and the 
political system: “Importantly, you're doing constructive things but you're also consciously 
all of the time reminding people that the reason for this is because you've got a government 
that doesn't care about us, and we're living in an unfair society” (Interview: 30 April 2013). 
The discourse of community organising thus differed in its emphasis and inspirations to that 
of political liberation and revolution. It drew not on a grand narrative of national democratic 
revolution but on concrete local experiences and the inequalities of everyday living. The 
democratic ethos it came to embody was thus informed by practical experience and direct 
benefits as much, if not more, than normative democratic theory. 
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Activists involved in grassroots work appear also to have been influenced by discourses and 
theories of community organising that drew on global experiences. An influential document 
at the time was a 1978 manual for organisers written in the Philippines entitled ‘Organising 
People for Power’ (Seekings 2000b: 56-7 and Interview: 19 February 2013; Cherry Interview: 
3 October 2012). According to Seekings, this was used by South African civics to build 
popular initiatives around local issues, drawing on both the material needs of communities 
and their psychological empowerment (2000b: 58-9). The manual emphasised both the 
potential for participants’ psychological liberation and the need to organise on the basis of 
“real and felt problems” (Maglaya 1978: 4).63 Domestic activists, more than those in exile, 
had contact with people’s everyday challenges. There was thus an appreciation of the 
tangible benefits to communities of organising through people’s power. Such benefits may 
not only have included an improvement in material conditions but a sense of empowerment 
and control. For those who were away from home and distanced from domestic activism, 
Valli Moosa noted that “there wasn't that same level of consciousness about the need to 
involve ordinary people”. Although he noted that there was no conflict involved in this 
difference, there was a degree of ‘tension’ (Interview: 30 April 2013). In this way, 
individuals’ differential experiences shaped their ideas about current conditions and the 
future they envisaged. 
Lechesa Tsenoli (Interview: 11 March 2013) and Janet Cherry (2000b) refer to ‘Rules for 
Radicals’ (1972) written by American community organiser, Saul Alinsky. Alinsky’s work in 
particular involved guidance for activists on the empowerment of low-income communities 
and, interestingly, sought to separate the notion of ‘revolution’ from ideology and 
communism in particular. He saw it instead as being about challenging inequality: about the 
‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ (Alinsky 1972: 9-10). They also referred to the influence of 
community development and re-investment initiatives in the USA which promoted active 
citizenship and democracy around social needs such as inner-city housing (Tsenoli Interview: 
11 March 2013; see also Cherry 2000b: 25-6).64 These ideas resonate with the radical 
democratic discourse of active citizenship revived with the SDS and materialising in the rise 
of the New Left. Cherry noted that the ideas being espoused by community activists in the 
USA, such a Francis Moore Lappe, were similar to those of activists in South Africa during 
the 1980s: of “ordinary people taking control of all aspects of their lives” (2000b: 26). 
The Brazilian educator, Paulo Freire, whose work emphasised the empowering and liberating 
potential of education, was influential on ‘revolutionary social movements’ in Latin America 
and Africa (PFI: undated), including in South Africa (Tsenoli Interview: 11 March 2013; 
Coleman Interview: 20 February 2013; Cherry Interview: 3 October 2012). Freirian pedagogy 
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covered the conscientisation of the oppressed, drew on the importance of adult and 
popular education in the establishment of democracy, and highlighted the importance of 
education relating to people’s lived experiences (Infed: undated). In this sense the 
construction of democratic processes alongside popular education were mutually 
reinforcing: participation was, in the Rousseauian sense, educative. 
It is possible to see how these inspirations came to shape ideas about the educative and 
empowering role of people’s power, in which conscientisation also played an important 
role. The civics were strongly influenced by the idea that mass action itself could transform 
popular consciousness (Seekings 2000b: 58). During his state trial, Moses Mayekiso, 
described the act of conscientising people as “to make them aware of the conditions in 
which they find themselves and how they can solve them” (1988: 2100). For some people, 
conscientisation was therefore part of a process whereby community organising would 
increase ownership of problems and solutions: a process of people taking control over their 
own lives. In this sense, people’s power introduced a notion of democracy that was not only 
participatory (in the sense of the process of political decision-making being the realm of 
ordinary people) but also transformative. It is a process of decision-making in which 
maximum participation produces not only democratic outcomes (policies) but facilitates 
what Pateman describes as “the development of the social and political capacities of each 
individual” (1970: 43). Its function is thus wider than that of representative democracy in 
that it develops human and, more specifically, citizen potential. In this way, people’s power 
spoke to ideas about a developmental form of democracy.  
The active involvement of people in the construction of solutions had the capacity to 
transform individuals and create responsible citizens. It was perhaps these strands of 
people’s power - focused on grassroots organisation, self-help, community education and 
negotiation with the authorities - that contributed most to preparing people not only for 
struggle but for governance. Freirian ideas of pedagogy, for example, spoke to the rejection 
of Bantu education, and Education for People’s Power. These attempts, rooted in 
organisation around everyday problems, imbibed communities with political, social and 
economic skills. Even the NECC’s campaign for ‘people’s education’, which played to both 
the liberation nationalism of the ANC and the popular militancy of the classroom boycott, 
also drew on ideas of building the new society through education and shaping people to 
become citizens (Sisulu 1986). 
In this sense, democratic participation was also self-developmental and, as Pateman 
described, ‘self-sustaining’ (1970: 25; 43): it ‘stretched’ the individual through the notion 
that “responsibility can only be developed be wielding it” (Parry 1972: 26).  By generating an 
idea of participation, as Macpherson describes, as developing human capacities (1977: 52), 
people’s power both rejected elitist conceptions of democracy and touched on ideas about 
the development of human potential and intellect through giving people a “direct interest” 
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in government and thus the incentive to participate (ibid.). It also rejected the narrow, 
individualistic thinking of liberalism to promote a more communitarian view of democracy: 
“a politics of the common good, in which neighbours look for common solutions to their 
problems” (Stoker 2002: 34).  
3.4. Reflection and Analysis 
In exploring these thematic threads and the influences underlying them, it is possible to 
identify not only dominant currents but also conceptual tensions. This final section thus 
reflects on these commonalities and nuances and puts forward a series of arguments about 
the implications for participatory democracy.  
3.4.1. Vanguardism and Hegemony 
“The people must be with the ANC at all times and the revolutionary 
vanguard role must be felt. Perhaps in this way we can manage to lead the 
masses into a revolutionary armed seizure of power”. (ANC 1985h). 
Although not exclusive to the phenomenon of people’s power, ‘vanguardism’ appears as a 
key theme in the movement-people relationship. The role of the ANC as a political and 
“revolutionary vanguard” (ANC PMSC 1979) is both an identification the movement gives to 
itself, as well as one bestowed on it by its support base. The very status of a “vanguard”, 
claimed by the ANC on numerous occasions (ANC PMSC 1979; ANC NEC 1986; ANC NEC 
1988a; Mbeki 1984 cited in Johnson 2003: 328-9), embodies a belief in its historic role as a 
leader of the people. The ANC must sustain both mass political consciousness and self-
organisation toward revolutionary ends. Generally associated with Marxist-Leninist 
revolutions, and originating with Lenin and the Bolsheviks, the concept of ‘vanguard’ 
organisation is overlooked in analyses of ANC identity. Yet the very notion of vanguardism 
shapes not only the role of movement and people but also the centrality of the 
revolutionary goal to the dynamic between the two.  
While we must distinguish the role of the ANC from that of the SACP (which assumed the 
position of vanguard of the working class), the ANC’s conception of its role as vanguard of 
the people is significant for understanding its democratic thought. The notion of the ANC as 
a popular vanguard has its intellectual roots in Marxist-Leninist and African Nationalist 
traditions. In the South African context the amalgamation of the thesis of colonialism of a 
special type with the Soviet push for the establishment of vanguard parties in ‘third world’ 
territories (Golan 1987: 599-600) produced an ANC-SACP alliance in a two-stage liberation 
struggle. It was a decision of the Comintern in 1920 that promoted Lenin’s notion of a 
‘united front’ and the formation of ‘mass organisations’ in third world states which, 
although not formed as communist organisations, would eventually take on a “popular, anti-
imperialist and anti-capitalist” character (Ul’yanovsky cited in Golan 1987: 604). 
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With the exception of a commitment to the doctrine of scientific socialism, several 
characteristics associated with a vanguard party, as set out in a 1976 article of the Soviet 
Journal, Narody Azii i Afriki (Peoples of Asia and Africa), can be applied to the character of 
the ANC in exile. These descriptors include: predominance over mass organisations and 
unions; representation of ‘progressive classes and social groups'; a membership limited to 
those 'capable of assuming all the obligations of the vanguard detachment of society'; and, 
organised on the basis of democratic centralism (cited in Golan 1987: 599). In its ultimate 
objectives and doctrinal focus, the vanguard role of the ANC was certainly not that of a 
Marxist-Leninist vanguard party. Rather it was an African Nationalist organisation which 
conformed to a broad church character. However, as the discussion of influences showed, 
the ANC’s conceptual leanings and modus operandi drew from the experience and ideas of 
its communist allies. The ANC’s Department of Political Education included in the scope of 
its work the “organisation of a revolutionary vanguard party movement” (ANC DPE: 1986-
88) and its vanguard leadership position appears to have derived from a theoretical 
framework associated with the Soviet Union and East Germany (Mabandla Interview:  28 
June 2013).65  
Although the ANC today is a mass organisation, prior to 1990 the restrictions of exile and 
illegality forced on the movement a mode of organisation more akin to a traditional Leninist 
party of ‘limited membership’, with a cell structure and centrally controlled corps of cadres - 
albeit with a broad church programme.66 In this context it was the ANC’s underground 
cadreship that played an important role in conscientisation. Cadres were responsible for 
organising the masses and imparting to them the revolutionary programme, strategy and 
tactics of the movement. 
One of the most visible features of the vanguard status is the ANC’s ‘predominance’ over 
mass organisations (and some trade unions) and its representation of ‘progressive classes 
and social groups'. This particular characteristic informs the nature of popular participation, 
and speaks to the theme of hegemony discussed above. In Marxist-Leninist vanguard 
parties, organs of people’s power were understood in a particularly instrumental sense, 
often as Party organs pursuing the Party programme.67 In the case of the ANC, it’s portrayal 
of popular structures is far more subtle. Organs are not directly described as appendages of 
the movement but the vanguard role is nonetheless clear. Joel Netshitenzhe, a member of 
the ANC’s external mission and editor of the ANC journal, Mayibuye described the careful 
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way in which ANC cadres would come to assume leadership positions within structures of 
people’s power:  
… [G]ood ANC cadres at community-level should so conduct themselves, 
should so distinguish themselves in the context of struggle, should have an 
appreciation of the general direction of things that when popular 
democracy expresses itself they would find themselves either elected or 
selected to lead … What the vanguard movement would seek to do … is to 
ensure that its cadres win the confidence of the people such that when 
popular democracy expresses itself, it finds its cadres in those leadership 
positions” (Interview: 14 May 2013). 
This explanation aligns with the axiom that leadership must be ‘earned’ and not ‘decreed’ 
(ibid.). The vanguard must win the confidence of the masses. Other accounts of the role of 
underground cadres are less delicately phrased. An ANC discussion paper, very possibly 
produced by its Political Commission, pronounced that “The u/g structures per se cannot 
merge with the street committees, but the vanguard movement should be so firmly in 
control that political distinction between the ANC and the popular organs becomes non-
existent” (sic) [emphasis added] (ANC, undated a: 18). Popular structures were conceived as 
directly linked to the movement: as vehicles of its revolutionary strategy.  
The role of the masses was thus at times depicted with a tone of instrumentality, their 
participation providing strength in numbers for a revolutionary purpose. In a context of 
illegality, it was critical that ANC presence be felt through infiltration of popular 
organisations and establishment of underground structures and mass revolutionary bases 
(ANC 1985b: 7). Hence when the ANC made the call in 1985 to “render the country 
ungovernable” it sought to shape how this played out on the ground. The ANC reiterated 
the adage that ‘the masses must be their own liberators’ but what was critical was the 
controlled development of a revolutionary offensive, guided by a correct popular 
understanding of the revolutionary programme (see ANC 1985b and ANC 1985c). This 
envisaged role of popular structures conformed more to the model of the council state 
conceived under the Bolsheviks (albeit inspired by the Paris Commune) in which the councils 
or committees constitute mechanisms of the vanguard party (Glaser, unpublished). The ANC 
envisaged that its underground units were to fulfil a “vanguard role of leading the people in 
a united offensive for the seizure of power” (ANC 1985b).  
Vanguardism thus implied a crucial and active role for the masses on whose participation 
liberation depended. In 1985, the ANC asserted that “Without the ANC, in contact with and 
as part of the masses of the people, enjoying their support and confidence and leading them 
into many-sided action, our victory is impossible” (ANC 1985b: 6). Just as a socialist 
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revolution cannot take place purely from above (Mandel 1983: 1),68 the ANC, as popular 
vanguard, must ensure that the people are “with the ANC at all times” (ANC 1985h: 3). 
However, in order that this activity carried a revolutionary content, the ANC’s guiding hand 
was needed. The movement emphasised the urgency of this in 1985:  
“The ANC seems unable to adapt and respond adequately to shifts and 
changes in day-to-day struggles. We seem unable to exert our will inside 
the country because the leadership is in exile … the key leadership must be 
inside the country; we must infiltrate every organisation; we must initiate 
political organisation among every sector; we must improve the flow of 
propaganda and information. The ANC’s presence in the country must be 
felt.” (ANC NPC 1985). 
Mandel’s formulation about the requirement of mass participation in socialist revolution is 
useful here. He remarks:  
“You cannot have a spontaneous socialist revolution. You cannot make a 
socialist revolution without really trying. And you cannot have a socialist 
revolution commandeered from the top, ordered around by some 
omniscient leader or group of leaders. You need both ingredients in a 
socialist revolution: the highest level of consciousness possible, and the 
highest level of self-organization and self-activity by the broadest possible 
segment of the population” (1983: 1). 
Given the ANC’s own emphasis on both mass participation and revolutionary leadership the 
movement’s understanding of its vanguardism seems subject to the broader ‘inconsistency’ 
in Marxist doctrine identified by Femia: between “the demand for both political control 
from above and popular initiative from below” (1993: 136). While the emergence of the 
UDF was welcomed by the ANC, its revolutionary potential was still predicated upon its own 
influence amongst UDF affiliates. Ivan Pillay, a key operative in the ANC’s ‘Operation Vula’ 
(established to secretly return a number of senior ANC leaders to South Africa), admitted 
that “Vula was not an attempt to plant new leaders inside the county but rather to shape 
internal leaders key decisions” (cited in Butler 2008: 230).  
If we accept that vanguardism is a defining feature of the ANC-mass relationship, then it 
carries important implications for participation. To be a vanguard is a status earned only by 
virtue of being recognised as such by the people themselves. The establishment of a 
Congress hegemonic unity was facilitated by the UDF itself, which identified the ANC as the 
rightful ‘vanguard’ of the struggle (MDM c.1988; Molefe 1990a).  The UDF was therefore not 
a political alternative to the ANC, nor did it wish to be seen as opposing it. Mufson also 
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 Mandel notes that the people must be convinced of the need for revolutionary transformation: the 
vanguard movement must secure their support for and active participation in that objective (1983: 1, 13). 
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comments that, although the trade unions were more independent of the ANC than the UDF 
was, the COSATU leadership’s open support for the ANC and recognition of its “influence 
and popularity” ultimately “created pressure to conform to the ANC position” (1990: 211). It 
is interesting that some of the MDM’s own commentary reflects similar thinking to the ANC 
on the necessity of vanguard leadership. A 1988 UDF discussion paper emphasised that 
mass organisations could only bring about change through linking with a broader political 
organisation; that on their own they “cannot lead themselves to a new society” (UDF 1988).  
It seems possible that the “vanguardist self-perception” which Seekings describes the UDF 
as sometimes adopting (2000a: 190) was linked to its role of fulfilling the ANC’s mandate. 
For those who were part of underground cells or had direct lines of communication to 
Lusaka or Robben Island, it is likely that greater responsibility to the movement may be felt. 
Sydney Mufamadi, an activist and member of the ANC underground in Soweto commented 
on how ANC influence was able to spread, via its underground cadres, into Street 
Committee structures:  
Oliver Tambo is the President of the ANC. I am a member of the ANC in 
Soweto ... I live in some street in Soweto … I’m an active member of the 
street committee. When we sit to discuss what to do and so on, because of 
my level of consciousness, even the chairman of the committee will feel 
that, you know, before he or she goes to the meeting there is a more 
knowledgeable member of our street. Why don’t I consult this person to 
see how do we do this, so you actually find that you play this mentoring 
role … And before people know it, they think like the ANC. So Oliver Tambo 
does not have to try and micro-manage me from Lusaka. Because I am just 
as much a member of the ANC as he is. When I am in my street, I know 
how the ANC would have acted if it was here [emphasis added]. (Interview: 
26 November 2012). 
The influence and pull of the movement on those at home should not be underestimated. 
Indeed, Mufamadi’s account reflects the strength of the bond that underground cadres felt 
with the ANC and the extent to which its vanguard role and personification of the popular 
will was felt by activists at home. It is of note that after 1990 the UDF appears to have begun 
consciously relinquishing its own role as a political organisation (Moosa, 1990). At its 
national workshop in 1990, it was also noted that some UDF affiliates may now be absorbed 
into the ANC (ibid.). 
The broad acceptance of ANC hegemony did not of course mean that the MDM held a 
uniform conception of participation. Regardless of its vanguard status there were nuances in 
what this implied for popular structures. One of the most important of these was that, for 
many activists in the UDF and its affiliates, the vanguard hegemony of the ANC did not 
preclude the simultaneous existence of decentralised and popular structures in which 
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control and democratic decision-making resided with people themselves. As such, while it 
accepted and revered the movement’s leadership, this was combined with a discourse of 
popular participation that allowed for a considerable degree of local control. This partly 
speaks to Cherry’s argument that building local democratic organisation and mobilising 
against the state “were not seen as contradictory, since the capturing of state power was 
the common objective of both projects” (2000a: 92). The themes of active participation, 
pre-figurative democracy and local self-governance also contained within them a notion of 
participation rooted in the value of local democratic practice. What this represented was a 
conceptual discomfort in the understanding of vanguardism itself.  
The ANC’s notion of the state was rooted in a theory of revolution in which the vanguard (of 
professional revolutionaries) must lead and direct the struggle. Yet, for some in the UDF, a 
future democracy would be “forged though mass action from below” (UDF c.1987). The 
tension between these versions in some sense mirrors Lenin’s dispute between Luxemburg 
and Trotsky over the role of the vanguard party. Luxemburg viewed the bottom-up initiative 
of the proletariat and development of its own consciousness as critical elements in a 
successful revolution. She objected to Lenin’s approach which, along with Trotsky, she saw 
as “a division of labour between revolutionaries and workers” in which the party was cut off 
from its constituency. Instead, the movement’s strength should be rooted in “the 
independence of the working class” (Thatcher 2007: 33). For the ANC, as for Lenin, mass 
mobilisation was also critical. But it required careful guidance by dedicated and disciplined 
cadres. In contrast, a 1990 statement by the Transvaal UDF Secretary, Popo Molefe 
reflected the Front’s more decentralised leaning: “When members realise that their 
problems come to notice of the leadership, when their successes are acknowledged, when 
they are part of the formulation of policy and decisions, then we can say we a have a living 
breathing democratic vanguard" (Molefe 1990a).  
Thus in one version, the role of an enlightened leadership is critical; mass mobilisation is 
underpinned by an ultimate truth that must be brought to the masses from without. In the 
other, the role of leadership is also fundamental but mobilisation simultaneously forms a 
basis for building popular power. As Luxemburg was concerned to emphasise - there was 
space for mass control alongside revolutionary objectives. Thus while the UDF’s version may 
have maintained a commitment to the revolutionary objectives, it also underscored that the 
role of democratic practice for some popular organisations was important in its own right. 
People’s power not only advanced the cause of a transfer of power but constituted a 
‘training ground’ (UDF 1876a: 20-3), building the democratic foundations of a future state 
and society. 
These dual understandings of vanguardism highlight the tension between people’s power as 
a means versus an end of struggle. Either way, however, whether subject to revolutionary 
imperatives or pre-figuring a future society, people’s power, overall, served a largely 
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teleological role. The notion that participation served a preordained purpose pervaded ANC 
theory. Even those for whom it represented not just a method but also a goal of struggle, its 
more democratic elements became subject to a greater good.  
3.4.2. Teleology 
 “How to ensure at the mass level the participation of the revolutionary 
classes, not merely as objects of mobilisation but as creative participants in 
the whole process?” (Slovo 1978: 39).  
The role of people’s power was tied inextricably to revolutionary theory and to notions of 
hegemony, discipline, the transfer of power and active participation. Yet these strands also 
overlapped and reinforced one another. The theme of active participation, in particular, 
formed the bedrock of people’s power and itself embodied a number of the other themes. 
The realisation of the ANC’s vanguard role, consolidation of hegemonic unity, transfer of 
power to the people, and establishment of an alternative order required active participation 
of the masses. 
The teleological view of people’s power is perhaps most visible in the strategy of people’s 
war. The notion that popular structures were vehicles of insurrection instilled them with a 
clearly functional character and in the people’s war narrative there is little indication that 
they were envisaged as playing a role beyond the defeat of the state. In 1985 the ANC’s 
Commission on Armed Struggle stated that: “The aspirations, aims and the demands of the 
people, the objectives of seizing power, should dominate any strategies formulated during 
the cause of the struggle” (ANC 1985f: 1). Participation in this sense became linked to the 
realisation of something else: to both a theory of historical direction and a pre-constituted 
notion of the people. ANC intellectual, Pallo Jordan (who incidentally was involved in the 
process from 1986 to produce the ANC’s Constitutional Guidelines) was emphatic that 
organs of people’s power were never viewed as long-term structures. For him they were 
‘instruments’ and ‘institutions’ of struggle whose administrative and governing 
responsibilities accrued merely by default as a result of the popular rejection of local state 
institutions (Interview: 12 November 2013). 
Barrell argues that, prior to 1979, the movement had not viewed local struggles and 
‘community work’ as contributory to the revolution (Barrell 1992 in Seekings 2000b: 60-61), 
and its focus on insurrection implied an absence of pre-figurative thought. Moreover even 
for those in the ANC who saw popular organs as a ‘prototype’ of a new state (ANC, undated 
a), it is not clear that they were conceived as structures of democracy necessarily. In the 
ANC, the pre-figurative discourse tied the popular will not so much to democracy as to 
revolutionary objectives. Jeremy Cronin referred to “significant parts of the ANC … not 
[being] particularly sympathetic to popular power or seeing it in a very instrumentalist way” 
(Interview: 27 November 2012).  
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The prevalence of the idea that organs of people’s power were simply institutions of 
struggle, as Jordan suggests, is partly corroborated in the ANC’s January 8 Statement of 
1986. This referred to the future establishment of “democratic, non-racial municipal 
councils” elected on the basis of “one person one vote” (ANC NEC 1986), and made no 
correlation between such institutions and the organs of people’s power. On the one hand, 
this view suggests there was no intention of people’s structures prefiguring those of 
government, and indeed for very good reason. Jordan explained that they could never be 
“transposed into organs of democratic governance” by virtue of the fact that they were 
highly partisan, and that “the ANC was largely responsible for setting them up inside the 
country” (Interview: 12 November 2013).  
On the other hand, although this confirms the presence of different conceptual influences in 
the ANC - with Jordan’s position reflecting a more liberal strand that was critical of Soviet 
dogma - the emphasis on the impermanency of popular structures highlights that their 
democratic role in empowering communities was not present in the ANC’s assessment. It 
rather implies that the structures of people’s power came to life only as a temporary 
creation of the movement. Therefore, while the ANC may (correctly) not have conflated 
people’s power with democratic local government, it was also not envisaged as a pre-
figurative civic realm. In contrast to the UDF, any traceable influence in the ANC of civil 
society a la Gramsci would appear to be fairly atypical. 
By the close of the 1980s this conceptual tension, between people’s power as pre-figurative 
versus fulfilling immediate revolutionary imperatives, remained. While the activists who 
adhered to a pre-figurative understanding often saw no contradiction in its concurrent 
fulfilment of a revolutionary function,69 it left open to debate the role that participation 
would play once revolutionary objectives were fulfilled. Parallel to this was a tension 
between community accountability and accountability to the movement. Yunus Carrim 
contrasted the approach of Lusaka with that of the domestic movement:  
“For the ANC the main focus was on overthrowing the state. I think for 
those inside it was both overthrowing the state and building an alternative 
source of power where civil society is strong. And some of the activists 
were then also, even then, warning that even if our own movement came 
to power, into government, we should still have a strong civil society”. 
(Interview: 16 January 2003). 
Even where the theoretical influences on people’s power shared a common heritage, the 
active involvement of some individuals in these structures compared to the greater distance 
of others, led inevitably to variations in their presumed objectives and impact. A useful 
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 Janet Cherry (2000a: 92) and Raymond Suttner (Interview: 25 October 2012), for example, referred to seeing 
themselves as fulfilling both insurrectionary and democratic imperatives. 
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example in this regard concerns tensions in the accountability and role of popular 
structures. Cas Coovadia, who understood the objective of organisation to be the overthrow 
of the state and its replacement with an ANC-led government, maintained simultaneously 
that democracy was something being built from the grassroots: not an “imposition of either 
a philosophy or political culture or strategy from the top” (Interview: 28 May 2013). 
Whether or not the civics simultaneously served a function of national liberation, they were 
also “local social movements accountable to their local communities” (Coovadia c.1991: 3). 
The participatory democratic practice that grassroots ownership demanded anticipated the 
form of democracy envisioned for the future: NDR, for the UDF, was democratic precisely 
because it involved “taking control by all the people of all aspects of their lives” (1986c, 
Series II). 
This tension also echoes the previous point about the presence of two conceptions of 
vanguardism. Within the domestic movement, awareness of the need to build and 
safeguard civil society as an arena distinct from state and party had, by the mid-1980s, 
already begun to surface. Andrew Boraine remarked that as early as 1987 people were 
“conscious of the failure of African democracy” (Interview: 21 May 2013). Admitting that 
“you don’t exactly talk about that because it seems to be undermining what we’re trying to 
do in South Africa”, he added that the “post-colonial failed state and the post-colonial 
nationalist movement crushing the people’s revolution were certainly debates going on at 
the time” (ibid.). 
This is not to say, of course, that the ANC’s support base did not identify with people’s war, 
or that teleology was synonymous with the military struggle alone. The ANC’s calls for 
insurrection were powerful inside South Africa and appealed to a strong sense of grievance, 
not least amongst the youth. What the ANC sought, as Slovo’s statement above highlights, 
was not the passivity of the masses but their creativity. In cultivating this, the ANC 
appreciated the power of both propaganda and mobilisational work. Drawing on the 
Vietnamese experience of popular conscientisation, the ANC noted that “Once patriotism 
and rev.[olutionary] ideas have penetrated deep into the people, they become an invincible 
force” (ANC London Collection, undated c).  
The emphasis on active involvement was thus a fundamental feature of the ANC’s approach. 
The creativity that it sought from the masses, however, was not unbounded but should be 
geared toward a revolutionary end. Observations made in another ANC collection on 
Vietnam capture how this creativity was envisaged: “Rev.[olution] must first awaken people 
politically, their class consciousness must be awakened and they must be given a political 
outlook. Must avoid ideas that ‘cadres’ or ‘leaders’ are making the rev.[olution]. It is the 
masses themselves that make the rev.[olution] (sic)” (ANC London Collection, undated d). It 
thus reflected, as Femia described, the inconsistency of a twofold desire for “political 
control from above and popular initiative from below” (1993: 136).  
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What is important to note, however, is that, although we can identify conceptual discomfort 
on reflection, neither the archival documentation consulted nor the interviews undertaken 
for this thesis, suggest that this was identified by participants at the time. Many of those at 
home considered their approach to converge neatly with that of Lusaka. As Mufamadi’s 
articulation conveyed: “[they knew] how the ANC would have acted if it was here” 
(Interview:  26 November 2012). It was perhaps only after 1990 when the formal (and not 
pre-figurative) construction of democracy took place that these tensions came to the fore.  
Moreover, the teleological view of people’s power was not confined to the external 
movement alone. Seekings argues that even the pre-figurative democratic discourse 
emerging from the UDF was in a sense a ‘top-down’ impetus, essentially resolving the 
predicament facing the leadership of how “to move from just mobilisation and 
confrontation to organisation and sustained resistance” (Interview: 19 February 2013).  
Activists who placed value on the empowering and educative benefits of popular 
organisation still often understood it as part of a broader process of achieving a national 
democratic future. Raymond Suttner’s retrospective account is, in this sense, very useful, 
reflecting on both the UDF’s ‘autonomy’ and its allegiance as an “agent of the ANC” (2004: 
697). As someone who was involved in the UDF and linked into the ANC’s structures, 
Suttner’s argument that local affiliates were creative, not merely instruments, is an 
important one. Yet his account also implies that people in general were actively pre-figuring 
a future democracy (2004: 696), or that their creativity was a response to a ‘policy’ set by 
the ANC (2004: 698).  
This view, in some senses, obscured both differing understandings of what people’s power 
entailed and the extent of more localised conceptions. Suttner highlights one aspect of this 
relating to the notion of ‘a transfer of power’: 
“The problem with the notion of a transfer of power is that at a particular 
moment, something called power is handed over, a ‘thing’ is passed from 
one set of rulers to another, and after that something completely different 
is done. This conception tends to devalue immediate activity, whose 
relevance is understood purely in relation to realising something else - the 
seizure or transfer of power at some decisive moment in the future” 
(2004: 695-6).  
The notion of there being a ‘decisive moment’ in the transfer of power speaks to the ANC’s 
ideological heritage and, as Suttner suggests, “converges with most Marxist-Leninist texts as 
well as general conceptions of transition held by most national liberation movements” 
(2004: 696). The insurrectionary ends of people’s power somewhat undermined a more 
democratic understanding of its role. Although Suttner contends that he re-thought his 
position on insurrection during the 1990s, he also noted that at the time “we saw 
everything that undermined the apartheid state as part of a process of seizing power” 
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(Interview: 25 October 2012). He contrasted the instrumental view of popular organs to a 
view of democracy as “valuable in its own right” (ibid.).  
It is also of note that the continuation of people’s power in a post-apartheid South Africa 
was not supported unanimously by cadres at home. Lechesa Tsenoli, a civic activist and 
member of the ANC involved in negotiations after 1990, emphasised that resistance to the 
preservation of people’s power did not only come from exiled cadres: “also people from 
here as well; some of them who took senior positions who may have had different 
perspectives about how we should proceed and who made certain assumptions about what 
would happen now that the ANC was in force” (Interview: 11 March 2013). While he advised 
that this view lost out to the more dominant vision of a people-driven process of change 
(ibid.), it points to a lack of internal consistency in the civics’ and UDF’s own theory.  
Although there was an appreciation that Lusaka by no means pulled the strings of mass 
organisation, the teleological way in which it was understood highlights the influence of 
vanguardism. Hassen Ebrahim remarked that the ANC’s role in the generation of popular 
activity at home was possible because of its integration with people and struggles inside the 
country (Interview by O’Malley: 4 December 1999). Yet there’s also an implication that the 
movement had a somehow superior appreciation or consciousness of popular activity. 
Ebrahim observed: “Often enough, and not often enough, generally in the eighties I would 
know more about what was happening in a community than people within that community 
and that's how effective our communication lines were” (ibid.).  
The assumption of this vanguard position demeaned to an extent the value of local 
contributions. Yet it was a status also bestowed on the movement by those at home. 
Suttner admits, retrospectively, that the care with which he and many others studied the 
message of the ANC’s January 8 Statements to find out how to apply it, “devalued the 
importance of the local by treating the ANC as hierarchically superior” (Interview: 25 
October 2012).70 Moses Mayekiso, who later joined the leadership of SANCO, reflected 
woefully on the extent to which activists had put the ANC on a pedestal - as the “super-
organisation”, portraying as somewhat naïve, with hindsight, the yielding of the civic 
movement to the ANC after 1990 (Interview: 8 April 2013).  
While the ANC and UDF both had somewhat teleological conceptions of the role of people’s 
power, it seems possible to argue that, overall, formal discussion within the ANC about the 
form of a democratic future was not especially forthcoming, while the more unambiguous 
account of people’s power as embryonic of a democratic future rested largely with the 
movement at home. The ANC itself drew on broader revolutionary theory, informed by 
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 Each year on January 8 (the anniversary of the founding of the ANC), Oliver Tambo delivered a statement on 
behalf of the NEC of the ANC reviewing the movement’s progress and challenges over the preceding year and 
setting new aims and goals for the year ahead.  
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ideas of a people’s war and the establishment of national democracy. It was asking people 
to create the beginnings of ‘people’s power’ and a state of people’s power seemed to be 
what it envisaged. What was not always made clear was what that power entailed. 
The UDF, while seeing itself as fulfilling the ANC’s mandate, combined ideas of national 
democracy with a discourse of local popular power and the forging of democracy from 
below. ‘Freedom’ in this sense was associated with the securing of state power by the ANC 
but also with what Pateman described as “control over one’s own environment” (1970: 26). 
Some of the themes emerging from the UDF and its affiliates reflect their concern not only 
with the realisation of national liberation but with local-level control and empowerment 
(Mamdoo 1988), and there is evidence that street and area committees came to be 
understood by participants as democratic structures. Cherry’s research in Kwazakele 
suggests that they gave ordinary residents “a real sense of empowerment, and invited their 
active participation in both decision-making and campaigning” (2000b: 124). One resident in 
fact remarked: “No one can come and teach us how to build democratic structures now, we 
know that very well … We have built our own democratic government” (Cherry 2000b: 92). 
Thus, while the pre-figurative discourse may have been shaped by the movement’s 
ideologues, the UDF imagining of ‘building democracy now’ was not a fabrication of what 
eventually happened. 
3.4.3. Bounded and Unitary Democracy 
Although we can identify the presence of conceptual difference, what appears to unite all 
the strands of people’s power is the promotion of a model of democracy that was 
essentially unitary in form. The discourses of hegemony, unity, vanguardism and discipline 
contributed to the conceptual construction of democracy as something ‘bounded’. This was 
neither in the sense of the exclusiveness to which democracy had been subjected in the 
past, nor in the sense of elitism in which decision-making was the preserve of professionals. 
Rather, democracy was bounded by a participatory process that was circumscribed by an 
allegiance to the movement and its programme.  
Although domestic activists were engaged in normative debate about the empowering and 
transformative role of democracy, the structures they envisaged remained limited by 
Charterist hegemony. Democracy was often enabled only in so far as it conformed to that 
agenda. The ANC, although less explicit about the form of the ‘democratic’ in the NDR, 
linked the achievement of a democratic future to the ANC as the alternative government. 
However while it had less to say about the participatory democratic features of people’s 
power, and more about insurrection, it would be incorrect to lay the movement’s 
undemocratic traits only at the feet of those in exile. The UDF’s vision of democracy also 
carried little respect for political tolerance or for individual rights. Its belief in political 
discipline and the subordination of one’s will to the collective (UDF 1985a: 23) was linked to 
a rejection of pluralism, and to a unitary conception of the ‘people’ (Glaser 1991: 111). It 
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thus contributed to a unitary understanding of participatory democracy. The dismissal of 
parliamentary democracy transpired not only from Marxism-Leninism but from the civics’ 
and unions’ councillist traditions. Hence while we can lament the loss of the popular power 
that mushroomed in the 1980s, we must also examine carefully and critically the type of 
democracy it implied.    
It is also worth noting that the Gramscian philosophy of ‘hegemony’, so influential in the 
UDF, also engendered, at least in practice, a “communal pressure” to conform (Cherry 
2000b: 128). The UDF’s appreciation of ideology as a terrain of struggle still did not account 
for the existence of alternative political affiliations in civil society. Presuming the 
homogeneity of popular views, what the UDF envisaged was democracy in a unitary form: 
“The key to deepening democracy lies in deepening mass organisations in 
all sectors of society … [D]emocracy for the oppressed lies not in the 
abstract notion of individualised choices. ‘In the face of exploitation and 
oppression the major weapon of the broad working masses lies in their 
number and in their capacity for united disciplined action. It is united, 
disciplined mass action -- and not left-wing debating societies -- that will 
lay the basis for real democracy in South Africa’” (UDF 1987 cited in UDF 
c.1987: 7-8). 
This extract supports the contention that it wasn’t just the insurrectionary agenda of 
people’s power, as Suttner has argued, that undermined its popular democratic value. It was 
also the pre-figurative element itself. In fact, as a method of struggle, people’s power was 
arguably less problematic: people were, for the most part, united by a common goal to end 
apartheid. Differences on the basis of race, gender, social class and age were papered over 
in a joint effort to construct an alternative, or at least to ameliorate the suffering of every-
day living. Thus, while we must concede that agreement on the means of getting there was 
not always reached democratically, it is arguably in people’s power as pre-figurative 
democracy that its unitary nature is more dangerous.  
The pre-figurative discourse incorrectly assumed that once apartheid had been overthrown, 
political unity over adversity and conformity over difference would also be absolute. By 
prefiguring, at the time, the society that was to come, the ANC and UDF assumed that a 
future South Africa would conform to Charterist hegemony, and did so prior to obtaining 
democratic consent. If the UDF was building democracy now, then the structures it built 
were indicative of its vision of the future. A more Leninist conception of building hegemony 
through coercion could also rear its head. There is no evidence to suggest that ANC or UDF 
leadership sanctioned or encouraged the exercise of violence in popular campaigns. But the 
messages they issued gave clear instructions to build unity in struggle and, on occasion, to 
ensure compliance with activities (ANC London Collection undated e).  
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The authority and legitimacy conferred on popular structures by virtue of residents’ 
participation in them, also led to a degree of what Cherry describes as “non-violent coercion 
through communal pressure” (2000b: 128). Port Elizabeth lawyer, Fikile Bam, noted that 
“the almost complete control that the UDF established over certain townships … made it 
intolerant even of passive opposition or dissent”, adding that “The success of its most 
important programs, such as the setting up of alternative structures, implied mass 
conformity” (cited in Mufson 1990: 130). 
The construction of ‘people’s courts’ represented the arm of popular collective justice. Such 
structures often held far greater legitimacy in the eyes of residents than did the institutions 
of the state, and there are accounts of the positive role of these courts in resolving conflicts 
through rehabilitative rather than punitive solutions. Some reports indicated that popular 
defence and justice mechanisms reduced crime in communities (ANC London Collection, 
undated e), supporting the maintenance of order in the face of both state onslaught and 
corrosion of the social fabric. In many cases there was a lot of popular support for the courts 
(Seekings 1990: 126), who were in some ways given a de facto mandate to carry out their 
function by virtue of the number of cases brought before them. Cases could range from 
neighbourly, family or intra-marital disputes to theft and other crimes (ibid.).  
In other instances, however, people who wished to report crimes to the police were 
prevented by ‘the comrades’ from doing so (Bozzoli 2004: 148-9). The authority of the 
people’s courts was therefore self-conferred; they were governed by neither impartiality 
nor accountability and made no acknowledgement of the separation of powers (Scharf and 
Ngcokoto 1990: 343). It is notable that in certain cases, such as Alexandra, a ‘people’s court’ 
was not always a designated structure but came to refer to any gathering where people got 
together to resolve a problem (Tshabalala 1988: 3766-7). Some courts issued corporal 
punishment and lashing of offenders (ibid; Seekings 1990: 128) and, even when overseen by 
elected representatives of the community, they were infused with a political bias. 
Glaser argues that “the notion that justice must be based on local participation, serve 
factional political ends, and respond to local traditions and even prejudices took precedence 
over any notion of legality or legal procedure” (1991: 111). A document on the practice of 
people’s power, interestingly, linked the courts directly to political goals: “The courts are not 
simply to hand out punishment, such as in a bourgeois court, but also to provide political 
leadership … A people’s court is called to address issues that cause divisions amongst the 
people”. While the courts’ jurisdiction included criminal offences, the document also cites 
“questions of political unity” (ANC London Collection, undated e).  
Dispute resolution and the building of unity was also the role of street and area committees 
(ibid.). These structures often served as an initial port of call prior to cases being escalated 
to a people’s court and were also used to ensure compliance and conformity. The same 
document noted: “If a stayaway or consumer boycott is called, it is the task of the 
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committee to make sure that everyone understands the call and participates in the 
campaign” (ibid.). There thus emerged a blurred line between the creation and maintenance 
of social cohesion and the enforcement of political obedience. Although the democratic 
features of the committees (elected representatives, mandates and accountability) were 
venerated by their participants, their purpose and role was foreordained. 
If we reflect on the deliberative democratic element to people’s power, discernible in the 
features of collective discussion and decision-making, it is not at all clear that this was a 
pluralistic process. Rather, deliberation was subject to political discipline. No guarantee was 
made that certain disagreements within the collective were not only ‘reasonable’ - as per 
Gutmann and Thomson’s criteria (2004: 28) - but also inherent to democratic process (see 
Mouffe: 2000 15-16). In this sense it is arguable that the neglect of individual human liberty 
ultimately undermined the democratic element of collective empowerment (Glaser 1991: 
94). 
In a sense the conceptual tensions in the theory of people’s power were played out in the 
structures themselves. The officially non-partisan character of popular structures blurred 
uneasily with their de facto function as vehicles of the Congress movement. An extract from 
an interview with an activist in Kwazakehle captures the democratic deficit that could result 
from this situation: 
“Of course, it was difficult for those structures … to be tolerant of views 
that are opposed to the ANC, because of the assumption that this area … 
was ANC based, and most structures in the democratic movement were 
dominated by people who either belonged to the ANC or supported the 
ANC. As a result our opposition, the PAC and AZAPO, did not find 
themselves comfortable within those structures. So from the onset the 
approach was conservative, because it was not representative of all 
political opinions within ourselves; it was representative of one opinion, 
which was the Freedom Charter opinion. The understanding was that no 
one was excluded, but because of the dominance of the ANC politics in the 
area, people thought that in our organizations they are going to be 
frustrated. So it was sort of a democratic structure, but the democracy was 
limited by the absence of other people. So the tolerance part of it became 
a problem” (cited in Cherry 2000b: 96). 
In other instances there was not only a suggestion of an unintentional partisanship but also 
an intentional one. In the appendix to a document about building organs of people’s power, 
the open membership of the street committee system is seen as having a ‘disciplinary’ 
effect on other political affiliations: 
134 
 
“It does not depend on a person’s political affiliations. This means that in 
some townships, for instance, there are a few Azapo members elected 
onto the street committees. This is not seen as a problem, because the 
dominant influence by far is that of the ANC or the UDF. In fact, 
participation of Azapo individuals within such structures places them 
under a progressive and collective discipline” (ANC London Collection 
undated e). 
Notably, cases in which “only card-carrying members of UDF affiliates” could be elected 
onto street committees are criticised for failing “to bring the widest number of people 
within democratic structures and discipline” (ibid.).  
People’s power’s most problematic aspect lay in the fact that it failed to cater for difference. 
Given that South Africa’s public discourse was then devoid of a broader “rights culture” 
(Scharf and Ncgokoto 1990: 363) this is perhaps not surprising. In a sense, the ‘social 
contract’ involved in people’s power reflected the Rousseauian principle of foregoing some 
individual liberty while gaining civil liberty: through participation, people would come to see 
themselves increasingly as ‘public’ individuals (Pateman 1970: 25). But in rejecting outright 
the exercise of what were considered ‘bourgeois’ rights and freedoms, people’s power 
sacrificed basic democratic liberties in favour of revolutionary unity.71 While this should not 
suggest that participation as a normative project is flawed, failure to recognise a plurality of 
interests resulted in a democratic deficit. The politically partisan nature of the organs of 
people’s power should thus have precluded their preservation as structures of democratic 
local government. Yet the alternative, and more widespread, conception that people’s 
power prefigured a future civil society is also itself problematic. Glaser highlights that, in 
contrast to the notion of civil society in its traditionally ‘liberal’ (pluralistic) form, people’s 
power generated a radical interpretation in which society is constituted as a “unitary quasi-
governing actor” (Glaser, unpublished).  
The democracy advocated by the UDF thus appealed to the kind of unitary democracy 
described by Mansbridge (1983): to building a sense of community and the public-minded 
‘good citizen’. It shirked individualistic thinking and was premised on the existence of 
common interests. What was sought was collective discipline, not the free flow of ideas. 
Mansbridge’s caution about the applicability of such a model applies equally here: unitary 
democracy may be appropriate and beneficial in cases where there is common agreement, 
and where everyone has the same interest, but in contexts in which this is not the case, 
unitary democracy may serve only to hide or suppress differences in the name of a false 
unity (1983: 4, 34-45). Bachrach and Botwinick’s defence of participatory democracy is 
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to recognise individual rights. 
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rooted in an understanding of participation as both self-liberating and promoting communal 
values: “self-development leads to the cultivation of a sense of full being as predicated on 
others’ sense of full being” (1992: 31).  
To heed Mansbridge’s warning, a sustainable and rights-based participatory democracy 
must be able to take the developmental features of participation, as conceived here by 
Bachrach and Botwinick, and extend them not only to popular control over immediate 
collective concerns but to broader political questions about how a shared society is 
governed. On this last point it is not clear that people’s power succeeded.  
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to show how people’s power constituted a web of ideas and themes 
which interlinked and overlapped to inform how it was understood. It also set out the 
ideological and conceptual influences on these discourses, tracing them to particular 
intellectual traditions and strands within the movement. The third and final section 
reflected on these findings and analysed their implications for the participatory democracy 
envisaged. 
Perhaps the dominant influence on the ANC during the 1980s was Marxism-Leninism. 
Amongst internal activists and intellectuals, Gramsci’s ideas were also prevalent, as was a 
broader democratic socialist tradition which posed an alternative to Marxism-Leninism. 
Within the trade union movement, whose ideas began to transfer to community and civic 
organisations, a socialist tradition was also emerging which was increasingly distanced from 
SACP doctrine and its alignment to the Soviet Union. This understanding of people’s power 
was also linked to localised forms of struggle. As such, those who saw it as a fulfilment of 
ANC policy were not prevented from also interpreting it as an educative and empowering 
experience or a practical means of negotiation and self-help. For activists inside South 
Africa, there was arguably a greater appreciation of localised experiences. Although spurred 
on by the ANC’s liberation narrative, these individuals were often concerned as much, if not 
more, with ameliorating the hardships of everyday life as they were with broader ideological 
questions. 
Although the ideas of exiled and domestic activists overlapped and informed one another, it 
is possible to identify conceptual discomfort between the views that emerged. While these 
strands did not conflict as such, they generated theoretical variation. Some discomfort 
existed between the role of people’s power as a means and an end of struggle, and 
differences are apparent in the understanding of ‘vanguardism’ which pervaded ANC 
discourse. Each of these tensions left unresolved the amount of leeway provided for popular 
control. For the ANC, its role as a vanguard movement was rooted in Marxism-Leninism and 
this informed directly its relationship with the people. For the broader MDM, the 
acceptance of this hegemony did not preclude a simultaneous vision of more tangible local 
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democratic control. It is of note, however, that these conceptions were often not 
interpreted at the time as potentially at odds with one another.  
Despite these nuances, what emerged across the board was a largely teleological 
understanding of participation, both in its function as a means of struggle and in prefiguring 
a post-apartheid order. Yet beyond this common goal there was no standardised vision of 
what the new order would entail: many within the ANC spoke of people’s power but had 
different ideas about what it meant. What can be ascertained is that neither the dominant 
discourse of the ANC-UDF, nor the more localised conceptions, made provision for the 
existence of difference. Even those structures which focused on social welfare and collective 
space papered over political diversity and precluded alternative ideas from flourishing. 
What their activities presupposed was a unitary form of democracy bounded by allegiance 
to the movement.  
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CHAPTER 4  
‘The People Shall Govern’: the Codification of Ideas 
Although the phenomenon of people’s power incorporated a process of normative 
theorising about democracy, the ideas it engendered did not feature a language of 
constitutionalism. It is therefore of note that, in parallel to the activities of people’s power, 
the ANC engaged in a separate, formal process of codifying its ideas regarding not only a 
democratic future but also a constitutional one. From January 1986 with the establishment 
of a Constitution Committee in the ANC’s Department of Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
(DLCA),72 the ANC began in earnest to formulate a series of constitutional foundations and 
guidelines - a move prompted by shifting international terrain and pressure on the ANC to 
codify its ideas in the event that a post-apartheid era became a reality. The constitutional 
principles formulated by the ANC’s committee were later brought to the table in the Multi-
Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) for an interim constitution which was followed in 1994 by 
the Constitutional Assembly responsible for drafting the final constitution.  
The first part of this chapter analyses the ideas about participatory democracy that emerged 
from this constitutional work, assessing how the idea of popular participation was linked to 
constitutionalism. The chapter also incorporates analysis of ANC thinking about democracy 
generally, for the very reason that the Constitution Committee not only represented the 
first attempt by the ANC to codify its democratic thought but also marked a shift toward the 
formal acceptance of some classically liberal democratic features. It is argued here that 
these shifts provide an important context to complementary forms of radical democracy 
also envisaged by the ANC.  
The second part of the Chapter looks at the development of ideas about participation and 
‘the local’. From 1988 onwards, there is evidence that the ANC began to envisage 
participatory democracy as something linked to the local sphere, encompassing ideas about 
both local government and the role of civil society. With the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, 
a number of local government negotiating forums were established which shaped the 
movement’s ideas about citizen participation. This section thus focuses on the ideas that 
emerged through this process, identifying some of the key actors and intellectual influences 
on participation at the local level. The chapter also considers the extent to which the era of 
people’s power was influential in shaping both constitutional thinking and the notion of 
democratic local government.  
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 The DLCA itself was established in Oct 1985, as a result of a decision of the 1985 Kabwe Conference, to carry 
out the ANC’s legal work (ANC DLCA c.1990: 10). 
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4.1. Participation and Constitutionalism  
One of the most noteworthy points about the Constitution Committee’s formation during 
what was considered the height of ‘people’s power’ (1985-7), is not only that people’s 
power did not draw on a language of constitutionalism but that the Committee appears to 
have formulated its ideas for the most part in intellectual isolation from the people’s power 
phenomena. With the exception of some discussion about provision for participatory 
democracy, there is curiously little evidence of conceptual cross-pollination between the 
two. Although the interpretation of many radical democrats was that people’s power 
represented the model of a democratic future, it was the formulations of the Constitution 
Committee that were the precursor to the democratic negotiations. In spite of this, there 
has been no interrogation within academia of the inconsistency in these discourses of 
democracy: between the people’s power movement on the one hand, and the Constitution 
Committee on the other. 
The Constitution Committee, described in 1990 as having been “at the centre of all the 
constitutional thinking in the ANC since its establishment in January 1986” (ANC DLCA 
c.1990: 2), was a precursor to the movement’s involvement in constitutional negotiations 
from 1993. The ANC’s 1988 Draft Constitutional Guidelines could be considered the 
movement’s first official publication since the Freedom Charter on its ideas about a 
democratic state. Although the Charter represented a programme of ideals, there was 
acknowledgement that it “didn't deal with … constitutional structures and the enforcement 
of constitutional rights” (Sachs Interview: 21 December 2005). The purpose of the 
Constitution Committee was “to serve as a ‘think tank’ of the NEC” regarding constitutional 
developments (ANC DLCA 1986c); and to “try and anticipate the current developments in 
the country and its political effects” (ANC DLCA 1986a: 1). After 1990, the Committee, along 
with other experts, returned to South Africa to act as an advisory group to the ANC in the 
constitutional negotiations.  
The Committee’s establishment seems to have been prompted by a number of 
circumstances including the realisation that an end to apartheid may not be far away. The 
ANC thus recognised the importance of beginning to codify its own ideas and pre-empt 
constitutional initiatives from its opponents, not least the South African state (ibid.). Joel 
Netshitenzhe also noted the need to address concerns emerging from the international 
community as well as from South African business about the type of state that would 
replace apartheid (Interview: 14 May 2013). The Constitution Committee itself also urged 
the movement to “outline and define the democratic organs of self-government envisaged 
in the Freedom Charter and the SACP Programme” (ANC CC 1986c) - a remark which 
suggests continued lack of clarity around the implications of this clause. On 7 February 1986, 
Ruth Mompati, on behalf of the NWC, remarked that the Committee’s work was “the first 
occasion on which the ANC has even attempted to give constitutional expression to its 
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programmatic demands” (ANC NWC 1986: 2). Its work was essentially to produce 
constitutional principles or guidelines for a democratic future. 
4.1.1. Meshing Ideological Traditions: Liberal and Radical Democracy 
In many ways the Constitution Committee represented a merging of the ANC’s ideological 
traditions. The principles it put forward suggest a resurfacing of former liberal ideas, the 
introduction of new ones, and a desire to retain in principle certain radical democratic 
features. The Committee’s work was overlaid with both the acceptance of recent 
international human rights conventions and the influence of other constitutional models, 
including those of nations not historically influential on ANC democratic thought. While the 
ANC’s position on liberal democracy is not of direct concern to this thesis, its conception of 
‘democracy’ in general impacts its understanding of citizen participation. It is therefore 
worth setting out the core features of a democratic state envisaged by the ANC, and the 
traditions from which they emerge. 
4.1.1.1. Multi-Party Democracy and Political Pluralism 
One of the most important features introduced by the Constitution Committee was the 
commitment to a multi-party system. The ANC’s 1988 Draft Constitutional Guidelines were 
the product of work and discussion by the Constitution Committee across a period of two 
years. Both the Guidelines and preceding drafts of the Committee’s constitutional principles 
made a formal commitment to the establishment of a multi-party system and provisions for 
freedom of speech and association (ANC CC 1988b; see also ANC CC 1986a; ANC NEC 1987a 
and 1987b). These commitments, among many others, were echoed in the ANC’s working 
document on a Bill of Rights (ANC CC 1990b), its Commentary on the Structure of a 
Constitution (ANC CC 1990a), and its 1992 policy guidelines entitled Ready to Govern (ANC 
1992). In South Africa’s final Constitution, which was a result of negotiation between parties 
in the Constitutional Assembly, these principles were embedded through a fundamental Bill 
of Rights (RSA 1996). 
As set out in the previous chapter, neither the discourse of the ANC or UDF had historically 
drawn on an understanding of democracy that provided for competing alternatives. In some 
instances such liberal precepts were rejected outright. It seems that it was only after May 
1986 that the ANC gravitated toward a formal position on political pluralism. An ANC 
memorandum in May of that year, quite possibly produced by its Constitution Committee, 
indicated that a press statement made by Oliver Tambo on 9 January 1986, in which he 
referred to a multi-party future, was the trigger for the ANC to reach a formal constitutional 
position on the very issue. The memorandum referred to Tambo’s remarks as “the only 
official statement from our movement which does refer to the existence of a multiplicity of 
parties or ‘political pluralism’ in a post-liberation South Africa” (ANC DLCA 1986b: 2). 
Tambo’s statement read: 
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“It is conceivable, of course, that when we win our victory and we are a 
non-racial democratic and united people, within those parameters, there 
will be divisions; people will form political parties of one form or another, 
and that will be permissible. That will not be division about the Freedom 
Charter or its objectives. It will be that people see the situation differently 
at the time and have different approaches to the problems which a 
liberated South Africa will be faced with. There could be many 
organisations of that kind formed, and they will be exercising their 
democratic rights in a democratic society” (Tambo 1986: 20). 
From analysis of the documentation of the Constitution Committee, it would seem that 
reservations about political pluralism centred on the issue of reconciling certain freedoms 
with the need to prevent ethnic and racial hatred (ANC CC: undated: 9). The Committee’s 
proposals thus came to presuppose the existence of multiple parties provided that they did 
not operate on the basis of race or ethnicity. It is not clear, however, that the principle of 
political pluralism was uniformly accepted across the ANC, at least not initially. The DLCA’s 
memorandum on multi-partyism went on to remark that Tambo’s statement “raises many 
questions especially that we will be one of the last to achieve liberation in Africa and Africa 
having the experience of one party states” (ANC DLCA 1986b: 2). A briefing document 
produced by Pallo Jordan in July 1985 as Director of Research in the ANC’s Department of 
Information and Publicity, spoke out against what seems to have been a penchant in the 
movement for one-party rule:  
“We shall also have to explicitly pronounce ourselves on the question of 
political pluralism (the multiplicity of parties and political space for the 
loyal opposition). There is a sad misconception which has taken root 
among us, that radical social transformation is only possible under one-
party rule. This notion must be dispelled and laid to rest once and for all” 
(Jordan 1985).  
The claim that such a view existed within the movement is not far-fetched. Indeed, by 
proclaiming a commitment to multi-partyism the ANC would have been defying the trend 
set by its fellow liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola and elsewhere. Sydney 
Mufamadi noted the influence of such states at the time: 
“[Y]ou will recall that there was a time when … just looking at the situation 
globally, outside your classical western democracies, post-colonial 
societies in some instances tended to see a one-party-state as the best 
form of democracy. So you must accept that there would have been 
people who also thought, amongst us, that this is the best way to organise 
your democracy … It’s not like all of us started off thinking that this one 
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form of organisation is the best and we are unanimous about it” 
(Interview: 26 November 2012). 
Thus, while there may have been those in the movement, such as Jordan, who saw “nothing 
to fear from political pluralism” (Jordan 1985), in the ANC as a whole this issue was far from 
finalised. The Freedom Charter itself, at the core of the ANC programme, did not itself 
guarantee the right of individuals to form political parties. 
It is also apparent that provision for the existence of parties not in agreement with the 
ANC’s programme also remained subject to discussion. The 1986 memorandum on a multi-
party system set out the issue as follows: “The problem arises about what attitude would be 
taken to those who do not agree or agree fully with the Freedom Charter … Will they be 
allowed to form parties although they don’t agree with the basic principles of the Freedom 
Charter?” (ANC DLCA 1986b: 2). The memorandum’s interpretation of Tambo’s statement is 
that he envisaged differences within the national liberation movement itself (ibid.). There 
was thus a lack of clarity on the tolerance of parties that fell outside of the movement’s 
ambit.  
4.1.1.2. Human Rights 
A further commitment which emerged through the work of the Constitution Committee was 
the principle of individual rights. Notably, the ANC’s first statement committing it to their 
protection appeared just one year after the Committee’s establishment. In its January 8 
Statement of 1987, the NEC provided assurance that “the revolution will guarantee the 
individual and equal rights of all South Africans”” (ANC NEC 1987b). In October of the same 
year, the ANC extended this by saying that the safeguarding of individual rights could be 
achieved through “an entrenched bill of rights” (ANC NEC 1987c: 3).  
Despite claims by Legal Professor and member of the Constitution Committee, Kader Asmal 
and others that the ANC had a longstanding commitment to human rights (Asmal 1990; 
Asmal et al 2005), examination of its publications and archives suggest a gap in this record.73 
In fact, in a paper on developing a human rights culture in South Africa, Asmal’s own 
reference to the ANC’s documents of 1943, 1955 and then 1987 (Asmal 1990) itself 
highlights the thirty year gap. Just as people’s power embodied a largely unitary conception 
of democracy, so had the ANC, prior to 1986, dismissed an individual rights-based political 
culture as a feature of bourgeois democracy. 
At the time of the Constitution Committee’s work, there appears to have been some 
aversion within the ANC toward the notion of a bill of rights. Rights had become associated 
not only with a discredited liberal tradition but also with efforts to protect minorities and 
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maintain majority oppression under a different guise. In contrast to historic bills of rights 
developed elsewhere, in South Africa the discussion of rights had ironically come to be 
associated with the protection of minority privilege (Sachs 1988). Although the commitment 
to both pluralism and rights were decisions taken by the NEC itself, ANC cadre and lawyer, 
Albie Sachs was a key individual in shifting the perspective on rights within the liberation 
movement generally (Seedat Interview: 13 May 2013). In 1988, Sachs produced an 
influential discussion paper in which he explained that a bill of rights, rather than being an 
instrument to maintain existing privilege, could instead be used to guarantee those very 
rights and freedoms so long denied to the majority (Sachs 1988).  
His paper reflected the way in which such misconceptions about rights were blocking 
constructive discussion of their role in a democratic society: 
“The most curious feature about the demand for a Bill of Rights in South 
Africa is that it comes not from the ranks of the oppressed but from a 
certain stratum in the ranks of the oppressors. This has the effect of 
turning the debate on a Bill of Rights inside out. Instead of a Bill of Rights 
being associated with democratic advance, it is seen as a brake on it; 
instead of being welcomed by the mass of the population as an instrument 
of liberation it is viewed by the majority with almost total suspicion” (ibid: 
3.). 
Despite the NEC’s declared commitments in 1987, the date of Albie Sachs’ paper (1988) 
suggests that undivided dedication to these principles remained tenuous. Kader Asmal 
continued even in 1990 to caution against the encouragement of “a negative culture of 
human rights … which sees the adoption of such rights as simply a restriction or limitation 
on a future government” (1990: 3). Acceptance of individual liberties such as those of 
association, organisation and speech did not sit all that comfortably with the notion of a 
unitary democracy, nor with a teleological conception of citizen participation. The re-
thinking of rights by the ANC, or at least by some within its ranks, thus seems to have 
demanded a review of its own ideas about democracy, including re-consideration of those 
democratic features traditionally considered ‘bourgeois’. 
The ANC’s shift during the late 1980s toward a rights commitment is therefore significant 
indeed. In 1992, the movement stated its commitment to the introduction of a bill of rights 
that would “enshrine principles for which we have fought all our lives” and which included a 
wide range of rights and freedoms (ANC 1992). The ANC’s submissions during the sitting of 
the Constitutional Assembly in 1995 also reflected a progressive vision for a bill of rights as 
including civil, political, social, developmental and environmental rights (ANC 1995b).    
It is interesting that several people involved at the time in theoretical or constitutional 
debates in the ANC referred to the movement as not committing itself to ‘liberal 
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democratic’ principles so much as humanistic ones, or at least to universal values associated 
with the development of humanity. Kader Asmal referred to the 1988 Draft Constitutional 
Guidelines, as well as the 1955 Freedom Charter and 1943 Africans’ Claims, as presenting “a 
humanistic alternative to the paradigm of apartheid” (1990: 6). Human rights, he argued, 
“may be seen as inherent in our nature … as vital for the development of the human 
personality” (1990: 3). Joel Netshitenzhe similarly commented that the ANC’s commitment 
to human rights was “not a question of the ANC becoming liberal democratic; it’s the ANC 
appreciating that those things about the freedom of the human spirit … are achievements of 
humanity that should be embraced by all” (Interview: 14 May 2013). 
One of the main reservations within the ANC camp about a bill of rights related to issues of 
private property. The UDF, for example emphasised “how can we successfully secure the 
protection of human and people's rights for all through a progressive Bill of Rights and not 
protect the property rights of the bourgeoisie as per a liberal, bourgeois Bill of Rights" (UDF 
1989). In the ANC’s own constitutional discussions and those of the constitutional 
negotiations and assembly, there is no suggestion of any reservations about the inclusion of 
first generation rights. Rather the ANC’s concerns seem, understandably, to have reflected 
the classic democratic challenge of securing both liberty and equality (ANC 1995: 8 cited in 
Strand 2001: 51): to what extent could rights secure equality rather than prevent it?  
In 1986 an NWC Sub-Committee, consisting of Joe Slovo, Pallo Jordan and Simon Makana 
(Nkokeli), was established to read and study the proposals of the Committee (ANC NWC S-C, 
1986: 1). The Secretary of the Constitution Committee, Z.N. Jobodwana remarked that the 
inclusion of civil and political rights for the ANC was non-contentious. What the NWC sub-
committee had wanted to see more of was discussion of socio-economic rights (Interview: 
25 January 2006). The ANC’s enunciation of rights in its constitutional proposals thus drew 
very much on the traditions of the Freedom Charter. By placing emphasis on substantive 
and socio-economic rights, the ANC objected not to the inclusion of civil and political rights 
but to their inclusion alone. The protection of first generation rights was necessary but also 
insufficient.  
Overlapping with the discourse of rights is also the suggestion of their restricted application. 
Unfortunately, the documented detail on this is minimal, leaving open to interpretation the 
definition and scope of what can be considered ‘people’s rights’. Nonetheless, in the 
aforementioned report of the NWC Sub-Committee, some worrying remarks are made 
about the qualification and application of certain rights and freedoms. In particular, the 
report sought clarification on “political power and the forms it will take”, asking: “do we 
envisage the enfranchisement of all or do we foresee disenfranchisement of certain classes, 
categories of persons, etc.?” It also suggests some reservations in the granting of civil 
liberties, asking “are these to be limited or unlimited? Do we envisage weighting the actual 
application in favour of certain classes or leave them as ‘legally’ neutral?” (ibid.: 4). 
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It is thus not clear to what extent the ANC envisaged rights, at the time, as being subject to 
programmatic demands. In some respects the document’s character was to be determined 
by its purpose: either as “primarily a mobilising tool in the context of struggle” or “a tactical 
instrument in the event of negotiations” (ibid.: 5). It remains unclear whether political and 
civil liberties were to be circumscribed on the basis of ‘class’ or exercised within the ambit of 
a hegemonic unity. What we can deduce is that there was some initial uncertainty about the 
role of such rights and extent to which they served a purpose other than the protection of 
individual freedoms. At the very least, it suggests that prior to 1986 rights had not yet been 
discussed by the ANC in any detail. 
One of the most fascinating aspects of the Constitution Committee’s work is the way in 
which it brought together both radical and liberal democratic traditions. The constitutional 
discussions reflect a coming together of these currents but they also show signs of a 
wavering: between the influences of its nationalist and Marxist-Leninist heritage, and the 
conventions of prevailing ‘western’ democracy. At the very time that the movement at 
home and abroad was drawing on notions of popular power rooted in a collective ‘people’, 
the Constitution Committee was exploring a variety of debates in constitutional democracy. 
While these debates maintained the ANC’s historic commitment to the realisation of socio-
economic justice, they also opened up the possibility of a politically neutral constitution 
based on the rights of individuals and a commitment to political pluralism.  
Given that the mushrooming of people’s power and elaboration of constitutional thought 
took place in parallel, it is of note that these discourses remained quite distinct. While in the 
Constitution Committee’s discussions there was early evidence of a merging of democratic 
traditions, there was also a gradual dissolution of the ANC’s more radical language. In the 
Committee, what emerged was a more conventional language of liberal constitutional 
democracy. Debates taking place here, and amongst the NWC and NEC, were not apparent 
in the wider movement. In the latter, as Suttner suggests, what preoccupied people was 
“empowering the masses and dislodging the apartheid regime” (Interview: 25 October 
2012). 
4.1.1.3. Legal and International Constitutional Influences 
Although the Constitution Committee’s documents reflected new strands of democratic 
thought, the earlier period of its work (between 1986 and 1988) still showed traits of 
continuing Marxist-Leninist influence. Recommendations are made that study be 
undertaken of “the People’s Democracies in Eastern Europe” (NWC-SC 1986) and “the 
constitutional evolution of Eastern Europe after World War II” (ANC CC 1986a). Despite Pallo 
Jordan insisting that Eastern Europe had not informed the work of the Committee 
(Interview: 12 November 2013), it does appear that in early 1987 a delegation from the 
DLCA and Constitution Committee visited the GDR and Czechoslovakia. The purpose of the 
visit was “to study and discuss with experts in the field of constitutional law in these two 
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socialist countries the historical development of their constitutional law since the smashing 
of fascism” (ANC DLCA: 1987). Although it is not evident from the report of this visit 
whether the ANC concurred with the advice offered, it is clear that guidance, lessons and 
potential areas for comparison were sought.  
The delegation emphasised that socialism was not the ANC’s immediate goal but there is an 
inference that a socialist republic was eventually envisaged (ibid.). The ANC’s proposal for a 
multi-party system appears to have been accepted by the GDR representative but with a 
view to all such forces falling within the movement’s camp. The summary of his 
recommendation stated: “The constitution, particularly at independence, will have to cater 
for the interests of all the forces rallying around and uniting behind the ANC and its allies” 
(ibid.). It is not clear what constitutional fate was foreseen at a later stage. Nonetheless, in 
the accounts of both the GDR and Czechoslovakia, ‘people’s democracy’ was firmly 
associated with the programme of the socialist parties themselves (ibid.). The ANC’s 
Constitution Committee in 1988 still used the term ‘people’s democracy’, particularly in 
relation to the economy (ANC CC 1988a).     
Perhaps the most concerning recommendation from the visit relates to the provision of a 
constitutional guarantee for the role of the ANC itself. One recommendation from the GDR 
stated that “the ANC as vanguard of the people’s struggle should have that declared in the 
constitution” (ibid.) - a point which appears to have already been contemplated by the ANC 
itself. A DLCA document on the issue of political pluralism posed the question: “will the ANC 
as the vanguard that would have brought about liberation contemplate any special role for 
itself which has to be stipulated in the constitution?” (ANC DLCA 1986b).74  
It is therefore clear that Marxist-Leninist-inspired ideas did retain some influence in the 
DLCA initially and thus penetrated the work of the Committee. However, from 1987-8 
onwards, there is evidence of a gradual injection of legal-constitutional language and less 
and less the revolutionary-inspired language characteristic of earlier ANC documents. 
Indeed, the adoption of legal-constitutional language in the Committee’s documents marks 
a largely-overlooked turning point in ANC discourse.  
Just as ideologues and intellectuals played a role in shaping the discourse of people’s power, 
so were they influential in the discourse of constitutional democracy. The work of the 
Constitution Committee was shaped by the composition of its members who were 
constituted largely from the legal profession. The position of Committee Chair was held by 
SACP member and academic, Jack Simons. Zola Skweyiya took the position of Vice Chair and 
Z.N. Jobodwana was Secretary. Others involved in the work of the Committee, although not 
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 This point is also raised in another document of the Constitution Committee which asked: “Does the NEC 
contemplate that the role played by the ANC should be contained in the constitution”? (ANC CC 1986b). 
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as administrative officials, were the lawyers Albie Sachs, Kader Asmal and Penuel Maduna 
(ANC DLCA 1986a: 1, 3).  
In terms of international influence, the deliberations between 1986 and 1990 seem to have 
drawn on a variety of constitutional and country examples. As noted above, in 1986-7 the 
socialist states remained largely influential but there is evidence that this began to change 
from 1987 onwards. In some cases, this was influenced by the individuals involved in 
formulating the proposals. Pallo Jordan, for example - convenor of the NWC Sub-Committee 
- was a visibly more liberal influence. He referred to the movement’s familiarity with bills of 
rights historically (Interview: 12 November 2013) and, in advocating the adoption of a bill of 
rights in South Africa, suggested application of the model of the French ‘Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen’ (Jordan 1985). Albie Sachs commented on the NEC’s preference 
for what he called a ‘post-dictatorship democracy’ which looked to the constitutional 
examples of states such as Spain and Portugal, rather than either a ‘people’s’ or ‘liberal’ 
democracy (Interview: 21 December 2005).  
These Constitutions appear to have remained models for the ANC into the post-1990 period. 
Valli Moosa, who was part of a working group on constitutional principles during the MPNP 
from 1993, said that delegations were sent to countries including Germany, Spain, Portugal, 
the United Kingdom, the USA, India and Malaysia (Interview: 30 April 2013). Moreover, Pallo 
Jordan insisted that, “except by negative example”, Eastern Europe had in no way informed 
the work of the Committee (Interview: 12 November 2013).  
Here, it is likely that the broader global shifts of late 1980s played a role in dampening 
radical commitments. At the same time as the Constitution Committee’s deliberations were 
taking place, there was increasing pressure on the ANC, including from Mikhail Gorbachev 
himself, to work toward a negotiated settlement (Esterhuyse 2014: 46). The onset of 
perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union and the discrediting of communism 
internationally were tipping the scales toward a new ideological era. It was from as early as 
1987 - prior to the commencement of official talks - that the radical democratic tone of 
constitutional commitments began to fizzle out. Thanks to more recent accounts, we now 
know that during 1987 secret talks were beginning to take place in exile between senior 
members of the ANC and representatives of the Afrikaner academic and business 
communities (Esterhuyse 2014). Gorbachev’s presidency in the Soviet Union, which 
commenced from 1985, also aligns with the commencement of formal constitutional 
discussion within the ANC’s DLCA. 
In general, these discussions also reflect the influence of the legal fraternity. Both Kader 
Asmal and Albie Sachs were influential in this regard and the mark of international rights 
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conventions can be seen in the content of ANC proposals.75 Halton Cheadle, who in 1993 
acted as a legal advisor to the ANC during negotiations for an interim constitution (focusing 
in particular on the bill of rights), commented that the Constitution Committee “played an 
important role in slowly diffusing a rights approach within the ANC” (Email correspondence: 
February 2006). With the commencement of CODESA II in 1992, the MPNP in 1993, and 
finally the Constitutional Assembly in 1994, the liberal approach dominated. In the MPNF, 
there was greater participation of lawyers and technical advisors to the ANC. Z.N. 
Jobodwana reflected: “there was not so much membership participation. I think that was 
how most of the ideas got diluted and drifted further to a more liberal type of acceptance of 
the constitution” (Interview: 25 January 2006). 
The ANC’s ‘Working Document’ on a Draft Bill of Rights, published for consultation in 1990, 
referred to the influence of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 1966 
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ANC CC 1990b). The introductory note stated: “- we have relied heavily on these great 
documents. We have also drawn upon the European Convention of Human Rights and the 
African Charter of Human and People’s Rights, as well as provisions dealing with protection 
of human rights in a great many constitutions, ranging from those of India to West Germany 
to the USA to Namibia” (ibid.). The ANC’s Draft Bill of Rights itself also proposed a 
“constitutionally entrenched human rights commission” as a watchdog and safeguard for 
the public (Mayibuye 1992: 21). Both this document and the final Bill of Rights that 
accompanied South Africa’s Constitution in 1996 encompassed a broad and progressive 
range of first, second and third generation rights.  
By the time the ANC’s Draft Constitutional Guidelines were published in 1988, the proposal 
of a constitutional guarantee for the ANC had disappeared and there remained no 
suggestion that the constitution would be in any way prescriptive. The ANC understandably 
used the Freedom Charter as a point of reference for the Guidelines (ANC NEC 1987a: 2; 
ANC CC undated b; Mabandla Interview: 28 June 2013; Sachs Interview: 21 December 2005) 
but it had also viewed the primary objective of drafting a constitution as being the 
translation of the Charter’s “principles and programme” into “an operative constitutional 
document” (ANC DLCA undated)76. By 1990, the Constitution Committee, in a confidential 
document, stated: 
 “(b) The Constitution should be an open, permissive constitution - 
allowing for the exercise of political power in any direction rather than a 
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 See for example, Asmal’s reference to the influence of developments in international law on “contemporary 
notions of human rights” (1990: 3). 
76
 Although this document is undated, it is contained within a DLCA archival folder labelled: ‘Committee 
Minutes/Reports: 1985-88’.  
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prescriptive constitution. It should not ‘declare’ socialism or a free market 
economy but it must not prevent a government from executing its political 
and economic programme; (c) The Constitution should be drafted for all 
South Africans rather than reflecting only the political programme of the 
ANC …” (ANC CC 1990a: 2-3). 
It is interesting that while these ideas were surfacing in the Constitution Committee, within 
the internal movement there is little evidence of such discussion, at least not until after the 
circulation of the Draft Constitutional Guidelines in 1988. The ANC’s Department of Political 
Education (DPE), up until 1989, continued to draw on the socialist, and largely Soviet, model 
in its syllabus. Like the Constitution Committee, the DPE was a product of a 
recommendation of the Kabwe Conference, yet the content of political education seems to 
have remained isolated from constitutional deliberations. The DPE syllabus does not appear 
to have discussed topics such as international human rights conventions, the ANC’s rights 
tradition, or the nature of multi-party versus one-party systems. In fact, between 1986 and 
1988 - arguably the most formative period in the codification of ANC democratic thought - 
the DPE continued to teach a syllabus focused on the history of struggle and on 
revolutionary and socialist theory (ANC DPE 1986; ANC DPE 1986-88).  
It is therefore of note that, by 1989, additional material was added to study courses offered 
by the DPE, including the “Soviet experience reconsidered” (ANC DPE 1989). Updates in 
course material also include reference to the Draft Constitutional Guidelines themselves as 
well as to “the role of constitution and codes of rights” (ibid). Traces of Marxism remained, 
however, as these new elements were intermingled with topics on the state and class 
society, people’s democracy, socialist transition, and the vanguard and masses in socialism 
(ibid.).  
4.1.1.4. Retaining Radical Influence: Introducing ‘Participatory Democracy’ 
Given the overlap in the timing of the Constitution Committee’s work and the proliferation 
of people’s power, it is worth analysing the extent to which ideas of popular power entered 
constitutional debates. Although ideological cross-pollination between the Committee and 
broader movement, in general, seems to have been minimal, popular structures were not 
overlooked entirely. It was through discussion of participatory democracy, specifically, that 
the influence of people’s power manifested. The ideological and theoretical influences 
behind this provision, however, are a little harder to pin down.  
It was argued earlier that the constitutional deliberations reflected a meshing of the ANC’s 
intellectual traditions and that a language of constitutionalism and rights, uncharacteristic of 
its previous discourse, also emerged in the Committee’s proposals. The Committee’s 
discussions represented an attempt to merge liberal and radical forms of democracy. Linked 
to the NWC Sub-Committee’s desire to see inclusion of socio-economic rights was a more 
149 
 
general ‘critique’ of the initial proposals. This surmised that the Constitution Committee’s 
“approach to a future constitution was too wedded to liberal-democratic notions with some 
slight modifications” (NWC S-C 1986: 1). The Sub-Committee also made a significant 
comment on its preferred model of democracy, implying that people’s power, in some form, 
should be accommodated in a future dispensation. Its critique noted that: 
“- The type of constitutional framework the document envisages is one 
very similar to conventional bourgeois-democracy and not a framework 
arising from or created by a revolutionary struggle. While we recognise 
that it is difficult to predict the shape of future institutions there are 
however already some indications in the embryonic forms of popular 
power that are being thrown up in the course of the struggle; that new 
and more far-reaching forms will emerge and that our constitutional 
thinking must necessarily accommodate these” (ibid.). 
The Sub-Committee then made three related points: Firstly, it requested specifically that the 
Constitution Committee “examine how we can incorporate mass organisations in the 
constitutional model and give them direct role in the legislative framework (sic)” [emphasis 
added] (NWC S-C 1986: 4). Secondly, it reported the NWC’s own insistence that “the 
constitutional document must create a framework through which popular power is 
translated into a reality, i.e. a government which is in reality subject to the people” 
[emphasis added] (ibid.: 5). Thirdly, it made a recommendation on economic democracy, 
advocating a basic principle of “entrenchment of the workers’ participation in the economic 
management and planning of all enterprises in which they are employed” (ibid.: 8). Each of 
these points prepared the way for an emerging constitutional understanding of 
participatory democracy. 
The first of these, the principle of a legislative role for mass organisations, perhaps speaks 
most directly to the notion of people’s power. Just as the street and area committees 
became de facto bodies for decision-making and control, so a future dispensation should 
allow for participation in governance and administration. The very fact that apartheid had 
been so deliberately and unashamedly exclusionary bolstered the ANC’s desire to construct 
a state in which all could partake in public life. NWC Sub-Committee member, Pallo Jordan, 
although emphasising categorically that the partisanship of organs of people’s power meant 
they could never be translated into structures of democratic governance - remarked that 
“the fact that they were set up was demonstrative of the fact that people did feel the need 
to intervene, to run their lives, to govern themselves … and you had to create space for that 
in whatever democratic dispensation you created” (Interview: 12 November 2013).   
The introduction of the term ‘participatory democracy’ into ANC lexicon can be pin-pointed 
to September 1986 with the Constitution Committee’s first set of ‘proposed foundations’ for 
government in a democratic South Africa. This included the provision that: “Participatory 
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democracy shall be encouraged by means of involving the community, and community and 
workers organisations, directly in public and economic administration” (ANC CC 1986a). In 
fitting with the idea of formulating ‘principles’, no additional details or potential 
mechanisms were floated at this stage. Pallo Jordan remarked that they were aware of 
historic models of popular participation. He referred to the Russian Soviets and the Paris 
Commune, although these examples didn’t arise in formal discussions. He also referred to 
some people finding the model of the New England town hall meeting “quite attractive” - 
likening it to the forum or assembly in pre-colonial African society (Interview: 12 November 
2013).77 However none of these models appear to have played a direct role in ANC 
constitutional thinking.   
However, given the timing of the DLCA’s visit to the GDR and Czechoslovakia (in early 1987), 
it is possible that the findings were of some influence - not least given the preceding 
recommendation of the NWC that the Committee “study the experience of the People’s 
Democracies in Eastern Europe” (NWC S-C 1986: 5). The GDR’s input, notably, reflects a 
particularly bureaucratic understanding of participation, advising ANC delegates that 
regional and local areas of administration should be introduced “to ensure the maximum 
participation of the people in the exercise of power and sovereignty” (ANC DLCA 1987). 
Interestingly, the report also notes that the GDR representative, on being informed of South 
Africa’s street and area committees, cautioned against too much power being ‘delegated’ to 
lower organs, emphasising the role of “democratic centralism” in the proper exercise of 
people’s power (ibid). The GDR’s People’s Chamber and Czechoslovakia’s Federal Assembly 
were each understood as the “the highest organs of people’s power” (ibid.).   
Given that this delegation was sent by the ANC in 1987, it is possible that the Eastern 
European people’s democracies, at the time, provided some inspiration. The second of the 
NWC’s points - that provision be made for worker participation in economic management - 
is certainly in fitting with the ANC’s socialist strand. Yet it is difficult to pin this commitment 
to a particular tradition of socialism: no detail is provided to suggest whether, for example, 
it be linked to a centrally-planned economy or to the establishment of workers councils. By 
1988, beyond the inclusion of collective bargaining and workers’ right to strike, the Draft 
Constitutional Guidelines made no reference to worker participation in planning or 
management of the economy. 
One also wonders to what extent a role was envisaged for mass structures in democratic 
decision-making as opposed to merely in the execution of policy. The ANC’s initial idea 
referred not to a legislative role for multi-interest structures of citizens but for ‘mass 
organisations’. While these organisations were seen to comprise groupings such as trade 
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  This was a form of local-level participatory democracy introduced in town councils in New England, USA 
(See Mansbridge 1983).  
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unions, civics and other sectoral organisations, they were still understood as being aligned 
to and represented by the movement. The idea of incorporating methods of popular 
participation remained characterised by a bounded and unitary conception of democracy. 
What is more, the suggestion of both a constitutional provision for the role of the ANC, as 
well as for mass organisations, did not bode well for the guarantee of pluralism or the 
political neutrality of public institutions. It is possible that what was envisaged initially was a 
form of participation by proxy in which mass structures would play an important role but 
only through the maintenance of hegemonic unity. In this sense participation would take 
place through the movement, enabling a fusion of representative, participatory and 
bounded democracy.  
Here we are able to interrogate the third of the NWC’s points: that the constitutional 
document must create a framework through which “popular power is translated into a 
reality”. It is of particular note that, once translated into constitutional terms, people’s 
power is detached from its radical content. Jack Simons described it as “a government 
willing and able to give effect to the wishes of a majority of the population. Their wishes, 
needs and wants are communicated by and through representatives of voters, organised in 
one or more parties” [emphasis added] (1986: 2). It would seem that in a legal-
constitutional sense, the Committee conceived of people’s power as no more than 
representative government.  
However, Simons then adds to this a participatory dimension: “These measures are not 
sufficient to guarantee that all governments in a liberated South Africa will at all times abide 
by and give effect to the will of the majority of voters. A democracy exists only to the extent 
that the voters ... actually participate in decision-making and the process of government at 
all levels” [emphasis added] (ibid.). In this understanding, constitutional democracy of a 
liberal-representative type could be supplemented by participatory institutions and 
features. As Kaufman (1960), Pateman (1970) and Barber (1984) have argued, democracy 
should be extended and deepened.  
The development of ANC thought around participatory democracy as it relates to 
constitutionalism seems to have developed along this line of thinking, drawing on its historic 
belief in the inadequacy of representative democracy alone. Yet there is also some 
qualification. The “guarantee” of a form of democracy qua people’s power is not the 
protection of pluralism, individual free will, participation in decision-making or the 
developmental notion of producing ‘good’ citizens but is instead the struggle for NDR. This, 
Simons argues, can only be realised through the direction of the Vanguard movement: 
“To provide the guarantee, the Revolution must be made permanent, 
ceaselessly agitating the people, raising their level of political 
understanding, organising local communities, trade unions, churches and 
other mass organisations for development and the fulfilment of the tasks 
of the Revolution. The task of ‘revolutionising’ the people is a process. It 
152 
 
will continue for many generations of struggle … under the guidance of a 
revolutionary leadership” (Simons 1986: 3). 
The emphasis here is teleological, equating democracy with a people revolutionised. 
Simons’ solution to the NWC’s charge that the Committee had adhered too closely to a 
“conventional liberal democratic” framework was to equate democracy with the realisation 
of the NDR. There is thus a tension between, on the one hand, the provisions of a 
fundamental bill of rights and institutionalised pluralism, and on the other, inhibition of 
these very liberties through a unitary and pre-defined will. It is not clear that the 
“participation in decision-making” which Simons refers to is understood as anything more 
than the fulfilment of revolutionary tasks. 
Given this revolutionary emphasis and the NWC’s cautioning against the confinements of 
liberal democracy, it is of note that the Committee’s radical democratic language is toned 
down during the course of its work, being gradually replaced by legal-constitutional 
terminology. While certain principles (of equality, majority rule and one country with one 
people) were absolute from the outset (DLCA 1986a: 4), it seems that the status accorded to 
participatory democracy and the mechanisms by which it could be affected were not at that 
stage broached. Notably, the term ‘people’s power’ is not used at any point in the published 
guidelines of the Committee. 
Of course the Committee’s provisions were designed deliberately to be flexible to 
refinement; they were ‘principles’, not details, and the ANC agreed that a constitution for 
South Africa could only be drawn up by an elected constituent assembly (ANC 1991a: 36). 
Moreover, the guidelines, much like the Freedom Charter, were understood as a mobilising 
document and in this sense devoid of detail (Jobodwana, Interview: 25 January 2006). 
Nonetheless it is notable that the provision for participatory democracy as a form of 
people’s power seemed to weaken during the course of constitutional discussion. The role of 
popular organisation was replaced by administrative structures. Raymond Suttner suggests 
that in constitutional work “the future of popular power fell in the cracks” (Interview: 25 
October 2012). Whereas the ANC’s 1986 ‘Foundations of Government’ referred to 
“participatory democracy” specifically, and made reference to the involvement of 
“community, and community and workers organisations” (ANC CC 1986a), the 1988 Draft 
Constitutional Guidelines stated only that: “Provision shall be made for the delegation of the 
powers of the central authority to subordinate administrative units for purposes of more 
efficient administration and democratic participation” (ANC CC 1988b).  
Whether or not this was a result of the ANC’s concern to keep the provisions vague, there 
seems to have been a lack of clarity as to how people’s power could be effected in practice. 
The report of the ANC’s In-House Seminar on the Guidelines in March 1988 noted that 
although there was general acceptance of their content amongst participants, it was “not 
clear as to how organs of Local People’s Power would fit into the scheme” (ANC CC 1988a). 
153 
 
The movement wavered between a radical democratic view of participation (in which 
representative democracy was necessary but insufficient) and a revolutionary movement 
discourse in which participation was tied to the extension of movement hegemony. 
Elements of the latter discourse, discernable in the 1980s, would carry over into the post-
1990 period and are picked up in Chapter six in the discussion of movement discourse.  
Within the ANC, these conceptual tensions also manifested themselves. According to Willie 
Esterhuyse, a prominent Afrikaner academic then at the University of Stellenbosch, the key 
ANC figure in the early negotiations with Pretoria was Thabo Mbeki. Oliver Tambo, it seems, 
was aware of these discussions but was also trying to keep happy those cadres who 
remained convinced of a military seizure of power (ibid.: 84-5). Observing with hindsight the 
overlap in events, it is possible that Tambo wished to keep the constitutional foundations 
sufficiently vague as to cover representative and radical possibilities. It is also clear that by 
1988-9, the ANC was aware that negotiations, rather than the seizure of power, had become 
a possibility (Mufumadi Interview: 26 November 2012; Constitutional Guidelines Workshop 
1989).  
The ANC was thus being pulled in several ideological directions: at the same time that 
people’s power had set a precedent for democratic organisation, the codification of 
constitutional ideas was also taking place alongside the possibility of secret negotiations and 
the beginnings of an equally secret ‘Operation Vula’. By the time of CODESA II, socialist 
inspired-language was noticeably absent.  
Whatever role the exigencies of diplomacy, constitutional convention and strategic choice 
had to play, it is clear that the ANC did view participatory mechanisms - if in a more limited 
form than envisaged by some on the Left - as a desirable supplement to representative 
democracy. The ANC’s statement of intent in January 1987 noted that “guarantees of 
genuine and active involvement of the people have to be introduced at all levels of 
government”; and that “A major thrust of the constitution will be the active involvement of 
wide sections of the people in the making and implementation of decision in the entire 
range of human activity (sic)” (ANC NEC 1987a: 5). 
There in fact appears to have been general consensus across all political parties on the 
desirability of participatory democracy. What remained contentious was its “content and 
constitutional entrenchment” (CA TC1 1995). The Constitutional Committee on The Nature 
of the Democratic State described participatory democracy as emphasising “continuing 
participation by the citizenry in government between elections” but noted that as yet there 
was “no clarity on what forms this should take, and whether it should be entrenched in the 
constitution” (ibid.). The principle of establishing a constitutional right to participation, 
including participation in legislative process, elicited disagreement. Kader Asmal, citing the 
reference in the ANC’s 1988 Draft Constitutional Guidelines to active involvement of the 
population in all levels of government, made a direct link between participation and rights, 
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commenting that the Guidelines “trench on an important and developing notion of 
participation in public life which is increasingly seen as a human right” (1990: 8). Yet this 
idea does not appear to have filtered through to the constitutional proposals themselves.  
A key issue in this regard concerned the constitutional right of community based 
organisations (CBOs) to be consulted. In May 1995, the advisors to the ‘Ad Hoc Committee 
on Local Government’ set out in a discussion document some ‘reservations’ about 
entrenching such an entitlement to participation. These included the views that: governing 
should rest with a statutory body; elaborate and long-winded consultation procedures could 
be costly and hamper efficiency; people would be able to exercise power through voting; 
and that to retain a ‘watchdog’ function civil society should not be too closely and formally 
linked to local government (1995: 5-6). The document finally commented: “- the 
responsibility of government should not be that of communities. The way in which they 
govern is what matters. Hence it would be important for local government to create 
structures and institute processes which will allow and illicit community participation 
without it being necessarily a constitutional entitlement” (ibid: 6). This recommendation is a 
far cry from the councillist bent of people’s power, in which legislative and executive 
functions were exercised by the people themselves. It also does not align with the (albeit 
ambiguous) appeal made earlier by the ANC for “the active involvement of wide sections of 
the people in the making and implementation of decisions” (ANC NEC 1987a: 3).  
Although the period of the multi-party negotiations comprised a noticeable moderating of 
radical demands, the ANC continued to push for a role for civil society and in some way 
envisaged that the historic role played by civic and other structures should be provided for 
in a future dispensation. In its submission to the Technical Committee on Local Government 
the ANC argued that: “Civil society and its various organisations have a crucial role in 
democratising and transforming South Africa. The final constitution, supplemented where 
necessary by national legislation, should provide for the principles and appropriate 
mechanisms of participatory democracy, as well as for organs of civil society” (Ad Hoc 
Technical Committee on Local Government 1995: 5).  
Although the ANC did not equate community organisations with democratic local 
government per se, it did envisage a constitutional role for the former in the governance 
process. In the final Constitution of 1996, however, participation is not phrased as a ‘right’. 
Instead, it is encouraged through provisions for national, provincial and, most especially, 
local government. The term ‘participatory democracy’ is also not given any clear definition, 
stating only that the National Assembly, National Council of Provinces and Provincial 
Legislatures may “make rules and orders concerning its business, with due regard to 
representative and participatory democracy, accountability, transparency and public 
involvement” (Republic of South Africa 1996: Sections 57, 70 and 116). 
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In relation to local government the term ‘participatory democracy’ is not actually used but 
does include the most detailed provisions on citizen participation, including: “(a) to provide 
democratic and accountable government for local communities … and (e) to encourage the 
involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local 
government” (Republic of South Africa 1996: Chapter 7, Section 152). From 1996, the 
constitutional provisions formed a basis for formulating policy on participatory governance 
centred on the notion of ‘developmental local government’ (see Chapter Five). 
Overall, between 1988 and 1994, the discussion of mechanisms for citizen participation in 
decision-making was not a visible priority due more to political imperatives than ideological 
conviction. Before the issue of citizen participation through mechanisms other than 
elections could be broached, a legitimate and functioning state had to be established. Thus, 
from 1992, focus understandably shifted to inter-party negotiations and the reaching of a 
political settlement. Similarly, the Local Government Transition Act of 1993 was somewhat 
of a holding operation. It provided interim arrangements for the functioning of local 
authorities in the run up to the 1995 local government elections, only after which was the 
detail of participatory democracy taken up in earnest. As this chapter has identified, 
however, it was as early as 1988 that the principle of participatory democracy was located 
primarily in the local government arena. This shift also made more visible the debate 
between the role of civil society and local government in realising participatory democracy.  
4.2. Participation and the Local 
“Democratic local government means more than just having the right to 
vote in a local election. It also includes facilitating the creation of a strong, 
independent civil society, a high degree of accountability, transparency and 
the right to participate in decision-making processes which affect 
communities between elections” (ANC 1992).  
4.2.1. Themes and Influences on Participation and Local Government 
Although the pre-figurative discourse of ‘people’s power’ attached its significance to the 
form of a future state, prior to 1986 no official ANC statement had linked popular power 
directly to the sphere of local government. As the Constitution Committee embarked on its 
constitutional proposals, however, the future of people’s power, and forms of participatory 
democracy more specifically, came to be viewed as the preserve of the local arena. What 
the ANC came to envisage and articulate more clearly from 1990 was the need for 
governmental powers and decision-making to be brought “closer to the people” (Skweyiya 
1990: 135). 
One of the Committee’s earliest documents acknowledged the role of “popular 
insurrectionary-type struggles” in bringing to the fore the link between community and local 
government (ANC CC undated a: 14). Noting that this relationship would carry even greater 
importance under democratic conditions, the Committee outlined the significance of 
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regional and local government: “[These] structures are important because: they deal with 
concrete questions directly affecting the lives of the people; they involve large sections of 
the population directly and actively in questions of government; [and] they will be the 
scenes of direct transformation of the lives of the people” (ibid.: 15). Although the 
document is undated, references to it in another document in the same collection (ANC 
DLCA 1986c) suggest that it was written at some stage during 1986. Thus, although the NWC 
had expressed a desire for constitutional thinking to ‘accommodate’ “embryonic forms of 
popular power” (NWC S-C 1986), it had not previously linked this to local government 
specifically.  
By 1990, positions on this had reached the clarity of “the importance of full participation by 
members of communities in local and regional government” (ANC CC 1990a). Again, in 1991, 
in a discussion document on Constitutional Principles, participatory democracy is linked 
specifically to the arena of the local: “Local tasks cover all the day to day aspects of living 
which most directly and intimately affect the citizen … The active involvement of all sections 
of the population will be necessary in the fulfilment of these tasks” (ANC CC 1991).  
There is, at this stage, little sense of the institutional form this might take and no mention is 
made of possible structures, mechanisms or processes. Yet what does appear to be clear is 
that popular power and active participation were seen as being catered for through citizen 
involvement in local issues. Although the ANC referred to “popular participation” in all 
structures of government (ibid.) it is not clear that, outside of the local arena, this was 
envisaged as anything more than participation in elections. In the ANC’s 1992 policy 
document, Ready to Govern, provisions and mechanisms for participatory democracy are 
discussed in their entirety under the heading: ‘A New System of Local Government’ (ANC 
1992). 
It is also of note that between 1986 and 1990 there was a modification of the envisaged 
substance of local government. In parallel with the Constitution Committee’s shift toward 
more moderate constitutional language generally, there is a diminishing of the framing of 
local government structures as features of a Marxist-Leninist style state. One of the 
Committee’s early documents on ‘Non-Central Government Structures’78 urged the ANC, 
not only to define the democratic organs of self-government referred to in the Freedom 
Charter but to “go beyond the creation of mere legal structures” (ANC CC 1986c). In doing 
so it made reference to the GDR’s model of territorial popular units under a “central organ 
of people’s power”, and set out a range of possible tasks that South Africa’s local structures 
of self-government could fulfil. The tasks listed carry the traits of states such as the GDR and 
Soviet Union, including: the “making of by-laws”; “implementation of decisions of the 
central people’s assembly”; local-level development and provision of services; “taking 
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 Based on annotated notes on this document, as well as a reference to it in a ‘Departmental Report for the 
NEC’ (DLCA 1986c), this was one of a series of documents produced by the Committee during 1986. 
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charge of some of the nationalised industries”; and “controlling of the allowed private 
sector” for local-level benefit (ibid.). It also seems to envisage that these structures would 
have some programmatic or partisan content: they “must reflect the predominantly but not 
exclusively black democratic state dominated by the working class and peasantry” (ibid.). 
By 1988, with the publication of the Draft Constitutional Guidelines, the ANC did not include 
any such level of detail, referring only to the delegation of power to lower levels (ANC CC 
1988b). It also removed all suggestion that the constitution would reflect a particular 
political programme (ibid.; see also ANC CC 1990a). As with the ANC’s thinking on 
democracy generally, the reduction of socialist influence in the proposals seems to have 
brought with it more explicitly democratic elements to participation. The Committee’s 
1986 document on non-central government structures, for example, had provided no 
assurance that ‘democratic organs of self-government’ would involve popular participation 
in the formulation of policy. It referred only to their role in its implementation (ANC CCC 
1986c; see also ANC CC 1986a). It also implied that the making of by-laws with which local 
units would be tasked would be bounded by the revolutionary programme. There was no 
guarantee that local government would provide the opportunity for real popular influence 
in the policy agenda. 
In contrast, later documents refer specifically to participation in decision-making and not 
just in administration (ANC NEC 1987a: 3; ANC 1992). The most explicit statement by the 
ANC in this regard is in its 1992 proposals on local government (quoted at the opening of 
this section) which emphasised both the limitations of representative democracy and “the 
right to participate in decision-making processes which affect communities between 
elections” (ANC 1992). It also introduced the need to actively include women in decision-
making processes and to give civil society groups opportunity to “influence the process of 
government” (ibid.). In October 1990, the ANC held a consultative conference on local 
government in which a number of research papers were produced. While these drew on 
various aspects of local government, the contributions showed the presence of participatory 
ideas and the importance of establishing citizen channels to influence government policy 
(CDS 1991).  
Between 1990 and 1996 the ANC, at its leadership-level, was increasingly caught up in 
national and constitutional negotiations. These took place across a period of ten years, from 
the formation of the Constitution Committee in 1986 to the adoption of the final 
Constitution in 1996. During this time, the ANC’s policy position zeroed in on local 
government as the most critical sphere for popular participation. In line with these 
developments, the final Constitution itself assigned participatory democracy predominantly 
to the local government sphere (Republic of South Africa 1996: Chapter 7, Section 152).  
At the same time, however, beyond its acceptance in principle, citizen participation was not 
at that time a key policy priority - only being taken up in earnest after 1996 following the 
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first local government elections and publication of the final Constitution. Prior to this, 
however, ideas about participation were being discussed within civil society, through 
contributions from the civic movement, trade unions, NGOs and academia. For these 
groups, at the local level, popular participation continued to carry great consequence. 
4.2.1.1. Civic Activism and Local Negotiation: Participation as Developmental 
As the previous chapter showed, activist discourse and the applied theory of community 
organising was one of a number of influences that penetrated people’s power. By 1990, as 
the ANC was unbanned and a political settlement increasingly likely, a number of strands 
from the activist community came together to embark on local negotiations as part of 
broader preparations for change. Forums for negotiation between local authorities and the 
non-statutory sector (comprised largely of civics) took place across South Africa in parallel to 
national negotiations and most extensively in metropolitan centres. The first, and most 
advanced, of these efforts was in the (then) Transvaal where state and non-state groupings 
came together to begin local negotiations as the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan 
Chamber.79 
The Metropolitan Chamber, formally established in 1991, was preceded by the 1990 Soweto 
Accord - an attempt by the Soweto Civic Association (SCA) to reach agreement with the 
Transvaal Provincial Authority and local electricity supplier, Eskom, over the writing-off of 
payment arrears. When the affected communities failed to resume paying the minimum 
rates agreed by the Accord, participants and representatives sought a more comprehensive 
solution (Ottaway 1993:126-7). In April 1991, the Metropolitan Chamber formed and was 
constituted of representatives from the Transvaal Provincial Authority (TPA), the Regional 
Service Councils (RSCs), White Municipalities, BLAs, a number of local Democratic Party (DP) 
Councillors, and several civic associations from the Johannesburg metropolitan area80 
represented through the Civic Association of Johannesburg (CAJ) (Ottaway 1993:127).81 One 
of the key figures on the non-state side was the Soweto People’s Delegation’s Cyril 
Ramaphosa, while the forum was chaired by the Progressive Federal Party’s Frederik van Zyl 
Slabbert. 
Although the Chamber’s participants recognised that establishment of democratic and non-
racial local government could only come about through formal negotiations aligned to a 
national-level strategy (Coovadia 1991; Ramaphosa in Collinge 1991: 9; Botha 1991: 20), the 
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 Although the Metropolitan Chamber was one of the first formal forums to negotiate interim structures, local 
negotiations over civic grievances and service issues had been taking place between civics and white city 
councillors since about 1985 (see, for example, Atkinson 1991: 273-5). 
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 This incorporated Johannesburg, Soweto, Alexandra, and Lenasia. 
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 Not all civic associations agreed to participate in the Chamber: half of Johannesburg’s civics opted out 
(Collinge 1991: 8), some feeling that negotiation with illegitimate authorities was incorrect (ibid.: 8-9; see also 
Mayekiso 1992: 1). 
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total breakdown of BLAs meant that, by necessity, local negotiations could not wait for new 
local administrations (Ottaway 1993: 125). Local negotiating forums, like the Metropolitan 
Chamber, thus sought to negotiate a new integrated local government structure ahead of 
the national settlement (ibid.: 126). The Chamber established a series of working groups to 
formulate policy around issues including the tax base, electrification infrastructure, water 
and sewerage systems and housing provision (van Donk & Pieterse 2006: 111). Ottaway thus 
suggests that, as the ANC returned to resume its role of leading the struggle at the centre, 
civic associations “started devoting more attention to local issues as an end in themselves” 
(1993: 114-115). Whereas in the 1980s their focus had been on ungovernability, “in the 
early 1990s they were beginning to focus on how the post-apartheid city should be 
governed in the future” (ibid.).  
The formation of local negotiating structures aligned with the UDF-ANC ‘One-City’ initiative, 
which argued for non-racial municipalities with one tax base and the creation of interim 
transitional bodies (Botha 1993: 66). With the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) in 
1993, local negotiating forums were formalised in local authorities pending the first local 
government elections in 1995. Despite these commitments, however, the ANC itself had 
concerns about the potential dislocation of local and national agreements. If the scope of 
the local forums became too broad, there was a risk of local-level initiatives being 
manipulated by the state and minority parties, thus undermining national-level demands 
(Ottaway 1993: 124; Cullinan 1992: 7).82 
As such, some analysts have suggested that the real impact of the Metropolitan Chamber 
was limited. Van Donk and Pieterse refer to it as “a body without an official position or real 
power” (2006: 112), and although it had a formal constitution, it lacked the authority to 
enforce the agreements reached (Ottaway 1993: 127). Tensions also developed between 
local civic initiatives and the ANC’s preference that local negotiations should respond to 
national strategic direction (Ottaway 1993: 124; see also Swilling & Boya 1997: 178-9). The 
ANC, and indeed some civics, were also concerned that the state’s encouragement of local 
level forums was part of an attempt to divide the movement and promote regionalism (ANC 
undated b; Mayekiso Interview by Cullinan 1992: 1, 3). 
Having said this, while the Chamber may not have succeeded in devising a “new, viable 
system of metropolitan government”, its participants did make conscious attempts “to 
shape the future local government model”, making it “de facto impossible for existing local 
structures to make decisions without consultation” (Ottaway 1993: 126, 128). Cas Coovadia, 
who represented the civic movement’s key interlocutor in the Chamber, noted their 
awareness of the need to “prepare the democratic movement … to begin to influence the 
structures of government at local government level.” (Interview: 28 May 2013). He also 
explained that, as the civics’ representative, the CAJ sought a mandate from its members to 
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reach agreement on particular issues (ibid.). Negotiation practices thus bore resemblance to 
established democratic process in the civics themselves. In some instances where 
compromises needed to be reached, Coovadia noted that he would return to communities 
to consult them or to sell a particular position. In other cases, where the constituency could 
not be convinced, he would return to the Chamber to put an issue back on the table (ibid.).  
Through the Chamber’s negotiations, participants engaged in a process of deliberation 
involving argument, reason, consensus-building and sometimes making concessions. It 
opened participants up to a deliberative form of democracy not previously experienced and, 
according to Coovadia, produced new levels of trust between the key interlocutors (ibid.). 
Swilling and Boya describe the local forums as “schools of the new South African 
democracy” (1997: 171),83 ‘grappling’ with the challenge of urban local governance “in an 
integrated and participatory manner” (ibid.: 180). The participatory value of the Chamber 
was also emphasised by Coovadia. Although he did not see the Chamber itself as a model 
for future non-racial local government, he explained the way in which it was preparing 
people for the process of governing: “Through mass struggles and local level negotiations, 
individuals and organisations at a grassroots level are obtaining practical experience about 
the possibilities and problems of local government and development in a future South 
Africa” (Coovadia undated: 2).  
Thozamile  Botha, who also participated in the local negotiations and was centrally involved 
in the formation of the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) in 1990, remarked 
on the Chamber’s work as an indication that “civics are not necessarily transforming 
themselves into local authorities but they are engaged in a process which seeks to ensure 
that democratic local authorities are properly set” (1991: 20). It thus reflected the key 
‘assumption’ of participatory theory: “that participatory experience generates a desire for 
more participation” (Bachrach and Botwinick 1992: 139).   
Other activists who were involved in or worked with the civic movement noted the 
importance of local negotiations in involving communities and giving them a stake in the 
system as active participants. Crispian (‘Chippy’) Olver, who had established the housing 
NGO, Corplan in the Eastern Cape and produced research for the ANC’s 1990 conference on 
local government, noted that, following the commencement of rural local government 
negotiations in the Border region, among the principles put forward for discussion was that 
“the establishment of interim structures must involve a process of local level consultation 
that draws in all significant interest groups in the area under discussion … The process must 
be designed to empower residents and community activists at the local level and equip them 
for tasks of local government” [emphasis added] (1991: 170).  
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 Swilling and Boya added that “This is where networks and relationships were built, mutual learning took 
place and a new culture of governance and consensus building developed” (1997: 171).    
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Coovadia, interestingly, also drew a parallel between the strategy of the civic movement 
and negotiations between national leadership, noting that the CAJ had grasped the need to 
move from “an insurrectionary agenda to one that had to prepare people for government” 
(Interview: 28 May 2013). His view was that the process of local negotiations, through 
structures such as the Metropolitan Chamber, also provided individuals and organisations 
with “practical experience about the possibilities and problems of local government and 
development in a future South Africa”, adding that “If these processes only resulted in this 
educative process, it would be a significant achievement” (1991: 334-335).  
In this sense, negotiations were also transformative, continuing and extending the 
educative and empowering process begun by the civics through people’s power. Just as 
community organisations had begun a process of transforming the popular mind-set toward 
issues of collective good and public citizenship, so did local negotiations begin a process of 
developing citizens who were ready to participate in the new structures rather than fight 
them. Here, Bachrach and Botwinick’s formulation seems useful, seeing “democratic 
participation with others … [as leading] to revised understandings of the participants’ 
capacities and resources, leading in turn to new conceptualizations of their individual and 
collective self-interest” (1992: 29).  
What was required in South Africa, Atkinson argued, was the creation of ‘public space’ 
(1992: 53). She draws on Hannah Arendt’s idea of a space created for the purpose of 
debate, discussion, persuasion and exchange of views, which roots itself in the reality of 
difference and disagreement but does not need to be confined to “the conventional political 
sphere” (ibid; 53-4). Coovadia’s reference to trust being developed between and amongst 
participants in the Metropolitan Chamber speaks to Arendt’s claim that “by participating … 
citizens establish the reality of the shared world and build up their faith in one another” 
(ibid.: 53). 
Having said this there was a degree to which participation and its benefits were restricted to 
people as collectives and not as individual citizens. Dominique Wooldridge, who was 
involved in the Metropolitan Chamber as a support and advisor to the South African 
Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU), noted that there was a lot of contestation about which 
organisations had “the right to speak on behalf of the people” (Wooldridge Interview: 12 
March 2013). She thus added that “speaking about citizen involvement often was more 
about representatives of civil society than direct citizen involvement” (ibid.). At the stage of 
the Chamber’s negotiations, there was little discussion “about how an individual citizen 
would participate in something” (ibid.).  
Nonetheless, Wooldridge emphasised that the CAJ’s Cas Coovadia and the SCA’s Lawrence 
Boya were key drivers in bringing into the negotiations ideas about participation (ibid.). 
Although the Chamber was established to deal with the provision of local services, issues in 
which they rooted ideas about participation continued the civic tradition of relating popular 
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input to people’s material needs. Wooldridge thus noted that a lot of ideas about 
participation were “around things like social housing or attempts to get bits of budget 
pushed down so a community would be able to prioritise their own use of them” (Ibid.).  
Simultaneously, therefore, the role of the civics in negotiations also prepared the ground for 
their continuing role in future policy formulation, serving as a forum for skills generation 
and technical expertise, especially in relation to the role of the public and private sectors in 
provision of municipal services (Coovadia, undated: 18). Coovadia noted that “the extent to 
which community based organizations such as civics are able to participate in actively 
formulating their needs and demands during the transition period, will determine the extent 
to which they will be able to play a leading role in the implementation of future policies” 
(1991: 335). For some participants, the experience of local negotiations touched once again 
on notions of democracy as educative and developmental.  
4.2.1.2. Progressive Planning and Development Influences 
In the development of the civics’ technical expertise, a key role was played by a series of 
individuals from progressive planning and development NGOs who provided advice and 
support to the civic movement and their non-statutory compatriots. The support of such 
organisations, as well as of individual academics, in providing technical advice helped to 
facilitate a more substantial contribution by civics to negotiations of the Metropolitan 
Chamber. 
The previous chapter observed that, during the 1980s, the influence of community 
organising and activism in the people’s power discourse also shaped NGOs’ approaches to 
urban citizenship, spatial contestation and political action. With the commencement of local 
government negotiations after 1990, many of these ideas and approaches to planning and 
development were transferred. Several key players in the Metropolitan Chamber also 
fulfilled roles in the National-level Local Government Negotiating Forum (NLGNF) (van Donk 
& Pieterse 2006: 113). This was the formal body responsible for drawing up the LGTA (1993) 
which provided formally for local-level negotiations involving representatives of 
communities. According to Swilling and Boya, the “core concepts” informing the national 
framework agreed by the NLGNF were “developed, designed and negotiated” within the 
Chamber: “the final settlement of the NLGNF was … a vindication of what the Metropolitan 
Chamber had been working on for some years already” (1997: 172). 
In both forums the NGO, Planact, was particularly influential and consisted of individuals 
such as Mark Swilling, Andrew Boraine and Billy Cobbett. Crispian (‘Chippy’) Olver was also 
involved in local government policy research, and Thozamile Botha was an influential 
activist, heading both the ANC’s Department of Provincial and Local Government and the 
local government arm of SANCO. Through such individuals, the work of the Metropolitan 
Chamber had a big influence on national-level local government agreements (ibid.). Via 
NGOs such as Planact and the Urban Sector Network, key influences were progressive 
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planning (Seedat, Interview: 13 May 2013) and radical political geography (Swilling 
Interview). Van Donk and Pieterse note that development theory and, in particular, 
‘participatory action research’ (PAR), which gained popularity among Left development 
theorists and practitioners internationally from the 1980s, also gave rise to the generation 
of NGOs in South Africa in the late 1980s who became “central in formulating the first round 
of policy thinking on urban democracy and development” (2006: 125).  
Although not synonymous with participatory development, PAR overlapped with some of its 
ideas and represented a shift away from top-down, paternalistic approaches to 
development previously incorporated in international ‘development projects’ (McGee 
2002). The ideas of Brazilian scholar, Paulo Freire, which had influenced community 
organisers in South Africa during the 1980s, “promoting a view of people as conscious 
agents in social and political life” (McGee 2002: 94), also penetrated the development 
paradigm. From the 1970s ideas about participatory development gained ground, emerging 
from the experience of various social movements in the developing world as well as 
community development and worker and adult education in North America and Britain 
(Kemmis & McTaggart 2005: 560). By the mid-1980s, development theorists such as 
Chambers and Cernea were helping to shift the participatory discourse into mainstream 
development theory (McGee 2002: 94). 
Given the global intellectual context it seems likely that these shifts influenced South 
Africa’s left-leaning development NGOs. Mark Swilling, who was heavily involved in the 
Metropolitan Chamber in Johannesburg and the setting up of Planact in the mid-1980s, 
referred to radical geographers such as David Harvey, Doreen Massey and Manuel Castells 
as shaping their theoretical outlook at the time (Interview: 20 February 2013). Doreen 
Massey, interestingly, seems actually to have attended a workshop in South Africa in 1992 
to debate scenarios for regional government (Marais 1992: 4). Geographer, David Harvey in 
the 1970s had begun to utilise a Marxist theoretical framework to understand urban space 
and later produced a geographical analysis of capitalism - an approach which would fit with 
ideas emerging amongst the Marxist academic Left in South Africa.  
Castells’ influential work, ‘The City and the Grassroots’ in 1983, had developed the idea of 
urban social movements as ‘harbingers’ of fundamental social change (Lowe 1986: 2). The 
idea of urban social movements, not only under democratic environments such as Spain 
(where Castells’ analysis was based) but in the revolutionary context of Latin America, were 
influential for planners such as Swilling in understanding collective contestations over urban 
space (Interview: 20 February 2013). While popular struggles in locations such as Nicaragua 
and Brazil were revolutions rather than social movements per se, they in a sense fitted 
Castells’ notion, as described by Mayer, of “movements which combine struggles for 
improved collective consumption with struggles for community culture as well as for 
political self-determination” (2006: 202).  
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It is thus possible to see how this theoretical framing helped planners and activists alike to 
see local movements as engaged not only in a struggle for political citizenship but for urban 
citizenship as well. It was also the very antithesis to the development discourse of the state 
which had for a long time co-opted a language of ‘development’ to justify racial 
separation.84 The potential for collective consumption issues to themselves garner popular 
organisation for change was expressed in the civic movement. Although the local spatial 
contestations of the 1980s had become subsumed in the struggle for national political 
change (Swilling, Interview: 20 February 2013), the transitional period and local-level 
negotiations, in particular, provided opportunity for urban consumption concerns to shape 
new power relations. From this perspective, the NGO movement, according to Swilling, was 
“trying to think of modes of democracy that were appropriate to the urban space” (ibid; see 
also Coovadia 1991: 334-5). 
The influence of the ideas of planners permeated the Metropolitan Chamber, filtering into 
proposals for local government more broadly. Although the Chamber did not pre-empt a 
new local government model as such, it did set a participatory precedent as to what was 
expected. Mark Swilling noted that the vacuum which civics had begun to fill as a result of 
the collapse of BLAs, as well as the broad recognition they received as “legitimate 
community representatives”, gave them “political clout and access to technical resources … 
[enabling] the civics to deliver tangible benefits to residents” (Jacobs 1992: 24).85 Moreover, 
through the support that NGO staff provided to non-statutory players (comprised largely of 
those from the Congress camp), these NGOs also transferred skills and introduced ideas 
about future local government that incorporated notions of civic involvement. Cas Coovadia 
noted:   
“I think we were fortunate in that we had PLANACT there at that time … A 
group of progressive town planners who understood town planning and 
how to actually progress town planning with the involvement of the 
people for whom this is being done. So at times it was a very slow and 
laborious process but you spend that time and I can tell you the buy-in 
after that is immediate” (Interview: 28 May 2013). 
Through the process of negotiations in the Metropolitan Chamber, civics also embarked on 
an educative experience of democracy (a la Rousseau, Pateman and Macpherson) which 
drew on their past traditions of empowerment but in a more structured environment. Civic 
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officials received technical advice and support (Wooldridge, Interview: 12 March 2013) but 
also took their own initiative to develop education and training programmes which would 
build their own expertise and capacity and “achieve levels of community participation in the 
formulation of development strategies” (Coovadia 1991: 345). As Coovadia saw it, the civics 
in the Metropolitan Chamber were in many ways “trail blazers” (Interview: 28 May 2013). 
Progressive planning discourses and ideas of participatory development also fitted nicely 
with emerging ideas about the key role of civics in development and reconstruction. A 1990 
UDF discussion paper on current political conditions and implications for the civic 
movement defined development as “a process which builds democracy by involving people 
in the process and putting power into the hands of the people so that they can control their 
lives while it also contributes to improving the living standards of the people" (UDF 1990b). 
Development was linked to both democracy and to empowerment. The influences of 
participatory development theory are thus visible in the discourse of the MDM itself. In a 
workshop paper in 1990, the MDM set out its ‘development principles’: 
"We have always argued that communities should have direct control over 
the process of development, from determination of basic needs and 
priorities, to project conceptualisation and design, to allocation of funds, 
to project implementation, to management and maintenance of 
development projects. This ensures that communities are empowered and 
strengthened rather than communities becoming hostages to a 
development process over which they have no control" (MDM 1990). 
This view of development incorporated the notion of participation as both a process and an 
outcome: as a means of achieving development goals and as a feature of successful 
development in itself. During the negotiation period, Coovadia advocated “the building of 
community-based vehicles for development … rather than waiting for centralized 
technocratically conceived planning exercises” or delivery by a future democratic state 
(1991: 335). These ideas of development thus incorporated features of self-reliance as well 
as self-governance, echoing Coovadia’s perception, expressed elsewhere, of people’s power 
as having engendered a deeper form of democracy in which participants were empowered 
rather than dependent (Interview: 28 May 2013).  
Those involved in the Metropolitan Chamber and in local negotiating forums elsewhere 
understandably defended the gains they made and the degree to which their input shaped 
interim local government. However, as Van Donk and Pieterse note, the end of the interim 
phase of local government in 1995 and commencement of formal policy development 
“signalled the beginning of a break between NGOs and grassroots movements”. (2006: 125). 
Since 1994, the exodus of skilled leadership from the civic movement has been much 
lamented: many civic leaders and those who built up expertise through local negotiations 
joined the ANC leadership, were transferred to parliament or began work in the new state 
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structures. Their departure left a gap in both local skills and leadership. Thus, in some 
respects, the participatory democratic traditions developed in the Chamber did not manifest 
themselves in the bottom-up community controlled development or community-state 
partnerships envisaged by the Chamber’s proponents.  
At the same time, the role of experts and advisers - in both the local forums and the NLGNF 
- speaks to concerns about the exclusionary nature of some participatory processes 
(Cornwall 2008: 275-6) and the representivity of those who claim to speak for communities 
(Botes & van Rensburg 2000: 46). Glaser, for example, notes the predominance of 
professionals, professional activists and men amongst civic leaders: as such they were “[not] 
necessarily microcosmically representative in the sense of being like those they claim to 
represent” (1997: 13). At the time, Doreen Atkinson alluded to the problem that 
participation by some on behalf of others could produce inequalities within the civic itself, 
asking: “if participatory planning is a good thing, how will it affect the egalitarian nature of 
civic organisations?” (1991: 287).  
The traditional aggregation of ‘communities’ or ‘the poor’ as homogeneous categories 
(Cohen and Uphoff cited in Cornwall 2008: 277-8) perhaps did not account for competing 
interests and class differences. There are thus grounds to argue that advocates of the 
Metropolitan Chamber and NLGNF assumed a ‘common good’.86 Elton Ngcobo of the 
Amahlongwa Interim Civic Organisation voiced the concern that SANCO, who was included 
as a participant in the NLGNF, did not and could not represent all civics. He emphasised the 
need for a more ‘inclusive’ process, stating that “we question whether technical committees 
sitting in Johannesburg can understand these dynamics without input from local and 
regional players” (1993). The role and value of the Metropolitan Chamber and NLGNF were 
thus not accepted unanimously across the civic movement.  
Having said this, it is not clear that the Metropolitan Chamber’s composition was 
deliberately exclusionary. All forms of participatory democracy generally include some 
element of representation (See Cornwall 2008: 277) and, depending on the form this takes, 
this need not be problematic. Cornwall notes that a process which seeks “only the 
engagement of a small group of articulate leaders is something very different to one in 
which community members delegate power to such a group to engage with the authorities” 
on their behalf (ibid.: 273). Here, as was the case in the Metropolitan Chamber, 
communities “receive information” from their delegates and are “consulted on key issues” 
(ibid).  
Whatever the model adopted by the Chamber itself, we can argue that the process of both 
local and national negotiation generated and circulated ideas about participatory 
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approaches. While this did not represent the beginning of formal policy formulation (a 
process which commenced only after the adoption of the final constitution), it began to 
show the range of influences, both new and historic, on the ANC’s thinking about local 
democracy.  
4.2.1.3. Caution about Decentralised Power: Participation as an Instrument of the Right 
It is also of note that the push for participatory mechanisms at local government level was 
by no means the preserve of the ANC camp alone. Some of the movement’s hesitancy about 
the devolution of power was a result of participatory democratic language emerging from 
the state itself. During the early 1990s a discourse of participation was co-opted by both the 
DP and the National Party (NP). In June 1990 the NP Government published the Thornhill 
Report which set out its ideas for a new local government model. The proposals, widely 
rejected by the ANC and civics, were rooted in a strategy of devolving negotiating powers to 
the local level and allowing towns and cities to establish their own local government 
charters. Through these proposals, the ANC claimed, the government was trying to: 
“separate local issues from national negotiations”; “rule from the grave by preserving local 
level apartheid after transfer of power at the national level”; and “end its responsibility for 
financing local authorities” (ANC undated b). One therefore wonders whether suspicion of 
the government’s motives prevented the ANC from taking a more radical stance on 
decentralisation and devolution.  
The NP’s Constitutional Proposals in September 1991 also expressed support for 
decentralisation and local autonomy. Ottaway described, “[it] had decided that local 
control, particularly if extended to the neighbourhood level, would offer whites the best 
possible protection after the repeal of the Group Areas Act” (1993: 119). The ANC position, 
in contrast, was that non-racial local authorities with one tax base must first be established 
before they could negotiate their own local government (ibid.). By encouraging civics to 
negotiate with local authorities, the NP government was seen to be both putting pressure 
on civics to reach agreements and compromises (Botha 1991: 17) and shrinking the remit of 
CODESA (Cullinan 1992: 6). It was with great irony that the NP referred to its local 
government proposals as ‘Constitutional Rule in a Participatory Democracy” (Ottaway 1993: 
120). Through the process of negotiation about regional and local government, participatory 
democracy became the language of ‘the Right' (Wooldridge Interview: 12 March 2013).  
Perhaps one of the most intriguing aspects of the government’s proposals was the idea of 
neighbourhood assemblies: “This will be a common local authority made up of non-racial 
geographically based neighbourhood management committees with a single tax base and 
administration” (Schmidt 1990 cited in Botha 1991: 16). The notion of neighbourhood 
committees and assemblies, to which the ANC-MDM had historically laid claim as radical 
structures for popular power, were co-opted by the state as structures for the retention of 
privilege. Schmidt thus described the state’s proposals for geographically based committees 
as intended “to allow richer communities some power to control their own affairs” (ibid.). 
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Devolution of power as proposed by the government risked replicating pockets of privilege 
and underdevelopment. The ANC-CDS also voiced concern that “neighbourhood 
committees” would draw decision-making powers away from democratically elected local 
authorities (ANC undated b). Thus while both the ANC and NP agreed on the need for local 
negotiations and, by 1995, on the desirability of strong local government (Siddle & Koelble 
2012: 70), where they differed was on the premise for this. 
4.2.1.4. Popular Assembly and Trade Union Influences 
Regardless of the state’s motives, the post-cold-war ideological context and steps toward a 
negotiated settlement generated conditions less favourable to experiments in radical 
democracy. As noted earlier, it was from as early 1987-8 (during the work of the 
Constitution Committee) that a legal-constitutional and liberal democratic language 
supplanted suggestions of more radical modes of participation. From the late 1980s, 
references in ANC discourse to people’s assemblies and councillist structures are in short 
supply and, in some cases, are phrased in such a way that they are indistinguishable from 
representative democratic arrangements. By the 1990s, Glaser suggests that “the 
international and domestic power balance … meant that the ANC, even if it came to power, 
would not do so entirely on its own terms” (1991 8).  
Yet this argument could be dated even earlier. In a Constitution Committee document, 
which looks to have been produced during the late 1980s, there is an indication that the 
ANC had to hold back on proposals for more radical forms of power:     
“If we had already succeeded in destroying the coercive power of the 
apartheid regime and establishing popular organs of government 
throughout the country, we would be able to proclaim a new constitution 
corresponding to this new reality. Since, however the question of a new 
constitution may well be placed separately on the agenda before such a 
stage is reached, we have to prepare a document consistent with a reality 
somewhat less favourable to our position. Our document accordingly 
would be provisional in the sense that if the situation were to advance 
dramatically and irreversibly in our favour before the new constitution 
were put into force, it would be possible to propose a new version 
containing provisions reflecting more advanced forms of popular power” 
[emphasis added] (ANC CC undated a).  
Activist, Rashid Seedat, noted that the transition came about in a different ideological milieu 
and speculated that “if we had taken power in ‘87 or something my guess is that we would 
probably have experimented with those things” (Interview: 20 May 2013). The ANC thus had 
to reach compromises on the form of structures it envisaged. Yet the ideas embodied in 
these earlier models were not lost entirely. Efforts to retain their principles are discernible 
in theoretical discussions about democracy and the model of local government.   
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The November 1991 edition of the ANC’s theoretical journal, Mayibuye included an article 
which specifically set out the movement’s understanding of ‘Democracy’, providing one of 
the ANC’s most explicit accounts of its understanding of the term. It stated: “Meaningful 
democracy is based on the active participation of people in all activities and processes that 
affect their lives. Through it ordinary people are empowered to take control of their lives in 
all spheres; political economic and social” (ANC 1991a: 36). It thus encompassed a view of 
democracy as participatory, empowering, and extending beyond the political to economic 
and social spheres. It also echoed earlier discourses of the inadequacy of parliamentary 
democracy, advocating instead a form of democracy that included direct popular control 
(ibid.).  
Perhaps most importantly, the very notion that ‘The People Shall Govern’ was understood 
to have been “built and expressed in practice” through structures such as the organs of 
people’s power and independent trade unions. It described these bodies as “based on the 
daily participation of ordinary people in deciding on matters affecting their lives” (ibid). 
Interestingly, another article in the same series set out the ANC’s understanding of internal 
democracy (i.e. within the movement itself). In contrast to the discourse of its exile years, 
this drew noticeably on the traditions of the trade unions (ANC 1991b: 36), including 
ensuring that leaders are subject to regular election, accountability, mandates and recall. 
The movement also emphasised the importance of trade union participation in the “control 
and planning of work” and municipalities’ consultation of communities in planning local 
economic activity and finance (ANC 1991a: 37). Less surprisingly, the model of development 
advocated by the MDM also drew on its trade union traditions, recommending principles of 
collective bargaining, the election of mandated representatives, and report-backs to 
constituents (MDM 1990).   
This expression of democracy as participatory represented a further attempt by the ANC to 
merge liberal and radical traditions. Alongside commitments to popular participation in 
decision-making were the promotion of political tolerance, free political activity, and a 
strong civil society of multiple interests for the safeguarding of democracy (ibid.). In its 1992 
document, Ready to Govern the ANC took its earlier commitments-in-principle one step 
further by outlining possible mechanisms for participation (ANC 1992). Relating this 
specifically to the system of local government, the suggested options include: “People`s 
assemblies to debate issues of major significance to that town, city or rural area; Local 
government sub-committees with outside representation to consult on specific policy areas; 
and Local government commissions to conduct public hearings and to consider submissions 
from outside interests on proposed local government activities” (ibid.). It also emphasised 
the need for concerted and targeted efforts to bring women into decision-making (ibid.).  
However, although the local government proposals opened by affirming that “Local 
government will bring government closer to the people and actively involve them in 
decision-making and planning processes which affect them”, the aforementioned 
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mechanisms are described, not as structures for control or partnership but for advice and 
consultation (ibid). Using Arnstein’s phraseology, there is “no assurance that citizen 
concerns and ideas will be taken into account” (1969: 219). Instead, ‘consultation’ may 
serve merely as evidence for powerholders “that they have gone through the required 
motions of involving ‘those people’” (ibid.). Therefore, while ‘Ready to Govern’ went further 
than the Constitutional Guidelines in suggesting specific structures, it still did not get to 
grips with how democracy could be ‘deepened’ beyond a form of consultation. One also 
wonders whether the ANC’s vision of a strong central state with adequate powers to effect 
development alongside the decentralisation of certain powers for purposes of participatory 
democracy proved difficult to reconcile. 
4.2.2. The Idea of ‘Civil Society’ as the Domain of People’s Power 
Within the ANC’s proposals on local government, there were indications of linking 
participatory democracy, not only to subordinate state structures but to organisations of 
civil society. The ANC’s democratic thinking by 1990 had been penetrated by a civil society 
discourse that had become prominent amongst both radical and liberal democrats globally, 
partly for different reasons (Glaser 1997: 5, 8). The role of civil society organisations in 
toppling the ruling regimes in Eastern Europe during the late 1980s, and discovery of the 
extent of human rights abuses in the former socialist states, reinforced global acceptance of 
the importance of an active and autonomous civil society to the transition and consolidation 
of democracy. For those on the Left it also connected participatory structures directly to civil 
society. 
Although the ANC had begun to articulate a view of local government as the domain of 
participatory democracy, from 1990 civil society also came to be understood as a forum for 
citizen engagement in political issues. Indeed, with the unbanning of political organisations 
in February 1990, the documents of the MDM produced a much clearer distinction between 
the proposed structures of new local government and the civil society sphere. During the 
early 1990s, the ANC itself asserted the need for both the constitutional protection of 
institutions of civil society and their importance to “a deep and thorough democratic order” 
(ANC 1992). Given that the 1980s discourse of the liberation movement had not made a 
clear separation between popular and movement structures, Glaser argues that recognition 
of the value of an autonomous civil society constituted “a remarkable democratic advance” 
(1997: 11).  
It is also of note, however, that as the lexicon of ‘people’s power’ died out in the ANC’s 
policy discourse, it began to appear more manifestly in the discourse of civil society. Going 
into the 1990s, ‘people’s power’, as Eastern Cape civic leader Guglie Nkwinti described, was 
a ‘civic activity’: something that needed to be built by civil society (cited in Collinge 1991: 1). 
Activist Lechesa Tsenoli, who was involved in the formation of SANCO, remarked that 
SANCO had a slogan which said that it was fighting for “‘genuine democratic engagement of 
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people in decision-making’ … to give people a sense of the value of being involved in the 
decision making processes” (Interview: 11 March 2013). Participatory democracy as an 
institutional mechanism had become linked to the sphere of local government. The baton of 
‘people’s power’, however, was picked up by civil society. 
4.2.2.1. Autonomous Representatives 
Discussion of the role of civic and sectorial organisations was of course wrapped up in the 
question of the UDF’s future. In 1990 a decision was taken to disband the UDF, proposing 
instead the erection of a national civic organisation which would come about a year later 
with the formation of SANCO. As noted in Chapter 4, the UDF ceded the role of political 
organisation to the ANC as the rightful vanguard. Thus, while the ANC focused on 
constitutional negotiation and the broader political framework, people’s power became 
located more clearly amongst civic, sectoral and other popular organisations as 
representatives of their constituents, autonomous from political organisations and the 
state. Defence of the civics’ independence appears to have been the dominant position 
within the civic and UDF camp (UDF 1991). A 1990 discussion paper of the UDF set out the 
role of civics in the transition: 
“Civil society includes all organisations outside politics and the state who 
represent specific sectors of people in society. Examples include trade 
unions, civics, student organisation, rural peoples organisations (sic). Civics 
therefore will be independent organisations representing their 
constituency, even in a situation where there is democratic government, 
they should continue to be watchdogs for the community and not become 
part of the local government structure. It is within this context that we say 
that civics are a crucial part of civil society. They will be key in giving power 
to the people and building real democracy by involving all the people in 
the development process" (UDF 1990b). 
The civics, alongside other residential and sectoral organisations, would occupy an 
autonomous space, acting as both a ‘counterweight’ to the state and a forum for 
participatory democracy (Glaser 1997: 5-10). For the UDF, civil society thus incorporated 
both liberal and radical democratic perspectives. A 1991 memorandum of the UDF, ANC and 
Border Civics Congress on restructuring local government in the Ciskei went further in 
elaborating the envisaged relationship between state and civil society: 
“A clear distinction needs to be made between the structures of 
government and the structures of civil society … the most important way 
in which we can the ensure the future accountability of local government 
is through the operation of strong and dynamic residents' associations, 
which build a cooperative but critical relationship with the local authority. 
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It is important for the entrenchment of democracy that civic organisations 
representing the interests of the community remain outside the direct 
structures of government. Residents associations should play a watchdog 
role as regards the institutions of government” (UDF - Border 1991: 2). 
A key part of this debate as it relates to participatory democracy was the need for civics to 
retain autonomy from political parties, while allowing them the flexibility to support 
particular programmes or organisations where they saw fit (Collinge 1991: 2). In 1990 the 
UDF emphasised that “even in a situation where there is democratic government, they 
[civics] should continue to be watchdogs for the community and not become part of the 
local government structure” (UDF 1990b). There was thus recognition amongst UDF and 
civic activists that even under conditions of democracy (including an elected ANC 
government), "government policy may not always meet the aspirations of the residents” 
(Conference: Developing Civic Unity, 1991). Having said that, the fundamental link between 
local material grievances and the national political system perhaps limited the extent to 
which the civic agenda could remain distinct from political programmes. Although civics saw 
themselves as adopting a ‘civil society’ space, by virtue of their role in local negotiations 
around urban governance, Ottaway points out that they were partly stepping into local 
government shoes (1993: 123-4). 
Some within the civics cautioned that their historic alignment with the ANC would implicitly 
limit their autonomy. Based on the experience of Communist Eastern Europe and post-
independence Africa, some activists were alert to the danger of civil society groups being 
crushed or co-opted by the state (Coleman Interview: 20 February 2013; Coovadia 
Interview: 28 May 2013). At the same time, the ease with which civic autonomy could be 
accomplished was perhaps taken for granted. Coovadia noted that from 1990 there was a 
concentration on re-building ANC structures (Interview: 28 May 2013). Whether or not that 
approach had been correct, he added that:  
“We all felt that the ANC as a party will be able to actually build structures, 
will be able to maintain those structures and that to a certain extent there 
would be a distance between those structures and the ANC-in-government 
… It was assumed that would be the case; and that we would do things a 
bit differently to other liberation movements when they went into 
government but unfortunately we didn’t” (ibid.). 
Some disagreement surfaced around the choice by SANCO’s leadership to adopt a unitary 
organisational structure. The civic movement was comprised of a variety of individual local 
organisations across the country and, given their differing contexts and priorities, might 
have best been organised as a federation. A unitary structure required that individual civics 
become branches of SANCO, and appears to have been linked to the ANC’s push for a 
unitary state (Mayekiso Interview: 8 April 2013; Botha Interview: 14 April 2014). According 
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to Swilling, the ANC’s rejection of a federal structure for South Africa itself resulted 
nonsensically in the discrediting of federalism in its entirety, regardless of its applicability to 
the civic movement (Interview 20 February 2013) - a decision which some suggest 
contributed ultimately to SANCO’s ineffectiveness (Mashatile, Interview: 21 February 2013; 
Swilling, Interview: 20 February 2013). 
Feeding into debates about participation was the potential for creating spaces in which civil 
society and state could interact. Although the policy formulation around such spaces in local 
government only began in earnest after 1996, discussion of possible structures for engaging 
civil society were raised during the transition period. As a movement/party, the ANC itself 
began to make some statements on this. Most discussion, however, appears to have been 
taking place amongst civics activists and sympathetic NGOs and advisors.  
The ANC’s 1992 policy guidelines for a democratic South Africa stated:  
 “The ANC believes that all legislative and executive power at the local 
level must be constitutionally vested in elected structures. In order to 
deepen democracy and ensure grassroots participation in the organs of 
government, the ANC believes that all organs of civil society, such as 
civic/residents associations, trade unions, traditional leaders, business 
organizations, cultural organisations, women`s organisations, religious 
groups, and other interest groups, need to be given the scope to influence 
the process of government” (ANC 1992).  
Its 1992 Draft Policy on Local Government also asserted that “while elected LG structures 
would hold power, there would also be room for civil society to influence local government 
through people’s assemblies, commissions and appeal boards” (cited in Cullinan, 1992: 7). 
The movement thus envisaged that some form of assembly or committee structure would 
facilitate citizen influence in decision-making. As participatory democracy became 
associated with local government it thus also became linked to a shared democratic space 
or ‘participatory sphere’, as Cornwall (et al) define it, comprising “a distinct arena at the 
interface of state and society” (2007: 1).  
During the latter part of the 1980s, the ANC had recognised the need to begin preparatory 
work on local government, and in 1989-9087 commissioned research by both technical 
experts and its own cadres culminating in an ANC-Centre for Development Studies (CDS) 
National Consultative Conference on Local Government in October 1990. In 1991, the CDS 
published the papers from the conference in a booklet on ‘Local Government and Planning 
for a Democratic South Africa’. As part of this research, proposals were formulated which 
drew on models for local participatory forums and, despite suspicions as to the state’s 
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incentives, the ANC also acknowledged the benefits of decentralisation for both democracy 
and efficiency (Skweyiya 1990: 137).  
At the conference, civic activist and ANC cadre Thozamile Botha produced a paper in which 
he proposed the idea of ‘people’s assemblies’, a model in fitting with Cornwall’s concept of 
the participatory sphere. Botha described the model of a people’s assembly as: “an open 
forum convened by the civics and attended by all elected representatives of state 
institutions, community organisations, sectoral interest groups and service organisations” 
(1991: 21). The idea of a people’s assembly seems to have been promoted at the ANC 
conference and was hailed as a model for civics to engage with the interim and democratic 
state going forward.  
Importantly, the assembly it was not a structure of local government itself but a structure 
for democratically engaging with it (Botha 1991 and Interview: 14 April 2014).  Botha cited 
two cases (Haarlem in the Western Cape and Alice in the Ciskei) where the local civic had 
taken over the running of the local authority, “[appointing] people within their own 
structures to run the councils while it, the civic, remains outside as a watchdog” (1991: 21). 
As he explained it, “these councils are accountable to the community through the civic 
structures. In essence, the civics have become local people’s assemblies where all issues 
affecting the community are discussed and the councillors are mandated to implement 
them” [emphasis added] (ibid.).  
What Botha appears to have envisaged is some form of non-partisan assembly that would 
“create fora or forums that would give people, both the state and the public, a platform 
through which to debate issues that affect them. So there would be a structure or a 
structured way of reporting to the state and the state feeding back to the people” 
(Interview: 13 April 2014). As such, civic organisations would not replace local government 
but would occupy an institutionalised space for engaging with it. The conference also 
appears to have discussed the introduction of a ‘Local Government Charter’ which would 
include the “basic principles” by which such a people’s assembly would be guided. This 
would include, “among other things a set of principles to guide a democratic local authority 
and to ensure grassroots participation in decision-making” (Botha 1991: 22). Botha 
emphasised the need for such a structure to prevent exclusion and involve people who are 
not organised in formal structures (ibid.: 23).  
What is not clear is the extent to which such an assembly would provide for decision-making 
powers. Botha seems to suggest that its key role would be one of oversight through 
monitoring government performance and delivery and holding it to account over 
commitments made (Interview: 14 April 2014). Either way, the idea of creating some form 
of assembly at the interface of state and society appears to have been considered as early as 
1990. The civic movement also envisaged a part for itself in formulating such proposals and 
developing ways for civil society to contribute to and shape the development process (UDF 
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1991). Researcher, Doreen Atkinson, at the time combined the idea of such a participatory 
assembly with participatory planning theory, citing the need to move away from “technicist 
and exclusive” planning processes toward greater levels of popular participation. The 
models for participation which she suggested included participation “in the planning 
activities of the local municipal bureaucracy itself” (1992: 52). 
For some activists who worked with civics in a support and advice capacity, the process of 
civic organisation and local negotiation itself provided a model for future state-civil society 
relations. Mark Swilling explained that some participants had viewed the Central 
Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber not as a transitional structure but as a longer-term 
participatory assembly which would continue after the election of a democratic 
government. He remarked: “- there was a strong feeling that once we’d established a 
metropolitan government for Johannesburg, the metropolitan chamber – the forum – 
would continue as a parallel structure, [and] should continue to meet” (Swilling Interview: 
20 February 2013).  
In promoting the model of the assembly there thus emerged some dispute as to who 
legitimately ‘represented’ communities. Through the establishment of local level 
negotiations, a tension surfaced between civics’ support for elected democratic government 
and the belief that they themselves effectively represented constituents. Also referring to 
the Metropolitan Chamber, civic activist Cas Coovadia remarked on the degree of strain 
between the ANC and civics over the leeway of the latter to negotiate on their own terms: 
“[R]ightly or wrongly, I think the ANC sort of took the view that, look, in 
many ways you guys were fronting for us; we’re now unbanned, we take 
over. We said hold on a second; there’s history here, there’s processes, 
there’s relationships built, and so on and so on. And it was towards the 
end of ’91, I think, that I left because of those clashes”. (Interview: 28 May 
2013). 
Mark Swilling made a similar point about the civics’ representivity but in a way more 
reminiscent of Castells’ urban social movements. Just as Castells understood urban social 
movements as fundamental agents of transformation, “ideologically untainted by political 
party programmes” (Lowe 1986: 35), so Swilling88 argued that “The civics were social 
movements in the true sense. They were not guided or goaded by an imposed political 
agenda, nor were they constitutionally compelled to apply the programmes of national 
organisations” (Jacobs 1992: 24). His view touched again on the value of their autonomy. 
This perhaps also highlighted a conceptual disconnect between movement leaders returning 
from exile (where a more Marxist-Leninist understanding of participation predominated) 
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and the democratic socialist and New Left traditions that shaped the discourse of activists at 
home. 
Through the creation of a state-society interface, a ‘participatory space’ between state 
and society, the very notion that ‘the people shall govern’ is given institutional form. At 
the same time, however, it is burdened with conceptual discord between the ANC-as-
vanguard and civics-as-representatives. AYCO and UDF leader, Paul Mashatile noted that, 
although the ANC was committed to the principle of independent civil society organisations, 
“[on] the question of how you work with them post-the unbanning of the ANC, we thought 
because the ANC is a broad church we should be able to continue to mobilise all these other 
forces behind us” (Interview: 21 February 2013). The continuing tension between top-down 
direction and bottom-up initiative is picked up again in Chapter six.  
Just as MDM activists during the 1980s drew on a variety of ideas and influences so, too, did 
their thinking after 1990 not exist in a conceptual vacuum. As such, although those with a 
history of organisation and activism at home often pushed for a greater role for civil society 
and popular participation, it would be inaccurate to attribute this view only, or indeed 
uniformly, to those from the MDM. In 1991 at the ANC’s first national conference since its 
unbanning, senior cadres from both the external and domestic wings of the ANC were 
integrated into the NEC. Sydney Mufamadi, for example, who was a founding member of 
COSATU and Transvaal Secretary of the UDF, as well as having been a member of the ANC 
underground, joined the ANC NEC in 1991 and was a delegate of the SACP at CODESA. He 
noted the continuing influence of the principle of people’s power post-1990 but also alluded 
to it belonging to a particular era. For him, the question of its ongoing applicability had to be 
considered in context: 
“So the four of us can be in some committee that emerged in 
circumstances where it became necessary for a committee to form. The 
four of us are serving in this committee. It does not mean that if we do 
something that is considered useful today we can remain in this 
committee in twenty years’ time and be relevant to the challenges of then 
… [the principles of people’s power] also have to be adapted to the 
evolving situation, so there is always the tension - constant tension - 
between comparability and contextuality” (Interview: 26 November 2012). 
If, as Mufamadi argues, we are to look at such structures in context then, while in 
comparison to the MDM, we might see the ANC’s more limited emphasis on 
institutionalising people’s power as suggestion of a weaker commitment to citizen control, it 
also signifies a separation of government and civil society critical to the foundation of 
democracy. The ANC’s proposals on local government emphasised that, although civil 
society participation would be provided for, power must rest with democratically elected 
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structures (ANC 1995c; ANC 1992). As such, there was a democratic premise for its 
proposals.  
On this point, Glaser (1997) has criticised the Left in South Africa for historically conceiving 
of civil society in collective terms. Emphasising its inherently pluralistic character, he states 
that civil society is not a “collective subject or alternative sovereign”, nor does it have a 
“popular mandate” (ibid.: 16). Yet in some ways the UDF and civics’ own identity was 
potentially hegemonic in aspiration - presuming that, as “a broad based grassroots 
movement”, everyone would be able to “find a home irrespective of political affiliation or 
lack of political affiliation” (UDF 1991). Just as alarm bells should sound with the suggestion 
that the ANC receive constitutional protection, so should we be concerned at what Glaser 
describes as the “constitutional elevation of particular organisations as representatives of 
sections of society” (1997: 22). While many in the MDM came to see civil society as the 
domain of people’s power in a democratic South Africa, if divorced from elected institutions 
this was itself not entirely unproblematic.    
4.3. Conclusion 
The period between 1986 and 1996 encompassed a codification of the ANC’s ideas about 
democracy. This chapter has sought to document this process, with a focus on its 
commitments to and conceptualisation of participatory democracy. It is possible to see that 
the ANC’s discussion of participatory democracy from 1986 was approached within a 
framework of constitutionalism and local government, becoming linked more formally to 
the notion that ‘the people shall govern’.  
It has also been argued, however, that constitutional discussion in the ANC occurred as a 
discrete process, distinct both organisationally and intellectually from the phenomenon of 
people’s power. In stark contrast to the ideas informing the latter, the Constitutional 
Committee’s work became increasingly shaped by the legal fraternity and human rights 
discourse. What took place was a merging of radical and liberal democratic traditions which 
continued to shape the ANC’s ideas about democracy after 1990.  
Although the formal process of policy formulation on the new local government model did 
not commence until after 1996, the civic movement and activists at home had already 
begun to feed into local negotiations their ideas about participation. Amongst this 
contingent, additional currents were influential, including trade unionism, community 
activism, progressive planning and participatory development. Linking in with these 
discussions was a discourse of civil society. This placed emphasis not only on the importance 
of an autonomous civic realm but on civil society as an arena for the exercise of people’s 
power.  
While the early 1990s produced the beginning of discussions about how to provide for 
citizen participation, it also brought to the surface a conceptual discord: between civics’ 
historic allegiance to the ANC and desire for a new autonomy; and between the ANC’s role 
178 
 
as vanguard of the people and the civics as representatives of communities. The unresolved 
tension between these strands is taken up in the final chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Participatory Democracy and Formulation of Post-1994 Policy 
 
“Although it can be argued that the Burkean89 form of representative 
democracy is most appropriate to the scale of modern life and is most 
conducive to efficiency, it carries the risk of alienating the broader 
citizenship from the process of government. Where people believe they 
have limited power to influence, they lose faith in the electoral system and 
in the checks and balances that regulate the use of power. If democracy is 
about involving people in the decisions that affect their lives, the challenge 
for modern governments is to seek a balance between efficiency and 
effective administration on the one hand, and accountability and public 
participation on the other” (Parliament of South Africa, 2001). 
 
Although not established as a constitutional right, South Africa’s final Constitution provided 
a framework for participatory democracy alongside representative democratic government. 
The Parliament of South Africa’s ‘Review of Public Participation in the Law and Policy-
Making Process’ asserts that “public participation processes strengthen and further 
democratise the institutions of representative democracy. Participatory democracy is not 
necessarily a new or different form of democracy, but a strengthening or expansion of 
formal representative democracy to include greater levels of participation by civil society” 
(2001). The detail, design and implementation of such a system are determined in national 
legislation.  
It was identified in the previous chapter that by the late 1980s the ANC envisaged 
participatory democracy as being located primarily in the sphere of local government. 
Drawing on the principles set out in Chapter 7 of the Constitution, between 1997 and 2001 a 
series of policy documents were developed to design a new system of local government. 
Policy and legislation centred on the notion of ‘Developmental Local Government’ (DLG), a 
model shaped in part by the ANC’s broader development vision. After 1994, the 
participatory democratic discourse of the ANC also found a home in the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) which situated citizen participation not only in the local 
government arena but in the development process as a whole.  
This chapter examines the intellectual and theoretical influences on the post-1994 policy 
discourse of participatory democracy. It shows the amalgamation of theoretical currents 
which shape how participation is understood and practiced, linking this to broader 
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 Here, the document refers to political philosopher Edmund Burke who argued that elected representatives 
could “exercise independent judgement” during the policy and law making processes (cited in Held 1996). As 
such, Burke’s understanding of representation was one of trusteeship. 
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intellectual and development trends. It identifies traditions of radical democracy, 
participatory development and planning, performance management and international best 
practice. The chapter goes on to set out the various mechanisms of institutionalised 
participation. Particular attention is given to the local government ward committee as the 
mechanism located at the centre of participatory governance. However, it also examines 
sector-specific forums for participation, as well as mechanisms for public participation in the 
national and provincial government spheres. The final part of the chapter deals thematically 
with the ideas and conceptions of participation that these structures entail, reflecting on the 
extent to which they fulfil their legislative objectives and represent mechanisms for citizen 
participation in decision-making.   
5.1. Participatory Democracy as Principle 
“Democracy for ordinary citizens must not end with formal rights and 
periodic one-person, one-vote elections. Without undermining the 
authority and responsibilities of elected representative bodies (the national 
assembly, provincial legislatures, local government), the democratic order 
we envisage must foster a wide range of institutions of participatory 
democracy in partnership with civil society on the basis of informed and 
empowered citizens (e.g. the various sectoral forums like the National 
Economic Forum) and facilitate direct democracy (people`s forums, 
referenda where appropriate, and other consultation processes)” (ANC 
1994a: 2). 
Documents from the proceedings of the Constitutional Assembly between 1994 and 1996 
suggest general agreement amongst the negotiating parties on the democratic ideal of 
popular participation in government between elections. The constitution-making process 
which itself involved the conduct of public events, hearings, meetings and education 
programmes also indicated a desire for popular input. However, according to a 
supplementary report to one of the Assembly’s theme committees, it remained unclear as 
to what was meant by ‘participatory democracy’, the “forms this should take”, and 
“whether it should be entrenched in the constitution” (CA TC1: 28 February 1995).  
In the end, the Constitution made provision for participatory democracy, stating that all 
spheres of government must “make rules and orders concerning its business, with due 
regard to representative and participatory democracy, accountability, transparency and 
public involvement” (RSA 1996: Sections 57.1, 70.1 and 116.1). This principle was articulated 
most extensively in relation to local government. However the constitution provided neither 
a definition of the term ‘participatory democracy’, nor did it stipulate the mechanisms 
through which it would be achieved. Much of this policy debate took place over the years 
subsequent to 1996. It was not until the Local Government White Paper in 1998 that a 
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policy position on citizen participation was formally articulated and, in 2000, the new 
system of local government introduced.  
The ANC’s 1994 policy stance on reconstruction and development, however, had already 
articulated the centrality of participatory democracy and citizen empowerment to socio-
economic development. The 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
represented perhaps the earliest expression of the ANC’s position (as a party of 
government) on the role of participatory democracy. It touched on themes of 
empowerment, citizenship, state-society partnership and people-centred development. In 
the same year the RDP was translated into a White Paper on Reconstruction and 
Development, which in turn informed the drafting of the White Paper on Local Government 
(Everatt et al 2010: 224). Many themes contained in the RDP were carried forward into local 
government policy.  
5.2. Participatory Democracy in the Restructuring of Local Government 
A foundational principle of the RDP was the notion of ‘people-driven’ development: a 
process in which citizens are not merely recipients but also key actors and agents. The RDP 
stated that “Development is not about the delivery of goods to a passive citizenry. It is 
about active involvement and growing empowerment” (ANC 1994a: 5). The policy also 
reiterated the ANC’s position on the need for participatory as well as representative 
institutions, stating that “Democracy for ordinary citizens must not end with formal rights 
and periodic one-person, one-vote elections ... the democratic order we envisage must 
foster a wide range of institutions of participatory democracy in partnership with civil society 
on the basis of informed and empowered citizens …” [emphasis added] (ibid.: 120-1).  
Fulfilment of citizen needs, moreover, was seen as being both reliant on popular energies 
and on a partnership between state and society. The RDP spoke not only about the 
institutions of governance but about fostering the development of NGOs, social movements 
and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and enabling organs of civil society to influence 
policy making (ANC 1994a). The RDP also envisaged local government as playing a critical 
role in realising the RDP’s vision. Not only was it acknowledged to be “the level of 
representative democracy closest to the people” but it also stated that “Local authority 
administrations should be structured in such a way as to ensure maximum participation of 
civil society and communities in decision-making and developmental initiatives of local 
authorities” (ibid.). Chapter Seven of the constitution itself entrenched this vision, requiring 
that local authorities “encourage the involvement of communities and community 
organisations in the matters of local government” (RSA 1996: Chapter 7; Section 152).  
The fact that the constitution established local government as its own ‘sphere’ also 
reinforced the centrality of its development role. Andrew Boraine explained that local 
government was established not as a “creature of statute” of national or provincial 
government but became its own sphere with decentralised responsibilities (Interview 21 
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May 2013). Through the development of further policy on local government, municipalities 
would become key agents of both development and democracy. In a publication of the 
Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), then Minister Sydney Mufamadi 
remarked that: “When we introduced the new system of local government in 2000, we 
correctly positioned this as the sphere of government that is best placed to give practical 
meaning and substance to the basic political commitment, that the People Shall Govern” 
(DPLG & GTZ 2005a: foreword). Participatory democracy in local government was linked 
once again to the traditions of the Freedom Charter. 
The development of more detail around participatory democracy was not picked up in 
earnest until the commencement of the Local Government White Paper process. Ottaway 
notes that, in South Africa, local government was a more important part of political 
transition than it had been elsewhere. Because South Africa’s towns and cities had been set 
up deliberately by the apartheid state for the purposes of separate development, regime 
change required the restructuring of the entire system (1993: 130). The complete overhaul 
and (in rural areas) the introduction of local government thus occupied policy makers and 
advisors during the stage of constitutional negotiation. The Local Government Transition Act 
(LGTA) in 1993 was also somewhat of a holding operation, providing interim arrangements 
for the functioning of local authorities in the run up to the 1995 local government elections.  
The reform of local government as a whole was a sensitive topic. With the restructuring of 
municipal boundaries, all previously ‘white’ local authorities were affected and the new 
system would require not only the negotiation of a new tax base for each municipality but 
agreement on their powers and functions. As such, detail around participatory democracy in 
the Constitutional Assembly was kept to minimum. Andrew Boraine, who was part of both 
the constitutional negotiations and the NLGNF, remarked:  
“The first thing was to get new structures in place, to get legitimacy into 
the system. And that’s to be in the principle of one-person, one-vote based 
on the new [municipal] boundaries ... So you’re not talking so much about 
participation … You have to get the system right first before you come to 
issues of participation because you can’t participate in an illegitimate 
system” (Interview: 21 May 2013). 
Dominique Wooldridge, a member of the editorial team for the Local Government White 
Paper, also emphasised that before issues of participation or decentralisation could be 
broached, the white paper committee focused on structural issues and the ‘one city, one tax 
base’ campaign in particular (Interview: 12 March 2013). Closely related to concerns about 
municipal capacity and resources was the issue of local economic development. It was 
through this strand of the discussion, centred on the role of the local state in development, 
that citizen participation became located. The idea of local economic development was an 
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important inspiration for the white paper’s central vision of ‘developmental local 
government’. 
5.3. ‘Developmental Local Government’: Intellectual Traditions and Influences 
“Developmental local government is local government committed to 
working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable 
ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the 
quality of their lives.” (RSA 1998a: section B.1). 
This section analyses the intellectual traditions and influences on ‘developmental local 
government’ (DLG), with a focus on those policy components encouraging public 
participation. DLG, as set out in the White Paper on Local Government, is described as 
having four interrelated characteristics: maximising social development and economic 
growth; integrating and coordinating; democratising development; and leading and learning 
(ibid.). It is in the section on democratising development that the paper states: “Municipal 
Councils play a central role in promoting local democracy. In addition to representing 
community interests within the Council, municipal councillors should promote the 
involvement of citizens and community groups in the design and delivery of municipal 
programmes” (ibid.: section B.1.3).  
The White Paper re-emphasised the RDP’s spirit of people-driven development, endorsing a 
view of citizens as not only voters and consumers but also participants in the policy process 
(RSA 1998a). It also introduced the idea of the ward committee to facilitate “local 
community participation in decisions which affect the local community” (ibid.: section 
D.2.3.3). The ideas introduced in the White Paper found legislative expression in the 1998 
Municipal Structures Act and the 2000 Municipal Systems Act. The former required 
municipalities to develop mechanisms for consulting communities, referring specifically to 
the establishment of ward committees (RSA 1998b). The Municipal Structures Act then 
called for “a culture of municipal governance”, combining “formal representative 
government (that is elected leaders) with a system of participatory governance (that is 
community participation)” (RSA 2000). In 2005, Guidelines for the Establishment and 
Operation of Municipal Ward Committees (DPLG 2005b) were also published to be read in 
conjunction with the Systems Act. 
A variety of influences diffused the discussions which produced this legislation. Policy 
makers drew on both the traditions born of South Africa’s own history and on development 
and policy trends gaining ground internationally. Parnell and Pieterse describe DLG as 
representing “a fusion of local and global visions about how to achieve sustainable 
democratic urban government” (1999: 82). Importantly, these multiple currents have 
generated both conceptual tensions as well as complementarities.  
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5.3.1. Historic Traditions of Popular Participation 
The commitment of the ANC government to participatory democracy is partly a result of its 
longstanding tradition of mass organisation. Chapter two of this thesis located the ANC’s 
origins as a mass movement in the 1950s, following efforts by the ANC Youth League to 
develop a mass membership. The post-1976 period, and the 1980s in particular, formed 
perhaps the most pivotal period in mass movement politics, with the rise of the civic 
movement and UDF, as well as the consolidation of a strong independent trade union 
movement. People’s power, in particular - as both a theory and practice - continued after 
1990 to provide a frame of reference for the ANC and MDM in their conceptualisation of 
democracy. Chapter Three discussed in detail the ideas informing the people’s power 
discourse. 
Differences within the ANC camp over the extent to which people’s power represented 
rudimentary principles rather than a pre-figurative system became perhaps more 
distinguishable after 1994 as policy makers grappled with giving legislative and practical 
expression to the ethos of popular power. Historic ideas and expectations of community 
participation in development permeated policy discussion. This was often attributable to 
the actors involved. Many of those who participated in developing and implementing local 
government policy cut their teeth in the UDF, civic, trade union and student movements. 
Andrew Boraine, a former UDF activist involved in the Local Government White Paper, 
remarked on the inspiration for the policy’s participatory elements:  
“I think all of us that were writing this stuff or involved in implementing it 
had been involved to a greater or lesser extent in organs of people’s 
power, civic organisation, student movements, etc. That was the tradition. 
So I mean we didn’t really need to go to other countries … I mean 
obviously there were study tours but generally we drew on … the post-
1976 experience. So that was out era; that was our point of reference” 
(Interview: 21 May 2013).  
Although policy makers undertook overseas visits from South Africa to look at other local 
government models, in terms of ideas about citizen participation these were, according to 
Boraine, of “secondary importance”. While international models provided lessons in other 
respects, he reflected that “participation was more from our own ranks” (ibid.). A 1995 
Constitutional Assembly document on the constitutional principles relating to local 
government observed that: “historically there has been a long tradition and demand for 
local government to be participatory by allowing for the participation of the communities 
that they govern” (Advisors to the Ad Hoc Committee on Local Government 1995). 
Several post-1994 government Ministers with roots in the trade union and civic movements 
referred to contemporary structures for citizen participation, including ward committees, 
Community Policing Forums, and School Governing Bodies - discussed in the sections below 
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- as being akin or having links to the 1980s organs of people’s power (Mashatile Interview: 
21 February 2013; Carrim Interview: 16 January 2013; Tsenoli Interview: 11 March 2013). 
Others went back further, linking the commitment to participatory democracy to the 
Freedom Charter’s demand that ‘the people shall govern’ (Botha Interview: April 2014; 
Mufamadi Interview November 2012).  
Ideas informing public policy on participation also echo the ANC’s historic belief in the 
inadequacy of representative democracy, a principle advocated clearly in the discourse of 
people’s power. Former Soweto civic activist and trade unionist, Amos Masondo, who in 
2001 became the Mayor of Johannesburg, commented on this tradition historically: “The 
notion was that democracy would not mean much if it doesn’t involve people and people 
directly. There was a notion obviously that you can’t all be in parliament, in a legislature, 
and therefore you have to elect some people to represent you but that you would not cede 
all your power and your mandate to them” (Interview: 13 March 2013). He also referred to 
the expectation “that effort or steps would always be taken to ensure that the notion of 
participatory democracy and local organs remained a reality” (ibid).  
Others in the ANC-aligned movement were more vehement in their assessment, 
interpreting people’s power as both a pre-figurative and superior form of democracy. The 
discourse of UDF ideologues which became prominent in the Front’s official publications 
advanced a unitary and direct form of democracy. This rejected pluralistic and liberal ideas 
and rooted itself, rather, in the promise of united action and mass discipline in providing 
direct popular control. Given the civic and trade union background of those involved in 
drafting the RDP, it seems likely that the document drew on some of these ideas. The RDP 
asserted both the role of community organisations in the struggle against apartheid and the 
programme’s foundations in the principle of participatory democracy: “that people who are 
affected by decisions must take part in making those decisions” (ANC 1994a).  
Through exploring the various influences which shaped people’s power, Chapter Three 
identified a discourse amongst the UDF and civics which highlighted its empowering 
potential. Through the act of people taking control of their own lives, activists highlighted 
democracy’s developmental and transformative role. The importance of popular 
empowerment was subsequently emphasised in the RDP, which asserted that 
“Development is not about the delivery of goods to a passive citizenry. It is about active 
involvement and growing empowerment” (ANC 1994a). The Local Government White Paper 
similarly made reference to “democratising development, empowering and redistributing” 
(RSA 1998a), although its focus was arguably more on empowerment through social and 
economic development than through democracy per se.  
Also pertinent to popular democratic traditions is the ANC’s largely unitary view of 
democracy. Critics of the participatory tradition have sometimes highlighted its tendency to 
view popular interest in collective terms - an approach which, they argue, seeks to eradicate 
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the difference and conflict constitutive of democracy. Others contend that participatory 
democracy can be used as a smokescreen to disguise decisions already taken by dominant 
groups (Glaser 1991: 103; Glaser 2007); or to suppress disagreement and individual rights in 
the interests of a ‘higher’ form of democracy (Glaser 1991: 105, 109). Such a collective 
conception of ‘the people’, however, is not specific to traditions of the ANC. It has been 
viewed as a weakness of radical democracy generally. The danger that participatory forums 
can sometimes reinforce existing inequalities, or become dominated by the interests of a 
few, has been highlighted by democratic and development theorists alike (Cornwall & 
Coelho 2007; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Mansbridge 1983).  
It is also associated with a view of representative democracy and its concomitant features as 
at best inadequate and at worst surplus to requirements. While people’s power provided 
rudimentary principles, as well as a model for the structures by which popular power might 
be realised, by the close of the 1980s many of its democratic deficits remained unresolved. 
These included questions of its collective nature, a lack of representivity, limited political 
pluralism and an absence of mechanisms to guarantee the equal access of all to participate.  
5.3.2. Radical Democratic Theory 
Speaking to and linking in with the tradition of popular participation is a radical view of 
democracy that goes beyond participation in elections to include direct, popular 
involvement. The people’s power structures of the 1980s, for many of their participants, 
constituted grassroots structures of decision-making. Their mode of organisation drew both 
on practices of community organisation and activism, and on models of trade union 
organising. This radical democratic tradition remains partly visible in post-1994 policy in 
which participatory governance continues to be understood as a necessary supplement to 
representative democracy.  
Former Deputy Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA)90, Yunus 
Carrim remarked of the 2000 Municipal Systems Act that: “Alone in that Act you can see 
both state organs based on democracy plus the idea that democracy means more than just 
voting once every five years. It means active participation in shaping your life” (Interview: 16 
January 2013). The South African Local Government Association’s (SALGA) Councillor 
Induction Programme also explains participatory democracy as being “where citizens have 
the right not only to elect their representatives, but to participate actively in government 
decision-making” (SALGA & GTZ 2006: 49).  
The RDP itself was also rooted in this ethos, reflecting, as Maree points out, the influence of 
COSATU’s ideas about democracy (1998: 30, 33). Individuals involved in producing the RDP 
included the UDF’s Cheryl Carolus and the trade union leaders Alex Erwin and Jay Naidoo 
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 In 2009 the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) was renamed Cooperative Governance 
and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA). 
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(Stewart 1997: 5). According to Heller and Ntolonkulu, SANCO also “had a role in shaping 
the RDP chapter on housing” (2001: 13). Notably, the document illustrated the Left’s 
concern with social and economic empowerment as vital to the creation of politically 
empowered citizens. The RDP stated that: “Deepening democracy in our society is not only 
about various governmental and non-governmental institutions. Effective democracy 
implies and requires empowered citizens. Formal rights must be given real substance. All of 
the social and economic issues (like job creation, housing and education) addressed in 
previous chapters of the RDP are directly related to empowering our people as citizens” 
(ANC 1994a).  
As identified in the preceding chapters, in addition to the influence of the independent 
trade union movement and its intellectuals, ideas about participatory democracy were also 
influenced by the 1980s generation of progressive NGOs. After 1994, a great number of 
these organisations continued to influence and shape local government policy, and included 
prominent NGOs such as Planact, the Urban Sector Network, Corplan and Idasa, all of whom 
were involved in providing expertise and technical advice. Individuals from Planact had of 
course already been influential in the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber.  
It is of note that much of the DPLG’s recent hand- and resource books for councillors and 
ward committees have been compiled by NGOs such as Idasa, the Electoral Institute for 
Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) and Afesis-Corplan.91 However, while there is a clear 
influence of this sector, it is not clear to what extent it predominates in the discourse as a 
whole. The language and emphasis of the DPLG’s resources differ from base policy 
documents such as the Local Government White Paper and, indeed, from the language used 
by the ANC in its own party publications. On the one hand, it is appropriate that this be the 
case: the DPLG guidance has a targeted audience and is designed to be accessible to local 
councillors, municipal officials and ward committee members. In addition to explaining 
concepts, it provides practical guidelines, ideas and suggestions for implementation, as 
opposed to merely a theoretical framework.  
Yet the language is also different in another sense. In addition to being user-friendly, the 
guidance documents compiled by NGOs put a greater emphasis on the empowering 
potential of democracy, referring to aspects such as community control and joint-decision-
making in municipal planning (SALGA & GTZ 2006: 70). The Ward Committee Resource Book 
also refers to the creation of a more participatory system as not only exceeding the 
representative dimension of democracy but as a process of democratic “deepening”; of 
“empowering citizens to fulfil their potential as partners with government” (DPLG & GTZ 
2005b: 10). Not dissimilarly to Arnstein’s (1969) gradation of citizen involvement, the 
Resource Book highlights the need to distinguish between “providing information”, 
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 See DPLG & GTZ (2005a); DPLG & GTZ (2005b) and SALGA & GTZ (2006). 
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“consultation” and “participation”. The three cannot be conflated and their appropriateness 
in different circumstances is emphasised (DPLG & GTZ 2005b: 11). 
The contrast between the NGO-compiled handbooks and the ANC’s own ‘movement’ 
discourse on participation is particularly evident. Since 1990, the latter has continued to 
situate participation largely in a context of movement building (ANC 2012) or has conflated 
popular will and citizen choice with its own vision of the ‘national democratic’ programme. 
The conceptual influence of this discourse is more akin to the Marxist-Leninist strand of 
participation prominent during the ANC’s years in exile, as well as to the largely teleological 
conception of participation held by many in the ANC and UDF. Analysis of this discourse in 
the post-1994 period and its implications for participatory democracy are taken up in the 
following chapter.  
In public policy documents, however, radical democratic thought is indeed discernible. One 
of the most elaborate in this regard is the DPLG’s ‘National Policy Framework for Public 
Participation’ (2007), a document described as “build[ing] on the commitment of the 
democratic government to deepen democracy” (ibid.: 6). It draws, in particular, on 
Arnstein’s ‘ladder of participation’ (1969 cited in DPLG 2006: 15-16). In setting out the 
varying degrees of citizen involvement, the policy document “advocates … a partnership 
approach between citizens and government, moving to citizens represented by ward 
committees having recognised powers, with delegated responsibilities” (2006: 17).  
By setting out an understanding of participation as a form of ‘partnership’ between citizen 
and government, the DPLG appears to recognise participatory democracy in two important 
senses: as both deliberative and empowering. The framework utilises a definition of ‘public 
participation’ as: “an open, accountable process through which individuals and groups 
within selected communities can exchange views and influence decision-making. It is further 
defined as a democratic process of engaging people, deciding, planning, and playing an 
active part in the development and operation of services that affect their lives” (DPLG 2007: 
15).  
Both Pieterse (2002: 5) and Stoker (2002: 32-3) refer to the re-thinking of approaches to 
local government as highlighting an understanding of democracy as ‘problem-solving’. This 
draws not only on democracy qua universal suffrage and human rights but on “our collective 
capacity to address unsolved social problems” (Cohen & Sabel 1997 cited in Stoker 2002: 
32). As such, democracy is also about reason, deliberation, and collective agreement. 
Pieterse, for example, refers to South Africa’s policy of Integrated Development Planning 
(IDP), which provides a way for local residents to participate in the preparation, adoption, 
implementation and review of their municipality’s development vision (RSA 1998a; RSA 
2001), as “a future-oriented, problem-solving approach [which] … aspires to provide a 
framework for diverse communities, citizens and interest groups to enter into public 
dialogue and debate about the desirable future that they want to construct” (2002: 6).  
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In this sense, although this model of democracy is based on achieving consensus, it is 
proposed that this be achieved through a process of deliberation and problem-solving. 
Moreover, by seeing participation as both a developmental process and outcome, the idea 
of participatory democracy is also something empowering. The Policy Framework 
underlined the government’s belief that participation must ‘empower’ citizens “to take 
charge of their own development” (DPLG 2007: 17).  
Emphasis has also remained on the notion of participation as a right and on enhancing 
citizens’ capacity to exercise that right. The 2006 ‘Handbook for Municipal Councillors’ 
asserted that:  
“Democracy in South Africa is about more than just voting. It is about 
people having the right to be informed about what their government is 
doing, and having the right to participate in decision-making, especially 
when the decisions directly affect them. This helps create empowered 
citizens who have the initiative to continue to contribute to the 
development of their communities” [emphasis added] (SALGA & GTZ 2006: 
45). 
This approach captures the Rousseauian notion, expressed by Pateman (1970) and 
Macpherson (1977), of democracy as ‘developmental’. The very same handbook, for 
example, poses questions for municipal councillors about the extent to which they: “are 
helping to educate constituents”; “promoting respect for human rights”; and “encouraging 
the potential and initiative of [their] constituency” (2006: 46). There is a visible current of 
thinking which seeks to emphasise the transformative and self-reinforcing role of 
participation in decision-making.  
With the RDP’s effective replacement by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
Programme (GEAR) in 1996, disappointment set in amongst those in the ANC camp who had 
hoped for a more radical form of democracy. GEAR’s focus on a market-oriented, growth-
led model of development has been interpreted by the Left as not only removing macro-
economic policy from the sphere of democratic contestation but as marking a break with 
participatory traditions. The ensuing argument is that a reduction in citizen control is 
necessary for the maintenance of a neoliberal macro-economic model. Notably, Harrison 
suggests that the closure of the RDP office in April 1996 and transfer of its staff to the 
Department of Constitutional Development led to the RDP’s vision of development planning 
shifting to the local rather than national terrain (2001: 186). It is possible to see how the 
side-lining of the RDP enabled a veneer of participatory discourse to remain, while shifting 
the locus of citizen influence to the local level. As such, popular control over macro-level 
policy is severely limited. 
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Participatory ideals, no matter how deeply rooted in the movement’s history, are not 
immune to other theoretical debates. Indeed, the perceived repeal of ANC commitments to 
a more radical form of democracy links in part to policy shifts internationally and the 
consolidation of a global economic orthodoxy. Conceptions of participation are thus shaped 
by other discursive traditions, including development theory, international best practice, 
and the discourse of good governance. I continue here with development. 
5.3.3. Participatory Development and Planning  
The post-1994 design of the new system of local government in South Africa coincided with 
international shifts in development theory regarding the role of state and citizen. One part 
of this, acknowledged during the constitutional negotiations, was refocusing the role of local 
government on development rather than delivery. Although it was the 1998 Local 
Government White Paper that formally introduced the notion of DLG, the idea appears to 
have first emerged during the work of the Constitutional Assembly. Advisors to the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Local Government in 1995 described DLG by listing a set of characteristics 
almost identical to those later included in the White Paper. The model was described as 
being: where local government is integral to local development and responsible for 
stimulating local economic growth; it must promote development that is integrated and 
sustainable; and it must build the “institutional capacity of communities to enhance their 
participation in the developments intended for them” (1995: 43).  
In terms of the third of these (the participation of communities), Andrew Boraine, a member 
of the Ad Hoc Committee on Local Government, remarked during a theme committee 
meeting on the shift in many countries away from municipal service delivery, explaining that 
“service delivery is almost an incidental side of what local authorities do” (CA TC3, 1995: 
30). He instead linked local government to deepening democracy, highlighting, in particular, 
how people must participate in decision-making as citizens and not as rate- or tax-payers 
(ibid). Ideas about people’s participation in local development thus spoke to the importance 
of ‘citizenship’, a term receiving growing attention in democratic theory.  
The relationship between the ‘public’ citizen and participatory democracy is discussed by 
Held (1996). He argues that “If democratic life involves no more than a periodic vote, the 
locus of people’s activities will be the private realm of civil society and the scope of their 
actions will depend largely on the resources they can command … Few opportunities will 
exist for citizens to exist as citizens, as participants in public life” (ibid.: 323). The RDP had 
also endorsed the importance of citizen participation in development, noting the need to 
move away from the ‘dependency’ and victim mentality bequeathed by apartheid (ANC 
1997a). 
The rise of the school of thought around DLG in the early 1990s is substantiated by 
Dominique Wooldridge, editor of the Local Government White Paper. She referred to some 
influential research produced during the preceding Green Paper process by local academic, 
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Ben Cashdan which advocated the re-direction of local government spending toward 
developmental ends. Wooldridge highlighted Cashdan’s paper as forming the basis for the 
DLG idea (Interview: 12 March 2013). Mark Swilling also referred to Left experiments in the 
United Kingdom (UK) at reforming local government as having been especially influential on 
South Africa (Interview: 20 February 2013). The UK had implemented a more ‘radical’ model 
of local government that focused on community-level citizen participation and not just state 
delivery of services. He referred, in particular, to British academic John Bennington who was 
involved in UK local economic development work, including in the Greater London Council. 
According to Swilling, Bennington was brought on as an advisor to the White paper process 
in South Africa (ibid.).  
A theme that surfaces with these shifts in development theory is both the role of the 
‘people’ (or ‘beneficiaries’) and the relationship between people and the state. Influencing 
changes in the conceptualisation of local government is the idea, highlighted in Chapter 
Four, of participatory development (McGee 2002). Spurred by the failure of top-down state-
driven projects, and later the damaging effects of economic structural adjustment policies in 
much of Africa and the developing world, development theory underwent significant 
changes from the 1980s (Leal 2011). A new wave of thinking emerged that located popular 
participation not only within discrete development ‘projects’ but in the development 
process as a whole (McGee 2002: 94-5).  
The ethos of participatory development fitted nicely with the intellectual heritage and 
practical experience of the UDF and civics. A document of the MDM (1990) argued that: "- 
communities should have direct control over the process of development … This ensures 
that communities are empowered and strengthened rather than communities becoming 
hostages to a development process over which they have no control". Ideas emphasised in 
recent municipal guidance - such as human agency, meaningful participation and 
community ownership of development planning (SALGA & GTZ 2006: 64, 70) - echo the 
principles of grassroots democracy and community organisation reminiscent of people’s 
power.  
It has been argued in this thesis that civics’ ideas about community organising in the 1980s 
intersected with the approach of NGOs working in urban citizenship and political action; and 
that with the commencement of local government negotiations in 1990, many such ideas 
transferred. This ethos remains visible in the formulation of local government policy. From 
1994 various universities and NGO research institutes assisted the government in 
developing policy proposals on housing and local government (Botha Interview: 14 April 
2014). Although, in the white paper process, the initial concern of policy makers was the 
racial integration of cities and the securing of a unitary tax base, Parnell and Pieterse note 
that “The most important addition … is the current emphasis on the transformation of 
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government itself: on the establishment of democratic municipalities that are in turn 
structurally dependent on civil society forums for input, vitality and legitimacy” (1999: 73).92  
NGOs and other research institutes brought to the table ideas about citizen participation in 
development and planning. During the Constitutional Affairs Portfolio Committee Hearings 
on the Local Government White Paper, submissions and presentations were made by a 
variety of stakeholder groups and NGOs. One such example is ‘Fair Share’, a programme 
based at the University of the Western Cape which works to build community partnerships 
with local government and develop economic literacy amongst communities (Constitutional 
Affairs Portfolio Committee: 24 April 1998). Fair Share’s submission to the Committee 
highlighted the importance of citizen-government partnerships in development, arguing 
that “In most community development theory and best practice, citizen participation is key 
to the success for sustainable development. If citizens 'own' their own resources and have 
been part of the decisions about the priorities of their area, they will freely give their time, 
money [through payments], and labour” (ibid.) 
Moreover, the timing of South Africa’s entrance into debates about development and 
democracy coincided with the rise of ‘civil society’ discourse. This was combined in 
development and planning circles with a discourse of ‘citizenship’ which understood the 
public’s role as not only consumers and voters but participants in the policy process. Greater 
focus on the role of the civic sphere, and on political and civil rights generally, fed into ideas 
internationally about civil society’s role in the development process. Combined with this 
were experiments by development practitioners and Left governments to introduce 
broader-based citizen participation in both development and municipal governance.  
In addition to South Africa’s own history of civic activism, international experiences seem to 
have provided some lessons. Wooldridge referred to the academic, Brendan Martin, who 
had been working on the participatory budgeting process in Porto Alegre, Brazil, coming out 
to South Africa to work with the White Paper team. Yunus Carrim also noted the influence 
of other metropolitan city models such as those in South America, recalling Bolivia as one 
example (Interview: 12 March 2013). Wooldridge noted, however, that although there were 
“exciting” ideas for many projects, the team ran into the issue of first needing to create an 
equal tax base before powers could be decentralised (Interview: 12 March 2013).  
Mark Swilling also suggested that limited thought went into issues of urban citizenship and 
space, with many of the battles that progressive urban NGOs had fought during the 1980s 
being collapsed into either ‘local government’ or ‘housing’ (Interview: 20 February 2013). 
Interestingly, Swilling referred to recent efforts by CoGTA to finally draw up an urban policy 
as “a resurgence of the discourse that influenced the urban centre network, urban NGOs 
and certain civics” (ibid.). As such, while there was recognition by policy makers of the need 
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for popular participation, there was perhaps some absence of thought about the ways that 
citizens on the ground interpret and negotiate development challenges. 
5.3.4. ‘Governance’ and Participatory Governance 
South Africa’s transition was affected by both global ideological shifts and the numerous 
local and international advisors asserting influence on the transition. Gaining popularity 
during this period was the idea of ‘governance’ (Seedat, Interview: 13 May 2013). Minogue 
defines governance as “the entire set of relationships between the state, the market and 
society” (2002: 117). According to Harrison (2006), the focus on ‘good governance’ 
internationally is associated with ‘third way’ politics promoted by centre-Left governments 
in the 1990s and with the discourse of New Public Management (NPM) (Harrison 2001; 
Minogue 2002: 117). 
It is the ‘governance’ aspect of the NPM model that speaks to participatory discourse. 
Governance is concerned not with the state alone but with the state-citizen relationship in 
the realisation of effective policies. As such, ‘good governance’ itself requires ‘good 
citizenship’ (Cloete 1999: 12). In South Africa, the DPLG’s Workbook and Guide on ‘Public 
Participation in Local Governance’ sets out democratic governance as follows: 
Democratic governance requires democratic participation through the 
voice of all civil society actors in policy and governance processes. This 
requires open decision-making and a people centred approach. It also 
requires citizens who are able to exercise judgement, contribute to debate 
and discussion that impact on their lives and awareness of the challenges 
in their communities and the skills and knowledge find solutions to these 
challenges (sic). Participation is a necessary part of good governance as it 
allows for the flow of information between citizens and elected leaders 
and accountability. It also gives a voice to those citizens most affected by 
public policy” (DPLG & LGSETA, Module 3, Part B, p.18).93  
In strengthening the system of local government, the ANC has continued to emphasise the 
importance of citizen-state co-operation. Then Deputy Minister of Cooperative Governance 
and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA), Yunus Carrim, spoke of the need “for more effective 
cooperative governance, not just cooperative government”, adding that “more active 
intervention of provincial and national government in local government needs to be 
complemented by greater public participation in municipalities” (2011: 16-17). 
Governance discourse also draws on the role of political accountability, legitimacy and 
human rights (see Minogue 2002: 118-121). These features have been widely encouraged 
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by international financial institutions and major aid donors, and with the 1989 collapse of 
the socialist bloc from whom the ANC had previously received much support, the 
emergence of governance as a buzz-word of mainstream development complemented 
simultaneous shifts in the ANC itself toward an embrace of liberal democratic principles. The 
DPLG’s Policy Framework on Public Participation notes that the “basic assumptions 
underlying public participation include … the values of good governance and human rights” 
(2007: 15). 
The aspect of governance concerned with citizen participation specifically has also appealed 
to Left regimes elsewhere. Stoker points toward an international shift in thinking about local 
government in which states have extended their focus beyond government as a service-
provider toward its concern with “community leadership” and local democratic input 
beyond electoral and representative democracy (2002: 31). The 1990s, in particular, saw a 
focus on participatory municipal governance amongst lower and middle income countries, 
including Porto Alegre in Brazil and Kerala in India.  
Yet although international experience has provided some inspiration for South Africa, there 
is also a considerable degree of contrast. The local budgeting process in Porto Alegre is 
shown to have delegated a tangible degree of control to citizens (Heller 2001: 140; Abers 
1998). Similarly, Kerala’s neighbourhood Panchayats (or assemblies) draw in a large number 
of participants and act as committee structures for local planning of development priorities 
(ibid.: 141-2). In South Africa, ward committees are merely advisory structures, providing 
more a mode of communication between council and community than any real mechanism 
for influence. As such, municipal councils are under no obligation to act on their 
recommendations. 
South Africa has, however, drawn on international standards in its public participation 
strategies. Those used in the application of the local Government IDP are based on the ‘core 
values’ of the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) (Theron & Ceasar 
2008: 112-113). Participatory policy adheres to IAP2’s core value 1, that: “the public should 
have a say in decisions about actions that could affect their lives” (ibid: 117). Nonetheless, 
Theron and Ceasar argue that the ‘say’ which public beneficiaries have correlates more to 
‘informing’ or ‘consulting’ than to ‘collaboration’ or ‘empowerment’ (ibid.). In this sense, 
participation in the IDP and ward-level processes amount to a form of ‘tokenism’.94 Buccus’ 
research on public participation in policy making suggests that, even though positive 
perceptions about the value of participation were identified amongst policy makers and 
bureaucrats, the planning process still only involved community input after policy responses 
had been formulated (undated: 11). 
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‘Model’ experiments in participatory governance have themselves not escaped criticism, for 
example in failing to address issues such as unequal power relations and social inequalities 
or to account for  local political contexts (c.f. Cornwall 2008; Baiocchi 2003; Cornwall & 
Coelho 2007; Theron & Ceasar 2008). Local party politics itself can negatively affect the 
dynamics of participatory institutions (Cornwall 2008: 513). In South Africa, the latter is 
particularly relevant where ward committees are themselves the site of party dominance 
and intra-party rivalries. 
In other cases, participatory governance has been replaced by technocracy and expediency. 
During the hearings on the White Paper it was questioned whether the IDP would 
necessarily build local capacity, with one presenter highlighting the lack of capacity in 
municipalities, commenting that “much of the know-how comes from contracted 
consultants” (Constitutional Affairs Portfolio Committee: 22 April 1998). Indeed, 
implementation of IDP was initially met with a lack of local government capacity and quite 
possibly a limited appreciation on the part of officials of the role of public input. Former 
Minister for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, Valli Moosa, remarked that 
there were incidents of some local authorities commissioning a consultancy to draft an IDP 
for them (Interview: 30 April 2013).  
What appears to have crept into the discourse of governance is a more ‘limited’ and 
‘formalised’ interpretation of participation, “stripped of the political volatility of direct 
popular involvement” (De Beer 1997: 67). Through increasingly technocratic processes in 
development, and by detaching participation from policy formulation, participatory 
governance is in effect de-politicised. However, at the same time, Tapscott points out that 
“because development is so frequently portrayed in technocratic and depoliticised 
language, this should not disguise that it is rarely if ever politically neutral”. It can in fact 
serve to ‘reproduce’ existing relations of power rather than induce social transformation 
(1997: 87). Issues that have surfaced in research on the ineffectiveness of ward committees 
include the prioritisation of party loyalty over accountability to constituents (Benit-Gbaffou 
2008), the inadequate power of ward committees and councillors in allocating development 
resources (Malabela & Ally 2011: 1), and the inadequate power of local government 
generally “to determine key development decisions” (Sinwell 2011: 371). 
While inadequacies in implementation can partly be attributed to logistical, training and 
resource deficiencies, they also lie in the underlying conceptual framework. During the Local 
Government White Paper hearings, some stakeholders remarked that power in the White 
Paper remained too centralised (Constitutional Affairs Portfolio Committee: 20 April 1998) 
and that the document did not go far enough to empower local government (Constitutional 
Affairs Portfolio Committee: 22 April 1998). In fact, Smith contends that the notion of 
participatory governance in the White Paper was “under-theorised”, giving aspects such as 
empowerment and participation very little elaboration (2007: 8). Indeed, the document did 
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not set out any definition of ‘participation’ and little explanation is given as to how 
communities might participate and to what ends.  
The resources compiled by NGOs in support of DPLG have somewhat filled the gap by 
providing such detail. However underlying policy remains lacking. Although the White Paper 
states that “municipalities should develop mechanisms to ensure citizen participation in 
policy initiation and formulation, and the monitoring and evaluation of decision-making and 
implementation” [emphasis added] (RSA 1998a), there is no reference to citizen 
participation in decision-making itself. It is the document’s lack of theoretical grounding in 
relation to participatory governance that, Smith argues, has led to citizen participation being 
“confined to a narrowly prescribed set of structures and processes, to the exclusion of a 
more open and inclusionary practice” (ibid.: 3). Although subsequent guidance has been 
more explicit in this regard, the underlying policy does not capture the desire to develop a 
truly empowered citizenry who can exercise judgement and contribute to decision-making. 
5.3.5. Performance Management  
While the themes of governance and citizenship speak to normative debates about 
participation in development, they are by no means exhaustive. The NPM model, with which 
mainstream ‘governance’ discourse is associated, is concerned not only with state-society 
relations but with improving public sector performance (Harrison 2001: 178-9). Alongside 
“public participation”, municipal legislation also incorporated the concept of “performance 
management”, introduced “in the interests of efficiency and transparency” (Provincial and 
Local Government Portfolio Committee & Local Government and Administration Select 
Committee: 19 April 2000).  
As noted earlier, the international shift toward participatory development was spurred in 
part by the failure of top-down development approaches. New development thinking 
included a desire to generate greater self-sufficiency by rolling back the state not extending 
it (McGee 2002: 95; see also Leal 2011). Cornwall and Coelho explain that, “On the one 
hand, participation is cast as a project constructed around the extension of citizenship and 
the deepening of democracy. On the other, participation has come to be associated with 
shrinking state responsibilities and the progressive exemption of the state from the role of 
guarantor of rights” (2007: 5). As such, while participation is considered an important 
feature of such self-sufficiency, its costs to efficiency and delivery must also be weighed up 
(Pieterse 2002: 12).  
It is in the field of development planning in South Africa that this tension is especially visible: 
between the neo-liberal concerns of efficiency and performance and those focused on the 
need for a bottom-up approach to development (Harrison 2006: 202). South Africa’s IDP 
embodies this very conundrum. Intended to ensure fiscal responsibility, efficiency and 
effectivity, as well as provide space for citizens to influence development priorities, Pieterse 
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describes the IDP as combining “democratic governance, participatory planning and 
efficient, modern managerial practice” (2002: 5). It thus contains some internal conceptual 
tension. While both participatory development and democracy discourses draw on notions 
of empowerment and agency, in the performance management strand the objective of 
partnerships with civil society is the creation of a more efficient system (Pieterse 2002: 7, 
13). Sinwell goes further to suggest that the spaces for participation created by the ANC 
government since 1994 “are fundamentally similar to those spaces adopted by the World 
Bank” (2011: 372).   
In South Africa, the shift in focus toward public sector performance and delivery was 
particularly visibly from 1999 with the commencement of Thabo Mbeki’s Presidency. The 
importance of fiscal accountability in local government, however, was emphasised by GEAR 
in 1996, and it is “at the local level within the context of DLG” that Parnell and Pieterse 
argue “the tension between GEAR and RDP will be contested” (1999: 75). Notably, Tapscott 
contends that in the development discourse of the 1990s the influence of those who had 
come from the anti-apartheid camp was not so apparent (1997: 94-5). He argues instead 
that a feature of that era “was the persistent attempts to foster a technocratic justification 
of the social and political order. Practical socio-economic issues, thus, were defined as 
technical problems, devoid of substantive political or ideological content, and solvable only 
by experts” (ibid.: 91).  
An example of this can be found in the IDP process, where research in Gauteng shows that 
participation is sometimes seen in a very utilitarian sense by officials, with the key motivator 
being legitimation and the desired development outcome, rather than the democratic value 
of the process itself (Everatt et al 2010: 228). Although international development in the 
1990s leant toward rolling back the state’s ‘delivery’ role, it remained concerned with 
efficiency and fiscal accountability. Penetrating the local government debate in South Africa 
was also the increasing popularity of privatisation amongst governments in the UK and New 
Zealand and the rise of public-private partnerships. The discourse of participatory 
development, which emerged originally from Freirian pedagogy and was taken up by 
progressive planners and community activists in South Africa and elsewhere, has become 
appropriated and adapted by mainstream international development agencies and bilateral 
donors to fit the demands not only of public sector ‘performance’ but also the ideological 
status quo. Its adoption by organisations like the World Bank, Leal argues, has been used as 
a way of making neo-liberal development discourse more palatable and people-friendly 
(2011: 71, 75-6).  
South Africa’s DLG model firmly links the management of public sector performance to 
community-based participation (see Parnell & Pieterse 1999: 76) and enhancing 
accountability to the electorate. The Municipal Systems Bill of 2000, by introducing a system 
of participatory governance, was understood as “[laying] the foundation for the later 
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Chapters in the Bill in which participatory processes are critical to the success of initiatives 
such as planning and performance management” (Provincial and Local Government 
Portfolio Committee & Local Government and Administration Select Committee, 19 April 
2000: 6). 
At the same time, however, there was caution that participatory processes could equally 
hamper development and delivery. The White Paper remarked that “participatory processes 
must not become an obstacle to development, and narrow interest groups must not be 
allowed to 'capture' the development process. It is important for municipalities to find ways 
of structuring participation which enhance, rather than impede, the delivery process” (RSA 
1998a: Section B.1.3). During a discussion on the Municipal Structures Bill, Minister and 
former civic activist Valli Moosa - was recorded as saying that “the key criterion for local 
government should be: are citizens receiving value for money?” and that local government 
“should develop a business-like approach to service delivery” (Constitutional Affairs 
Portfolio Committee: 1 Sept 1998). Although the challenges of balancing performance and 
participation began to face South Africa in the 1990s, it of course reflects the broader 
challenge facing modern governments (and set out at the opening of this chapter), of 
achieving “efficiency and effective administration on the one hand, and accountability and 
public participation on the other” (Parliament of South Africa, 2001).  
The Gauteng Provincial Legislature’s ‘Public Participation Strategy’ also reflects the 
combination of technocracy and participation encompassed in performance management. It 
phrases this as “effective public participation … [marking] a shift from techno-bureaucracy 
towards techno-democracy” (GPL 2011: 18). It is interesting that current Head of the 
Gauteng Planning Department, Rashid Seedat remarked that it is in some ways much easier 
for governments to focus on delivering services than it is to practically implement 
mechanisms for citizen participation (Interview: 13 May 2013). He also commented that, 
from his experience in the City of Johannesburg, the increasing bureaucratisation of 
processes for public participation could themselves take the ‘dynamism’ out of it (ibid.). 
Although, according to Harrison, international theoretical influence on planning has been 
subtle in South Africa, it can be seen in the presence of international agencies and their 
influence on public sector policies (2001: 178). The Local Government White Paper process 
was funded mostly by USAID and the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) 
(Wooldridge: Interview: 12 March 2015). Similarly, the German Agency for Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ) has undertaken programmes with both the DPLG and SALGA to produce 
a series of hand- and resource-books on participatory democracy and governance in South 
African municipalities.95 Harrison also suggests parallels between the IDP and the policies of 
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‘New Labour’ in the United Kingdom, where despite a trend toward decentralisation, policy 
design remains at the centre (2006: 190). 
Other models of NPM internationally include Australia, New Zealand and the USA (Harrison 
2006). During a meeting on the White Paper process, Crispian Olver, then Director of the 
RDP, recommended the New Zealand model for measures to assess overall national 
performance in local government (Constitutional Affairs Portfolio Committee: 20 April 
1998). The New Zealand model of local authorities publishing their plans and discussing 
them with the community appears also to have been raised by the Ad-Hoc Committee on 
Local Government during the Constitutional Assembly (CA TC3, 1995: 15-16), as does the 
German model of providing an ‘enabling’ (rather than prescriptive) constitutional 
framework for participatory democracy in local government (ibid.: 14).  
Dominique Wooldridge remarked that, during the White Paper process, tours were 
undertaken of the UK and especially Scotland on the devolution of powers (Interview: 12 
March 2013). Although there was no one especially strong influence, she remarked that 
“there were a lot of donors pushing models and a lot of American consultants. Every time 
you turned around there was an American consultant!” Wooldridge also commented that 
she had brought in the consultant, Brendan Martin (who had previously worked on Porto 
Alegre’s participatory budgeting system in Brazil) to ‘counter’ those consultants working on 
public-private partnerships (ibid.). Yet models of metropolitan government such as those in 
Latin America are themselves shaped by global development discourse. Reflecting on 
international influences in the White Paper, Yunus Carrim recalled the relationship between 
budgeting, IDPs, delivery and performance management as being drawn and adapted from 
the Bolivian example (Interview: 12 March 2013). 
It is thus possible to see how policy frameworks themselves can serve an ideological 
function. Leal argues that the discourse of participatory development has been “modified, 
sanitized and depoliticised”, and is used as a mechanism for participation within the existing 
neo-liberal paradigm (2011: 75-6). He also posits, however, that, having been “detached 
from its radical nature”, participatory action has been “re-politicized in the service of the 
conservative neo-liberal agenda” [emphasis added] (2011: 76). This lack of ideological 
neutrality in the development process is borne out by the tensions and conflicts within it. 
Parnell and Pieterse capture this when they highlight the tension between “acceptance of 
mainstream economic policy and dealing with its structural consequences” (1999: 71). As 
such they argue that “DLG in South Africa is … born of both the consensus and the conflict 
apparent in international development thinking” (ibid.).  
The ascendancy of ‘participation’ in neo-liberal discourse has prompted calls by Left 
development theorists for it to be re-claimed and reconnected with its radical, 
transformative roots (Leal 2011: 79; see also Kothari 2001). Policy frameworks, while 
drawing on contemporary trends in development, planning and governance, may also be 
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rooted in dominant orthodoxies. Where this is the case, the extent to which prevailing 
ideological paradigms can be challenged may remain slim, rendering policy texts merely 
hollow commitments to citizen participation. Leal maintains that the “technification of 
social and political problems” reduces its empowering potential (2011: 76). Authority to 
deliver services may be transferred to the local level but real power may not (Mastenbroek 
& Steytler 1997: 236). In South Africa, mechanisms for citizens to influence planning exist 
only at the most local level, thus closing off the broader policy agenda from popular 
democratic debate.  
Within the ANC itself conceptual tensions in what is understood by ‘participation’ also 
endure. Here, participatory discourse remains infused with the conflict referred to 
previously - of “political control from above and popular initiative from below” (Femia 1993: 
136). Raymond Suttner posited his view that “the popular subject was displaced from 1990 
and it became the ‘people’s government’” (Interview: 25 October 2012). This speaks both to 
the persistence of multiple interpretations of ‘people’s power’ discussed in Chapter Three, 
and to Leal’s contention that ‘power’ in mainstream development theory is viewed not as 
the process by which marginalised groups gain the capacity to claim rights and resources, 
but rather as something that “can be ‘given’ by the powerful to the powerless” (2011: 77).  
The post-1994 narrative of popular participation in the ANC’s own discourse is discussed in 
Chapter Six. This deals, in particular, with the discussion and policy documents of the 
movement itself rather than the discourse in legislation. It is worth noting here, however, 
that within the ANC itself, understandings of popular power and participation remained 
inconsistent. Suttner, who wrote speeches for Nelson Mandela during his presidency, 
remarked: 
“I always had in mind a range of ways in which democracy could be 
people-driven. [When writing] speeches for Mandela … I used to bring in 
this type of thing but then when he was interviewed afterwards he would 
say something completely different because what I think they had in mind 
is that a government must govern and concentrate on the central 
government” (Interview: 25 October 2012).  
Indeed, not only did the government’s delivery function take precedent but Sinwell (2011: 
369) and Gumede (2005: 284-5) argue that that Mandela and other ANC members saw civil 
society as needing to reorient itself toward acting “as service delivery agents for the state’s 
development trajectory” (Sinwell: 2011: 369).  
The idea that ‘governments have to govern’ and ‘leaders have to lead’ is a view that Suttner 
attributes to many of those on Robben Island and in exile (2014: 13). Nonetheless, his 
observation speaks to concerns about the difficulty of balancing the multiple demands of 
governance: of development and delivery, on the one hand, and public participation and 
democracy on the other. Notably, during the hearings on the Local Government White 
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Paper, Steven Friedman, then at the Centre for Policy Studies, argued that insufficient 
attention had been paid to the “fundamental problem” of “enhancing democracy and 
development side by side”. He argued that “these two ideals are difficult to combine, and 
that the White Paper should focus mostly on enhancing the democracy ideal in local 
government” (Constitutional Affairs Portfolio Committee, 20 April 1998: 2).  
It also concerns the extent to which control over development issues are decentralised to 
the local level. This is especially relevant when development plans are to be devised via local 
participatory processes while simultaneously speaking to national-level development 
policies and ideological frameworks. Research on decentralisation in the UK suggests “that 
the rolling back of the state in favour of the market has had a particularly detrimental effect 
on local government’s power to govern” (Mastenbroek & Steytler 1997: 236). In the South 
African case, Parnell and Pieterse’s summation is that the key challenge of DLG is achieving 
all of its visions simultaneously: that is, integrated, sustainable and equitable urban 
management while upholding the principle of local democracy and autonomy (1999: 82). 
5.3.6. Radicalism versus Realism 
A further strand feeding into conceptions of participation is not so much rooted in a 
particular theoretical framework as in the day-to-day experience and exigencies of 
governing. Here, policy makers’ interpretations of participatory democracy have been 
shaped by changing ideology, political imperatives and pragmatism. A notable theme 
identified amongst some of those interviewed about participatory democratic policy 
concerned the extent to which the changed ideological milieu between the 1980s and 1994 
altered their perceptions about what was both possible and desirable.  
Andrew Boraine, a former UDF leader who was later part of the NLGNF, the Constitutional 
Assembly’s Ad Hoc Committee on Local Government, and the early stages of drafting the 
White Paper, reflected on the idealism with which many in the ANC-UDF camp had viewed 
popular power during the 1980s. Looking back, he remarked that many of the ideas which 
had influenced them had been somewhat romantic: “I mean if I go back there now, you 
know, you’re looking at everything from Che Guevara to Franz Fanon to Lenin and things like 
that, Gramsci. And, quite frankly, a lot of that’s romantic, you know. And that was part of 
the struggle culture of the time and that’s what we believed” (Interview: 21 May 2013).  
Rashid Seedat, also involved in civic activism and later in work on the post-apartheid local 
government model, similarly commented that their understanding of the role of civics and 
their vision of a democratic future in the 1980s had been shaped by the local and global 
ideological context of that time:   
“I mean I think it was a different era. And I there was a u-change in what 
happened in the intervening period: at the leadership level, in terms of 
membership … And you must remember it was a good, almost thirty years, 
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and a hell of a lot can happen in thirty years! It may sound like a cliché but 
it’s true. And of course a lot of people don’t have that kind of institutional 
memory in any case. You know I think that people just, you move on … So 
a lot has changed and I don’t think you can really compare it. I think that 
the whole, I mean the milieu was different. It was a different milieu, you 
know; it was during the cold war; it was during a particular kind of 
contestation on a global basis” (Interview: 20 May 2013). 
Seedat also reflected on the extent to which many ideological principles during the 1980s 
had been accepted unquestioningly: “Our belief in the ‘80s in socialism and all that was 
almost like a religious belief. It was sort of like one took a completely uncritical view of 
things. I mean, as things changed, and we spoke about Slovo’s ‘Has Socialism Failed’… you 
know those things don’t work anymore” (ibid.). The White Paper’s editor, Dominique 
Wooldridge also looked back with some discomfort on the socialist ideological lens through 
which the future had been conceived, even during the early part of the 1990s:  
“It was just the way we, it was the language we used. But it was that thing 
where you were a ‘comrade’ and it was, you know. It’s ridiculous looking 
back at it now. At the time we weren’t at all self-conscious about it. It was 
the way you greeted other people. Comrade and proletariat; that’s the 
way we conceived things” (Interview: 12 March 2013).  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the end of the cold war and change in global 
ideological climate instigated shifts in the ANC’s own ideological outlook. This, in turn, 
generated a transition in its democratic thought. From 1986 onwards, the ANC made formal 
commitments to liberal democratic principles such as a multi-party system and individual 
civil and political rights. These changes took effect not only at the leadership level but also 
amongst activists who would come to participate in policy-making. Seedat remarked on how 
these shifts impacted the democratic project itself, changing not only the possibility but the 
desirability of institutionalising people’s power:  
“[I]f we had taken power in ‘87 or something my guess is that we would 
probably have experimented with those things because, number one, 
you’re seizing power; number two, you believe this is now kind of a 
revolutionary context ... I think that actually, in a funny way, maybe it 
wasn’t a bad thing that we didn’t do it because I think we were 
forewarned about particular issues. And I also think the issue around 
formal institutions of procedural democracy and so on is actually quite 
fundamental. You can be quite, sort of, dismissive of it and say well, voting 
every five years ... But if you don’t vote every five years you’re basically 
not a democracy” (Interview: 20 May 2013). 
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His remark suggests the emergence of a new appreciation for certain principles and 
practices of representative and procedural democracy, previously overlooked or dismissed. 
Wooldridge likewise remarked that there had been a “strong suspicion” of what they 
referred to as “neo-liberal democracy” (Interview: 12 March 2013).  
As well as pointing to a rethinking of democratic principles, it is interesting that Seedat’s 
reflections on popular power also address the challenges of converting theory into practice. 
Not only did he consider people’s power to have been part of a particular revolutionary era 
but also that its implications in a post-revolutionary context had not been thought through:  
“- the milieu was such that, I mean, this is a revolution, etc. You know, 
we’re going to kind of push the boundaries of the state; we’re going to 
take more direct power and so on. But I mean where does it take you 
eventually? I’m not saying it by way of a judgement but I’m saying the 
difficulty with that is how do you apply this uniformly across the country? 
What rules do you put into place? What mechanisms do you establish to 
get them set up and so on? Because these things happen spontaneously 
and so on, right? Whereas in many ways democracy has to be organised - I 
think that’s the reality. I think you need rules, you need precepts, you 
know; … so there isn’t an arbitrariness and there isn’t a making up the 
rules as you go along … Because you want to ensure equality and you want 
to ensure fairness and all those sorts of natural-justice principles. How do 
you make sure that everyone has an equal chance to be part of an organ of 
popular power? So it’s a very nice romantic notion of organs of popular 
power ..; [but]… you need to organise yourselves and I think that’s the 
difficulty” (Interview: 20 May 2013). 
Seedat’s observation speaks to a number of the challenges highlighted by participatory 
democracy’s critics, as well as by those radical democrats seeking to extend and deepen 
democracy without undermining individual freedom and political choice. Ensuring equal 
access to participatory structures and preventing their domination by narrow interest 
groups, are challenges raised by various development theorists (Cooke and Kothari 2001; 
Cornwall 2008). It is interesting that Seedat considered the ANC to have never clearly 
thought about how people’s power as a conceptual ideal could be successfully translated 
into an implementable model: “A representative component is a necessary but insufficient 
condition, as we put it. But to make that more than just a sufficient condition was what we 
had to kind of figure out and I don’t think we really got to grips with that” (Interview: 20 
May 2013). Wooldridge similarly reasoned that, although she felt most people were 
committed to the principle of participation, “when it came down to what it would mean in 
practice there were a lot of diverging views” (Interview: 12 March 2013).  
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In suggesting possible reasons for the challenges facing policy makers, Seedat highlights 
both the imperatives of delivery but also the difficulty of translating ideas into a realisable 
policy: 
“… I think there were several reasons probably. Maybe the one was that we 
hadn’t been able to figure out how we actually do this, practically. Because 
if you work in the state, broadly defined, you have to agree on a set of 
ideas which are implementable, which are rational, which can be described 
in policies and legislation and so on. You can’t put philosophical notions 
down; I mean you can but you have to boil it down to nuts and bolts and I 
don’t think we were ever able to do that effectively.” (Interview: 20 May 
2013).  
Reflecting on these comments, there is value in considering the extent to which policy-
makers in the ANC either felt that the principles they once held now belonged to a period of 
history, versus the extent to which the realities of governing simply instilled in them a new 
pragmatism.  
The required overhaul of local government after 1990 also loaded the policy agenda with an 
array of foundational and structural challenges that demanded attention before citizen 
participation could be contemplated. Moreover, the introduction of a system of 
representative democracy itself was no mean feat. Wooldridge remarked that “the idea of 
representative, like very old fashioned, representative democracy was still new enough in 
terms of getting it working on the ground that a lot of people ended up pouring their energy 
into that” (Interview: 12 March 2013). Similarly, Suttner noted that the ANC’s Department 
of Political Education had poured its effort into electoral education in the run up to 1994, 
such that attention was diverted from the issue of popular power (Interview: 25 October 
2012). Due to the power-sharing arrangement between 1994 and 1999, Wooldridge also 
remarked that political considerations effectively put the brakes on what could be achieved 
in terms of a more radical form of democracy: 
“My sense of it when editing was you can’t really say too much about just 
how you envisage local government participation working when that local 
government isn’t going to be representative, it’s power-sharing … we were 
tied into that deal. We knew it before we wrote one word of the White 
Paper. And I mean there was a lot of really nice stuff coming from NGOs, 
Planact, the Urban Sector Network, but, ja, there was a real caution in 
terms of how that was received and what we would want to write in, in 
the sense that we were giving  away additional power to somebody for an 
election term.” (Interview: 12 March 2013). 
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Her comment speaks to the concern raised earlier that participatory arrangements could be 
utilised by the Right to entrench existing interests and local political strongholds: “I think 
there was quite a lot of holding back and let’s agree what we can and what we can live with 
for this power sharing period that will put something in place but let’s also not over-commit 
and create structures that we’re basically inviting the opposition to take over” (ibid.). 
The challenges of devising practical mechanisms for participation have a knock-on effect at 
the implementation stage. Referring to the IDP process during his time working in the City of 
Joburg, Seedat commented that, despite real commitment to making it work, “we were 
really struggling, methodologically, … to find the right kind of ways of actually doing this” 
(Interview : 20 May 2013). He referred to the large public meetings held as part of the IDP as 
being “a good PR exercise in many ways” but that they did not yield the sort of results they 
were looking for (ibid.). Successfully enabling the participatory principle to gel with 
bureaucratic process and structures also remained elusive:  
“The way a bureaucracy is organised is very different to what people 
actually need … Communities think about their lives in a much more 
integrated way but bureaucracies are necessarily organised on a sectoral 
basis. So that becomes the difficulty in trying to match what people on the 
ground are saying … and how to transpose it into the bureaucracy. And 
that’s why we were struggling for a long time with this stuff” (ibid.).  
Government departments do, however, appear to be aware of such challenges. The DPLG’s 
National Policy Framework on Public Participation states:  
“It is widely accepted that it is a challenge for governments to design and 
implement effective forms of public participation. Doing this well requires 
participatory institutions and practices that (i) aim at empowering citizens 
in meaningful ways whilst simultaneously taking into account (ii) real world 
conditions, including experience from elsewhere in the world, but 
especially the conditions of local governance in South Africa, and (iii) the 
broader legislative and policy context which frames institutional design. At 
its heart the challenge is one of balancing lofty ambitions with the real-
world constraints” [emphasis added] (2007: 11) 
Nonetheless, Seedat added to his own observations the tremendous value of the IDP 
process in identifying and understanding communities’ needs. Such engagement, he argued, 
gave the City of Joburg a good sense of what people on the ground were saying. In 
circumstances where there was insufficient budget to cater for particular demands, officials 
were at least able to gain a sense of where money needed to be directed (ibid.). The process 
also enabled the City to identify broader, underlying challenges. 
206 
 
Some of the obstacles to implementation highlight the broader challenge of citizen 
education. Former Minister of the DPLG, Sydney Mufamadi, referred to participatory 
democracy as “knowledge-intensive”. As such, he observed that there is sometimes a 
discrepancy between the aspiration of a policy and the reality:  
“Experiences made us to understand that any participatory system of 
government is a knowledge-intensive system because it presupposes that 
people know something. If you say integrated development planning, if 
you are dealing with a community in which there is a level of illiteracy 
which is as high as seventy per cent, theoretically people have got this 
right but they don’t have the means to exercise it … So it imposes other 
obligations: how do you equip people to enable them to exercise these 
rights that they have? So these rights are not self-enforcing … there are 
issues of civic education that arise” [emphasis added] (Interview: 26 
November 2012). 
That being said, pragmatism was not the only factor guiding policy makers. In reference to 
drafting the constitution, Valli Moosa, noted some ‘tension’ between the approach of those 
in the ANC who had spent their time in exile and those with a background in the MDM, 
suggesting that “there wasn't that same level of consciousness about the need to involve 
ordinary people” (Interview: 30 April 2013). While “it was almost automatic” for those from 
the MDM that they would have to set up a participatory process, he remarked that, for 
others, “it wasn't an automatic instinctive thing, I think. And people didn't always think that 
it was workable or that it was practical to want to consult fairly uneducated people about 
the constitution” (ibid.).  
Moosa’s comments speak also to the conceptual divergences within the ANC about the role 
and future of people’s power: between those for whom it represented a democratic ideal 
and a pre-figurative form of democracy, and those for whom it was rather a means for the 
establishment of what Suttner referred to as “the people’s government”. The ‘romanticism’ 
of the 1980s and the possibilities for people’s power began to clash with the ‘realism’ after 
1994 of what was both possible and desirable. The emergence of this realist sentiment 
within the ANC was at various stages prompted and reinforced by various factors, including 
shifts in ideology, a realignment of democratic thinking, the pragmatism of implementation, 
and the exigencies of state delivery, all of which overlapped with efforts to introduce the 
system of participatory governance. 
5.4. Institutionalising Participation 
5.4.1. Ward Committees 
The institutionalised mechanisms for participatory democracy in South Africa take a variety 
of forms, the primary one being the local government ward committee. The idea of ward 
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committees was introduced in the Local Government White Paper, and subsequently 
legislated in the 1998 Municipal Structures Act. Municipal policy frames the role of ward 
committees as: “the facilitation of local community participation in decisions which affect 
the local community, the articulation of local community interests, and the representation 
of these interests within the metropolitan government system” (RSA 1998a: section 
D.2.3.3). According to the DPLG, the ward committee is also conceived as playing a critical 
role in specified participatory processes such as Community-Based Planning, IDP and 
performance management (2007).  
Most ward committees were established in 2001 following the 2000 local government 
elections. Exceptions to this were in the Western Cape and Kwa-Zulu Natal where provincial 
governments opted not to adopt the ward committee system until 2004 (DPLG & GTZ, 
2005b: 22). In 2005, the DPLG stated that “the establishment of ward committees is still at 
an early stage, and a great deal of capacity-building still needs to be undertaken” (2005a: 8). 
Notably, the minimal entrenchment and success of the system seems to have triggered the 
publication of a range of guidance to support and improve the ward participatory system. 
Key documents which those establishing ward committees are encouraged to refer to 
include: Having Your Say: A Handbook for Ward Committees (DPLG & GTZ 2005a); the 
National Ward Committee Resource Book (DPLG & GTZ 2005b); and the 2005 National 
Guidelines for the Establishment and Operation of Municipal Ward Committees (DPLG 
2005b).  
The National Guidelines are intended “to provide uniform and simplified guidelines to ward 
committee members, ward councillors and metropolitan and local municipalities on the 
establishment and operation of ward committees” (DPLG 2005b), while the Having Your Say 
Handbook “aims to provide handy hints, practical ideas and guidance for running ward 
committees” (DPLG & GTZ 2005a). In addition, some municipalities may also have their own 
‘Public Participation Policy’. Amongst these resources is a skills programme from the DPLG 
which provides certification to ward committee members. This not only entrenches certain 
standards but is a means of upskilling community members that is given recognition through 
a national qualification. The module draws on materials developed by NGOs including EISA, 
Planact, the Foundation for Contemporary Research, and the Open Society Foundation. 
Some of the DPLG’s resources also use examples of existing good practice, drawing on 
positive experiences in model wards where ward committees and citizen involvement have 
been established successfully.   
The ward committee is of course a structure of the broader DLG model. As such, the ideas 
informing it draw on the theoretical currents discussed already: traditions of popular 
participation, radical democratic theory, participatory development, participatory 
governance, and performance management. It is the ward committee specifically that is 
identified as the mechanism for government to work with communities and fulfil the White 
Paper objective of democratising development. At the ANC’s summit on provincial and local 
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government in December 2010, its discussion document stated that: “The ward committee 
system is aimed at giving expression to people-centred government and deepening 
community and public participation at a local level ... [W]ard committees have the 
opportunity to become the single and most elementary point of community and 
cooperative governance”. (ANC 2010: 17).  
5.4.2. Sectoral Participation 
In addition to the ward committee, sector-specific structures are also provided for local 
participation by citizens. Two key examples are Community Policing Forums (CPFs) and 
School Governing Bodies (SGBs). Although not falling within the remit of ‘local government’, 
CPFs and SGBs provide for local community-level participation in policing and schooling 
respectively.  
The formation of School Governing Bodies (SGBs) in South Africa can be linked directly to 
the post-1976 discourse of ‘people’s education’. This was spearheaded in the 1980s by 
organisations such as the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) through which 
students, parents and teachers pushed for a say in the running of schools. The South African 
Schools Act (1996) and the Education White Paper (1996) provided for the establishment of 
SGBs as part of a broader reform of education whose principle purpose was “the 
democratisation of schooling” (Karlsson 2002: 328). The idea of SGBs is that they are 
constituted by those who have the most vested interests in the school: parents, teachers 
and learners (ibid.: 329). 
Community Policing Forums (CPFs), in contrast to SGBs, are not purported to be a form of 
self-governance. Rather, they are “consultative” structures (DPLG 2007: 68). The South 
African Police Service (SAPS) Act of 1995 established and detailed the role of CPFs (Gordon 
2001: 131), setting out their objectives as: “establishing and maintaining a partnership 
between the community and the Service” as well as promoting communication and co-
operation; improving the rendering of police services to the community; improving 
transparency and accountability; and promoting joint problem-identification and problem-
solving (RSA 1995: Section 18.1).  
The idea of community input in local policing, however, was first mentioned in the Interim 
Constitution as a means of increasing police accountability to the community and 
encouraging community cooperation (RSA 1993: Section 221). According to Pelser, the idea 
emerged out of the 1991 Peace Accord between the ANC, the South African Government 
and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) following mounting violence and “evidence of police 
collusion” in Kwa-Zulu Natal and the Transvaal (1999: 3). The Accord included the provision 
that: “The police shall be guided by the belief that they are accountable to society in 
rendering their policing services … [T]he police shall endeavour to obtain the co-operation 
of the public whose partnership in the task of crime control and prevention is essential” 
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(1991, cited in Pelser 1999: 2). The idea of community-police cooperation thus seems to 
have emerged out of the need to reconcile community-police tensions and to make the 
police in a new South Africa legitimate and accountable to citizens (Gastrow & Shaw 2001: 
262).  
A further sectoral mechanism for participatory governance, this time at the national level, is 
the National Economic, Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC). Established as a 
statutory body in 1995 NEDLAC’s key function is to “consider all proposed labour legislation 
relating to labour market policy before it is introduced in Parliament; and consider all 
significant changes to social and economic policy before it is implemented or introduced in 
Parliament” (RSA 1994: Sections 5.1 and 5.2). NEDLAC is a classic ‘corporatist’ arrangement 
as defined by Held, constituting what he describes as “tripartite relations between 
organizations of employers, labour and the state, steered ultimately by the latter” (2006: 
180). However, it also contains a fourth ‘development’ chamber in which relevant sectors of 
civil society are incorporated in the policy process (Friedman 2006: 2). Habib describes 
NEDLAC as “the vehicle by which government, labour, business, and community 
organisations negotiate agreements and policies that would, it is hoped, facilitate 
sustainable growth, greater social equity and increased participation of all stakeholders in 
the economy of the country” (1997: 65).  
5.4.3. Public Meetings and Hearings 
Another well-known, although non-statutory, mechanism designed to bring government 
closer to the people is the Executive’s Imbizo Programme. The name imbizo (or izimbizo in 
its plural form) is derived from the Zulu term meaning “a calling-together”. Izimbizo were 
started under former President Thabo Mbeki and incorporated a process in which members 
of the Executive including the President, government Ministers and Municipal Electoral 
Councillors (MEC) visit areas of South Africa to meet with communities in order to exchange 
views on service delivery (Government Communications Handbook 2000, cited in Hartslief 
2009: 328).  
At the provincial level, a similar principle is reflected in the Gauteng Provincial Legislature’s 
(GPL) Bua le Sechaba programme, loosely translated as ‘talking to the people’. In contrast to 
the executive izimbizo, provincial legislatures are muIti-party oversight bodies. Bua le 
Sechaba is thus a way of taking the legislature to the people. The Head of the Public 
Participation and Petitions Unit at the GPL explained that “[it] seeks to go out to 
communities and to address issues at the source of the problem … it’s ‘talking to the people’ 
to solicit their views on service delivery issues” (Mogale Interview: 9 April 2014).  
The exercise of public participation in the national and provincial government spheres is 
guided, respectively, by sections 59 and 118 of the Constitution. A key mechanism in both of 
these is the conduct of public hearings on draft legislation. Public hearings largely take place 
through the committee system. Parliamentary or legislative committees are formed on the 
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basis of a particular policy field or sector and have powers to “monitor, investigate, enquire 
into and make recommendations” relating to the legislative programme and process 
(Parliament of South Africa 2001). It is through committees that the public is able to 
influence the policy process and engage in oversight of the executive. 
5.5. Ideas and Conceptions in Institutionalised Participation 
While there are a variety of ways and processes through which citizens can communicate 
with government, it was noted at the outset of this thesis that we must allow for competing 
conceptions of participation. The following sections discuss the institutionalised forms of 
participation provided in South Africa, drawing out the particular ideas that have shaped 
them and the form of participation they entail 
5.5.1. Placation 
The ward committee system is one of the most extensive forms of institutionalised 
participatory democracy. Despite the production since 2005 of a series of guides and 
handbooks to assist and support the establishment of ward committees, the system 
continues to have limited success in realising its legislated role. As such, the roots of these 
policy ideas are worth examination. Notably, in contrast to the participatory and 
empowering function assigned to ward committees today, they seem originally to have 
been conceived, not as mechanisms for empowered local government but as a concession 
to the opposition.  
Dominique Wooldridge, who was part of the 1998 Local Government White Paper’s editorial 
team, remarked that although she felt the ANC-camp was generally committed to 
participatory principles and to the importance of building a strong civil society, the push to 
locate participatory democracy at the lowest level of government was a position adopted by 
the Right (Interview: 12 March 2013). For opposition parties whose constituents resided in 
the white suburbs, small local government and retention of their own tax base would not 
only preserve the existence of white enclaves but also give them greater autonomy (Boraine 
Interview: 21 May 2013): 
 “At the time, the kind of strategy-side was arguing that we need to push 
everything as low as possible. And while normally that sounds like a good 
idea, in an apartheid city it’s not a good idea. What it really means is if you 
fragment things far enough you have some people who have no resources. 
So in a way it was very awkward because here we were the good guys on 
the side of democracy and participation and so on, arguing against that in 
order to not get, and not end up supporting, a fragmented city and a 
fragmented tax base! … It led to some very weird things like right-wings 
arguing for local-level participation!” (Wooldridge Interview: 12 March 
2013). 
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Ironically, then, the case for decentralisation and local-level power, both of which were 
features of civic and UDF discourse, in fact possessed the potential to limit transformation. 
Wooldridge suggests that the ward committee system was largely proposed as a way to 
placate opposition parties: meeting them half-way and granting communities a degree of 
local autonomy, while the ANC continued to push the case for a single tax base. As such, 
while ward committees have since been located as a centrepiece of democratic local 
government, they were, according to Wooldridge, not originally conceived as an 
empowering mechanism: 
“[T]o a large extent the idea of ward committees was a fob. They were 
adopted nationally as a way of kind of sweetening the pill, or trying to 
sweeten the pill, so we said it’s not a move to macro-government because 
there are these small ward committees … So, I mean I’m crudifying it a bit 
but that’s my broad sense of it; that there wasn’t that much commitment 
to establishing ward committees or any smaller level of really empowered 
government” (ibid.). 
The ANC’s aversion to small local government is certainly logical. In order to fulfil the RDP’s 
transformative objectives - for which local government was the primary vehicle - the 
devolution of powers to existing communities of privilege would prevent the realisation of 
transformation as well as restrict the power of national government to effect change at the 
local level.  
During discussion on the Municipal Structures Bill in 1998, concerns were raised by the DP 
and IFP that it still allowed too much involvement of national government in the affairs of 
local government (Constitutional Affairs Portfolio Committee: 1 September 1998). Although 
the DP and IFP had their own motives for ensuring the autonomy of their communities, 
recent research on the ward committee system has identified the insufficient powers held 
by local councillors as a hindrance to its effectiveness (Benit-Gbaffou 2008).  
The purely ‘advisory’ role allocated to ward committees would indeed support the 
contention that they were never envisaged as providing a substantial degree of local 
control. Moreover, although White Paper discussions on aspects such as social housing drew 
on participatory traditions, Wooldridge noted that these debates took place quite 
separately from those on ward committees. She also added that the committee meetings in 
which debates about democracy and participation were taking place were often those 
considered less urgent (Interview: 12 March 2013). 
5.5.2. Informing, Consulting and Aspiring to Empower 
The Municipal Systems Act (2000) builds on the constitutional provision for communities to 
be involved in the matters of local government and to be encouraged to participate in 
policy-making (RSA 1996: Chapter 7). The Act sets out the local council’s duty to develop a 
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system of participatory governance; create conditions for the community to participate in 
municipal affairs; and build the community’s capacity to participate (RSA 2000: Chapter 4, 
Section 16). Worth noting, however, is that it is only the section of the Act which lists the 
rights of the community (rather than the duties of the council) that makes any reference to 
citizens contributing to decision-making processes (RSA 2000: Chapter 2, Section 5). As with 
the White Paper, no definition or elaboration is provided as to what ‘participating’ or 
‘contributing’ means.  
According to Theron and Ceasar (2008: 112-113), South Africa’s local government IDP 
strategy is based on the core values set out by IAP2. This includes the specification that 
public participation “is based on the belief that those who are affected by a decision have a 
right to be involved in the decision-making process” (IAP2 2007b). It also includes “the 
promise that the public’s contribution will influence the decision” and that their input will 
be actively sought (ibid.). IAP2 has also produced a ‘Spectrum of Public Participation’ not 
dissimilar to Arnstein’s ladder which includes the ascending categories of: inform, consult, 
involve, collaborate and empower (IAP2 2007a). From a reading of South Africa’s legislation 
on the ward participatory system, the notion of ‘participation’ conceived there seems to 
correlate to the IAP2 categories of ‘informing’ and ‘consulting’, as well as, in some instances, 
‘involving’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The DPLG’s National Policy Framework on Public Participation (2007), despite making 
continued reference to ‘empowering’ ward committees and communities, does not make 
use of ‘empowerment’ as a category of participation. Instead, it states that the legislation 
requires municipalities to either “inform”, “consult” or “involve” communities, depending 
on the type of communication required (ibid.: 45-6).  
Having said this, the document also asserts that municipalities must “empower and 
support” ward committees and IDP forums (2007: 13), while the overarching term “public 
participation” is understood to mean “an open, accountable process through which 
individuals and groups within selected communities can exchange views and influence 
Inform: “to provide the public with balanced and objective information to assist 
them in understanding the problem, alternatives, opportunities and/or 
solutions.” 
Consult: “to obtain public feedback on analysis, alternatives, and/or decisions.” 
Involve: “to work directly with the public throughout the process to ensure that 
public concerns and aspirations are consistently understood and considered.” 
SOURCE: IAP2 ‘Spectrum of Public Participation’, 2007. 
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decision-making” (ibid.: 15). ‘Involvement’ is understood by the DPLG to mean “an active 
working relationship between the public (represented by ward committees and stakeholder 
groups) and the municipality in order to ensure that concerns and issues raised by the 
community are directly reflected in the way the municipality deals with it” (2007: 48). In the 
DPLG’s interpretation, therefore, ‘involvement’ implies some community share in decision-
making processes.  
The National Guidelines for the Establishment and Operation of Municipal Ward 
Committees assert that ward committees should “ensure the active participation of the 
community in … decisions about the provision of municipal services; and decisions about by-
laws” (DPLG 2005b). Where citizens participate in the making of decisions and, most 
importantly, have influence over the decisions reached - in other words, their “concerns and 
aspirations are consistently understood and considered” (IAP2 2007) - then participation 
could be deemed as ‘involvement’. For Everatt (et al), participation fundamentally requires 
“the transfer of decision-making power and resource allocation decisions from state to 
citizens” (2010: 225). The DPLG’s ward committee handbook is more explicit than the 
municipal legislation in this regard, stating that the role of ward committees is not only to 
“raise issues of concern” but also “to have a say in decisions, planning and projects that the 
council or municipality undertakes” (DPLG & GTZ 2005a: 5). 
However, it is difficult to see how the mechanisms put forward for public participation are 
able to ‘empower’ communities in any real sense. Despite the DPLG’s claim to, at least, 
aspire to the ‘involvement’ of communities, the key mechanisms put forward for public 
participation - the ward committee and the IDP forum - do not carry decision-making 
powers. The ward committee is as “an advisory body” (DPLG 2005b) and the IDP forum is 
considered a “consultative forum and not a decision-making one” (DPLG 2007: 14). There is 
no detail in the DPLG’s Guidelines (2005b) as to what councils will ‘do’ with the input from 
residents, nor is there any explanation as to how this might constitute ‘involvement’ as the 
DPLG itself defines it. The effectiveness of participatory institutions in generating greater 
citizen control thus also depends on their relationship with the institutions of representative 
democracy. 
As such, despite the use of language indicating a more radical and empowering form of 
participation, Buccus (et al) argue that key legislation and policy frames public participation 
“mostly as consultation rather than formal empowerment” (2007: 3). Indeed, in certain 
instances only ‘informing’ is required, thus constituting a unidirectional communication 
channel from council to community. In line with this ‘consultative’ approach, municipalities 
are required to seek the input and views of the community but are not obliged to take on 
board their recommendations. Indeed, Sydney Mufamadi referred to the role of ward 
committees and the IDP as being one of consultation (Interview: 26 November 2012). 
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Understandably, the DPLG’s guidance and handbooks are more detailed about the role of 
ward committees than is municipal legislation. However, there is also a greater emphasis in 
the guidance and handbooks on the participation of ward committees in decision-making - 
something which is not so explicit in legislation. The training material for ward committees 
on public participation in local governance gives the sense that community participation via 
the ward committee can lead to a tangible degree of community control and influence. The 
training module for ward committees lists the benefits to the ward:  
“Citizen focused service delivery … [in which] the municipality responds to 
the needs of the community rather than imposes its ideas on the 
community; municipalities can tap into the resources in the community; 
communities have a wide range of skills and experience that can benefit 
the municipality; … the community develops ownership for the projects 
being implemented; … the community has a better understanding of a 
project and its objectives; … it makes the legislation to encourage public 
participation a reality” (DPLG & LGSETA 2007: 22).  
This training material, as well as other handbooks, has been compiled for the DPLG by NGOs 
such as EISA. It, again, taps into the idea of democracy as developmental and educative (c.f. 
Macpherson 1977 and Pateman 1970), thus producing citizens who are better informed and 
empowered. 
On the issue of citizen influence, Izimbizo are also relevant. The tradition of these ‘callings 
together’ can be traced back to the gatherings of communities and their leaders in pre-
colonial Africa. The imbizo, as present policy, thus brings together the indigenous tradition 
of the pre-colonial forum with contemporary governance processes in what Hartslief refers 
to as “a process of listening to the people, prior to decision-making” (2009: 330). In her 
research on the Presidential imbizo, Hartslief (2009) provides a particularly positive account 
of its effectiveness as a participatory mechanism, linking the ethos of the imbizo to the 
participatory tradition of the ANC itself, with particular reference to the 1955 COP.  
Analysis of the imbizo, however, reveals it to be more of a feedback mechanism than a 
forum that influences decision-making. Whereas the demands collated through the COP 
campaign served to inform the drafting of the Freedom Charter, views gathered at izimbizo 
provide feedback on existing delivery. They do not inform the design or content of a 
particular policy. Moreover, as argued in Chapter Two, the COP itself largely fulfilled a 
mobilising function. The process that Bernstein referred to, of “listening to and learning 
from the people” (1999: 150), did not signify any transference of decision-making powers or 
influence to participants themselves.   
The provincial Bua le Sechaba serves a similar function to the imbizo, acting as an “oversight 
mechanism” of delivery by provincial government (Mogale Interview: 9 April 2014). Bua le 
Sechaba does not seek feedback alone, however. Rather, it acts as a fact-finding exercise in 
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which the legislature’s committees gain an idea of the lay of the land in a particular 
community or setting, and people are “able to channel their concerns and issues to various 
committees” (ibid.). It also has a clearer process than izimbizo of tracking issues raised by 
the community, with a follow-up meeting one year later. The very same stakeholders will be 
present, as well as relevant government departments who provide a report-back to the 
community on how the issues they raised are being addressed (ibid.). 
The effectiveness with which the GPL conducts such activities is arguably related to scale 
and the greater proximity of provincial legislatures to their residents. Moreover, while the 
provincial legislatures are required constitutionally “to facilitate public involvement” (RSA 
1996: Section 118), this is not a constitutional requirement of the executive: the presidential 
izimbizo are conducted on a non-statutory basis. Hartslief’s analysis of the imbizo seems to 
somewhat overestimate its potential to serve an educative and empowering function. She 
describes the expression of the public’s views as “significant forces of influence” (2009: 
335). Yet by virtue of being a method of garnering feedback from communities, participation 
is essentially tagged onto the end of the policy process, providing government with an 
evaluating mechanism subsequent to both design and implementation.  
Arguably, of course, provision for citizens to influence policy design lies elsewhere, for 
example in the requirement on national government to encourage and facilitate public 
comment on draft policies. However mechanisms such as public hearings and consultations 
on draft policy are not themselves especially radical, nor do they grant citizens any degree 
of control. In and of itself, the imbizo does not constitute a decision-making forum. 
Community feedback may assist government departments to guide their future 
programmes and priorities but this is by no means guaranteed, nor is there a consistent 
system of accountability and follow-up after an imbizo takes place.  
Kondlo argues that to render the imbizo more effective as an instrument of participatory 
governance, “attention [must] be given to design and content issues first, and then 
coordination, follow-up and implementation” (2010: 384). Former civic activist and SANCO 
leader Thozamile Botha, who became Deputy Director General in the DPLG between 1994 
and 1997, remarked that the people’s parliaments currently held by the executive branch 
are not comparable to what he had in mind as ‘people’s assemblies’ during discussions on 
the local government model (Interview: 14 April 2014). He remarked: “those people’s 
parliaments, they just go, brief people, make political statements and, of course, people are 
able to ask questions. I don’t know in reality what happens to that” (ibid.).  
On the other hand, former Premier of Gauteng, Paul Mashatile, who undertook izimbizo 
amongst communities in the province, views them as an important method of public 
participation (Interview: 21 February 2013). He did recognise weaknesses in the system, 
however, emphasising the need for izimbizo to be better developed as empowering 
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mechanisms - an approach which again reflects a desire for state and society to work 
together:  
“[Izimbizo] must be designed not just as complaint sessions. I think we 
must be able to say to people. ‘Yes, we hear you but what do you think 
should be done? What do you think your role is?’ I think we must find a 
way of using them to empower the communities rather than waiting for 
government to deliver” (Interview: 21 February 2013).  
Mashatile’s comment speaks to numerous strands of participatory discourse: the centrality 
of governance; the role of partnership between state and society; the importance of 
empowerment rather than passivity; and government’s preference for constructive input 
and support from citizens rather than merely ‘complaints’. State-initiated mechanisms for 
participation are designed to facilitate such structured input. At the provincial and national 
level, there are mechanisms other than izimbizo to provide for citizen participation. 
Although they may not involve the same degree of unmediated contact between 
government and people, these alternatives may be more effective in achieving public 
influence over policy.  
In the case of the national assembly, parliamentary committees have oversight over the 
national executive and national government departments, while provincial legislative 
committees have oversight over the provincial executive and provincial government 
departments. The committee system provides public hearings on draft bills, as well as 
consultations in which the public are invited to make written or oral submissions. It is 
notable that Sydney Mufamadi, reflecting on the principle that ‘the people shall govern’, 
referred to its practical application by drawing on the public consultations held by 
government departments and parliamentary committees during the process of drafting 
policy (Interview: 26 November 2012). He also viewed the role of civil society in 
participatory democracy as taking place through such processes as public comment and 
input on published bills (ibid.). However, citizen influence in consultations may vary and it is 
not clear to what extent views submitted by the public, as individuals or organised groups, 
will be incorporated in policy development. As Arnstein argues “if consulting … is not 
combined with other modes of participation … [it]… is still a sham since it offers no 
assurance that citizen concerns and ideas will be taken into account” (1969: 219).  
At the provincial level, a good example of the consultation process can be found in the GPL’s 
public petitions process. The Petitions Act (2002) “encourages the people of Gauteng to 
petition and make submissions to the Petitions Standing Committee of the GPL” (GPL 2011: 
27). This process allows citizens to petition the legislature on particular issues within its 
jurisdiction and allows the public to access the oversight function of the legislature. When 
petitions are raised around issues such as housing or municipal billing, for example, the 
Petitions Committee will bring together the relevant municipal authorities and managers, as 
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well as the affected community. The Committee also has the power to subpoena structures 
that do not comply (Interview, Mogale: 9 April 2013). In addition to receiving submissions 
from the public, the Committee also undertakes public hearings in communities on a 
quarterly basis (ibid.). 
Via the GPL, citizens can also petition their local authority. According to Tiragalo Mogale, 
who heads the Public Participation and Petitions Unit at the GPL, local authorities in the 
province have responded positively and take the petitions process “very seriously” (ibid.). In 
addition to assisting walk-in cases where people wish to make a petition in person, the Unit 
runs workshops to educate people about the petitions process. In the GPL’s Public 
Participation Strategy, educating the public and generating greater knowledge about how 
citizens can participate in legislative processes appears to be a key priority (GPL 2011: 20).  
At first, public consultations and hearings would seem to be a less radical model of 
democracy than the local government ward committee which provides for regular, 
structured contact between councillor and community. However the ward committee is an 
advisory body only and there is no guarantee that its input will be taken on board by the 
municipal council. In contrast, the GPL’s Public Participation Strategy, which draws on the 
IAP2 core values, asserts not only “that those who are affected by a decision have a right to 
be involved in the decision-making process” but also that “public participation includes the 
promise that the public’s contribution will influence the decision” [emphasis added] (2011: 
11). One of the objectives of the petitions process is that “policy imperatives should be 
derived from lodged petitions” (GPL 2011: 27).  
Interestingly, the GPL’s strategy document makes reference to the example of Porto Alegre 
in Brazil as a model of citizen participation in budget formulation (GPL 2011: 16-17; Mogale 
Interview: 9 April 2013). The budgeting process in Gauteng may be a far cry from the Porto 
Alegre model where citizens have substantial influence and responsibilities in the budgeting 
process. In South Africa, public recommendations on budget priorities are sought but the 
degree and scope of participation is not especially extensive. Nonetheless, the GPL asserts 
that “the committee report on the budget vote must reflect public inputs during hearings 
and other public participation activities [emphasis added] (2011: 25). It adds that “the public 
act as a source of verification on budget priorities in line with service delivery priorities” but 
also that the public “develop recommendations for future budget priorities” (ibid.: 26).  
The GPL also undertakes sector parliaments to inform policy-making processes “as part of 
channelling issues and interests within different sectors of society” (ibid.: 28). Sectors 
include women, youth, workers, senior citizens and the disabled. Due to sector parliaments 
themselves not having an ‘official status’, it is required that their “resolutions … be tabled in 
the House, by the relevant committee for adoption”. Issues raised by sector parliaments 
must then be “factored into the committee processes” (ibid.: 28-9). In this sense, comparing 
the GPL’s initiative to IAP2’s spectrum of participation, it could potentially constitute a form 
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of ‘involvement’ in which elected institutions “work directly with the public throughout the 
process to ensure that public concerns and aspirations are consistently understood and 
considered” (IAP2 2007a).  
Overall the public participation strategy of the GPL falls in line with the legislature’s own 
oversight role of legislative implementation and delivery. However it is also guided by 
principles of openness, transparency, accountability and oversight. In a sense, these 
provincial-level mechanisms allow for citizen initiative and explicitly seek citizen input for 
incorporation into policies, plans and budgets. The GPL’s strategy describes participation as 
“a process wherein people exercise their collective and individual initiatives to promote 
their interests in decision-making” (2011: 13). It includes the premise of both the 
“strengthening of participatory democracy” and “a need to allow citizens, especially the 
disadvantaged and marginalised, to be heard on issues that affect them” (ibid.). 
At the same time, despite their stated ambitions, some policy documentation reflects a 
failure to distinguish between the different types of participation offered. The GPL, for 
example, lumps the Thusong Service Centres together with the ward committee and imbizo 
as forms of “extended engagement, access and participation” (GPL 2011: 19). While ward 
committees and izimbizo have their own limitations as participatory forums, the Thusong 
Service Centres are not a forum for participatory democracy in any sense. They are rather 
designed as accessible, one-stop community centres that can assist citizens to access 
government services. While constituting a valuable initiative in itself, there is no suggestion 
that these centres involve community participation in policy or decision-making processes. 
Rather, they “aim to empower the poor and disadvantaged through access to information, 
services, resources and technology” (Office of the Presidency 2010: 30).  
Although both national and provincial policy draws on democratic and development theory, 
there is little recognition that certain mechanisms do not so much represent forms of 
participatory democracy, as they do mechanisms for consultation or merely information. 
Participation is, in this case, truncated and fails to involve any real degree of citizen control, 
delegated power or partnership. 
5.5.3. Partnership 
5.5.3.1. Partnership: Legitimation and Consensus 
A further role of the ward committee is its function as an interface between community and 
council: “an institutionalised channel of communication and interaction between 
communities and municipalities” (DPLG & GTZ 2005b: 20). The DPLG’s policy framework, in 
fact promotes a shift in focus from citizens as passive recipients, toward communities 
working in partnership with the municipality: “What this framework advocates is a 
partnership approach between citizens and government, moving to citizens represented by 
ward committees having recognised powers, with delegated responsibilities. In other words, 
219 
 
we are aiming to move beyond a rhetoric of participation, to practical means of 
empowering citizens to take charge of their own development, in partnership with 
government” (2007: 17).  
On the ‘partnership’ rung of Arnstein’s ladder, power is “redistributed through negotiation 
between citizens and powerholders. They agree to share planning and decision-making 
responsibilities through such structures as joint policy boards, planning committees and 
mechanisms for resolving impasses” (1969: 221). In other words, citizen and government 
work together. IAP2 instead use the term ‘collaborate’, meaning “to partner with the public 
in each aspect of the decision” (2007), an idea which aligns with international discourse on 
good governance generally. 
It is not clear, however, that the partnership envisaged between community and council fits 
the notion of shared decision-making. Existing research suggests that it veers toward a 
method of legitimating decisions already taken, rather than ceding real influence to 
communities. In Everatt (et al’s) research on the IDP process in Gauteng, one IDP 
coordinator referred to public participation as lending “legitimacy to the plans the city puts 
on the table” (cited in 2010: 227-8), a comment which suggests that what is sought is not 
the community’s input but their endorsement of the council’s plans. It was also noted that 
“[the IDP is] important for us because we need to enforce the things we bring on the table” 
(ibid.: 2010: 228). 
This raises issues about the type of participation taking place. Everatt (et al) link the IDP to a 
‘corporatist’ style approach in which the value of public participation is the legitimacy it 
lends to development processes and initiatives (ibid.). The mere occurrence of a public 
participation exercise may be taken as validation from the community of the municipality’s 
plans. It also highlights a form of democracy based on the achievement of consensus. 
Consensus-based democracy is by no means undemocratic, and one might argue that for 
the participatory planning processes to work, a level of consensus or agreement is 
fundamental.  
However, if a participatory process either limits or skips the deliberative stage, while still 
seeking consensus¸ participation may simply be consultation or even tokenism. What 
manifests then is a unitary form of democracy - a model whose logic, Mansbridge argues, is 
based on the existence of a collective who have identical or common interests (1983: 24-
27). Where interests collide, then ensuring that all participants have equal influence over 
decision-making is all the more important. In a unitary model, decisions may be taken prior 
to the participatory forum itself or by those who hold greater power or influence. 
Mansbridge also highlights how participants may then feel unable to challenge or oppose 
what is purportedly in the ‘common interest’ (1983).  
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Critics have therefore highlighted participatory democracy’s tendency to minimise the 
conflict inherent to democracy by treating people/participants as a homogenous whole 
(see, e.g. Mouffe 2000). During the hearings on the Local Government White Paper, one 
participant highlighted as problematic the IDP model’s assumption “[of] a shared view about 
what needs to be done and what is the common goal” (Constitutional Affairs Portfolio 
Committee, 22 April 1998). Dominique Wooldridge, reflecting on the local government 
green paper process, remarked that it had been very participatory and that everybody got 
to comment on it (Interview: 12 March 2013). When it came to the white paper, however, 
she remarked that “participation was much more structured and things were kept much 
more in the ANC caucus; like real debate. We’d kind of decide what to say before a public 
thing not at a public thing. And it became more of a policy process” (ibid.). 
Returning again to the IDP, informing communities of municipal budgets and development 
plans is imperative. It enables citizens to exercise their right to participation in an informed 
manner. However, this does not in itself guarantee community ownership or control. Part of 
the discourse of participation in the ward-based planning model highlights low expectations 
amongst policy makers and practitioners as to the capacity of communities to provide input. 
Issues such as low literacy levels, for example, present an enormous challenge to the 
engagement of communities in exercises like participatory budgeting - a factor which 
reinforces Mufamadi’s comment that citizens’ right to participate is not “self-enforcing” 
(Interview: November 2012). 
Illiteracy amongst communities presents a genuine obstacle to participation, and is not 
something municipalities can rectify overnight. Yet there is also some evidence that the 
value of citizen input is not appreciated. Everatt (et al’s) research on the IDP in Gauteng 
revealed how the process was sometimes seen as little more than an obligation, undertaken 
only due to legal requirement. Interestingly, this view is reflected not only amongst 
municipal officials but amongst communities themselves (2010: 227-9). As such the 
underlying philosophy that “development … is about active involvement and growing 
empowerment” (ANC 1994a) is undermined, not only by emphases on participation qua 
consultation but by the presence of a view of participation as obligatory.  
In other cases, officials may be more vehemently dismissive of public input, seeing it as 
incidental to the planning process. Buccus et al (2008: 302) note the opinion amongst some 
council officials that “they know what people want and therefore participation is not 
necessary”. A ‘top official’ in one municipality is quoted as saying “we know what people’s 
needs are, and what they will be for the next 100 years, only the rank order will change” 
(ibid). This highlights not only the primacy placed on experts but also traits of elitist 
democracy in which public participation is viewed as leading to instability and poor policy 
choices. Indeed, the above quote reflects the sentiment that ‘government know best’. 
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In light of this, it is encouraging that Everatt et al’s research on the IDP revealed that, for 
some officials, “the democratizing potential of participation held the most attraction” (2010: 
229). This perhaps shows that targeted guidance for municipalities, emphasising the values 
and objectives of participation, and not just the methods, can indeed pay off. The DPLG 
Ward Committee Resource Book, compiled by Idasa and Afesis-Corplan, in fact emphasised 
that “these strong policy provisions for public participation will only be translated into 
reality once they are broadly known to citizens and there is increasing awareness of the 
existence and practical value of ward committees” [emphasis added] (DPLG & GTZ 2005b).  
It is also possible that broader city or district development objectives sit uneasily with the 
needs articulated by communities. Rashid Seedat, citing the example of the City of Joburg 
where he was Director of the unit responsible for strategic planning, including the IDP, gave 
the following example: 
“Every other ward is asking for a skills development hub; it’s just really a 
reaction to the jobs crisis. And so people think if you build a skills building 
where you can train people in this or that then you will solve the 
unemployment problem. Well it doesn’t quite work that way. But people 
believe that and that’s why they will push for that. But on the other hand if 
you invest R250 million in improving the public transport system, which 
you can’t pinpoint to a particular ward but you’re improving the overall 
efficiency of the economy, you actually make a bigger impact in terms of 
investment and so on; you make your city more conducive to investment. 
So you have to constantly balance those things” (Interview: 20 May 2013). 
This again points to the challenge of civic education around citizen participation, and the 
difficulties of balancing the demands of public sector performance (which may require the 
input of experts) with those of participation by ordinary citizens. 
5.5.3.2. Partnership: Cooperation and Support 
Just as guidance provided by the DPLG is intended to support municipal councillors, officials 
and ward committee members with the effective establishment and running of ward 
committees, so too is civic education important for citizens to play a partnership role with 
government. In a discussion of participation, Sydney Mufamadi placed the onus for civic 
education, in part, on South Africa’s Chapter Nine institutions (Interview: 26 November 
2012). These institutions, which include bodies such as the South African Human Rights 
Commission and Public Protector, are indeed pivotal in the promotion and protection of 
human rights. However, Mufamadi was also concerned that they should support and assist 
the state, rather than just act as a watchdog: 
“You have in the constitution, what you call ‘Chapter Nine institutions’ 
which exercise some sort of oversight over the activities of the state and 
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so on. I always say these institutions must not see their role as one of just 
watching and recording whether the state is behaving according to the 
norms and the dictates of the constitution. They must also ask themselves 
whether they have a role to play in educating the people to be in a 
position to hold state organs to account for what they do” (ibid.). 
Mufamadi also placed responsibility on citizens themselves. While recognising the 
infrastructural and service demands of communities as entirely legitimate, he remarked on 
citizens’ “obligation to know what resources actually are at the disposal of these 
authorities”, adding that “it’s not only about what should be done but by what means” 
(ibid.). Notably, when asked about his view of the role of participation in local government 
within the broader scheme of South Africa’s democracy, Mufamadi’s emphasis was on the 
importance of people understanding the limitations on resources (and how to budget and 
prioritise accordingly), rather than on the democratic value of participation per se.  
A discernible thread in the policy discourse of participation is thus the emphasis on citizens 
working with the state and not against it. This push for cooperation, however takes two 
forms: the first stems from the technocratic and performance-driven emphasis of NPM in 
which issues of development are depoliticised and controlled by experts. As highlighted 
earlier with respect to DLG, citizen involvement in decision-making is confined to the most 
local of issues: questions of strategic and ideological direction are not for popular debate 
but fall, rather, in the remit of central government.  
In addition to this, a second current has emerged in which the limited capacity of the state 
itself has generated renewed interest on the part of the government in local-level initiative 
and community organisation. The ANC has expressed its unease at the rise of what have 
been commonly termed ‘service delivery protests’ (ANC 2012a: 15). Former Mayor of 
Joburg, Amos Masondo, remarked on the more cooperative role that citizens should play 
alongside government. While emphasising the importance of strong civil society formations, 
he also argued that it would be more effective if civil society engaged with the question of 
how it could help government, rather than just criticise it:  
“Civil society can’t just become a voice that’s critical of government.  There 
must be an answer to the question: what is the developmental role, or 
what is the role of civil society on the question of development? So that 
whilst you criticise you are also seen to be practically engaging with all the 
issues … I don’t think that part of the work is getting enough kind of focus, 
because you can’t just be critical. I’m not saying that role shouldn’t be 
played by civil society. But they should also be saying ‘how do we help 
government?’ Or ‘how do we ourselves point out the way in government 
by doing certain practical work and engaging in broader society’?” 
(Masondo Interview: 13 March 2013). 
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Yunus Carrim also referred to organisations such as NGOs and CBOs as constituting ‘organs 
of people’s power’, which he viewed as: “Any organisation whether national or local or 
provincial which actually seeks to advance the needs and interests of people on the ground 
who are disadvantaged” (Interview: 16 January 2013). He also recognised the role of extra-
state methods of participation, such as community protest, as a non-institutionalised form 
of participation that “municipalities are forced to come to terms with” (ibid.). However, 
while noting that there is value to protest, Carrim remarked that “it would be more 
productive and they would be able to achieve far more if they also used state structures 
beside their own” (ibid.). Paul Mashatile also referred to the ANC’s 2009 election slogan, 
‘Working Together’, as signifying the desire “to move away from the notion that 
government delivers to you whilst you are sitting. We want to say to citizens, ‘no, this is 
partnership, let’s work together to do all these things’” (Interview: 21 February 2013). 
There is also some encouragement - perhaps even nostalgia - for a form of ‘partnership’ in 
which government delivery is supplemented by forms of community self-help so prevalent 
in the 1980s. Mashatile, who was an activist in AYCO and later MEC for Safety in Gauteng, 
reflected on the impact of civil society’s demobilisation after 1990:  
“I think that demobilisation of your civil society movement was not 
deliberate. But I think once we started grappling with governance I think 
there were weaknesses there; we were not able to maintain the balance 
so a lot of things shifted into governance and government and so on ... I 
think we need to be gradually assisting to ensure very vibrant organs of 
civil society; I think that’s what we need because I think, sooner than we’re 
there, we realised that government can’t do everything on its own and 
that reality has dawned now to say that, you know, we need organs of civil 
society. We need people, because they will assist to get people involved, 
rather than people going out and then there’s service delivery protests. 
Protest will always be there but you need a greater appreciation of people 
that this is also our responsibility to change the conditions and lives in our 
communities (Mashatile, Interview: 21 February 2013). 
He linked the importance of a role for civil society to the introduction of structures such as 
constituency offices and ward committees but also to citizens’ responsibility to help 
themselves. He went on to give an example of his own involvement in private fundraising 
initiatives for university education in Alexandra, where the message to communities was 
that “there are things we can do on our own” (ibid.). Mashatile linked this type of initiative 
to the self-organising ethos of the 1980s: 
“Government can put money to schools, assist with bursaries but we can 
also do it ourselves. So we go, we do fundraising, go out there, business 
people come, we raise funds ... And it’s that kind of spirit that is required 
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in our communities today because when we started with organs of 
people’s power in the years of struggle it was more, we, the people, can 
do it, and we must not lose that” (ibid.). 
Another mechanism for participatory governance, this time at the national level, is NEDLAC - 
a statutory, tripartite corporatist arrangement (of government, labour and business - plus in 
South Africa’s case community organisations) to consider all proposed labour legislation and 
any significant changes to social and economic policy before it is introduced in Parliament 
(RSA 1994: Sections 5.1 and 5.2). Friedman observes that “those who are afforded a role in 
governance in this model are not being given a voice - because they are organised, they 
already have one. They are rather offered an opportunity to express that voice directly to 
the government and other key interests in officially sanctioned channels and in ways which 
give them a guaranteed say in policy” (2006: 4).  
The very emergence of NEDLAC can be traced to the desire to resolve the historically 
antagonistic relations between labour and capital in South Africa through the development 
of a social contract and a strategy of ‘strategic unionism’. Then editor of the South African 
Labour Bulletin, Karl von Holdt, described strategic unionism as “a step-by-step program of 
radical reforms — each of which extends the arena of democratic decision-making, and 
deepens the power of the working class" (1992, cited in Habib 1997: 63). NEDLAC is thus 
more than merely consultative. Representatives of labour and business are invited to join 
the policy making process itself.  
Parallels can be seen here with the model of DLG: just as initiatives such as the ward 
committee and IDP reflect an increasing role for civil society and a shift away from top-down 
development, so does corporatism embody the ethos of state-society partnership 
characteristic of good governance generally. Simultaneously (and conveniently) it also 
complements the post-1994 government’s own focus on national reconciliation and unity. 
Habib notes that NEDLAC’s establishment was rooted in the attempt to establish a 
‘cooperative’ policy-making process that would bring together “the three contending 
actors” and foster efforts “to consolidate national unity, reconciliation, and development” 
(1997: 65).  
However, it is for these very reasons that corporatism has not been without criticism. It has 
not produced the radical form of working class power that its advocates in the labour 
movement might have hoped. The corporatist model is premised on the achievement of 
consensus. Friedman thus links its rationale to the recognition by governments that its goals 
cannot be achieved without the “acquiescence to or active support of organized private 
constituencies” (2006: 4). Corporatism’s rationale is thus the desire for societal cooperation 
and support for government objectives. Formally corporatist arrangements like NEDLAC 
may therefore be utilised as legitimating mechanisms or provide endorsement of policy 
proposals merely by virtue of the organised interests being present. This is perhaps 
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comparable to the corporatist characteristics of IDP in which the value of public 
participation is the legitimacy it lends to the initiatives proposed by government (Everatt el 
al, 2010: 228)  
Friedman explains corporatism’s logic as follows: 
“The implicit or explicit expectation is that the organizations invited to 
participate will support decisions to which they are party – and will be able 
to bind their constituents to agreements. These arrangements, often 
justified as vehicles for enhancing values such as ‘social partnership’ and 
co-operation in the common interest are pragmatic devices to prevent 
resistance by, and induce co-operation from, organized interest groups” 
(2006: 4). 
It is thus argued that corporatism is one method adopted by the ANC government to 
“neutralise opposition” to the new neo-liberal economic order (Habib 1997: 70-1). 
Moreover, NEDLAC is designed as a consensus-seeking structure, intended “[to] conclude 
agreements on matters pertaining to social and economic policy” (RSA 1994, Section 5.1). 
The contention that NEDLAC contributes to the deepening of democracy thus runs up 
against the same critique as participation in local government: citizen influence is confined 
to shaping social and economic policy within the existing ideological paradigm. 
Via NEDLAC, democracy may be broadened through the incorporation of organised groups. 
But the depth of their participation does not extend to delegated powers or control. While 
participatory democracy is regarded as being able to achieve both citizen empowerment 
and more efficient and sustainable development, Friedman notes that “there is an 
important difference between corporatism’s concern to include organized groups in 
decisions so that they can bind their constituency to them and the assertion that people 
need to be heard so that their preferences will be known to planners and policy-makers” 
(2006: 5). As a participatory decision-making body, it is not clear that NEDLAC is premised 
on the latter.    
The final structure for consideration here, whose role implies a form of partnership, is the 
CPF. The SAPS Act (1995) embraced a more extensive notion of consultation than that set 
out by the DPLG, advocating instead the idea of ‘partnership’ and ‘cooperation’ between 
communities and the police service (RSA 1995: Section 18.1). The Community Policing Policy 
Framework and Guidelines (1997) defined community policing “in terms of a collaborative, 
partnership-based approach to local level problem solving” (Pelser 1999: 4). 
Similarly to the ward committee, there is a link between the community activist traditions of 
the 1980s and the idea of community policing as a form of crime prevention, emphasising 
“decentralized command, and community involvement” (Gordon 2001: 127). Gordon 
suggests that “the early proponents of CPFs were largely scholars and NGO representatives 
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outside the government, many of them former activists in the antiapartheid struggle” (ibid.). 
A tradition which fed into the community policing model was thus “a vision of democratic 
policing as a more communitarian process” (ibid.: 131). This, Gordon argues, was based on 
the “long tradition of organized self-help in many black communities” (ibid.). It also 
reflected the conceptual strand of people’s power in which political democracy was 
fundamentally linked to the development of grassroots participation and institutions. 
In this sense, the model of community policing builds not only on historic activist traditions 
in South Africa but also on revised approaches to local government in which democratic 
governance is about ‘problem-solving’ and developing “our collective capacity” (Cohen & 
Sabel 1997 cited in Stoker 2002: 32). The 1997 Policy Framework and Guidelines also include 
‘empowerment’ amongst its core characteristics, defining this as “the creation of joint 
responsibility and capacity for addressing crime” (ibid.). This element of the policy speaks to 
radical democratic debates about the transformative nature of democracy, as well as its 
potential to be self-enforcing through the creation of publicly-minded citizens.  
Parallels in the intellectual heritage of CPFs and DLG extend further to include the notion of 
governance associated with NPM. In line with the growing trend of state-society 
partnerships and the role of the state as a facilitator of development, rather than a 
deliverer, Pelser suggests that the idea of community policing “corresponds with the 
distinctive features of the neo-liberal model of community policing as it evolved in Western 
Europe, particularly in the United Kingdom” (1999: 5). Drawing on research by Shearing and 
McMahon (1998), he highlights the two “distinguishing features” of this model as, firstly, 
the “change in definition of the police from a ‘force’ to a ‘service’ … [including] … the 
development of ‘consultative forums’ designed to permit communities to make their 
policing concerns known”; and, secondly, “the re-conception of the police as people who 
enable communities to solve their own problems rather than as people who solve problems 
on their own” (cited in Pelser 1999: 5). 
As such, Shearing and McMahon highlight that the neo-liberal agenda is encapsulated in the 
principles of: policing being shifted to “the civic realm”; “the use of non-state resources and 
knowledge”; and the rise of the private security sector (1998 cited in Pelser 1999: 5). They 
describe the South African approach as a partnership in which the state is “steering” and 
civil society/communities “rowing” (ibid.). Former MEC for Safety in Gauteng, Paul 
Mashatile expressed his support and encouragement of the CPF initiative as something that 
citizens could do to take initiative themselves: “to empower the communities rather than 
waiting for government to deliver” (Interview: 21 February 2013).  
Although CPFs are not structures of DLG, they reflect a similar idea of bottom-up 
development alongside a more efficient and effective state. It is possible to see how 
participatory democracy is understood by policy makers as serving multiple purposes. 
Lechesa Tsenoli, Chairperson of the NLGNF and later of the CoGTA Portfolio Committee, 
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when asked whether structures such as ward committees, SGBs and CPFs represent 
contemporary ‘organs of people’s power’, replied: 
“In a sense, yes. Yes, in other words, structures in which people 
themselves drive change; they define their agenda, they define its 
implementation, they define it's monitoring and evaluation. That's what 
we had in mind, because we recognised the state on its own would not be 
adequate for the task of dealing with people's problems in that area, 
without active involvement and participation of those organs of people’s 
power, structures that involve citizens effectively engaging in that work” 
[emphasis added] (Interview: 11 March 2013). 
Tsenoli’s understanding thus drew not only on a notion of development as people-driven 
but also recognised the limitations of the state-as-deliverer. Therefore while inspired by past 
experiences of popular power, it is also not uncomplementary to the performance-driven 
trend which seeks an alternative to top-down, state-driven development initiatives. Organs 
of people’s power are thus not understood only as government-initiated structures. Both 
Tsenoli and Carrim placed emphasis on the citizen/civil society component as crucial to 
present-day structures of people’s power (Tsenoli, Interview: 11 March 2013; Carrim, 
Interview: 16 January 2013). 
However, Gordon highlights an additional problem in the South African case. He argues that, 
contrary to the policy intent of the partnership-based model of policing, “once the 
legitimacy of the new government has been established the imperative of regime 
performance carries more weight than the need to deepen democracy” (2001: 121). The 
practice of participation thus comes up against citizens’ own expectations of delivery. As 
such, the model of community policing has veered more towards its function as an 
assistance to the police - “gathering intelligence and improving public relations” (ibid.: 131) - 
rather than as the “arena of local democracy” that activists and scholars had envisaged 
(ibid). The battle between radicalism and realism once again rears its head.  
Arguably, policy documents on CPFs, despite what their drafters may have intended, reflect 
the CPF’s role as an assistant to the police. The structures certainly reflect an important 
means of citizen involvement in safety and crime-reduction. However they are not 
presented in legislation as democratic mechanisms or as a means of democratising local 
policing. They are, in the main, a method of tackling crime and improving police-community 
relations. In fact, the failure since 1994 to reduce South Africa’s crime rate has exacerbated 
the shift toward focusing on police performance and tougher crime-fighting rather than on 
police-community partnerships (ibid.: 134-5). As with DLG, policing has become subject to 
the dual demands of performance and democracy: between reducing crime and ensuring 
public safety; and facilitating a process in which citizens and police collaborate and share 
responsibility for community safety.  
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In this context it is understandable that, much like the ward committee, the exigencies of 
public sector performance may render CPFs a legitimising structure which makes for good 
public relations while ticking the box of community consultation. Moreover, much like other 
participatory structures, the application of the notion of ‘community’ is not unproblematic 
(cf. Mohan 2001). It assumes that ‘a community’ is constituted of homogenous interests, 
and that those representing community members are able to speak for and articulate the 
interests of all rather than the few (Pelser 1999: 6). Nonetheless, the educative and 
upskilling potential of structures like the CPF should not be dismissed. Community forums 
for consultation and partnership can develop administrative and organisational skills 
amongst participants which can be replicated in other contexts, both public and private. 
Having analysed the forms of partnership entailed in the preceding mechanisms, it is 
possible to conceive of it in three senses. In the first, as defined by Arnstein (1969) and IAP2 
(2007a), ‘partnership’ is a form of collaboration involving the sharing or redistributing of 
power between state and citizens. Influence over decision-making is shared and citizen 
input is substantial. Importantly, it implies a partnership between equals such that each side 
holds equal right to influence the decision-making process and is equally able to access that 
right. This version of partnership is reflected in some of the DPLG’s documentation on 
participatory governance which makes reference to shared responsibility and control. It falls 
short, however, of criteria for really empowering communities or institutionalising the 
mechanisms to make their ‘influence’ a reality.  
In the second version, civil society’s role is not only that of watchdog but of support and 
cooperation. Where there is dissatisfaction, civil society structures have a duty to support 
government in its delivery. This may be done through assistance and cooperation with state 
structures to improve existing programmes, and/or by providing informed 
recommendations and suggestions to government rather than merely criticism. This form of 
participation is envisaged as taking place primarily through state-invited structures. The 
onus is placed on civil society not only to take advantage of the structures provided but also 
to assist the state in furthering civic education. An example of such partnership can be seen 
in the corporatist-type models of NEDLAC and the IDP, as well as in the arena of community 
policing.  Indeed, the strands of participatory policy in South Africa which advocate a form of 
partnership fall mostly within this second category.    
Thirdly, partnership can be understood in the sense of self-help. Here, communities and civil 
society organisations are understood as needing to ‘do their bit’ through taking initiative 
and finding their own methods of development and access to resources. This current draws 
partly on a long-standing tradition of ‘doing things for oneself’. The spirit and practice of 
self-help and community organising, as chapter three highlighted, constituted a visible 
strand of people’s power. Moreover as Mashatile’s comments imply, there is increasing 
recognition on the part of government that to address development challenges the 
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command of state power on its own is insufficient. This third category also complements 
trends in mainstream development which advocate greater reliance on market-driven 
development initiatives. It draws not only on citizens’ responsibilities in partnership with the 
state but on the growing attraction of privatisation and the use of non-state resources in the 
advancement of development.  
5.5.4. Confined Citizen Control 
Although NEDLAC, CPFs and SGBs constitute sector-specific structures for participation, 
SGBs are addressed separately here by virtue of the type of participation involved. SGBs, 
introduced from 1996 as a method of democratising schooling, are constituted by parents, 
teachers and learners (ibid.: 329). Karlsson remarks that the inclusion of students, via a 
Learner’s Representative Council (LRC), gives school learners an opportunity to “experience 
democracy in student affairs” and “to engage in democratic structures” (2002: 329). SGBs 
thus provide greater control by the school’s community, as well as nurturing the ‘educative’ 
and developmental benefits of democracy highlighted by Pateman (1970) and Macpherson 
(1977).  
The DPLG’s National Policy Framework for Public Participation describes SGBs as being 
“legally responsible for the management of schools” (2007: 68). Notably, the earlier draft of 
this policy framework, referred to in some of the DPLG guidance, described SGBs as 
“[conforming] to the Self-Managing aspect of the Citizen Power in the ladder of 
participation” (sic) (2005a: 15). Analysis of the effectiveness of SGBs, however, suggests 
that, overall, participation serves the purposes of greater efficiency rather than democracy 
(Grant Lewis & Naidoo 2004: 108). Grant Lewis and Naidoo suggest that the SGB initiative is 
not translating into real empowerment of communities (ibid.). The setting of fees by SGBs - 
influenced by the socio-economic make-up of the parents - continues to reinforce existing 
patterns of exclusion (Karlsson 2002: 331). As such, while they may grant direct influence in 
decision-making to those who sit on the structure, Karlsson argues that there is no 
“mechanism for avoiding and overcoming a re-enactment of the traditional power relations 
in South Africa in terms of gender, class and race” (ibid.). In addition to the unintentional 
perpetuation of racial inequalities (ibid.; Grant Lewis & Naidoo 2004), good policy intentions 
in the remit of local schooling are hampered by the limited resources available to SGBs to 
tackle their development challenges (Karlsson 2002: 335). 
Importantly, although SGBs represent a form of direct participation in decision-making by 
the school’s stakeholders, like in the ward committee system it is confined to the most local 
level. SGBs are by nature sector specific, providing for public participation in the running of 
the school but not increasing citizen control of broader education policy.  
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5.6. Conclusion 
The variety of intellectual influences shaping policy on citizen participation, as well as the 
presence of conceptual tensions within and between these strands, attests to the value of 
studying the ideas underlying practice. This chapter has shown how some of the theoretical 
strands constituting people’s power continued into the post-1994 period through both 
radical democratic thought and historic participatory traditions. Conceptual continuity was 
also made possible by the continued involvement of individuals from the ANC and MDM 
who participated in policy formulation.  
In shaping the model of DLG and in the design of other institutionalised forms of citizen 
participation, policy also absorbed new theoretical influences, drawing on emerging local 
and international trends in development theory, planning and governance. Coinciding with 
these currents was the global ascendency of performance management, adopted by many 
Western governments and advocated by international organisations and donors. While 
governance and performance discourses provide some complement to citizen participation - 
encouraging bottom-up development, a greater role for civil society and a reduced role for 
the state - they also pose a challenge to the realisation of participatory democracy. Public 
sector efficiency and delivery are pitted against participation and democracy, depoliticising 
citizen influence and narrowing it to the most local level.    
Restriction of citizen influence to issues that do not challenge broader policy has ensured 
that ‘participation’ in the affairs of governing is confined predominantly to information, 
consultation and legitimation. In some instances, it is intended that citizens work in 
‘partnership’ with government. However this is often understood by the latter as 
constituting either public support for government programmes or the resurrection of self-
help traditions in which citizens further their own development rather than waiting for 
government to deliver.  
Simultaneously, the change in ideological milieu from the 1980s to 1990s brought with it 
new perspectives within the ANC about the possibility and desirability of institutionalised 
people’s power. Combined with the exigencies of governance and delivery, previously 
radical thinking about participation has been replaced by a creeping realism.  
Nonetheless, the public policy framework does provide for multi-interest mechanisms for 
participation by civil society which are intended to facilitate citizen influence. More recently-
published guidance on municipal participation draws particularly on democratic thinking 
rooted in empowerment, education and citizen agency. It is not clear, however, that this 
current is dominant. Strands of participatory discourse driven by performance and 
efficiency, as well as the confinement of citizen influence to non-ideological issues, 
undermines the potential for these empowering objectives to be realised. 
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CHAPTER 6  
Participation and Movement Discourse 
 
The previous chapter explored the theoretical and intellectual influences on the 
development of participatory democratic policy. The theoretical underpinnings and 
successful realisation of such policy, however, are not guided by this alone. Coinciding with 
and parallel to public policy discourse is a discourse of participation that emerges from the 
ANC as a movement. This discourse is identifiable not so much in official legislation, as in the 
discussion documents, statements and commentary of the ruling party itself. Thus although 
new theoretical influences have certainly shaped policy formulation, historic traditions, 
political conventions and organisational culture continue to play their part. 
The chapter examines the understanding of participation within the ANC. While there are 
some overlapping influences between this discourse and that reflected in public policy, 
there are also identifiable differences. The language and commentary of the ANC-as-
movement draws much more clearly on its national liberation character, resurrecting those 
strands of people’s power concerned with the notion of vanguardism. Although movement 
discourse is not analogous with legislation, it does not exist in isolation from it. The 
intellectual history and organisational culture of the ANC plays an important part in how 
policy is interpreted and practiced.  
The chapter begins by examining the ANC’s ‘mass’ character, drawing on the significance of 
its ‘national liberation movement’ heritage in the democratic era. It also identifies linkages 
between the historic identity of the ANC-as-vanguard, and the continued relevance and 
application of vanguardism post-1994. It goes on to examine how participatory spaces are 
understood by the ANC, as well as asking in what capacity the movement envisages citizens 
participating. The chapter closes by identifying the conceptual tensions and parallels 
identifiable in policy and movement discourse. It highlights the ongoing relevance and 
pervasiveness of vanguardism in contemporary ANC identity, as well as the way in which 
popular participation is linked not only to democracy but to the realisation of programmatic 
goals. As such, the revolutionary (or national democratic) objectives of the ANC-as-
movement trump the democratic objective of achieving popular empowerment.96  
6.1. From Building People’s Power to Building the ANC 
The constitutional and local government negotiations, as well as the subsequent process of 
policy formulation, took place in parallel with the re-building of the ANC. Until 1990, ANC 
structures inside South Africa had been either non-existent or underground. A key focus of 
the movement from 1990, and even more so from 1994, was rebuilding the organisation 
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 Some of the material presented in this chapter draws on a chapter published as a contribution to an edited 
book on mass parties. See Brooks Yung (2014).   
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and its leadership capacity. Efforts toward establishing organisational presence in 
communities and rebuilding an ANC “capable of assuming its historical role” (ANC 1997c) 
involved both the ANC and its Alliance partners. Given the overlap between the conduct of 
constitutional and local government negotiations and the rebuilding of the movement, it is 
of little surprise that ANC tradition - both organisational and ideological - penetrated policy 
discussion. At the centre of this movement tradition is the ANC’s relationship with the 
people.  
6.1.1. Vanguardism: Linking Movement and People 
“The ANC has to operate as a vanguard movement with political, 
ideological and organisational capacity to direct the state and give 
leadership to the motive forces in all spheres of influence and pillars of our 
transformation project” (ANC 2012a: 12). 
Into the post-1994 period, the ANC has continued to reiterate its role not only as a political 
party but also a mass movement. Its mass movement history shapes both its conception of 
democracy and its relationship with the people. The ANC’s 1997 document, ‘The Character 
of the ANC’, linked its movement identity to three historic factors: firstly, the desire to be “a 
movement of mass participation”; secondly, its tradition as a ‘broad church’ and ‘hegemonic 
organisation’; and thirdly the “style” in which it has functioned: “[attempting] to be a force 
for cohesion in the centre of a broad range of allied organisations, mass democratic and 
community based structures” (ANC 1997c). 
In light of these characteristics, and the longstanding objective that ‘the people shall 
govern’, the people themselves were envisaged as playing a role in rebuilding the ANC. As 
indicated in Chapter Four, however, the role of the civic movement in this respect was 
complex. Civics represented simultaneously part of the new ‘civil society’ and part of the 
broad movement of forces that historically identified with the ANC. In contrast to the 
dominant position put forward by the civics, in which they would act as autonomous 
safeguards of community interests and a check on government power (UDF 1990b; UDF - 
Border 1991: 2), the ANC’s Commission on Organisation Building in 1991 described the ANC-
civic relationship as follows: 
“Relations between ourselves and the civics in many areas are becoming 
strained. We need to remember that civics were created by the ANC at a 
time when there were few other legal formations. The fact that the ANC 
has been unbanned does not make the civics redundant. They have a 
crucial role in uniting the masses of our people across the political 
spectrum … Now there are tensions between the two and we need to 
provide discussion around the role of ANC members in civic structures in 
order to see that the civics are part of the broader democratic movement - 
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otherwise they can and will be used by other forces against the interests of 
the people” (ANC 1991c: 5). 
The document therefore made clear that, while civics could not be replaced by the ANC, 
their task should be one of building unity. Having, as this document claims, been “created by 
the ANC” (ibid), they must continue to be a part of the ANC-aligned movement. Elsewhere, 
the movement encouraged dual membership of both ANC and mass formations such as 
civics and trade unions (ANC Ismail Vadi Collection: undated). 
As the ANC sought to shift from a politics of resistance to one of reconstruction and nation-
building, it saw this as requiring renewal and innovation but also a continuation of its 
national liberation traditions (ANC undated c: 13).97 A 1991 political education document of 
the ANC commented:   
“- for the ANC to succeed in its goal of dismantling apartheid and building 
a democratic state in its place it needs to retain its broadness and unity …  
[A] central component of the ANC’s character must remain an identity 
with ‘the people’, to represent their aspirations and to involve them in 
active struggle for the creation of a new nation … [T]he ANC’s link to the 
masses is not only vital to its character but it is also essential to its strength 
both in the current period and under a democratic government where 
transformation will require the mobilisation of the energies of all South 
Africans” (ANC DPE 1991a). 
As per the ‘mass party’ typology originally theorised by Maurice Duverger (1964: 63), the 
ANC draws its strength and very raison d‘etre from its membership. Its link to the masses is 
what makes it more than a political party: “the power of the ANC lies in its mass base” (ANC 
DPE 1991a). Darraq insists that the membership of the ANC is “very strikingly and 
emotionally attached” to the organisation’s “national liberation movement character” 
(2008: 439).  
Yet in assuming the post-1994 ‘dual identity’ of both a party and a movement, the ANC 
embodies a complexity of characteristics and traditions for which a purely organisational 
party typology cannot necessarily account or explain.98 Chapter three of this thesis 
dedicated significant attention to the presence of a discourse of vanguardism. Vanguardism 
became increasingly prominent in ANC discourse after 1960 and can be identified in the 
theorisation of people’s power. The movement’s self-identification as ‘a vanguard’ reflects 
its dominant roots in both African nationalism and Marxism-Leninism. It is this heritage 
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 Although this document is undated, the reference to organisational challenges “over the past 5 years” since 
1990, suggests it was written c.1995. 
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 On the limitations of exclusively ‘organisational’ or ‘sociological’ classifications of parties see Gunther and 
Diamond (2003: 169-70). 
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which helps to explain the movement’s display of certain features reminiscent of a 
vanguard-type party, while aspiring to retain the broad ‘united front’ politics of a 
movement.99 
It was also argued in chapter three that the role of vanguard organisation is often 
overlooked in analyses of ANC identity. The relevance of vanguardism, however, is pertinent 
not only to its history as a liberation movement but to its ongoing role as a governing party. 
The ANC today continues to identify itself as a vanguard of the people - an organisation able 
to give revolutionary leadership to state and society. In various documents and statements, 
the ANC refers to itself directly as: “the vanguard of the liberation struggle” (Nzo 1991); “a 
vanguard movement” (ANC 2012a: 12); “the vanguard of the NDR” and of the “motive 
forces of the NDR” (ANC 1997b); and as “a vanguard movement for transformation” (ANC 
2012a: 67). The ANC’s perception of its vanguard status is also linked to its claim to an 
historic role and purpose. In 1991, Alfred Nzo stated: “we are honoured to be the vanguard 
of the liberation struggle. This has not been achieved by proclamation but by the 
correctness of our policies and by concrete actions” (1991: 28). 
On the question of participatory democracy, vanguardism’s relevance lies in the relationship 
with the people it implies. Most critically, vanguardism cannot be imposed. Instead it 
requires that the people themselves identify with and actively participate in the 
achievement of revolutionary objectives.100 The masses cannot be passive spectators but 
must be active participants: the ‘mobilisation’ of all their ‘energies’ is required (ANC DPE 
1991a). 
It was noted in Chapter Three that we must distinguish the ANC’s vanguard identity from 
that of the SACP. Communist Parties historically have identified themselves as the vanguard 
of the working class. Here the SACP is no exception, considering itself to be the vanguard 
party of the struggle for socialism. This is not something that the ANC disputes. However, 
while the ANC recognises the SACP as “the vanguard party of the working class” (ibid.: 57), it 
simultaneously understands itself to be the vanguard of the people. While the SACP is 
historically a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, at the head of the struggle for socialism, the 
ANC is the vanguard of the NDR. Although there is no inherent conflict between these roles, 
there is perhaps a degree of tension. It is arguably the continuation in the present of the 
phase of national democratic struggle that enables the ANC to retain its intra-Alliance 
dominance.  
                                                          
99
 On the topic of a united front, see the ANC’s reference to “three key features of a progressive movement for 
national liberation or social emancipation” which include adopting a broad church character: “Unlike a tightly 
knit organisation, a movement promotes united front politics among the ‘broadly like-minded forces and 
formations’” (ANC 2012a: 22). 
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 Chapter three set out the notion of vanguardism and the socialist vanguard party as described by Mandel 
(1983: 1). 
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The implications of vanguardism post-1994 are related fundamentally to context. Although, 
from the 1950s onwards, we can speak of the ANC as having a ‘mass’ character, during its 
period in exile it also displayed characteristics reminiscent of a Leninist or vanguard-type 
party: it had both a cell structure and a centrally-controlled corps of cadres, albeit with a 
broad church programme.101 From 1990, although the ANC sought to retain its vanguard 
identity, there was also recognition of the need to change this mode of operation. In an 
interview at the time, Valli Moosa explained: “We have had underground units doing 
various things, that's different from a visible branch which ordinary people who like the ANC 
could join and participate in its decision-making. So that we need to break out, very 
decisively break out, of the old mould way of working as an illegal organisation and become 
a democratic, mass-based organisation” (Interview with O’Malley: 13 August 1990).  
Breaking with the practice of centralised control, however, did not necessarily come easily. 
On its return to South Africa, activist Rashid Seedat recalled suggestions by the ANC that the 
Indian Congresses should disband and collapse into the ANC:  
“They were coming and saying, listen, you guys have to close down 
because there’s only one show in town; that’s the ANC. I mean we were all 
ANC people, running ANC branches, and so it wasn’t that. We thought that 
tactically you should see if you can use us as an instrument. But they were 
just adamant: no ways; you can’t do it. And that was just a highly 
problematic attitude and we stood up to that.” (Interview: 13 May 2013). 
Seedat’s recollection speaks to similar concerns raised at the time as to who best 
represented ‘the people’ and was thereby best placed to establish ANC branches. In the 
PWV region a tension existed between those ‘stalwarts’ of the ANC who were part of the 
organisation before its banning, and activists who had “borne the brunt of the mass 
struggles in recent years” (ANC PWV Region 1990).102 Although the ANC needed to 
reconnect itself with people at home, it was the civic movement that had established such a 
connection in its absence. Tensions thus surfaced over issues of representation and over the 
continuation of a multiplicity of mass structures rather than one all-encompassing ‘ANC’.       
Seekings referred to the ANC as sometimes subscribing to a “‘leaderist’ conception of 
politics” (1991: 297). On this account local leadership and protest are understood “as simply 
part of the national political struggle” and the intentions of national leadership are 
conflated with concerns at the local level (ibid: 296-7). In reconnecting itself with the 
people, the ANC to an extent overlooked the value of relationships established between 
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‘the people’ and other organisations. Some individuals, such as the ANC and SACP’s Blade 
Nzimande and Mpume Sikhosana were charged with suggesting that there was no need for 
separate civic structures once the ANC was legally re-established (Mayekiso 1993: 27). They 
contended that both civics and ANC branches were part of the national democratic 
revolution (Nzimande & Sikhosana 1992: 26).  
Given Ben Turok’s claim that some within the Party leadership viewed the UDF as a threat 
(Interview: 19 February 2013), one wonders whether there remained a concern after 1990 
to limit its conceptual influence. At the SACP’s consultative conference it was noted that 
“unnecessary overlaps” should not be created “in treating the UDF as another entity of the 
Alliance” (SACP undated: 8). In 1994, with the departure of much of the civic leadership to 
the structures of party and government, the civics contributed unintentionally to their own 
demise.       
As the ANC rebuilt itself as an organisation that would compete in electoral politics it also 
sought to maintain the predominance over mass organisations that characterised its 
leadership as a liberation movement. Aware of the greater fragility of popular support in a 
pluralistic democratic context, the ANC remarked in 1991 that “the sort of aura and respect 
that we commanded as a clandestine vanguard is receding at an alarming pace” (ANC 1991c: 
1). Over more recent years, there has been increasing awareness within the ANC of the 
need to reconnect itself with the masses. Following the ANC’s national consultative 
conference in 2007, the NEC called for “a period of renewal” (ANC 2007a), while the 
Commission on Organisational Renewal asserted that “mass mobilisation and organisational 
work should be stated as the primary pillar” (ANC 2007c). Its subsequent policy conference 
in 2012 placed even more emphasis on the dangers of losing contact with the people.  
As explained earlier, the ANC’s status as a vanguard movement by its very definition has 
implications for its relationship with the people. As the ANC has sought to both maintain 
and renew this status as a political and governing party, its movement discourse continues 
to shape its understanding of the popular role in democratic politics and in participatory 
democracy in particular. 
6.2. Participation in What Capacity?  
The previous chapter interrogated the ideas and intellectual currents that have been woven 
into South Africa’s policy on participatory democracy in order to uncover how ‘participation’ 
is understood. It showed how public policy has been informed by a multitude of influences, 
from domestic traditions of popular organisation to radical democratic theory and 
development and planning discourses. These various threads have contributed to some 
well-developed policy but also some conceptual tension in which the goals of citizen 
influence come up against the exigencies of state performance and delivery.  
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Analysis of the ‘forms’ of participation constituted in institutionalised mechanisms suggest 
that, in practice, most citizen participation conforms to a type of consultation. Nonetheless, 
there are visible strands to policy discourse which place a high value on citizen 
empowerment. Both policy frameworks and legislation are clear that the institutionalised 
mechanisms provided constitute politically pluralistic spaces for participation by civil 
society.   
The ideas informing the ANC’s own discourse of participation, however, are somewhat 
different. The conception of participatory democracy reflected in internal ANC documents, 
speeches, publications and commentary draws less on ideas from development theory, 
participatory governance and performance management and more on its own historic 
identity. Here, the capacity in which citizens are envisaged as participating continues to be 
shaped by the concept of vanguardism. As such, its objectives are linked not to citizen 
influence but to realisation of the NDR.  
6.2.1. Partners for Hegemonic Unity 
“- [D]espite the very real organisational difficulties the ANC is confronted 
with, we do have in South Africa the unique reality of a party which is 
solidly anchored in a broad social movement” (ANC 1994b: 4). 
In keeping with its vanguard character and the relationship with the people this entails, 
popular participation is often portrayed by the ANC as a form of partnership between 
movement and masses. This understanding is particularly visible from 1990 during the 
rebuilding of the ANC inside South Africa and the establishment of organisational unity. This 
post-1990 discourse draws not only on nation-building but on the idea of ‘progressive’ civil 
society working with and supporting the state.  
The linking of popular participation to the establishment of hegemonic unity has been 
sustained and, arguably, amplified during the ANC’s time in office. The ANC recognised in 
the 1990s the potential danger of social distance. From the mid-2000s, however, open 
acknowledgement by the movement of a weakening connection with its support base 
brought with it a revived movement discourse in which the strengthening of popular 
participation is linked to the strengthening of its own hegemony. As an illegal organisation in 
exile, internal unity was an understandable priority. With the ANC’s return as a legal 
organisation intending to compete in democratic elections, the role of civil society 
organisations - and civics in particular - became an issue of some debate.  
Some discussion on the role of civics in a democratic state was discussed in Chapter Four.103 
Views ranged from those who saw the civics’ role as effectively nullified with the ANC’s 
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return (Collinge 1991: 1; see also Nzimande and Sikhosana 1992: 26), to those who felt 
strongly that civics must not only maintain their autonomy but their role as safe-guarders of 
community interests (UDF 1991; Conference: Developing Civic Unity 1991; Ebrahim 1990). 
Those who questioned the ongoing relevance of civics appear to have been in a minority. 
Left democratic debate in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in South Africa and elsewhere, 
came increasingly to view an independent civil society as a requisite feature of democracy 
(Friedman 1992: 83, 84; Glaser 1997). This was a position also supported by the ANC (ANC 
DPE 1991a). However, although consensus of opinion was in favour of the civics’ 
independence, both from political organisations and government, nuances existed in 
precisely what this meant.  
While the UDF depicted civics as independent structures who would play an important role 
in keeping a check on local government and representing the interests of their communities 
(UDF 1991), the ANC placed its emphasis on the link between the civics and itself. An ANC 
political education paper on its relationship with the civics stated that, although civics are 
not ANC organisations nor do they ‘belong’ to the ANC, “it is not an accident that the civics 
have in the past and still do identify with the ANC” (ANC DPE 1991b: 5). It went on to remark 
that “from their struggles, residents’ organisations have found that the interests of their 
members can be accommodated within the framework of the Freedom Charter” (ibid.).  
On the one hand it emphasised the importance of building “strong mass organisations” 
separate from political parties and the state. Yet it also encouraged ANC members to 
continue building mass democratic structures (ibid.: 7). The same paper also envisaged an 
organisational and leadership linkage between party and civic movement, stating that: 
“Through ideological debate, the actions of its members, joint strategizing and campaigning, 
the ANC must win its leadership role in relationship to the civics” [emphasis added] (ibid.). It 
is “political leadership” and the raising of “political consciousness”, specifically, that that the 
ANC envisages itself providing to civic struggles (ibid.: 7).  
Just as the UDF’s own aspirations were potentially hegemonic, claiming to be a Front that 
could house all political affiliations (UDF 1991), so too did the ANC’s broad church character, 
historically incorporating the civic movement, enable it to claim the civics as an ongoing part 
of the ‘broader democratic movement’. Despite confirming the requisite of an independent 
civil society, the ongoing importance of ANC-civic unity was expressed in a statement by 
then ANC Secretary General, Alfred Nzo. Highlighting concern at the “very poor relationship 
between ANC structures and civic associations”, Nzo emphasised the importance of a joint 
approach: 
“Apart from the lack of coordination between ANC structures and civics, in 
many instances there are different approaches being taken on the burning 
issues affecting our people at a local level. The ILC [Interim Leadership 
Core] has also found that regions and branches were not consistently 
239 
 
trying to mobilise the broad democratic forces like religious bodies, 
cultural and sporting organisations, etc. behind the programme and the 
positions of the ANC” (Nzo  1991: 10).104 
The implied role for civics is one of unification. As the struggle is not yet over, their 
participation and that of other mass organisations, remains indispensable to victory. The 
conceptual glue that holds this unity together is the connection made between the ANC and 
democracy itself, both in the struggle to end apartheid and in the post-apartheid era. Broad-
based popular identification with the Freedom Charter emanated from the ANC’s ability to 
unite people of different ideologies under the principles of a non-racial democratic future. 
While associated with and adopted by the Congress Movement, the Freedom Charter 
became a document that spoke to a more general desire for freedom, equality, democracy 
and non-racialism.  
After 1990, despite the ANC’s acceptance of the principles of multi-party politics, it 
continued to emphasise an inherent connection between itself and the consolidation 
democracy. Strengthening the ANC is understood to also mean strengthening democracy. 
During the phase of democratic negotiations, the ANC asserted that “its specific task is to 
conduct a political struggle for the transfer of power to the people. It strives to organise the 
people and provide leadership to the entire liberation movement. In doing this, it unites, 
organises, educates and mobilises the people and all democratic forces for the winning of 
political power” [emphasis added] (ANC DPE 1991b: 6).  
In this portrayal, the ANC represents all people who wish to see democracy in South Africa. 
Those who form alternative political groupings fall outside of the definition of “democratic”. 
Yet in a politically pluralistic system there is no inherent homogeneity in political outlook 
amongst those in favour of democracy; and it cannot be assumed that all pro-democratic 
forces will be won over en masse to the ANC.  
That being said, the MDM itself - the range of organisations in the 1980s united behind the 
ANC - has contributed to the reinforcement of this position. The ANC’s status as a ‘vanguard’ 
is endorsed by its support base. Indeed, despite asserting their own independence, civics 
were themselves not clear as to how their historic identification with the ANC could be 
reconciled with the desire to act autonomously while influencing policy formulation. Civic 
activist, Thozamile Botha who became a leader of the South African National Civic 
Organisation (SANCO) established in 1991, highlighted both the challenge of re-defining the 
civic-ANC relationship and the dilemma of translating participatory theory into practice: 
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 “- there was no clear structured way of saying how we would facilitate 
participation of civil society. It took quite a lot of lobbying and mobilisation 
and asking the government to help finance some of these organisations … 
the NGOs … But of course SANCO itself became part of the ANC alliance. 
Now whether that was good or bad, that’s another issue that can be 
explored because SANCO gets to a stage where it is not clear whether it is 
part [of those] that should push for the agenda of the ruling party or 
whether it should identify issues - because those issues that were raised 
through civics in the ‘70s won’t disappear because there’s a democratic 
government” (Interview: 14 April 2014). 
For some in the civics, the conception of their continuing role as a champion of residents’ 
interests sat uncomfortably with the idea of assuming support for an ANC government. 
While the ANC encouraged the building of civil society formations, it continued to envisage 
itself as the driving and facilitating force.  
For other civil society activists, that the democratic era would present such a dilemma had 
not been clearly foreseen. Dominique Wooldridge, who undertook activist work and 
became involved in policy development on local government, noted that many activists saw 
their work as already building a strong civil society. However her remarks also suggest that 
some people had simply envisaged that the interests of civil society and ANC would 
continue to converge under a democratic government:  
 “I think, kind of, everyone I was working with was an activist in some non-
state organisation and it was just kind of assumed that, you know, what 
we’re doing would continue. Although what actually happened is everyone 
went into government! There was no-one left in civil society organisations 
… I think it was kind of an almost unspoken assumption: you’d meet at a 
hall on a Saturday morning and everyone who was there was an activist 
and, you know, it was just, we assumed that that would continue, and 
grow even; that it would get easier if ‘we’ ended up taking power” 
(Interview 12 March 2012). 
The belief that civic and ANC interests would coincide was echoed by Moses Mayekiso 
(Interview: 8 April 2013), yet in a sense this very assumption undermined the simultaneous 
emphasis on the importance of civil society autonomy. 
On the ANC’s part, the role it envisaged for mass organisations was carefully worded. The 
need for their independence was reiterated but also carried a subtext: although civics must 
remain autonomous organisationally, and even ideologically, this applied to their immediate 
local-level activities, rather than to their contribution to the national policy picture. The 
ANC’s role was still to provide political ‘leadership’. The civics’ role, in addition to engaging 
in local bread and butter issues, was to participate actively in the general task of political 
241 
 
struggle. As such, their individual interests should converge with those of the whole. Three 
years into democracy, at its National Conference in 1997, the ANC remarked:      
“We have attempted to be a force for cohesion in the centre of a broad 
range of allied organisations, mass democratic and community based 
structures. We have, as the ANC, not undermined the ideological and 
organisational independence or autonomy of these organisations, but 
rather to interact with them, and fuse or combine their energies, 
constituencies and diverse capacities into a common national democratic 
purpose” [emphasis added] (ANC 1997c). 
As with public policy, the ANC’s discourse draws on its tradition of mass participation. 
However, it also injects the notion of popular participation with a programmatic objective: 
organisational autonomy requires broad-based cohesion for a common objective. Having 
reached the goal that previously united them, mass organisations are now expected to join 
forces for national democracy. Underpinning the ANC’s endorsement of local control 
alongside national unity is the assumption of the national democratic project as a collective 
good. 
6.2.2. Structures of Participatory Governance: the New ‘Organs of People’s Power’? 
Notably, it is not only civil society organisations that the ANC has linked to its movement 
tradition but structures of democratic governance. The 1997 document, The Character of 
the ANC, stated: 
“This movement tradition, which can be referred to as the masses in 
movement, is continued in our present commitment to a people-driven 
RDP. It is found in our attempts to develop, in the new conditions of our 
country, many new forms of popular activism and governance (ranging 
from community policing forums, to participatory local government 
budgeting, to work-place forums)” (ANC 1997).  
As the above extract reflects, the mechanisms for popular activism created since 1994 are 
themselves structures of governance, providing a means for citizens to interact and engage 
with government in the realisation of effective policies. The ANC’s discourse on 
participatory governance, however, contains some internal conflict. On the one hand, 
popular participation and empowerment are key ideas in its understanding of democracy. 
Its National General Council in 2000 set out one of the NDR’s “strategic tasks” as “the 
mobilisation of the masses of the people to govern themselves in the context of the 
objective that "the people shall govern" (ANC NGC 2000).  
Noting the importance to the system of governance of voluntary, popular and non-
governmental organisations, it stated: “The empowerment of the people to participate in 
the process of governance, expressed in the concepts of a people-centred society and 
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people-driven processes of transformation, indicates the centrality of the concept of 
popular and participatory democracy to our understanding of the functioning of the 
democratic state” (ibid.).  
At the same time, however, in contrast to public policy in which structures for participatory 
governance are a civil society function, in the ANC’s own discourse, such structures for 
participation are located in the context of movement-building. From the early 1990s, ANC 
debate around the institutionalisation of popular participation, rather than developing a 
strong civil society, centred on developing strong mass organisations for the consolidation 
of ANC support. In the RDP, the ANC emphasised principles of participatory democracy. 
However it also offset the promise of popular power with the priority of extending its own 
influence. Reflecting on the RDP, the ANC remarked:  
“If the RDP is to live up to its vision of ‘democratising power’, such that 
‘democracy’ means the active participation of the people affected in 
decision-making and policy formulation, then the ANC must not only 
survive, but thrive, as an organisation outside government. Furthermore, 
the ANC must also ensure it is firmly and deeply rooted in the organs of 
civil society, encouraging the growth of such organisations, and ensuring 
that people do have the necessary vehicles through which to contribute to 
reconstruction and development” [emphasis added] (ANC 1994b: 3). 
On the one hand it recognised the need for participation not merely in the form of 
legitimation but in the sense of agency and influence (involving affected people “in decision-
making and policy formulation”). It also reiterated the movement’s longstanding belief that 
“democratising power” meant going beyond representative democracy. The counterpart to 
this, however, was the corresponding belief that it also required the extension of the ANC’s 
hegemony - a process by which the ANC “is firmly and deeply rooted in the organs of civil 
society” (ibid.).  
In linking the RDP to the reorganisation of the ANC itself, the movement failed to make a 
clear distinction between popular participation and popular mobilisation. Yet, as Sartori 
explained, the distinction between the two is critical. “Participation is self-motion”:  it is 
therefore “the exact reverse of being put into motion (by another will), i.e. the opposite of 
mobilisation” (1987: 113). It also blurred the line between institutions of participatory 
governance and those of party mobilisation. All political parties seek to expand their 
influence and mobilise support for their policies throughout society. This in itself forms part 
of pluralistic democratic life. There is, within ANC discourse, however, a conflation of 
popular mobilisation with participatory democracy. On the one hand the RDP represents a 
clear statement of participatory democratic commitments - “the active participation of the 
people affected in decision-making and policy formulation” (ANC 1994a: 3). Parallel 
statements of the ANC, however, blur the line between participation and mobilisation, and 
between democracy and hegemony:  
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 “[T]he ANC faces the challenge of ensuring that the RDP is indeed a 
people-driven process, and not something that is entirely delivered by 
government to the people. This means, amongst other things, ensuring not 
only the consolidation of our own structures on the ground, but also the 
fullest mobilisation of communities and sectors of the community in the 
country as a whole” (ANC 1994b: 2). 
Referring to the continuation of the people’s power ethos in the democratic era, former 
member of the ANC underground and a founder member of SANCO, Lechesa Tsenoli linked 
the idea of organs of people’s power to the ‘Building Organisation’ Commission of the ANC 
(Interview: 11 March 2013) - a 1991 commission geared toward “building the ANC and 
maximising support around our positions” (ANC 1991c: 1). Whether organs of people’s 
power are understood as state-initiated forums and/or structures of civil society, their role 
here is linked to building support for the ANC, not with providing opportunity for public 
involvement in decision-making.  
Of the structures for participatory governance, the local government ward committee, in 
particular, has been linked to the extension of ANC hegemony. The legislation and municipal 
guidance providing for ward committees was discussed in the previous chapter. The local 
government policy framework establishes the ward committee as a structure for the 
enhancement of participatory democracy. Its effectiveness in the fulfilment of this 
objective, however, remains subject to considerable critique. In public and academic 
discussion, it is not uncommon to hear it argued that ward committees are dominated by 
the ANC, functioning as forums for intra-party contestation rather than real citizen 
influence.  
The ANC is by no means been blind to this, nor to the systems’ limited effectiveness. It has 
recognised that the performance of many municipalities has been hindered not only by 
capacity and functionality issues but by “political factors which are internal to the ANC and 
the Alliance” (ANC 2010: 14). The NEC discussion document at the ANC’s 2010 summit on 
provincial and local government noted that, although the ward committee system should be 
seen as a big achievement, a number of weaknesses remain, including: the negative impact 
of many “seasoned” ANC cadres being deployed to provincial or national government; 
tensions between the political and administrative roles in municipalities; the limited 
enforcement of councillor accountability; intra-ANC and intra-Alliance factionalism at 
municipal level; and the rise of service delivery protests (ibid).   
The same document went on to propose that “a fundamental review of the current ward 
committee model” be undertaken: “critical areas of legislative and functional reform include 
making the establishment of ward committees legally mandatory and providing for a more 
developmental role that is adequately resourced” (2010: 17). Government has also 
recognised ANC dominance of ward committees as problematic. In 2013, Yunus Carrim, then 
Deputy Minister of CoGTA, also remarked that the government was “considering reviewing 
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the legislation to explore the possibility of reducing the prospects of political activists, party-
political activists, dominating the ward committee” (Interview: 16 January 2013).  
However the ward committee is not only a feature of public policy discourse but of the 
ANC’s own discourse of ‘participation’. In the latter, ward committees are located not in the 
context of empowering citizens to participate in decision-making but in the context of 
strengthening the movement. Given the extent of ANC electoral dominance, we might argue 
that its effective monopolisation of many ward committees is somewhat inevitable. Indeed, 
the principle of committee members representing a multiplicity of sectoral and other 
interests in the ward is not necessarily incompatible with the ANC dominating each of those 
sectors.  
Closer examination of the origins of ward committees, however, suggests that their initial 
conception differed from that later published in legislation. An interview with member of 
the editorial team for the Local Government White Paper, Dominique Wooldridge, suggests 
that, as well as being a means to “sweeten the pill” for those opposition parties who 
objected to ‘big’ local government, the ward committee was originally linked to the 
objective of re-establishing the ANC (Interview: 12 March 2013). Wooldridge remarked: “I 
think the ANC very explicitly, from some informal discussions more than anything formal, 
they explicitly saw ward committees as a way to rebuild ANC branches” (ibid).  
On this account, rather than being seen as way to link citizens with the decision-making 
processes of local government, ward committees were seen as a way of strengthening the 
connection between movement and people. Although Wooldridge qualified that she was 
not sure how much consensus existed on this approach, she recalled the strategy being used 
in Johannesburg. She also added that one of its “drivers” had been Yunus Carrim, who she 
recalled “talking about it nationally” (ibid.). With this in mind, it is possible that weaknesses 
in the ward committee may relate to its original conceptualisation as a politically partisan 
structure. Wooldridge explained: 
“I think part of the reason why they didn’t work very well was that in a lot 
of people’s minds they were never really seen as multi-interest forums. 
And when they became multi-interest forums it led to conflict. So, ja, I 
think the ANC very much linked the re-building of branches to ward 
committees, to the detriment of ward committees”. (ibid.) 
However, ward committees were not only understood as playing a role in re-rooting the 
ANC organisationally but in establishing popular unity behind its policies. Speaking as the 
Deputy Minister of CoGTA in 2001, Yunus Carrim gave political inflection to them directly, 
noting that “Ideally, the ward committee should be used to mobilise the broadest range of 
interests in the community behind progressive goals as part of the overall national 
democratic transition” (2001). The inference here is that community shaping of 
development is subject to movement imperatives or is somehow an intra-ANC activity. 
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Former Mayor of Johannesburg, Amos Masondo, despite supporting the idea of the ward 
committee as a multi-interest forum, still saw the ANC as “a very, very important role player 
in terms of making sure the ward committee exists, that the ward committee is properly 
constituted”, adding: “Where it’s not properly constituted it’s a reflection on the ANC local 
structures there as well. So the relationship between ward committees and ANC local 
branch culture is a very close one” (Interview: 13 March 2013). 
The injection of programmatic content into purportedly non-party political structures 
renders uncertain the protection of civil society’s autonomy as a check on state power. This 
strand of participatory discourse resonates with the historically teleological conception of 
participation in the ANC. It also echoes the earlier idea of people’s power as proposed by 
the ANC Constitution Committee in 1986, in which its guarantee was fulfilment of the NDR. 
In the ANC’s contemporary participatory discourse there remains a tension between the 
guarantee of political pluralism and the conflation of democracy with ANC hegemony.   
6.2.3. Loyal Civil Society 
The unclear line between what constitutes ‘civil society’ and what the ANC refers to as 
‘progressive’ organisations, blurs the line between uniting society behind a democratic 
purpose and extending the movement’s hegemonic reach across the institutions of 
‘independent’ civil society (Glaser 1997). This overlap was reflected in Wooldridge’s remark 
that many of those who were activists in the ANC camp assumed that the building of civil 
society would “continue” if ‘we’ (read the ANC-aligned movement) took power (Interview: 
12 March 2013). Although the conversation was had about civics potentially taking over 
local urban administration, as was the possibility of them being effectively “replaced” by 
ANC structures (1991: 1), examination of the UDF archives suggests that emphasis was 
placed on their ‘watchdog’ function (UDF 1990b; UDF 1991; Conference: Developing Civic 
Unity 1991; Ebrahim 1991 and 1990). 
The UDF National Civics Workshop Report in December 1990 emphasised that “civics cannot 
involve themselves in power-sharing. Civics are not intended to replace apartheid local 
government structures. We are community organisations, not organs of government" 
(Ebrahim 1990). At the civics’ National Consultative Conference in May 1991, the 
importance of their autonomy from political organisations was also underlined: 
 “[T]he new conditions require that the civic movement should be broad 
and straddle the political spectrum. Our civic must be open to all the 
residents. Members of Azapo, the PAC, IFP, should be free to join the civic. 
And the civic association should be independent of political organisations. 
If it should support the position of any political organisation, it should be 
because it agrees with that organisations position on a specific issue or 
with certain aspects of the organisation’s policy" (Conference: Developing 
Civic Unity, 1991). 
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Given the civics’ historic relationship with the ANC, ensuring such autonomy was not that 
easy. Reflecting on the civics’ experience in the early 1990s, the national education officer of 
the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) observed that: “The civic has often 
become the base for leadership who missed out in the ANC branch. There is also extensive 
overlapping leadership. This means that, even where there is awareness within the civic in 
the need to strengthen the ‘watchdog role’ there is the contrary pressure to go into councils 
on behalf of the ANC” (Mawby 1994: 81).  
During the struggle itself, activists do not appear to have been oblivious to the risks 
associated with political allegiance, even if not spoken about openly. Andrew Boraine, 
formerly part of the UDF executive and later involved in work on the local government 
transition, explained that there was an awareness at the time of the fallout from other 
revolutionary and liberation struggles, in Africa and elsewhere, where popular structures 
were ‘crushed’ by the nationalist movement: “People were conscious of the failure of 
African democracy, even though you don’t exactly talk about that because it seems to be 
undermining what we’re trying to do in South Africa in 1987. But the sort of post-colonial 
failed state and the post-colonial nationalist movement crushing the people’s revolution 
were certainly debates going on at the time” (Interview: 21 May 2013). 
Within the ANC camp there were interestingly different takes on the danger of political 
allegiance. Among the reasons influencing the civics’ choice to remain independent, Collinge 
lists the experience of other African states where liberation movements after coming into 
power turned out to be undemocratic, as well as the experience of Eastern Europe where 
people’s organs became mere ‘conveyer belts’ of the ruling party (1991: 1). Neil Coleman 
also remarked that in South Africa activists “had the benefit of hindsight”: of the experience 
of African states in the 1960s (Interview: 20 February 2013). However he referred not to the 
suppression of political freedoms but to “the dangers of neo-colonialism” and the 
“comprador bourgeoisie” (ibid.). These comments in themselves reflect the variation in 
ideological outlook within the liberation movement. 
Nonetheless, the civics do not appear to have put forward any clear, institutional model for 
their own participation while their role in assisting the re-building of the ANC became 
something of a priority. With this focus on rebuilding ANC structures, as well as the fact that 
policy on citizen participation was not an immediate priority for reaching a political 
settlement, concrete discussion about the participation of civil society structures took 
something of a back seat.  
Having said that, as the ANC became a governing party it also appears to have 
demonstrated some unease at both civil society’s role as a check on state power and on the 
value of continuing practices of local participation established during the transition. Swilling 
and Boya highlight that it was in 1994 that political parties became fully involved in the 
Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber - Johannesburg’s local negotiating forum of 
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state and non-state actors established to negotiate a new integrated local government 
structure (Ottaway 1993: 126). They emphasize that the delay in political parties joining the 
Chamber, “was caused in part by the belief amongst certain provincial ANC leaders that the 
MC [Metropolitan Chamber] was a threat to their own desire to centralize political control 
of the transition” (1997: 178-9).  
Swilling made the following comment, worth quoting in full, about the ANC’s view of the 
Chamber and of democracy in general, once it had taken power: 
“I think that one of the first things that the hard-line ANC people did when 
they moved in and took over that whole process was to kill that whole idea 
[of the Chamber as a parallel structure]. So the notion that the 
metropolitan chamber would continue after you have a metropolitan 
government was, like, seen as madness … I think it was just a very limited 
conception of … the nature of power in a democratic society. There was a 
genuine assumption that the state would be seized as an instrument and 
the people would be able to deploy it, so why you would then have to 
have checks and balances; why you would have institutional arrangements 
for institutionalising and formalising the involvement of a whole bunch of 
organised civic parties when, afterall, that’s what councillors are going to 
be representing for people? There was nothing, absolutely nothing in their 
conception of democracy that prepared them to think about that – 
nothing” (Interview: 20 February 2013).  
It is not clear to what extent Swilling’s view was widespread within the movement. It 
perhaps highlights, again, the role of activist intellectuals in shaping normative ideas about a 
radical democratic society in which popular structures would play a more central role.  
Either way, by the time policy makers turned their attention to citizen participation after the 
local government elections in 1995, the locus of participatory democracy moved almost 
entirely to establishing institutionalised state structures. By this stage, the voice of the civics 
seems to have diminished substantially. 
Despite formal commitments, the idea of an ‘independent civil society’ appears to have 
been treated with some suspicion by the ANC. A political education document on its 
relationship with the civic movement asserted that, although the role of civil society 
organisations is one of “ensuring checks and balances on the state … they also have an 
interest in ensuring … that the ANC fulfils its democratic tasks” (ANC DPE 1991b: 9). It then 
went on to state that “the task of the ANC … is to interact with and unite these formations in 
the direction of democracy. Then they will not be seen in opposition to the ANC, but as 
having common interests …” [emphasis added] (ibid.).  
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It is not clear what the ANC means by its “democratic tasks”. However it fundamentally links 
the interests of the ANC to those of democracy itself. Accordingly, if an organisation is in 
opposition to the ANC, it is also in opposition to democracy. Alternatively, if the implication 
is that organisations may not necessarily be united ideologically but are united in favour of 
democracy, then this should still not preclude them from being critical of, or in opposition 
to, the ANC. If this summation of the ANC-civic relationship lacks some clarity, the critique 
provided in the same document of the very concept of ‘civil society’ is more revealing: 
“Some comrades in the civics, as well as in other organisations, see the 
civics as part of ‘civil society’. The words ‘civil society’ come from liberal 
social science. It refers to all those parts of society which are not part of 
the state … Comrades are using the term ‘civil society’ because they feel 
that one of the lessons that we need to learn from Eastern Europe is the 
need for a strong and independent “civil society”. A strong civil society can 
balance the power of the state and through providing channels for 
participation by ordinary people, ensure that democracy is built and 
strengthened. However … the argument for a strong civil society often 
contains some incorrect assumptions. Some comrades putting forward this 
argument assume that the ANC is not capable of democratising itself and 
when it comes to power it will automatically be opposed to the 
democratisation of society” (ANC DPE 1991b: 9). 
On the one hand it recognises the theoretical premise of civil society as important for the 
defence of democracy (that it can balance the power of the state and provide for 
participation by ordinary people). On the other hand, there is a subtext that links it with 
‘liberal’ (and thus possibly ‘bourgeois’) democracy. The statement that “some comrades ... 
see the civics as part of ‘civil society’” is not an affirmation of the ANC’s own belief in this. 
Instead, those who hold this view are referred to in the third person, while the document 
subsequently seeks to right some of their “incorrect assumptions”. Understandably, the ANC 
seeks to emphasise its own commitment to the democratisation of society but also defines 
for itself those organisations that should be considered “progressive or democratic” (ibid.).  
The document correctly highlights the continued risk posed by organisations in civil society 
who seek to prevent the advent of democracy. However, in correcting what it believes to be 
a misplaced emphasis on civil society - the danger that they “see it as the solution to all 
South Africa’s problems” (ibid) - the ANC also seeks to discourage the civics from playing a 
political role (ibid.: 8). Although written prior to the commencement of ANC rule, it seems 
nonetheless to be referring to “when it comes to power” (ibid.: 9). Simultaneously it argues 
that the vehicle for involving people in policy formulation is “the mass democratic 
formations of civil society” (ibid.: 10) - i.e. structures of the broader liberation movement 
historically aligned with the ANC. This critique echoes the Marxist suspicion of civil society 
as the private sphere of atomised individuals: the egoistic man, rather than the community-
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oriented citizen (Cohen & Arato 1994: 97. 117), thus helping to explain the desired merging 
of state and civil society in Marxist theory. 
Since assuming power the ANC has also chastised civil society structures, particularly those 
historically supportive of the movement, who see their role as keeping a check on 
government. At the ANC’s national conference in 1997, Nelson Mandela attacked “sections 
of the non-governmental sector which seek to assert that the distinguishing feature of a 
genuine organisation of civil society is to be a critical ‘watchdog’ over our movement” 
(Mandela 1997). This view highlighted the ANC’s discomfort over organisations assuming 
political independence rather than support for and partnership with the movement. Those 
who act as critics are seen as impeding efforts to transform South Africa (ibid.). Thus while 
the ANC saw civics as having ongoing relevance after 1990, their allocated function was to 
build unity. By ensuring that they remain “part of the broader democratic movement” (ANC 
1991c: 5) what the ANC sought was not the cultivation of a strong civil society in the form of 
independent watchdogs but rather a civil society that will remain loyal: “otherwise they can 
and will be used by other forces against the interests of the people” (ibid.).  
Some within the ANC, and in the SACP in particular, cautioned against the “uncritical use of 
the notion of ‘civil society’” (Nzimande and Sikhosana 1992: 27). In an 1992 article entitled 
‘Civil Society does not Equal Democracy’, and referring to its application in “advanced 
capitalist countries”, Nzimande and Sikhosana argued that “civil society is “an institutional 
expression of the rule of the bourgeoisie and the exploitation of the working class” (ibid.). In 
Marxism, ‘the interests of the people’ would of course be reflected in the disappearance of 
the state-civil society divide. It is perhaps worth considering whether it was precisely the 
civics’ characteristic of housing a multitude of political orientations that presented a threat 
to the consolidation of an ANC-led project. 
The narrative of the strong yet loyal civil society has remained a feature of ANC discourse 
and has, I would argue, been resurrected during the 2000s through efforts to reconnect the 
ANC with its support base and retain its vanguard status. ANC conferences in 1997, 2002 
and 2007 generated resolutions to strengthen relations with the Alliance partners and civil 
society (ANC 1997d; ANC 2002; ANC 2007a). During the 2000s, in particular, there has been 
increasing acknowledgment of a weakening connection with the people and loss of its ‘mass 
character’. ANC conference and discussion documents from 2005 onwards focus 
increasingly on the need to reinvigorate ANC branches, with Deputy President Kgalema 
Motlanthe in 2006 making the notable observation that the ANC was “dead on the ground” 
(cited in Darraq 2008).  
The ANC has often affirmed its role in encouraging the formation of and working within 
‘progressive’ civil society (ANC 2007b). Although during the 1980s it was the structures of 
the MDM through which people were able to participate in political and grassroots 
struggles, the idea of the MDM or ‘mass democratic formations’ is today somewhat 
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redundant. However it is occasionally used ambiguously in ANC parlance as a catch-all 
phrase for ‘progressive’ civil society. In this regard it is especially noteworthy that the ANC’s 
most recent policy conference in 2012 set out the movement’s intention to revive civil-
society-based structures in a way that implies a return to a past ANC-MDM relationship 
(ANC 2012a). Among the subsequent conference resolutions is a decision “to build and 
revive structures of the mass democratic movement and progressive civil society” (ANC 
2013: 8). 
Yet there is a democratic deficit in these proposals. When it is the ANC that holds claim to 
define what constitutes ‘civil society’ and then seeks to extend hegemony over it, this 
undermines not only the role of civil society as an autonomous and independent watchdog 
but also the legitimate existence within such a society of the presence of political 
opposition. It mirrors the very situation of which Friedman warned: “the colonisation of civil 
society” (1992). Writing in the early 1990s about the tension between the re-birth of civil 
society discourse and the liberation movement’s historic assumption of ‘the people’ as a 
homogeneous whole, he highlighted that “To argue for civil society's independence from 
the state is surely to argue for the freedom to associate and speak as well as for the right of 
the organised citizenry to influence, and check the power of, governments” (Friedman 1992: 
83). Yet, in ANC discourse, it is implied that ‘progressive’ civil society’ constitutes those who 
associate with and support the policies of the ANC (ibid.: 86-88; Glaser 1997: 12). 
Correspondingly, non-progressive civil society would not be confined only to those opposed 
to democracy and non-racialism but to those who stand in opposition to the liberation 
movement.  
Although these debates were taking pace in the early 1990s, the discourse of “progressive” 
civil society has continued through the democratic era. Speaking in 2013, then Deputy 
Minister of CoGTA, Yunus Carrim highlighted the importance to democratic local 
government of a ‘strong civil society’. But he also moved to define it as those who fall within 
the MDM:  
“ - even if you actually have popular power at local government level via 
the state structures, you also have to have a strong civil society movement 
as well ... If you have a strong civil society it empowers the municipality 
and if you have a strong municipality, it should I believe empower civil 
society too ... Of course, the term civil society is being increasingly 
contested in our movement … because of the nature of some of the 
organisations, individuals and other actors that occupy this space in recent 
years, and the crude juxtaposition of some of them that civil society is all 
good and the state is all bad  … [I]ncreasingly some of us speak of 
progressive civil society as important. Or we might, in a more limited way, 
speak of the mass democratic movement when we speak of progressive 
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actors that engage in civil society [emphasis added]” (Interview: 12 March 
2013). 
According to this view, local government can only be strengthened by civil society actors 
identified by the ANC as ‘progressive’. This poses the danger that those who seek to 
challenge the movement, or to make their voices heard through other actors and 
organisations, are somehow non-transformative.  
Commitments by the ANC to political pluralism remain, and there is no suggestion that it 
would seek to renege on this formally. It is problematic, however, that popular involvement 
and the right to free political choice are viewed by the ANC as a double-edged sword. In a 
1996 document looking at the progress of the NDR, the ANC made the observation that: 
“Thoroughgoing democracy, human rights, transparency and mass involvement are matters 
of principle. But they are, in a sense double-edged swords. We are able to utilise them even 
in the early stages of the changeover as the most effective and suitable forms of 
revolutionary self-defence. But they can also be used by criminals and counter-
revolutionaries” (ANC DPE 1996: 7). This may well be a reference to forces within South 
African society seeking to stall the advent of non-racial democracy. However it is not clear 
exactly who is included in the definition of “counter-revolutionaries”.   
The participation advocated in this discourse falls into the category, discussed in Chapter 
Five,105 of support and cooperation rather than collaboration. While the latter concedes 
some control to citizens, as well an equal right to influence the decision-making process, the 
former centres on civil society’s role in supporting government in delivery. The role of 
‘progressive’ civil society, as the ANC envisages it, seems to involve cooperation rather than 
criticism and there is no reason why it should conflict with the simultaneous existence of 
self-help. Elsewhere ANC officials have encouraged the formation of civil society 
organisations that assist government through helping communities to develop their own 
initiatives and solutions to development challenges (Mashatile, Interview: 21 February 
2013).  
The distinction, however, is that while the support and cooperation discernible in public 
policy emphasises civil society participation through state-invited structures, within the 
ANC’s movement discourse, it is encouraged primarily through movement structures: those 
of the MDM, Alliance partners and ANC branches.  
                                                          
105
 Chapter Five of this thesis discussed the notion of ‘partnership’ identifiable in public policy, suggesting that 
partnership (as a form of participation) could be understood in three senses: collaboration; support and 
cooperation; or self-help. 
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6.3. Conceptual Tensions and Parallels 
The revolutionary language which remains a feature of the ANC’s discourse is today 
considered rhetoric, not least in light of the ideological conflict between NDR and the ANC’s 
market-oriented macro-economic policy. Emanating from the thesis of colonialism of a 
special type, national democracy was originally envisaged as a necessary transitional stage 
that would achieve political democracy while paving the way for socialism. The notion of the 
national democratic state today may thus be considered a smoke screen for policies that 
kow tow to the interests of big business and international capital. As policy on participatory 
democracy has come increasingly to absorb a multitude of other conceptual influences - 
some rooted in domestic traditions of popular organisation but others drawing on shifts in 
development and planning theory - one might consider the ANC’s revolutionary discourse to 
belong to a bygone era.  
Yet notions such as ‘vanguardism’, ‘national democracy’ and ‘mass organisation’ should not 
be too readily dismissed. The ANC continues to see itself as engaged in NDR, while the 
legal, rights-oriented constitutional language that began to penetrate the movement 
during the late 1980s is no longer easy to discern. In contrast to the suggestion put forward 
by Johnson (2003), that the ANC has become an elitist, liberal party with a mere rhetoric of 
participation, I argue that it has rather retained many of its African nationalist and Marxist-
Leninist traditions. Each of these currents promotes the importance of conscientisation and 
while the path may be planned for the people by the leadership, parliamentary democracy 
is generally seen as insufficient. Far from being ‘elitist’, mass participation remains critical to 
the ANC project. Its 2000 NGC reiterated “the centrality of the concept of popular and 
participatory democracy to our understanding of the functioning of the democratic state” 
(ANC NGC 2000). The extension of these ideas into legislation shows that they are not mere 
rhetoric. The question this thesis has sought to answer is what the ANC understands 
‘participation’ to mean.  
The final two sections below draw together the ideas identifiable in movement discourse. In 
so doing, conceptual tensions and parallels are highlighted between the participatory 
discourse of the ANC-as-movement and the participatory discourse in public policy (set out 
previously in Chapter Five). While there are overlaps in the intellectual currents shaping 
each of these discourses, there are also unresolved tensions. It is the coexistence of these 
multiple influences and conceptions of participation that have repercussions for the 
effectiveness of policy.  
6.3.1. Restricted Participation and Vanguardism 
The very essence of the ANC’s vanguard character is its relationship with the people. As the 
movement stated in 1991, its link to the masses is “essential to its strength both in the 
current period and under a democratic government” (ANC DPE 1991a). The movement has 
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thus sought to retain its mass movement character. A critical part of this identity is its role 
as a political vanguard. As set out earlier, a vanguard is a leadership organisation and 
educator able to lead the people in a correct and revolutionary direction. The status of a 
vanguard party is one that needs to be established: in other words, according to Mandel’s 
definition, the people to whom the leadership organisation links itself must themselves 
identify it as their vanguard (Mandel 1983: 9). 
Moreover, as in a socialist vanguard party, the revolution cannot take place purely from 
above. Rather, the people must be convinced of the need for revolutionary transformation, 
and the vanguard movement must secure their support for and active participation in that 
objective (ibid.: 1, 13). Vanguardism thus requires the masses themselves to identify with 
and actively participate in the achievement of revolutionary objectives. As Evans describes 
of Marx’s idea of political participation, “Theory, organisation and a will to revolution are all 
vital factors if the proletarian is to participate effectively … Participation must be both 
conscious and intentional” (1972: 135). Therefore they cannot be passive spectators but 
must be active participants. 
As a revolutionary organisation in exile, the ANC’s vanguard character was overlaid with 
features of clandestinity. Although characterised historically as a mass movement, this was 
paired with traits more akin to a centrally-controlled Leninist-type party (Johnson 2003). 
While the masses were fundamental to its identity, it was the ANC’s cadres that fulfilled a 
vanguard function, bringing the movement to the people in a context in which membership 
was illegal. Carefully deployed and ideologically trained, their work amongst the masses was 
the key to realising revolutionary objectives.  
Just as vanguardism constituted one of the conceptual strands that shaped people’s power, 
so too does it constitute a conceptual influence on popular participation today. Equally, just 
as ‘active participation’ comprised a fundamental feature of people’s power, so it remains 
today a driver of transformation and development (ANC 1994; ANC 2012a). As a party in 
government, the ANC has sought to consolidate its relationship with the masses. Yet its 
predominance over mass organisations has been combined historically with both the desire 
for a hegemonic unity and a somewhat instrumental role for participation. It should 
therefore be asked whether, in the democratic era, vanguardism sustains a form of popular 
participation that replicates this hegemony and teleology. Under democratic conditions, 
what are the implications of vanguardism for participatory democracy? 
One of the fundamental problems which vanguardism poses to the realisation of 
participatory democracy is mirrored in Femia’s critique of Marxism (1993: 136). Through its 
two-fold features of both vanguard hegemony and active participation, vanguardism 
embodies Marxism’s own inconsistency of “both political control from above and popular 
initiative from below”. Concurrent with the control and direction of revolutionary leadership 
is the requirement for popular initiative and creativity. Yet revolutionary theory inherently 
limits the extent to which popular initiative can extend beyond the bounds of the prescribed 
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framework. It dictates that the political vanguard lead the people to a foretold end. 
Whereas public policy on participatory democracy advocates the creation of ‘empowered’ 
and informed citizens (SALGA & GTZ 2006: 45, 70; DPLG 2006; ANC 1994a: 120-1; DPLG & 
GTZ 2005b: 10), vanguardism seeks the creation of participants who accept the vanguard’s 
theory unquestioned. 
Of particular note is that the educative and empowerment strand (discernible in the 
people’s power tradition and in policy on local governance) is not especially a feature of the 
ANC’s own participatory discourse. The 2006 Handbook for Municipal Councillors refers to 
the importance of councillors “encouraging the potential and initiative” of their 
constituency (SALGA & GTZ: 2006: 46). Tapping into community experience and knowledge, 
developing local capacity, and producing informed citizens able to actively participate and 
influence decision-making are ideas drawn on in the DPLG training material to assist the 
building of ward committees (DPLG & LGSETA 2007: 22). Whereas the DPLG speaks of 
democratic deepening (2007: 6), the ANC speaks of mass mobilisation (2012a). 
Although public policy remains far removed from entrenching participation as 
‘collaboration’, it does encourage a far greater degree of influence and responsibility to 
citizens than does ANC discourse. The revolutionary rhetoric currently espoused in 
discussion documents, publications and speeches of the ANC contrasts even to those 
contained in its own RDP. Even the educative strand that emerged from the ANC camp itself 
- promulgated during the 1980s by activists who viewed community-level organisation 
around basic needs as itself empowering and educative - is not visible in contemporary ANC 
narrative. Where such community organisation is mentioned, it is in reference to citizens 
being drawn into the broader camp of ‘democratic’ (read ANC-aligned) forces. 
Consequently, where public policy has sought to foster a deeper understanding of 
democracy, in which citizens are given real ‘voice’, “exercise judgement [and] contribute to 
debate and discussion” (DPLG & LGSETA, Module 3, Part B, p.18), this is undermined by a 
movement discourse that links participation to the extension of the ANC’s hegemony. The 
notion of participation captured in vanguardism, does not foster the creative initiative and 
empowerment on which people-centred development rests.106 
In light of this, it is notable that, in more recent years, the ANC has revived a language of 
people’s power. In a document on organisational renewal presented at the ANC’s 2012 
policy conference, the ANC made reference to the importance of participatory democracy as 
an element of activism (2012a: 44). The ANC describes participatory democracy as 
“organising and mobilising our people for active participation in local transformation and 
development initiatives, including the creation of organs of people’s power” [emphasis 
added] (ibid.). It is not clear what the ANC envisages for ‘people’s power’ in the present. 
Although many activists involved in its theorisation and practice in the 1980s were 
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influenced by ideas of empowerment and self-organisation, its structures were also marred 
by democratic deficit, coercion and political intolerance of other organisations and 
influences (Mufson 1990: 129-30). They were, in general, aligned to the ANC. 
In the 2012 organisational renewal document, the proposed form and content of “organs of 
people’s power” is given little elaboration. However it is useful to examine the idea by 
reflecting on other earlier references to the resurrection of such structures. A notable 
example is the resolution of the ANC’s 2007 national policy conference to re-establish 
‘street committees’ as a way for communities to support local police in the fight against 
crime (ANC 2007b). In a subsequent article in the ANC TODAY, ANC government minister 
and SACP General Secretary, Blade Nzimande suggested that street committees should not 
be party political but should “seek to organise our people irrespective of political 
affiliations” (2008). He was also clear, however, that they were linked to the ANC’s identity, 
commenting that “By taking a lead in re-building such structures, the ANC will be affirming 
its ‘dual’ but necessary, roles as both a ruling party and a mass mobiliser of the people” 
(ibid).  
While there is indeed no “inherent contradiction between governing and mobilising” (ibid.), 
what is problematic is when mobilisation is equated with democratic participation such that 
the discourse of participatory governance stands in tension with the discourse of 
mobilisation. Street committees may not be conceptualised as structures of the ANC per se. 
Yet they still appear to be envisaged as “a new platform to intensify the struggle for the 
renewal of the revolutionary values of our movement” (ibid.). What this seems to imply is 
that popular participation be exercised through the vanguard. On this issue Reddy observes 
that “The notion of differentiating party from state structures poses a problem, as 
historically and ideologically the dominant view in ANC political culture, enunciated in the 
NDR concept, is that the state serves as an instrument to transform society” (2010: 198). As 
such, while ANC discourse does draw on ideas from democratic theory - particularly the 
extension of representative democracy to include features of participatory democracy - its 
own ideological tradition sees the state and masses as the drivers of NDR.  
The ANC does refer in the RDP to the ‘empowerment’ of citizens (ANC 1994) and, in more 
recent documents, to participatory democracy as “empowering” (ANC 2012a: 44). These 
principles are not developed in any detail, however, while the educative and empowering 
benefits of participation, identifiable in public policy discourse, do not appear to be 
influential in the discourse of the ANC. What the movement discourse lacks is an 
understanding of mass participation as a developmental or learning experience for individual 
citizens. As such, rather than being understood as educative or self-sustaining - developing 
individual capacity as argued by those such as Pateman (1970: 24-25, 43) - participation is 
understood in a teleological sense, echoing the strand of ANC discourse from the 1980s in 
which popular power constituted a means to a greater (revolutionary) end.  
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Mass participation in the ANC’s discourse is developmental and educative only in the sense 
of developing popular political consciousness. This takes place through political education 
and collective work in the direction of a common interest. While civil society organisations 
may retain their “ideological and organisational independence”, the movement still seeks to 
“fuse or combine their energies, constituencies and diverse capacities into a common 
national democratic purpose” (ANC 1997). Participation is thus achieved not through “self-
motion” as described by Sartori but through “being put into motion (by another will)” (1987: 
113). What takes place is mobilisation.  
The conception of political conscientisation and active participation of its members is 
comparable to that of a revolutionary Leninist-type party. What appears to be encouraged, 
is not so much individual initiative and the sharing of ideas as it is ideological and theoretical 
conformity. In this regard, Evans’ reflection on Marxism and theoretical understanding 
amongst the proletariat is rather useful:  
“If theoretical understanding is one criterion of genuine participation, then 
most of the proletariat have never participated, and it is difficult to see 
how they ever will. Further the understanding must be of the right 
(Marxian) kind. The role of individual initiative remains limited. The 
proletarian fits himself into the organisation in a manner guided by the 
communist as educator. Thus the educative effects of participation remain 
confined” (1972: 137). 
This takes us back again to the contradiction within vanguardism: of political control from 
above and popular initiative from below. Active participation is essential for the fulfilment 
of revolutionary (in this case national democratic) tasks. Yet while this requires ‘theoretical 
understanding’, this “must be of the right kind”.  
The very existence of a political vanguard that sees itself as leading an identified ‘people’ in 
the direction a predestined common interest immediately limits the extent to which the 
initiative and ideas of these people are taken into account. However, this is not the 
imposition of hegemony by undemocratic means. The ANC has been democratically elected 
and given a mandate by the majority of voters to implement its policies. The problem arises 
when institutions of participatory democracy are utilised as a means of extending this 
hegemony. In these circumstances, the strands of participatory democratic policy which 
seek to develop and enhance citizen capacity to participate in decision-making stand 
fundamentally in tension with vanguardism’s requirement of active participation within the 
bounds of the movement’s framework. This manifestation of this conceptual tension in the 
structure of the ward committee is discussed below. 
6.3.2. Teleology: Revolutionary Objectives Trump Empowerment 
As a movement in power, the discourse of the ANC continues to reflect its dominant 
ideological heritage in African nationalism and Marxism-Leninism. The Freedom Charter 
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continues to be hailed as a reflection of the movement’s values, while, despite its unclear 
applicability to the present context, NDR remains its official programme. The ANC’s failure 
to critically review the NDR’s applicability has, nevertheless, confined it largely to political 
rhetoric.107 Increasing socio-economic division within the black majority itself has not been 
revisited by the theory, while its ideological underpinnings remain worlds apart from policy 
commitments to a neo-liberal economic framework. Nonetheless, ANC discourse continues 
to draw on the NDR for the maintenance of its hegemony. What can be discerned is a 
programmatic connection between the role of participatory democracy and the 
achievement of national democratic objectives (no matter how much of a smoke screen 
they might be). 
It is not uncharacteristic of the ANC to presage speeches and publications with an historic 
pre-amble. Indeed, reflections on its history are in fitting with the ANC’s continued ability to 
play to its strengths by drawing on both its liberation heritage and broad popular following. 
As I have argued elsewhere, the ANC utilises historical claims and the resurrection of a 
discourse of the past as a means of renewing itself in the present (Brooks Yung 2014).  
As far as popular participation goes, these observations are not especially noteworthy. 
Ruling parties generally have to govern and mobilise support for their policies at the same 
time. Problematic for democracy, however, is when the structures of governance 
themselves are infused with a partisan purpose. In an article in Umrabulo in 2001 following 
the introduction of local government legislation providing for participatory democracy, 
Yunus Carrim recommended that “the national framework [on the local government 
system] be given more political detail and be linked closely to our national democratic 
tasks”. He added to this: “We are not just seeking to effect a new system of local 
government. We are also seeking to use this new system to significantly advance the 
national democratic transition” [emphasis added] (Carrim 2001). In a more recent interview, 
Carrim gave the following description of the ward committee: 
“The Ward Committee would be a broader structure than the ANC branch 
… [It] would draw in people who wouldn’t otherwise join a political party 
even if they may vote for it. It will also draw in people who don’t interest 
themselves in a political party to even vote for it … the aim was that it 
would be a broad civil society structure which would mobilise people who 
are not otherwise mobilisable by an ANC branch structure” (Interview: 16 
January 2013). 
The ward committee is described as fulfilling a ‘mobilising’ function. However, 
acknowledging the problem of ward committees being dominated by ANC members, Carrim 
clarified that they are primarily aimed at “reach[ing] people who don’t normally play an 
                                                          
107
 For comments and criticisms on the ANC’s use of NDR see, for example, Fakir (2007) and Sachs (2007: 37). 
258 
 
active role in local government” (ibid.). Their longer term goal, he explained, was 
“mobilising communities as a whole to play an active role in our democracy” (ibid.). 
Mobilising people to participate in a democratic decision-making process aligns with the 
legislated function of the ward committee. However, in Umrabulo (where Carrim is 
presumably wearing his ‘ANC’ rather his ‘CoGTA’ hat), he refers to the local government 
system in such a way that the mobilisation of people behind fixed goals stands in tension 
with the idea of mobilising them to participate in democracy: 
“As the ANC we need to develop our policy on ward committees. We need 
to give guidance to ANC-run municipalities on how these committees 
should be elected and what political meaning should be given to the 
‘diversity of interests’ that the law requires to be represented in these 
committees. Ideally, the ward committee should be used to mobilise the 
broadest range of interests in the community behind progressive goals as 
part of the overall national democratic transition” (2001). 
Here, the role of the ward committee is given political inflection in such a way that it is seen 
as means of advancing revolutionary objectives. Equally, the basic policy principle that ward 
committees are multi-interest, civil society forums is undermined by Carrim’s suggestion 
that their “diversity of interests” be given political meaning. The DPLG’s 2005 Ward 
Committee Resource Book emphasised that “by virtue of being a function of civic society 
and not party political they can function independently of the strictures imposed by party 
alliances” (DPLG & GTZ 2005a: 34). The DPLG has therefore warned of the risks of party 
political influence on ward committee nomination processes, explaining that it “brings a 
high degree of party influence into what, in policy terms, is intended to be a civil society 
function” (ibid.: 31).  
The duality of policy versus movement discourse is thus especially visible in the tension 
between ward committees’ as vehicles of the NDR and simultaneous efforts to prevent 
them from becoming dominated by political parties. Although Carrim infuses ward 
committees with political meaning, while still Deputy Minister of CoGTA in 2013, he also 
stated that: “We are considering reviewing the legislation to explore the possibility of 
reducing the prospects of … party-political activists dominating the ward committee” 
(Interview: 12 March 2013). This pull between the objectives of democratic governance and 
those of movement ideology brings to light the parallel tension between the principles of 
liberal democracy and those of NDR. Reflecting on this in the post-1994 context, Steinberg 
observes that: “- the theory of NDR is left stranded between two competing conceptions of 
democracy; the first, a pluralist representative democracy and the second, a platform on 
which history’s privileged agent (here the oppressed nation) is to destroy the raison d’etre 
of political contestation in any form” (2000: 184).  
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By furthering the NDR, the ward committee negates the very reason for its establishment: 
to provide a participatory democratic forum for multiple (potentially competing) interests. 
Homogeneity is instead presupposed and the need for contestation and debate is nullified. 
In this way the ward committee also enforces a unitary form of democracy. Unitary models 
are oriented toward consensus and, as Mansbrige notes, may be effective where people 
have common interests (1983: 4-5). However in a context in which unity cannot be 
assumed, then pluralism and contestation must be catered for.  
Reflecting on the ward committee system, Wooldridge remarked: “it was very much a thing 
of whoever won the ward got to define which interests were in or out … I remember there 
being very few cases where an ANC ward councillor would go out of their way to include 
interest groups that were going to fight with them” (Interview: 12 March 2013). Given the 
failure to do this, they are commonly seen as ANC structures. If we are willing to consider 
that ward committees were not originally conceived as “multi-interest forums” but rather as 
a way of re-building ANC branches (Wooldridge, Interview: 12 March 2013), then it is 
possible that they were always understood in a teleological sense: as popular organs to 
carry out the transformative tasks of the national democratic state.  
Revolutionary purpose has similarly been linked to the proposals to re-establish ‘street 
committees’. During the 1980s, street committees brought material and psychological 
benefits to communities, and their resurrection in the present-day draws on some of these 
successes, most especially a reduction in crime.108 Yet there are parallels with the 1980s in 
terms of both prospects and risks. The key difference between then and now is 
fundamentally one of context. Under apartheid, organs of people’s power filled a crucial 
gap: their activists and proponents developed alternative ways of organising society in the 
face of state neglect, while some also argued that they constituted a school of democracy 
(UDF 1986: 2-3). Today, however, South Africans live in a formal democratic state, in which 
people’s rights have constitutional protection and they are able to vote for the structures of 
government. Thus while the widespread realisation of socio-economic rights remains a 
challenge, we cannot ignore the requirement that programmes to protect rights and 
advance development must operate within the bounds of accountable institutions. What 
the street committee initiative leaves unclear is how it will relate to such institutions. 
Reflecting on the NDR’s theoretical foundations, in which the state is used as an instrument 
to transform society, normative concerns accordingly arise about the relationship between 
organs of people’s power and legislated governance structures. The introduction of CPFs 
from 1995 was intended to improve community-police relations and to mobilise 
communities to assist in crime prevention. Yet there is no real clarification of the role of the 
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street committee in relation to the CPF. Nathi Mthetwa, who subsequently became Minister 
of Safety and Security, set out the role of the street committee in 2008 as being 
supplementary “to the work of the other civil society and governance organs and 
institutions” (Mthetwa 2008).  
However, while street committees are not ‘officially’ structures of the party, the intention is 
implied that they be imbued with ideological purpose. Recognising that there is a potential 
risk of ‘vigilantism’, Mthetwa proposed that this be addressed through “ideological training” 
to prevent them being exploited by “counter-revolutionaries” (ibid.). Rather than address 
existing weaknesses in CPFs, such as a lack of broader community involvement, the 
proposed solution is that street committees play a leading role instead (Nzimande 2008). 
Yet what is to stop street committees, themselves, becoming dominated by the same 
voices? If they are subject to ideological direction, we can only presume they will be 
comprised predominantly of ANC-aligned individuals.  
Reservation about the resurrection of street committees is not to dismiss entirely their role 
in crime prevention or other development strategies. To understand their potential, further 
research is required to ascertain the extent to which the meanings bequeathed to them by 
their participants align with those stated by the ANC. However, the solution to challenges of 
participatory governance should not be the introduction of seemingly partisan structures 
which fall outside of legislation. There is nothing to stop the movement from introducing 
street committees as party political structures, perhaps intended to link residents with the 
local ANC branch. But the problem arises when they are created under the pretence of 
political neutrality, or at the expense of improvements to mechanisms for participatory 
governance. 
In contemporary usage of the term, Carrim referred to ‘organs of people’s power’ as 
including legislated or state-invited structures, such ward committees, IDP forums, SGBs, 
CPFs and health committees, as well as civil society groups such as NGOs and community 
based organisations. He refers to “any organisation whether national or local or provincial 
which actually seeks to advance the needs and interests of people on the ground who are 
disadvantaged” (Interview: 16 January 2013). Both local government structures and civil 
society groups can thus constitute an organ of people’s power. Yet, despite affirming that 
these structures can be either state-invited or citizen-invented, the lines between party and 
state and between party and society are once again blurred.  
Reflecting on the understanding of people’s power today, Carrim explained it as also being 
intended to spread ideas and values of a more egalitarian society (Interview: 16 January 
2013). In terms of the ongoing NDR, he described people’s power as “essentially the power 
of organised people to transform their society to serve their interests, working often in 
cooperation with the progressive government and state but sometimes, if necessary, acting 
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beyond the government and state and even against it. A national democratic state needs 
organs of people’s power to carry out its transformative tasks” (ibid.).   
On the one hand, people’s power is intended to build popular capacity and self-
organisation, guided by the people’s own interests. Yet there is also an assumption that 
these interests are represented by the NDR. The need for people not only to work with but 
also to challenge government is acknowledged. Yet, by stating that “a national democratic 
state needs organs of people’s power to carry out its transformative tasks” (ibid), the 
structure of party and state become conceptually linked. Popular power is once again 
teleological.  
It should be qualified that this aforementioned statement from Carrim referred to the 
contemporary understanding of people’s power within the SACP, of which he is also a 
member. However the extent of dual membership of the Party and ANC results in 
conceptual cross-pollination. Carrim explained that the distinction in the SACP’s 
understanding was one of class emphasis: the SACP focuses far more of the power of the 
working class and the ultimate struggle for socialism (ibid.).  
There seems overall to be a somewhat blinkered understanding of people’s power, reflected 
in the assumption of popular homogeneity and adherence to the NDR’s precepts. What is 
implied here, in contrast to published policy, is not the cultivation of an empowered and 
educated citizenry but one that conforms to a pre-conceived programme. The space of 
participation as open and contested is potentially at risk from the presence of a discourse 
that removes the overarching policy framework (i.e. the NDR) from democratic debate. 
Interestingly, in reference to internal party democracy, Lodge remarks that although efforts 
are made to ‘induce’ membership participation in policy discussions, “the agendas for such 
deliberations are quite carefully controlled” (2004: 208).  
There is some suggestion that historic adherence to the NDR’s directives was fairly 
dogmatic, in such a way that precluded discussion and incorporation of ideas outside of the 
NDR framework. Wooldridge made an interesting observation about the way in which 
revolutionary theory guided thinking during the early 1990s by using the example of 
feminist issues raised at ANC and civic meetings: 
“I remember there was a lot of union work on, working on gender issues, 
and people would always get included in forums and then get told ‘no, this 
is a two-step revolution. First we do this and then we will deal with 
women’s rights’. You know there were a lot of assumptions made as this is 
the kind of path that is laid out in the NDR, played out in terms of what 
gets said at this meeting, what gets taken up. So, you know, feminist 
activists are welcome to come; say anything you want but you do 
understand: second part of the revolution only! … It was bizarre but it was 
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just very widely shared, you know? Feminist activists would take that at a 
meeting. They would never do that today! … It was pervasive” (Interview: 
12 March 2013).   
Thus while the NDR may have begun to lose some conceptual relevance by this period, 
there still appears to have been rigid adherence to its prescriptions and principles. While 
perceiving itself as having allowed the structures of the broader movement to maintain 
“ideological and organisational independence”, the ANC still sought to “fuse or combine 
their energies … into a common national democratic purpose” (ANC 1997). The interests 
and will of the people are thus equated with the NDR. 
6.3.3. Bounded Democracy: the NDR and NPM 
Preservation of the NDR discourse into the third decade of democracy, begs the question as 
to how we understand the role of GEAR. While ANC policy retains some characteristics of 
state-welfarism, GEAR’s ideological foundations, discussed in the preceding chapter, lie in 
the neo-liberal assumption that market growth will facilitate development. In stark contrast, 
the historic idea of ‘national democracy’ is that it would include a mixed economy and was 
considered by the ANC and SACP as a necessary prelude to a transition to socialism. Sat next 
to the post-1994 macro-economic framework, the NDR is rather incongruous. 
If, however, we reflect back on the intellectual influences explored in the previous chapter, 
it was argued that the rise of discourses of governance and ‘performance management’ 
have limited the scope of democratic debate through a centralised process of policy 
formulation. Macro-economic policy is thus protected from formal challenge. Local 
government policy in South Africa, including that on the role of citizens, has been 
penetrated by these same concerns of public sector efficiency, reduction in the use of state 
resources, and retention of policy direction by central government. This technocratic, 
centralisation process has thus also enabled the ANC to simultaneously remove the NDR 
from popular scrutiny and contestation.  
While at the most local of levels South Africans have the opportunity to influence municipal 
planning, this is divorced from their ability to contest policy itself. Challenge to the broader 
system, and to the centrally-planned development agenda, is significantly confined. 
Simultaneously, the ANC’s vanguard discourse encourages the active participation of MDM 
structures. Yet by virtue of the ANC determining which contributions from civil society are 
considered ‘progressive’, and by narrowing the agenda for debate to those issues that fall 
within NDR, both the broader policy framework and vanguard discourse carry a self-
sustaining ideological function. 
Therefore, although the NPM and movement discourses have starkly different ideological 
origins - one seeking performance and efficiency and the other a hegemonic unity - their 
simultaneous usage has been mutually reinforcing. Technocratic and performance-driven 
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elements of public policy, in particular, have enabled the ANC-as-movement to mask where 
power really lies.109 As such, a weak or more restricted understanding of participation in 
public policy, “stripped of the political volatility of direct popular involvement” (De Beer 
1997: 67), has in effect enabled a continuation of a top-down mode of development, 
appearing at the level of the movement as ‘vanguardism’.  
This vanguardist approach, however, is linked to the ANC’s intellectual heritage which 
differs significantly from that of the NPM. Harrison notes that influences of planning theory 
in the ANC camp have been shaped not only by multilateral development agencies but by 
the East Asian developmental state and the top-down approaches of “newly-independent” 
and/or “socialist countries to which the ANC in exile was exposed” (2001: 182). As noted 
earlier, the movement’s resemblance to a vanguard-type party, as much as a broad united 
front, has influenced its view of the popular role. As such, it has adopted what Heller 
describes as a “bureaucratic and commandist logic of local government” (2001: 134).  
What is important to clarify, is that it is a particular type of vanguardism that the shift 
toward neo-liberalism has reinforced. In Chapter Three it was argued that a tension existed 
in the notions of vanguardism that penetrated people’s power. Whereas those in the UDF 
and civics recognised the ANC as the rightful political vanguard, they did not see this as 
precluding the coexistence of bottom-up structures of popular power. As such, although 
they themselves reinforced the ANC’s vanguard status, they also encouraged the 
development of people’s power as an educative and empowering experience. While its 
goals were still political (i.e. the seizure of political power under the leadership of the ANC), 
participation was also seen as valuable in itself. This conception both encouraged a form of 
developmental democracy and recognised the material and psychological benefits to be 
accrued from community organisation and self-help. 
The strand of vanguardism parallel to this was more visible in the external ANC and it is this 
discourse that characterises much of the movement’s official documentation during its 
period in exile. This strand showed greater concern to ensure top-down direction by the 
vanguard leadership, whereby mass participation was controlled by the guiding hand of the 
movement. It did not exhibit concern for individual development and empowerment, nor 
did it cultivate popular initiative outside of the NDR framework. Organs of people’s power, 
moreover, were understood in a far more instrumental sense - as weapons of struggle and 
bastions of the movement through which the line between ANC and masses would be 
blurred. Due to its prevalence amongst the ANC’s top leadership and some of its most 
influential cadres, it was this latter strand of vanguardism that was arguably most dominant 
in the ANC of the 1980s.  
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Within the discourse of people’s power this competed with a more bottom-up vision 
prevalent in the movement at home. Chapter Five set out how activists’ ideas about 
community organisation informed the policy process. It is due to the strength of this strand 
of political culture in the UDF and civics that its influence is visible in the current local 
government system. Within the ANC, itself, however, this empowerment strand is arguably 
much weaker. The discourse of vanguardism that prevails today in the ANC-as-movement is 
of the former kind, in which the real scope of popular input and agency is limited by the 
NDR. Participatory democracy, contrary to what some argue, is not merely rhetoric: ‘active 
participation’ is a crucial feature of NDR. However it is guided by a vanguardism in which 
democracy is bounded by a form of participation circumscribed by allegiance to the 
movement. The predominance of this strand is a result of the ANC’s history, both 
ideologically and organisationally and highlights the survival of traditions emerging from 
Marxism-Leninism.  
It is thus with great irony that this vanguard discourse has been bolstered by its ideological 
nemesis: neo-liberalism. The trend toward technocratic process, the use of experts and the 
push for efficiency and performance have protected economic policy from popular 
influence. The development sphere is thus sectioned-off from the powers of participatory 
governance. Top-down development processes, control from the centre and the cultivation 
of a ‘bounded’ democracy appear at the level of the movement as vanguardism.  
6.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the participatory discourse of the ANC which overlays the range 
of influences discernible in public policy. While there are of course overlaps between the 
two, the movement discourse draws far more heavily on the ANC’s liberation heritage. 
Here, vanguardism is the dominant concept informing the understanding of participation. 
Active participation by the people is critical to both the endurance of vanguardism and 
continuation of the NDR, no matter how ambiguous the content of the latter. While the 
form of participation this requires may not meet normative democratic criteria, it is a form 
of participation nonetheless and, perhaps most important of all, is understood by the ANC 
as constitutive of participatory democracy.  
In the preceding chapter which traced the intellectual currents shaping participatory 
democratic policy, it was argued that the shift toward a more technocratic approach to local 
government has removed from popular contestation the direction of broader economic and 
development policy. While South Africans can participate in development at the local level, 
they lack influence and power over the policy agenda itself. Looking in parallel at the 
discourse of the ANC, it is possible to see how the notion of ‘weak’ participation embodied 
in the technocratic approach has enabled the simultaneous continuation of vanguardism 
which also removes from the sphere of contestation the ANC’s programme of NDR. Despite 
differences in their ideological premise, what both discourses facilitate is a narrow form of 
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participation in which the real locus of power is concealed by the formulaic discourse of 
policy on the one hand and the nostalgic discourse of the movement on the other.  
Although many in the UDF and civics recognised the ANC as the rightful political vanguard, 
and themselves promoted an idea of democracy deficient in providing for pluralism, their 
notion of vanguardism nonetheless included establishing popular control and 
empowerment. In the discourse of the movement since 1994, however, this strand appears 
to have lost out to a more dominant current. In the latter, what is advanced is not so much 
popular power as it is a hegemonic unity. Civil society must be independent yet loyal, while 
the conflation of revolutionary policy with the popular democratic will undermines the 
objective of citizen agency and influence set out in public policy. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusion: How Shall the People Govern? 
Vanguardism and Democracy 
This thesis has examined how the ANC has understood and practiced participatory 
democracy, with particular reference to 1980s people’s power and post-1990 policy 
formulation. Framing the research within democratic theory it has interrogated what the 
ANC means by ‘participation’ and ‘participatory democracy’. It embarked on an analysis of 
1980s people’s power, the codification of ANC democratic thought and the formulation of 
post-1994 policy on participatory democracy. It considered the way in which ideas 
(incorporating theories, ideologies, intellectual traditions and schools of thought) have 
informed the ANC’s conception of the role for ‘the people’ and popular participation in a 
democratic state. 
The thesis essentially traces the development of ideas. Although the period of focus is from 
the 1980s, the analysis is rooted in an understanding of the ANC’s ideological lineage. Based 
on the premise that ideas inform practice, the dominant ideological currents in the ANC, as 
well as the development of its democratic thought more generally, are crucial to 
understanding its ideas in the present.  
It has also sought to challenge existing approaches to analysis of the 1980s which have 
tended to view the democracy established after 1994 as inferior or unrelated to that pre-
figured by people’s power.110 Instead, I have argued that the discourse and practice of 
people’s power has had bearing on the character of South Africa’s democracy since 1994, 
and that people’s power, itself, did not constitute an entirely democratic form of 
participation. Its proponents, while embracing ideas of decentralised grassroots control, 
also embraced a notion of participation as teleological. For those in the ANC and UDF, 
people’s power was tied fundamentally to the achievement of political goals. It also rejected 
many of the features of democracy that allow for freedom of political choice and 
association, establishing structures for popular power that were aligned predominantly with 
the ANC.  
The thesis has also sought to show that democratic deficiencies in South Africa’s democracy 
cannot be attributed to a post-1994 change in the ‘character’ of the ANC from that of a 
popular democratic organisation to an authoritarian elite-driven structure. It also contends 
that democratic deficits should not be attributed to the acceptance of features of political 
and economic liberalism alone. Such accounts ignore the presence of ideas about people’s 
power and a radical form of democracy that themselves lacked key democratic features.  
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Instead this thesis has suggested that the source of undemocratic and centralised 
tendencies in the ANC can be found in its dominant ideological traditions of African 
nationalism and Marxism-Leninism, both of which fostered notions of leadership as 
vanguardism and active participation as teleological. These traditions and the ideas that 
they encompass, rather than being attributable only to a particular ‘strand’ of the ANC, 
constituted powerful conceptual influences on the theory of people’s power. Thus while 
conceptions of participatory democracy in the ANC have been shaped by a number of 
traditions and theories, they cannot be delinked from undemocratic traits in the theoretical 
heritage of the ANC generally. 
What the thesis has drawn out is a series of themes and sub-themes in the discourse of 
participation. It has traced the way in which these ideas have been woven through the 
policy process. It examines the extent to which those currents influential in the theory and 
practice of people’s power have been carried over into the post-1990 period of policy 
formulation, as well as tracing the emergence of new influences and schools of thought.  
Examination of the development of these ideas reveals that there is no one, identifiable 
theory of participatory democracy in the ANC but that it is possible to identify a number of 
dominant themes and conceptions. This enables us to formulate a much clearer 
understanding of the ANC’s conception of participatory democracy. It is argued that its 
conception has developed out of a variety of intellectual traditions that can themselves be 
linked to particular points in the ANC’s history and to certain strands of the movement. It 
has also been shaped by strategic considerations and external theoretical and political 
influences, in South Africa and globally.  
This multiplicity of influences, however, has led to some conceptual tension. Firstly, South 
Africa’s public policy on participatory democracy, which focuses largely on local 
government, draws on a range of local and international ideas. These include radical 
democratic theory, domestic traditions of popular participation, participatory development 
theory, progressive planning, the discourse of ‘governance’, and performance management. 
This array of influences has made for some well-researched policy. Those ideas emerging, in 
particular, from local activist traditions, radical democratic theory and participatory 
development have contributed to an aspect of policy which seeks not just the consultation 
of citizens but their empowerment to contribute to decision-making. Policy draws on both 
the efficiency benefits to be gained from enlisting local insight, as well as the democratic 
benefits of developing more empowered citizens while increasing popular influence.  
However, the policy strands rooted in governance and performance management focus not 
so much on the democratic aspects of participation as they do on the desirability of a more 
efficient state. Under this influence, participation is depoliticised and “detached from its 
radical nature” (Leal 2011: 76). Citizen participation thus takes place within the existing 
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policy framework and popular influence on decision-making is reduced to the most local of 
levels. 
The second conceptual tension is that what has emerged since 1994 is a discourse of 
participation found in public policy on the one hand, and a separate, distinct discourse of 
participation found in the ANC as a movement on the other. In the latter, mechanisms for 
participatory governance, intended to allow for the influence of a plurality of civil society 
interests, are equated by the ANC with mechanisms for the extension of its hegemony. 
Structures intended in legislation to be vehicles for participatory democracy are 
characterised in the ANC’s discourse as both party political and teleological.  
While South Africa’s public policy on participatory democracy is not without its weaknesses, 
the ideas and theories that shape it should provide citizens with a degree of influence in 
decision-making, at least at the local level. The parallel discourse of the ANC as a movement, 
however, rooted in ideas of its history as a ‘vanguard’ movement, risk undermining the 
democratising objectives of South African public policy. An identifiable theme throughout 
the development of ANC’s ideas is an ongoing and unresolved tension between a desire for 
political control from above and popular initiative from below. Post-1994, this can be 
framed more concisely as a tension between vanguardism and participatory democracy.   
Chapter One of this thesis set out the scope of this work, providing the aim, rationale, key 
research questions and methodological approach. It situated the research within a 
framework of democratic theory, outlining the intellectual traditions from which 
participatory democratic thought has evolved. It also drew on other traditions, located 
outside democratic theory, that have also played a role in shaping experiments in 
participation within organisations, the workplace, in development projects and in municipal 
government. This sought to show that the lineage of participatory democracy is not only 
varied but that its history on the political Left has itself not gone uncontested. The existence 
of normative democratic debate amongst theorists and practitioners strengthens the case 
for an analysis that allows for competing conceptions of participation.  
Discussion of a normative idea of participatory democracy and clarification of its features in 
relation to other models or types of democracy provided a benchmark against which to 
examine the ANC’s own understanding. This also helped to inform the questions asked of 
the ANC throughout the course of the thesis. The chapter also provided a review of existing 
literature, highlighting its value in providing historical accounts and context and emphasising 
the gap in current research on people’s power and participatory democracy as part of a 
broader trajectory of ANC democratic thought.   
Chapter Two provided an overview of the presence and role of participation in the 
development of ANC democratic thought. The premise of the chapter was that the ANC 
existed as an organisation for over seven decades prior to people’s power. Understanding 
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the main ideological influences on the movement and the extent to which its thinking 
incorporated a role for popular participation historically was critical for the exploration of 
subsequent years.  
It characterised the ANC’s early years as constituting a conservative liberalism and the 
favouring of parliamentary representative democracy. The chapter also noted that ANC 
democratic thought at that time was influenced predominantly by the notion of trusteeship  
- a form of representation in which Congress would act as a trustee, guided by what they 
believed to be in the best interests of Africans. Representation as trusteeship would not 
involve any form of popular participation but rather the entrustment of this role to 
Congress, who could best understand and determine the interests of their disadvantaged 
people. The ANC’s perception of itself as a spokesperson of Africans formed the basis on 
which its early ideas of representative democracy lay.  
The chapter then went on to explore the spread of African nationalism in the ANC which, 
with the rise of a new leadership generation from the ANC Youth League, became the 
dominant ideology of Congress from the mid-1940s. It also highlighted, however, that from 
1950 onwards Marxist ideology began to permeate the movement through its contact with 
the Communist Party. By the close of the 1950s and the banning of the ANC, both African 
nationalism and Marxism-Leninism constituted dominant ideological influences.  
Despite the rise of these new currents, however, ‘democracy’ as articulated by the ANC still 
appeared to be nothing other than representative in form. The influence of African 
nationalist and Marxist-Leninist thought however did have two critical implications for the 
ANC’s ideas about democracy. The introduction of African nationalism from the mid-1940s 
induced a shift away from delegations and reformist appeals for change toward the 
conversion of the ANC into a mass movement. The type of mass participation it generated, 
however, constituted a form of mobilisation. The key goal of the ANC’s campaigns during 
the 1950s was mass mobilisation behind the goal of political freedom. The Freedom Charter 
itself, while constituting a broad statement of aims, did not generate greater clarity on the 
model of democracy sought. The lack of indication on this point reflects both the 
underdevelopment of ANC democratic thought at that stage, and a deliberate strategy to 
broaden the alliance of forces under its hegemony. As such, the Freedom Charter served 
predominantly as a unifying and mobilising tool. 
Secondly, despite comprising vastly different sets of ideas to the liberalism that guided 
Congress previously, both ideologies served to buttress the premise of trusteeship. African 
Nationalism and Marxism-Leninism contained theories of organisation that entailed an 
active role for the masses and the political direction of a dedicated leadership. Just as 
trusteeship entailed representation of the people by a leadership able to determine their 
best interests, so too did African nationalism and Marxism-Leninism embody the idea of a 
movement able to convince the people of both the need for its leadership and the 
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correctness of its revolutionary objectives. Leadership, as conceived by the ANC, thus shifted 
from one top-down form to another. Early traditions of trusteeship and paternalism 
provided favourable conditions and a conceptual foundation for a new view of leadership as 
vanguardism.  
It was in exile from 1960, with the ANC’s adoption of revolutionary discourse, combined 
with the decision to embark on armed struggle and the growing influence of Marxism-
Leninism, that trusteeship began to manifest as vanguardism. Concomitant with this was the 
consolidation of its view of the masses as active participants, and the increasing subjection 
of participation to the revolutionary imperative of seizing state power.  
Chapter three focused on the 1980s, tracing the ideas informing the ANC’s conception of 
people’s power and, in particular, its role and future. It showed how people’s power as a 
phenomenon constituted a web of interlinking ideas and themes. Perhaps the most 
dominant influence on the ANC during the 1980s was Marxism-Leninism. Amongst internal 
activists and intellectuals, Gramsci’s ideas were also prevalent, as was a broader democratic 
socialist tradition which posed an alternative to orthodox Marxism.  
Within the trade union movement, whose ideas began to transfer to community and civic 
organisations, a socialist tradition was also emerging which was increasingly distanced from 
the SACP and its alignment to the Soviet Union. This understanding of people’s power was 
also linked to localised forms of struggle. As such, those who saw it as a fulfilment of ANC 
policy were not prevented from also interpreting it as an educative and empowering 
experience or a practical means of negotiation and self-help. For activists inside South 
Africa, there was arguably a greater appreciation of localised experience. Although spurred 
on by the ANC’s liberation narrative, these individuals were often concerned as much, if not 
more, with ameliorating the hardships of everyday life as they were with broader ideological 
questions. 
Although the ideas of exiled and domestic activists overlapped and informed one another, it 
is possible to identify conceptual discomfort between the views that emerged. While these 
strands did not conflict as such, they generated theoretical variation, not only between 
people’s power as a means versus an end of struggle but in the interpretation of 
vanguardism and the masses as creative participants. For the ANC, its role as a vanguard 
movement was rooted in Marxism-Leninism and informed directly its relationship with the 
people. ‘Democracy’ was thus rooted not so much in local democratic control as in the 
fulfilment of revolutionary objectives. Active participation required that political 
consciousness be brought to the people from without, and that mass participation for 
revolutionary ends take place under the guiding hand of the movement.  
For the broader MDM, the ANC’s vanguard status and the depth of its connection with the 
people was never questioned. However, acceptance of this hegemony, and the use of 
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popular power for revolutionary ends, did not preclude a simultaneous vision of tangible 
local democratic control. Democracy, for the UDF and civics, was also linked to their own 
role and structure as independent organisations connected to grassroots concerns. Thus 
while political conscientisation was characteristic of UDF discourse too, it also involved 
raising the people’s consciousness that collective organisation and democratic practice 
could themselves ameliorate shared problems. Amongst this strand of the movement, ideas 
of grassroots organising, community self-help and democracy as developmental shaped 
their view of the future. 
It is of note, however, that these conceptions were often not interpreted at the time as 
potentially at odds with one another. Indeed, what emerged across the board was a largely 
teleological understanding of participation, both in its function as a means of struggle and in 
prefiguring a post-apartheid order. While the UDF and civics may have envisaged a form of 
democracy in which communities would govern and control their local affairs - holding 
direct influence over the decisions that affect their lives - this was still envisaged as taking 
place within the remit of Charterist hegemony. Even those structures which focused on 
social welfare and collective space papered over political diversity and precluded alternative 
ideas from flourishing. Thus, although they fostered notions of popular activity which 
embodied empowering and educating characteristics, its manifestation in participatory 
democracy failed fundamentally to cater for political difference. What was produced was a 
unitary form of democracy, bound by allegiance to the movement.   
From 1990 as the ANC moved into a process of process of clarifying and formalising its 
democratic ideas, these conceptual tensions remained unresolved. The failure to reconcile 
the premise of vanguard leadership with the concurrent belief in popular initiative 
manifested after 1990 in a tension between vanguardism and democracy. Moreover, 
beyond the common goal of political freedom, there was no common, standardised vision of 
the institutionalised form that people’s power would take. The lack of a common resolution 
by the end of the 1980s as to what people’s power implied for a democratic future had a 
knock-on effect in the codification and formalisation of ANC democratic thought.  
Chapter Four went on to explore this very process. The first part of the chapter focused on 
the period of constitutional discussion from 1986, firstly within the ANC and then in the 
multi-party constitutional negotiations from 1993. It was suggested that this marked a 
critical period in the codification of ANC democratic thought. The analysis made three 
critical points: Firstly, it identified that, with the formation of the ANC’s Constitution 
Committee in 1986, this process of codification took place within a framework of 
constitutionalism and that the work of the Committee represented a merging of liberal and 
radical democratic ideas.  
Between 1986 and 1996 new theoretical influences began to penetrate the ANC through 
support from the legal fraternity. Through their participation in the internal discussions of 
272 
 
the ANC, the influence of lawyers succeeded in bringing a rights-based discourse to the 
ANC’s constitutional formulations. Statements of the ANC’s Constitution Committee during 
the late 1980s, which culminated in the publication of its 1988 Draft Constitutional 
Guidelines, signified the first formal commitment by the liberation movement to the 
principles of a multi-party system and individual civil and political rights.  
Secondly, and particularly importantly, it was argued that this process of constitutional 
discussion and written codification of the ANC’s ideas took place largely in conceptual 
isolation from the phenomenon of people’s power. Examination of the documents of the 
committee and the ideas filtering into its discussions suggest very little conceptual cross-
pollination between the two. During the late 1980s, the discourse of the MDM and broader 
ANC was not at all penetrated by ideas of constitutionalism, human rights or discussion of 
multi-party versus one-party systems. The domestic movement was also not moved by the 
same urgency to clarify its ideas about a future state form. Instead, within the broader 
movement other ideas continued to be influential, including revolutionary theory, Marxism-
Leninism, and the more localised, home-grown experiences of popular organisation and 
control.  
Thirdly, the chapter identified that, during this period of constitutional discussion, the ANC 
began to locate participatory democracy in the local government arena specifically. 
Although people’s power had, by its nature, taken place at a local/community level, the ANC 
had not previously given any indication of the institutional location of popular participation 
in a future state. The discussion of constitutional principles and guidelines, however, 
seemed to situate participatory democracy within a framework of local government.     
Although the formal process of policy formulation on local government did not commence 
until after 1996, with the unbanning of the liberation movement in 1990 the civic 
movement and activists at home began to feed their own ideas about participation into 
local-level negotiations. The second part of Chapter Four thus explored the discussion of 
these ideas within the ANC, MDM, and civics in particular, about a future model of local 
government. Some of this debate took place quite separately to discussions of the ANC, 
whose leaders were preoccupied with national-level negotiations for a political settlement. 
The exchange of ideas and discussion of government models was taking place at the local 
level between municipal administrations and representatives of the non-statutory camp. 
The chapter drew, in particular, on the example of the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan 
Chamber which pioneered and provided a model for other metropolitan areas to address 
the collapse of local administrations and the interim provision of services in the absence of a 
national agreement.   
Although the Metropolitan Chamber did not succeed in developing a new local government 
model, through technical support from NGOs and academics, it did provide non-statutory 
participants with the opportunity to influence the direction of local government. The 
chamber and other forums like it set a precedent for the involvement of civics in governance 
273 
 
and in the formulation of development strategies. It also prepared them for engaging the 
state rather than fighting it. Amongst those involved in discussing new local government, a 
number of ideas and traditions were influential, including trade unionism, community 
activism, progressive planning and participatory development.  
Linking in with local government discussions was the theme of ‘civil society’, an idea that 
grew in popularity in democratic theory in the early 1990s. The experience of the socialist 
states in Eastern Europe and of post-independence Africa demonstrated to South African 
activists the risk of popular organisations being crushed or co-opted by liberation 
movements on coming to power. The discourse of civil society thus placed emphasis not 
only on the importance of an autonomous civic realm but on civil society as an arena for the 
exercise of people’s power. What seems to have taken place from 1990 onwards is a shift 
away from the ANC as delivering people’s power, toward people’s power as a project of civil 
society autonomous from the ANC-in-government. In ANC discourse, revolutionary and 
radical democratic language became replaced by that of constitutionalism, while the 
language of people’s power instead begun to appear more manifestly in the discourse of 
civil society.  
This did not mean that the ANC was no longer expected to provide for participatory 
democracy. On the contrary, participatory structures would constitute the interface (or 
‘participatory space’) for policy influence between government and civil society. ‘People’s 
power’, however, became something that could only be guaranteed by civil society itself. 
Under a democratic state, civic organisations and others in the MDM began to see 
themselves, and not necessarily the ANC, as the legitimate representative of popular 
interests. Thus while the early 1990s produced the beginning of discussions about how to 
provide for citizen participation, it also brought to the surface a conceptual discord: 
between the civics’ desire for a new autonomy and the ANC’s distrust of an oppositional 
civil society; and between the civics as representatives of communities and the ANC as the 
vanguard of the people.  
Against the backdrop of this genealogy of ideas, Chapter Five focused on the ideas informing 
post-1994 policy on participatory democracy. Although it has been argued that the ANC’s 
democratic discourse by the early 1990s had been stripped of its more radical character, the 
idea that South Africa’s constitution embraces a notion of both representative and 
participatory democracy is widely accepted (Parliament of South Africa, undated). The 
national parliament describes participatory democracy as “a strengthening or expansion of 
formal representative democracy to include greater levels of participation by civil society” 
(ibid.).  
Since 1998 there has been a series of policy frameworks, municipal legislation, guidance and 
handbooks detailing participatory democracy in local government. While this has been 
identified as the primary arena for participatory democracy, mechanisms for public 
participation in governance also exist in the fields of community policing, school governance 
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and economic and labour policy, as well as within initiatives of the executive and the 
national and provincial legislatures.   
Chapter Five thus showed how some of the theoretical strands constituting people’s power 
continued into the post-1994 period and were woven into public policy. Participatory 
traditions of the 1980s as well as radical democratic thought from within the ANC camp 
generally (most especially its longstanding belief in the inadequacy of representative 
democracy) formed the very basis on which the project to develop participatory democracy 
policy lay. Direct association is often made today between the idea of popular participation 
in governance and the Freedom Charter’s premise that “the people shall govern” (Tsenoli, 
Interview: 11 March 2013; Botha, Interview: 14 April 2014). The import of past traditions on 
the premise of establishing a participatory democratic system can be attributed to the 
continued involvement of individuals from the ANC and MDM in formulating local 
government policy.  
That being said, policy development also absorbed new ideas and experiences. The 1980s 
and early 1990s activist traditions, especially around challenges of urban development, 
surfaced more visibly after 1994 through the influence of progressive planning and 
participatory development theory. These strands, alongside models of participatory 
municipal governance elsewhere on the globe, can be identified amongst the influences on 
policy. Although development and planning traditions were identifiable in the 1980s, 
particularly amongst intellectuals and NGOs, during the period of policy formulation they 
came much more clearly to the fore as schools of thought shaping the governance project.   
Ideals of citizen empowerment remain clearly influenced by the ideas of contemporary 
NGOs. Chapter Five highlighted the role played by organisations and think tanks such as 
Idasa, Planact, Afesis-Corplan and EISA in assisting the DPLG to compile guidance documents 
for use by municipalities. These documents draw out the benefits to be gained by both 
communities and municipalities from engaging citizens in participatory governance. They 
encompasses ideas such as municipalities responding to the needs of communities rather 
than imposing its own ideas; communities’ wide range of skills and experience that can 
benefit the municipality; and the development of better community understanding and 
ownership for the projects being implemented (DPLG & LGSETA 2007: 22).  
The chapter also showed, however, that debates about democracy, development and the 
state also absorbed the dominant global discourses of Western governments, international 
financial institutions and technical advisors. Contained within this paradigm were the ideas 
of good governance and performance management. Both of these strands provide some 
complement to citizen participation, encouraging bottom-up development, a greater role 
for civil society and a reduced role for the state. It was also identified, however that they 
equally pose something of a challenge to it. The NPM model is concerned primarily with 
ensuring efficiency. Its ideas about governance thus have their own internal tension in 
which the exigencies of performance are weighed up against the costs of facilitating citizen 
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input. Partnerships with civil society are a key feature of the NPM and of mainstream 
governance discourse. Their primary concern, however, is efficiency and doing more with 
less. The exigencies of being more business-like often sit uncomfortably with more 
elongated processes of citizen participation and democracy. The potential for participation 
to slow down development therefore undermines it being seen as a crucial step in the 
process.  
Constraints on citizen influence are thus attributable to the nature of the state and its 
development strategy. Cornwall and Coelho, highlight that in states such as South Africa, 
India and Brazil, the existence of a relatively strong state has generated “a fear of letting go 
of control, high levels of bureaucratization and embedded aspects of political culture 
[which] provide potent obstacles to the participation of traditionally excluded citizens” 
(2007: 22). In South Africa, the tendency to control policy direction from the centre and to 
convert participatory exercises into technocratic ones in the interests of performance and 
efficiency has had the effect of removing from public democratic influence South Africa’s 
macro-economic framework. As such, schools of thought which place a premise on citizen 
participation have also by their nature restricted citizens’ ability to exercise influence 
beyond the most local of levels.  
The spread of global rethinking about local government, alongside the change in ideological 
milieu between the 1980s and 1990s, generated new perspectives within the ANC itself 
about the possibility and desirability of people’s power. After 1994, with the pressures of 
governance and delivery combined with the fact that converting people’s power into an 
institutionalised form had not been clearly thought through by the movement, previously 
radical thinking about participation begun to be replaced by a creeping realism. Chapter 
Five’s analysis of the legislated mechanisms provided for participatory governance showed 
that public participation in South Africa often takes the form of consultation, rather than 
granting citizens any real influence in decision-making processes.  
Despite aspects of policy aspiring to empower communities, they have often not had this 
result. The ease with which participation has fallen into a category of ‘informing’ and 
‘consulting’, or at best ‘cooperating’, perhaps relates both to the lack of detail ascribed to it 
during the ANC’s own constitutional formulations, and to the more moderate feel given to 
participation during the Constitutional Assembly. In both cases, there remained a lack of 
clarity as to how participatory democracy would be realised.  
The claim is therefore made that the absorption of a language of ‘participation’ in 
mainstream development discourse has actually been used as a way of making neo-liberal 
development more palatable and people-friendly (Leal 2011: 71, 75-6). The notion of 
partnership incorporated in NPM discourse should not be mistaken for a sharing of power 
between citizen and state. Rather, the encouragement of self-help initiatives in civil society 
reduces pressure on the state. By civil society structures finding their own solutions to 
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development challenges, their ‘participation’ via self-help plays into the hands of neo-
liberalism’s trend of “shrinking state responsibilities” (Cornwall & Coelho 2007: 5). 
Chapter One of this thesis argued that there is no clearly articulated theory of participatory 
democracy within the ANC historically. The opening to this conclusion also contended that 
that a singular, standardised conception cannot be identified from examination of its ideas 
and practice. What can be detected however is, firstly, that multiple ideas and conceptions 
of the role for ‘the people’ and ‘participation’ have fed into post-1994 policy. Secondly, 
there are two distinct but parallel discourses of participatory democracy in the post-1994 
period: one contained within public policy and the other in the commentary of the ANC.  
The final chapter of the thesis explored the latter of these, examining the ANC’s 
understanding of participatory democracy as expressed in its own discussion documents, 
publications, speeches and commentary. In contrast to the variety of influences on public 
policy development, the ANC’s ‘movement’ discourse draws far more heavily on its 
liberation heritage. Here, the concept of vanguardism, prominent within the ANC during its 
years in exile and in the discourse of people’s power, continues to inform the movement’s 
understanding of popular participation. Vanguardism, and the relationship between people 
and movement it implies, is a fundamental characteristic of the ANC’s identity, both 
historically and today.  
One of the key emphases of this thesis is the ANC’s relationship with the people. As both a 
movement and political party, its identity must be understood through the lens of historic 
struggle and ideological tradition. Discussion of the ANC’s ideological history in Chapter Two 
identified the emergence of vanguardism - a strand born from the growing influence of 
Marxism-Leninism but also complemented by existing nationalist sentiments involving 
popular conscientisation and the role of a dedicated leadership. This was then developed in 
Chapter Three through examination of the conceptual relationship between vanguardism 
and people’s power. Chapters Four and Six then showed how vanguardism has remained a 
conceptual current in ANC discourse, experiencing a revival in the movement since 1994. 
Vanguardism thus remains relevant not only to the ANC’s history as a liberation movement 
but to its ongoing role as a governing party. The ANC today continues to identify itself as a 
‘vanguard’. What Chapter Six brought to the fore are the implications of vanguardism for 
participatory democracy in the context of a democratic state. 
The very premise of vanguardism is the need for a dedicated movement or party able to 
give ideological, moral and intellectual leadership through a process of conscientisation in 
which the people themselves come not only to see the vanguard’s revolutionary objectives 
as in their best interest but also see leadership by that vanguard as essential for those 
interests to be secured. Vanguardism implies a fundamental connection between the 
people’s needs as a collective and the leadership of their vanguard organisation.  
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Secondly, and importantly, an active role for the people is critical to both the endurance of 
vanguardism itself and to the continuation of the revolution. In the ANC’s case, this is the 
NDR, no matter how ambiguous its contemporary relevance and objectives. Thus while the 
path maybe planned for the people by the leadership, active participation remains critical. 
While the form of participation this requires may not meet normative democratic criteria, it 
is a form of participation nonetheless and, perhaps most importantly, is understood by the 
ANC as constitutive of participatory democracy. In movement discourse, the capacity in 
which citizens are envisaged as participating continues to be shaped by the concept of 
vanguardism, while ‘participation’ is linked not to greater citizen influence but to realisation 
of the NDR. Although the NDR may well constitute a cover for neo-liberal policy, this thesis 
has contended that the NDR’s utility and resilience cannot be ignored. The ANC continues to 
use a language of liberation and national democracy for the retention of its own hegemony. 
Reflecting on these ideas and the form of ‘participation’ they imply, Chapter Six highlighted 
the conceptual tension between the discourse of participation in public policy and the 
discourse from the ANC as a movement. On the one hand, those strands of people’s power 
embedded in ideas of community organising, education, empowerment and development 
remain visible in government policy, attesting to the influence of the ANC-aligned 
movement in shaping a policy framework that takes account of local experience. The thesis 
noted that members of the ANC camp, especially those involved in the UDF, civics and trade 
unions, were involved in the policy formulation process around local government. As such, 
theoretical linkages and overlaps can be identified.  
However, it is perhaps precisely the predominance of actors from the MDM (rather than the 
central ANC leadership or its external mission) that helps to explain some of the conceptual 
tension between policy and movement discourse. In the latter, not only are new theoretical 
influences such as international development, planning and governance absent, but 
traditions from the ANC camp’s own heritage - of education, empowerment and democratic 
grassroots control - also do not feature. In the ANC’s discourse of participatory democracy 
today, the surviving strands of people’s power are those rooted in vanguardism, speaking 
most clearly to the ANC’s ideological heritage in Marxism-Leninism and to a teleological 
conception of participation. 
As such, while South Africa’s policy on participatory democracy is not free from internal 
tension (between the demands of efficiency and performance and the commitment to 
bottom-up participation), it nonetheless remains firmly a function of democratic 
governance, involving the engagement in decision-making processes of a pluralistic civil 
society. Moreover, while much more may need to be done to redress the internal tensions 
in policy imperatives, the framework still draws on a democratic discourse that seeks both a 
democracy that is developmental and a citizenry that is active and empowered.  
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The risk to participatory democracy in South Africa is this: the discourse of participation 
emerging from the ANC itself risks undermining the parallel discourse contained in public 
policy. The ANC equates democratic participation with mass mobilisation and links the 
objectives of participatory democratic structures with the realisation of the NDR and the 
extension of its own hegemony. In public policy, however, legislated structures for 
participatory democratic governance are intended to provide forums and mechanisms for 
influence by a politically pluralistic society. As such the revolutionary (or national 
democratic) objectives of the ANC-as-movement trump the democratic policy objective of 
achieving popular empowerment.  
Current weaknesses in the realisation of participatory democracy can be explained in part 
by this discord. Its roots, however, also lay in the conceptual tensions within people’s power 
which themselves remained unresolved by the end of the 1980s. The strands of people’s 
power that placed value in local democratic control have lost out in the post-1994 era to a 
form of people’s power in which participation can only be realised through the structures of 
the vanguard. Civil society must be independent yet loyal, while the conflation of 
revolutionary policy with the popular democratic will undermines the objectives of citizen 
agency and influence set out in public policy. 
Examination of participatory democracy in the discourses of policy and movement also draw 
attention to another weakness in the theory. This time, however, its source is a conceptual 
parallel, in which the question of macro-level policy frameworks, in both policy and 
movement discourses alike, are protected from democratic contestation. In South Africa, 
participatory democracy is located primarily in the local government arena. The post-1994 
shift toward a more technocratic approach to local government has removed from popular 
contestation the direction of broader economic and development policy. As such, although 
South Africans can participate in development at the local level, they lack influence and 
power over the policy agenda itself. Processes of participation that take place from the 
grassroots upwards collide with the simultaneous imperatives of controlling policy at the 
centre, enlisting the help of experts and raising performance and efficiency.  
Looking in parallel at the vanguard discourse of the ANC, it is possible to see how the notion 
of ‘weak’ participation embodied in this technocratic approach has enabled the 
simultaneous continuation of vanguardism which also removes from the sphere of 
contestation the ANC’s programme of NDR. Through the requirements of a hegemonic 
unity, the ability of citizens to contest the ideas of government is effectively removed. Policy 
and movement discourse similarly draw on the idea of state-society partnership. However 
the restriction of citizen influence to issues that do not challenge broader policy has ensured 
that partnerships are framed as public support for government programmes or are equated 
with the resurrection of self-help traditions in which citizens further their own development 
rather than waiting for government to deliver. Despite differences in their ideological 
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premise both the ‘performance’ and ‘vanguard’ discourses facilitate a narrow form of 
participation. 
This thesis has undertaken an exercise in normative democratic theory. However it has also 
sought to identify the conceptual underpinnings of the ANC’s own theory of participatory 
democracy. It so doing, it has drawn a causal linkage between ideas and practice, seeking to 
show how the way participatory democracy is understood by policy makers and the ruling 
party can help to explain its weaknesses in practice. It was acknowledged in Chapter One 
that a range of research analysing specific mechanisms for participatory democracy, such as 
ward committees and IDP, has already been produced. This has pointed to a number of the 
difficulties facing municipalities in the implementation of ward participation. Challenges 
identified include issues such as limited resources, inadequate civic education, insufficient 
municipal capacity and logistical difficulties. Party political influence over ward committees 
has also been acknowledged as presenting a challenge, not only to the incorporation of 
other interests in the ward but also to ensuring that councillors are accountable to their 
constituents rather than the party.   
‘Ideas’ are thus not the only factor influencing successful policy implementation. Individuals 
and parties are also influenced by their own interests and it would be unrealistic, perhaps 
naïve, to suggest that all action is theoretically driven. The range and depth of ideological 
and conceptual influence featured in ANC discourse, however, suggests that ideas have 
historically played an important function. The adoption of revolutionary theory after 1960 
and the linking of its strategy and tactics to theoretical frameworks of African Nationalism, 
Marxism-Leninism and NDR imply the influence of ideas.  
Throughout the 1980s the ANC and UDF produced a number of theoretical publications. 
Even where discussion was not necessarily focused on the form of a future democratic 
state, activists and cadres drew on theoretical frameworks and the influence of 
international revolutionary experience. The UDF’s theoretical journal, Isizwe often 
complemented its articles with questions for further discussion by its readers and affiliate 
organisations. The ANC’s Department of Political Education played a prominent role in exile 
and much of the material included in its syllabuses and lectures related to the very ideas 
developed and espoused in the movement’s key documents. Moreover, as Chapter Three 
noted, while some theoretical influences can be attributed to particular intellectuals and 
ideologues, their ideas filtered through parts of the movement and also shaped official 
discourse. 
It is also clear that theory did not guide all participants equally. As Suttner noted in 
reference to people’s power, for some people “it would be just a practical thing” (Interview: 
25 October 2012). However, whether or not actions were guided by theory from the outset, 
it is possible to argue that much of the organisational work undertaken by activists and local 
structures themselves generated principles and models for further action. 
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There are, of course, limitations to this research. It has not been possible to examine more 
fully the ideas and conceptions of ordinary community members who joined or were caught 
up in local popular activity. It is also not possible to elicit the views of everybody involved in 
people’s power activity, nor in the processes of formulating ideas and developing policy. 
However the research has tried to draw on insights from across the liberation movement, 
and has incorporated the views and accounts of those in a variety of roles: in exile, at 
headquarters, at home, in the trade unions, in community structures and NGOs, and in the 
ANC underground. 
In some instances, the research covered more detail of local cases than in others. The 
example of Alexandra was referred to frequently in discussing people’s power. When 
looking that the transitional period, the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber in 
Johannesburg was highlighted as the leading example of the local government negotiations 
in which civics and local authorities agreed interim arrangements for the provision of 
services. The thesis has not, however, provided an analysis of a particular organisation or 
locale in its entirety. This is precisely for the reason that its primary concern is the study of 
ideas. Although existing research has provided accounts of people’s power in particular 
locations, as well as examining more broadly the different interpretations of what was 
taking place, there has been no interrogation to date of the theory of people’s power as 
part of a broader trajectory of ANC democratic thought. This thesis has therefore made 
that contribution by linking together the study of ideas from the 1980s into the post-1994 
period, enabling a far more complete picture of how the ANC understands a form of 
democracy to which it frequently refers but of which it has given little articulation.   
Our existing understanding of participatory democracy has been missing an examination of 
theoretical and conceptual continuities and discontinuities between the 1980s and the 
present. This thesis has challenged both the view that the democratic traditions of the 
1980s have been forgotten entirely, and that the post-1994 model of democracy in South 
Africa is wholly unrelated to that prefigured by people’s power. It has also sought to avoid a 
rose-tinted account of what people’s power entailed. Rather, it has highlighted the variety 
of currents, traditions and influences that fed into what was a complex and nuanced 
discourse.  
In so doing, the thesis has made two important points: Firstly, democratic ideas and models 
during times of struggle can tell us something about the forms that then emerge under 
conditions of democracy. The model of democracy espoused in the 1980s is not entirely 
unconnected to the post-1994 dispensation. Far from the conceptual influence of people’s 
power coming to an abrupt end in 1994, or even in 1990, ideas and traditions from that time 
have been fed into policy formulation. Many of those involved in the labour movement, 
civic activism and UDF leadership carried their values and ideals with them into the new 
local government model. Ideas of community organisation, citizen empowerment, 
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participatory development and the educative benefits of democracy can be identified in the 
post-1994 policy framework. What has been included, and was absent during the 1980s, is a 
language of constitutionalism and rights. Through this addition, popular participation has 
been un-bounded such that public policy has delinked participation from political 
partisanship and situated it instead within a broader democratic framework of political 
pluralism and individual civil and political rights.  
Secondly, it has challenged the idea that people’s power in itself represented a thoroughly 
democratic model for the future; and, had its pre-figurative character been realised, that it 
would have guaranteed a model of democracy superior to that which exists in South Africa 
today. People’s power was shaped and guided by a multiplicity of ideas, not all of which sat 
comfortably with one another. Aspects of the discourse rooted themselves in democratic 
ideals and local experiences. Many were shaped by their participants’ own ideas and beliefs 
while some responded to existing theoretical frameworks and others to immediate material 
concerns.  
Most importantly, however, people’s power constituted a web of interlinking themes, none 
of which can be considered in conceptual isolation. Rather, they formed a part of the whole. 
Some strands of the discourse rooted themselves in ideas about empowerment, 
decentralised control, resolving shared problems and bottom-up decision-making. Others, 
however, were not premised on such democratic ideals or, if they were, they allowed for 
local influence and control only where it conformed to broader political objectives.  
Chapter three highlighted that, although the UDF and civics saw themselves as establishing 
structures of local democratic decision-making, what they practiced was a bounded and 
unitary form of democracy. Organs of people’s power were predominantly aligned to the 
ANC. Even where structures were open to all residents, the subtext remained that 
participants should agree with the ultimate objectives of political struggle. The idea of 
individual rights and a pluralistic parliamentary-style democracy were considered by many 
in the UDF to be features of bourgeois democracy. Whether or not they were democratically 
constituted and locally controlled, organs of people’s power themselves served a largely 
teleological function. 
Moreover we cannot be selective in our conceptual analysis of people’s power. Across the 
ANC-aligned movement, people had different interpretations of its role and future. We must 
therefore resist the urge to overlook those aspects rooted in traditions that undermined or 
openly sought to eliminate democratic principles and practice. Currents which placed 
emphasis on vanguard leadership, on the conscientisation of the masses, and on active 
participation of the people were ideas also rooted in Marxist-Leninist theory. As such, while 
we can agree that elements of the people’s power discourse held democratic process in 
very high regard and emphasised the developmental benefits of democracy, not just the 
objective of seizing power, we must also accept that the people’s power constituted other 
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conceptual threads which included the direction of a vanguard leadership and the belief in 
a foretold will. 
For those who see participatory democracy as a feature of the past, now lost to a liberal 
democratic framework, attention should be paid to its conceptual foundations.  Not only did 
the form of democracy espoused by people’s power lack certain key democratic features 
but the democracy espoused in ANC discourse today retains a number of its characteristics. 
The teleological nature of participation, the push for a hegemonic unity, and the parallel 
desire for both political control from above and creative participation from below can be 
identified in people’s power. 
 Participatory democracy remains central to the ANC’s governance programme and the 
movement continues to reiterate this in its documents, statements and at party 
conferences. It may not meet normative democratic criteria, nor may it draw on those 
strands of people’s power that those in the MDM might have hoped. It remains, 
nonetheless, a conception of participatory democracy whose weaknesses can be found in its 
intellectual and ideological heritage.  
In conducting this research, extensive used was made of archival sources and interviews. It 
was set out in Chapter One that the primary research method was the analysis of texts. The 
thesis has referred to a variety of ANC, UDF, SACP and MDM documents. Some of these are 
well known and/or published, while others are less frequently cited but are publicly 
available. However, the thesis also uncovered a range of archived material from the UDF 
and ANC that are not referred to in existing academic research. Thematic analysis of the 
1980s, covered in Chapter Three, and of the period of intra-ANC constitutional discussion, 
covered in Chapter Four, has drawn on a series of materials previously uncited in accounts 
of this period.  
It was also noted in Chapter Four that the work of the ANC’s Constitution Committee, has, 
according to this author, been given insufficient attention in existing research. This is 
perhaps a consequence of the Committee’s discussions taking place in a rather isolated 
manner. The proposals and reports of the Committee seem to have been shared with the 
NWC and its sub-committees but not much more widely than that. The first published 
document circulated through the broader movement seems to have been the 1988 Draft 
Constitutional Guidelines. Although interviews with activists suggest that concerns were 
surfacing in the UDF at that time about the authoritarianism of revolutionary movements in 
Eastern Europe and Africa, evidence suggests that the Committee’s elevation of a rights-
based discourse was not representative of the broader movement.  
However, it is precisely for this reason that its ideas require interrogation. The formulations 
and proposals of the Committee bear little resemblance to the discourse of democracy in 
the broader ANC. They reflected neither the radical democratic tone of people’s power, nor 
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the African nationalist, Marxist-Leninist inspired language of the ANC’s own documents. It 
was the thinking of the Constitution Committee, however, that from 1990 became the 
official discourse of the ANC in its constitutional proposals for a democratic South Africa. 
The very fact that it was not a discourse that emerged organically from the ANC as a whole, 
nor was it immediately embraced by the ANC camp, goes some way to explaining the 
endurance of the vanguard discourse into the post-1994 era. 
Analysis of primary documents for this research was accompanied by interviews with 
activists involved in people’s power and in the external mission of the ANC, as well as with 
those who played a part in the process of formulating policy on participatory democracy. 
Given the passing of time between the 1980s and today, interviews were intended to 
supplement document analysis and, indeed, they did. However they also provided an 
extraordinary amount of insight into the development of thinking that has otherwise been 
undocumented.  
Interviews were also undertaken with individuals not immediately identifiable from existing 
records and data but who played a key role in the development of ideas or were present at 
points what particular conceptual shifts or clarifications took place. Neil Coleman, for 
example appears to have played an important role in theorisations alongside more visible 
theorists such as Raymond Suttner and Jeremy Cronin. Janet Cherry was involved in local 
activism in Cape Town and Port Elizabeth but also undertook her own academic research on 
people’s power in the Eastern Cape. Sydney Mufamadi, Thozamile Botha, Lechesa Tsenoli 
and Paul Mashatile were activists during the 1980s but also went on to play roles in local or 
provincial government.111 Z.N. Jobodwana, was Secretary of the Constitution Committee, 
while Dominique Woodridge, who had been working with trade unions in a support 
capacity, headed the editorial team for the Local Government White Paper.   
Similarly, while interviews have previously been undertaken with officials responsible for 
implementing participatory democracy, there has been little reflective analysis through 
interviews with those who also participated in policy development. Individuals such as 
Rashid Seedat, Andrew Boraine and Yunus Carrim were part of the conceptual discussion 
around the future of local government while also going on to be involved in its practice.112 
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 Sydney Mufumadi was Transvaal Secretary of the UDF, a member of the ANC underground, and a founding 
member of COSATU. Between 1999 and 2008 he was Minister in the DPLG. Thozamile Botha, a former civic 
activist, was involved in the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber, headed the local government arm 
of SANCO, and became Chair of the Commission on Provincial Government. Paul Mashatile was a leader of 
AYCO and the UDF and later became an MEC in Gauteng. Lechesa Tsenoli was a civic activist, a founder 
member of SANCO, was involved in the NLGNF and the Local Government White Paper process and chaired 
the portfolio committee on CoGTA. 
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 Part way through the drafting of the Local Government White Paper, Andrew Boraine left to work for the 
City of Cape Town. Rashid Seedat who, for a period, worked at Planact undertaking research on the new local 
government model, later headed the strategy unit responsible for IDP in the City of Joburg. Yunus Carrim, a 
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The people interviewed and the periods of time across which they provided insight enabled 
valuable data to be gathered on the evolution, or genealogy, of ideas. Interviews also 
provided new insights into undocumented discussions and the origins of certain ideas and 
mechanisms, such as the local government ward committee. 
Although this thesis did not set out a specific cut-off date, its post-1994 analysis is primarily 
concerned with the policy formulation period. Although the last piece of relevant municipal 
legislation was the 2000 Municipal Systems Act, it was noted that some ward committees 
did not begin to be established until 2004. Moreover, given the time taken for the ward 
participatory system to bed in, between 2005 and 2007, a series of guidance and support 
documents for municipalities and municipal officials were produced by the DPLG. The thesis 
therefore covered this broader period to allow for a more complete analysis of policy and 
related documents. Examination of the ANC’s own movement discourse thus also covered 
the same period. 
In is of note that, at the time of this research, the ANC’s 2012 National Policy Conference 
put the issue of participation democracy on its own renewal agenda.113 The conference 
produced a document on Organisational Renewal which, extending concerns raised at its 
previous conference in 2007, raised the issue of the ANC’s growing distance from its support 
base. It lamented the post-1994 decline in the movement’s ability to carry out “sustained 
political and ideological work”, and emphasised the need for “a dedicated machinery to 
interact with sectors dynamically” lest the movement “lose touch with key sectors of 
society” (ANC 2012a: 60). Its recognition that the space of mass mobilisation had been left 
open to alternative forces (ibid.: 18) underscored the presence of a threat to its vanguard 
status. This conference, more than any of those previously, recognised the danger posed by 
a loss of its mass character. 
Notably, a part of the ANC’s 2012 proposals for organisational renewal referred to 
“strengthening grassroots development activism and participatory democracy” (2012a: 44). 
It defines participatory democracy as “an on-going process of empowering our people to 
play an active part in the processes that affect their lives” (ibid.). However, its discussion of 
participatory democracy is not framed by public policy but by the renewal of the ANC. It 
emphasises the relevance of participation - of the masses not becoming “spectators of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
former civic activist and a member of the SACP, was involved in the Local Government White Paper process. 
He also chaired the Provincial and Local Government Portfolio Committee between 1998 and 2004 and was 
Deputy Minister in CoGTA from 2009 to 2013.  
113
 The material presented here that discusses the ANC’s 2012 ‘Organisational Renewal’ document (ANC 
2012a) draws heavily on a chapter published as a contribution to an edited book on mass parties. See Brooks 
Yung (2014).   
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government delivery” (ibid.) - but ties this to the role of ANC branches, rather than to the 
structures of participatory governance.  
The role of civil society as autonomous and pluralistic is undermined by its characterisation 
as a terrain reserved for extending ANC hegemony. While state-society partnership in the 
discourse of public policy emphasises citizens’ participation through state-invited structures, 
within the ANC’s movement discourse, participation is encouraged primarily through the 
structures of the movement. As such, while the ANC has reaffirmed the importance of 
participatory democracy, it’s positioning within a discussion of ANC organisational design 
does not augur a strengthening of participatory institutions and practice. Instead, citizens’ 
ability to shape development is limited by the claim that “communities can shape the kind 
of development they want if led by an agent for change [emphasis added]” (2012a: 44). As 
the ANC understands itself to be the “agent for change” (ibid.: 7, 23, 29), then participation 
of communities in shaping development is bound by their allegiance to the movement.  
The same document goes on to say that “[communities] can also be misled by other forces 
contesting the space to turn against the ANC”. While this is conceded to be a result of 
“social distance” and the ANC’s “absence on the ground” (ibid.: 44), there is a lack of 
recognition that people can contribute to transformation through other forces or 
representatives legitimately contesting that space. Moreover, its references to 
‘participation’ do not suggest a role for citizen influence in decision-making itself.  
It is hoped that the findings of this thesis will enable policy makers and practitioners to re-
examine the extent to which the content of participatory democratic policy enables the 
objectives set out in legislation. The findings of the thesis point to some competing policy 
imperatives between public sector efficiency on the one hand and participatory democracy 
on the other. It also highlights a conception of participation in which citizen influence is 
reduced to consultation or is fenced off from discussion of broader policy direction and 
content. Those proposing measures to target logistical and capacity constraints in local 
government may do well to consider whether civic education, increased resources and 
improved training of municipal staff will succeed in combatting challenges that are located 
in the conceptual framework itself. 
Furthermore, limitations on the realisation of participatory democracy in South Africa 
remain fundamentally linked to the discourse of the ruling party. The ANC is not only in 
power but remains electorally dominant, and it is unlikely that its influence will diminish any 
time soon. From this perspective, although policy revisions and improvements can be made, 
this will not necessarily bring about a more democratic form of participation. It is of note 
that the ANC’s acknowledgement of its fledging connection with the masses and subsequent 
launch of its ‘period of renewal’ coincided with the publication of the DPLG’s National Policy 
Framework on Public Participation (2007) and the release of a series of hand and resource 
books for municipalities and councillors implementing the ward committee system. These 
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publications contain valuable guidance on understanding the principles and benefits of 
citizen participation, as well as tips for its practical application.  
However, so long as the corresponding discourse of participation from the ANC as a 
movement links the structures of participatory governance to realising the NDR and 
renewing its own mass character, there remains no guarantee that participatory democracy 
can be realised in practice. It is the pull between these two - between vanguardism and 
participation and between democracy and teleology - that places a limit on the extent to 
which participation in South Africa can generate the democratic influence of its citizens. 
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